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This PhD proposes a method for making private law doctrine. The introduction defines 
private law, argues that the way in which private laws are dealing with new cases is 
causing them a crisis and introduces the method that jurists should follow to make private 
laws exit their crisis. The chapters of the dissertation illustrate an application of the 
method. The first step of the method is to identify a new case. Mine is the case of revoked 
(firm) promises. The second step is to criticize laws and decisions. Private laws imply 
collateral contracts, apply the reliance theory and enact special provisions to sanction the 
revocation of promises. These solutions may serve to tackle the injustice arising from 
unduly revoked promises but compromise the integrity of, respectively, contract law, the 
division freedom\obligations and private law in general. The third step of the method is 
to	  think	  of	  the	  case’s	  best	  possible	  private	  law	  form.	  I ask: If promise were to be a private 
law concept, what should that concept be? The form for promise is that of contract, tort 
and unjust enrichment. The fourth step is to construe a legal proposal. Here I construe 
promise	  as	  another	  cause	  of	  obligation.	  The	  “unilateral	  promise”,	  as	  the	  new	  concept	  is	  
called, enables judges to find an exchange of rights in certain promises and conclude their 
irrevocability. The last step is to evaluate the construction. I neutralize the arguments 
against construing promise as a (voluntary) cause of obligation and suggest that my 
proposal is better than the possible alternatives, which are revocability and regulating 
revocation as a tort. In the conclusion I show that my proposal does the work of the 
current laws of promises but without compromising the conceptual integrity of private 
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INTRODUCTORY PART: PRIVATE LAW, ITS CURRENT CRISIS AND THE PATH 
TO ITS CONTINUITY 
This PhD proposes a method for making private law. As my understanding of private law 
may no longer be considered conventional, I will dedicate the first section of this 
introduction to defining private law. In section two I will explain the circumstances that 
motivate reflection on methodology. Section three presents the method, introducing the 
six parts of my PhD. In the last section I justify the methodology. Why the proposed 
methodology and not, for example, historical jurisprudence, sociology or economy? 
IP.1. PRIVATE LAW 
Here I will be working with a tri-dimensional understanding of private law.1 To introduce 
you to this epistemological stance, let me first give you a glimpse of a tri-dimensional 
interpretation.  
To the trialist, almost every sensible reality is susceptible to understanding, and 
understanding a sensible reality involves being able to account for it in terms of an 
intelligible reality. Take the example of the reality you are now confronted with. It is by 
virtue of the intelligible reality called “scholarly	  paper”	  that	  you	  are	  able	  to	  first,	  isolate	  
the written text from its background and second, approach it with the intention of 
discerning the claims and arguments that are hereby exposed. In this example, the 
sensible reality is the piece of paper over which the black letterforms are displayed. You 
could leave this piece in a stack of other pieces of paper just like it and interpret the pile 
as a library, or you could separate it from the rest and, to the dismay of its author, identify 
it as the combustible needed to set barbeque coals alight. Sensible realities are susceptible 
to multiple understandings, and the soundness or unsoundness of an account or 
interpretation depends on the relation between the sensible reality and the intelligible 
reality. Your friend will applaud your resourcefulness if you point to these papers to start 
the fire with, but burst out laughing if she sees you twisting them into cones to serve 
drinks in. 
                                                        
1 For a trialist theory of law see Werner Goldschmidt, Introducción	  filosófica	  al	  Derecho: La	  teoría	  trialista	  
del	  mundo	  jurídico	  y	  sus	  horizontes, 6th ed., Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1987. The	  name	  “trialism”	  comes	  
from	   Miguel	   Reale,	   “Fundamentos	   da	   concepção	   tridimensional	   do	   Dirito,”	   in	   Revista Brasileira de 




So far	  we	  have	  the	  “real,	  material	  or	  sensible	  dimension”	  and	  the	  “cultural,	  conceptual	  or	  
intelligible	  dimension.”	  What	  about	  the	  third	  dimension,	  what	  is	  the	  third	  element	  of	  the	  
triad?  
The	  “ideal	  or	  formal	  dimension”	  is	  the	  perspective	  from	  which	  you	  can	  render a reality 
intelligible. We said that what makes what you are reading now intelligible is the concept 
of “scholarly	  paper,” but	  on	  its	  own,	  “scholarly	  paper”	  means	  nothing.	  “Scholarly	  paper”	  
acquires intelligibility, and serves as a specific interpretative tool because of concepts like 
“scientific	   journal,”	   “scholar,”	   “school	   of	   thought,”	   etc.	   etc.	   You	   will	   be	   able	   to	   give	  
complete sense to the examined reality only if you approach it, albeit unconsciously, with 
notions	  relatable	  to	  “scholarly	  paper;”	  in other words, with notions that form the world 
of	  academia.	  The	  ideal	  dimension	  of	  our	  present	  example,	  what	  makes	  “scholarly	  paper”	  
an interpretative tool, is the idea of “Academy.”2 
As we will see in this section, private law has three dimensions too: the cultural 
dimension, or private law itself; the material dimension, or the relations to which it makes 
sense to apply the private law concepts, rules and principles; and the ideal dimension, 
that abstract, but well-defined form which, if you are told of, and taught to appreciate, you 
can find traversing both the cultural and living private law. 
IP.1.1. JUSTICE: THE FORM OF PRIVATE LAW 
I need to say six things about the justice of private law. Explain the circumstances in which 
it generally appears, how humans make it theirs, define it, elaborate a little on it, analyze 
it, and parse it. So let me begin: 
Justice manifests itself in environments populated by comparable egoists. 3 Comparable 
egoists? Egoists are purposive beings; they have the capacity to imagine purposes, and 
bodies to execute those purposes. But not only that; they are egoists. The purposes they 
pursue are for the satisfaction of their own needs and interests, they never act out of love. 
Now, egoists are comparable when they are in a position to compete. When they have 
comparable creativity, physical strength, and entitlement. So, for example, Argentina, the 
nation-state, and Jorge Soros, the American billionaire, can be deemed comparable 
egoists. Transnationally, they treat each other as actors acting each in his or its own 
                                                        
2  Academia,	   according	   to	   one	   conception	   of	   it,	   is	   “an	   institution	   devoted to caring for the intellectual 
inheritance—the stock of ideas, images, beliefs, skills and modes of thinking—that compose the world’s	  
civilization.”	  Ernest	  Weinrib, Corrective Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 297. 
3 This paragraph is inspired	  by	  a	  section	  (“The	  emergence	  of	  a	  legal	  order”)	  in	  Roberto	  Mangabeira	  Unger,	  





interest. And, even though one is a state and the other a private person, they are in a 
position to compete: Argentina could need something from Soros that it cannot take 
against	  his	  will,	  while	  an	  act	  of	  Jorge’s	  could	  shake	  Argentina’s	  stability. 
The occasion for justice is the encounter, willed or forced by the circumstances, of two 
comparable	  egoists.	  They	  say	  to	  each	  other,	  “I	  know	  that	  our	  interests	  differ.	  But	  we	  know	  
that if each of us pursues her interests without consideration of the other, the other will 
have difficulty doing	  what	  she	  wants.	  So,	  why	  don’t	  we	  establish	  rules	  between	  us	  so	  we	  
can	  act	  freely	  without	  bothering	  each	  other?”	  Given	  the	  latent	  possibility	  of	  conflict,	  the	  
absence of coordination and/or sought benefits of cooperation, these individuals decide 
to enter a juridical state of affairs. They relinquish part of their factual potential power to 
acquire a normative potential power or right, by which one can do whatever one desires 
in	  so	  far	  as	  one’s	  deed	  does	  not	  impede	  the	  other’s	  exercise	  of	  her	  own	  right. 4  
Justice in private law, put succinctly, is the rule of equal freedom. Each comparable egoist 
must recognize in the other an equal share of freedom. 
True, the rule of equal freedom is very abstract. But the parties of the original transaction 
fulfill it or render it applicable. “Respect	  the	  integrity	  of	  my	  body	  if	  you	  want	  me	  to	  respect	  
yours.”	  “Accept	  that	  I	  take	  things	  as	  mine,	  and	  I	  will	  do	  the	  same	  for	  you.”	  	  “Let	  me	  make	  
you offers, I will tolerate	   yours;”	   and	   so	   on.	   These	   are	   real-life interests regulated in 
conformity with justice, norms which parties make on the basis of their indigenous beliefs 
and interests or, as commonly happens, import from elsewhere, like a book of private law. 
Yet there is something very important in the formality or purity of justice. Where private 
life has been comprehensively ordered, if someone refuses to accept the status quo, she 
can appeal to her right to equal freedom. She can, referring to the original transaction, say, 
                                                        
4 The original transaction is not hypothetical, as is the case for Rousseau’s	  social	  contract.	  It	  is	  implicit	  in	  
every private law transaction. Whenever two individuals meet to conclude a contract, they are 
recognizing each other as capable of assuming liability and as owners of certain transferable things. 
Why? Well, because the concept of contract presupposes or necessitates those notions (see 4.1.3.1). For 
example, when Argentina sends a letter to Jorge Soros, asking him if he will loan her a sum, Argentina is 
saying to Soros, “You	  have	  things	  I	  want and cannot take from you against	  your	  will.”	  And	  also, “You are 
able to engage with me	  contractually.”	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  see	  you	  as	  someone	  with	  rights	  over things and 
a capacity to contract obligations. Argentina is recognizing Soros as something like a nineteenth century 
private law persona.  
Even more interesting are the implications of an original transaction for third parties. It is a proven fact that 
private persons achieve international relevance by effectuating transactions with well-established 
international actors. Once again, in receiving money from a private person, Argentina is recognizing him 
or her as an international private law persona. From then on other international players will recognize 
him or her as Argentina has. The thrilling question then arises: Should other international actors impute 
international law obligations to private persons on the grounds that they have been dealing with bearers 




for	  example,	  “Look,	  what	  we	  recognized	   in each other was equality of freedom, not the 
infinite ability to acquire things. I want to revise the latter authorization, for you have 
acquired so many things that I cannot acquire even the basics for myself.” 
To facilitate its understanding and application, philosophers have analyzed and parsed 
the rule of equal freedom. An analysis of the rule consists of making the rule say more 
without rendering it applicable. Kant teaches us two authorizations that are already 
involved	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  equal	  freedom.	  The	  first	  says:	  “[I]ndependence	  from	  being	  bound	  
by	  others	  to	  more	  than	  one	  can	  in	  turn	  bind	  them.”5 Obviously, if I am free to the extent 
that	  you	  are,	  I	  couldn’t	  consistently	  say	  to	  you:	  “See	  those	  things there? Well, only I will 
be	   able	   to	  make	   them	  mine.	   You	  will	   only	   be	   bound	   to	   respect	  my	   acquisitions.”	   The	  
second	  says:	  All	  are	  “authorized	  to	  do	  to	  others	  anything	  that	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  diminish	  
what	   is	   theirs.”6 This authorization is a bit more distant than the previous one, yet it 
follows analytically from the right of equal freedom: if we have established the principle 
of justice to secure a space for ourselves, it was not to isolate us, one from the other, but 
to permit pacific interaction. And interaction	  presupposes,	  as	  Kant	  says,	  “such	  things	  as	  
merely	  communicating	  our	  thoughts	  to	  others,	  telling	  or	  promising	  them	  something.”7 
What about partition? The division of justice consists of saying what a putative application 
of justice must have, in order for it not to be dismissed without discussion. Stammler gives 
an	  example	  of	  partition	  when	  he	  talks	  about	  “the	  fundamental	  legal	  concepts.”8 I would 
say that three are the parts into which the rule of equal freedom must be divided: First, 
there is the idea of a bearer of freedom, an entity with the intelligence and strength to 
realize its purposes. Second, there is the idea of object. This is everything that is devoid of 
freedom,	  and	  can	  be	  put	  into	  service	  for	  someone’s	  purpose.	  (You	  are	  not	  an	  object, for if 
I do what I want with you without your authorization, I hinder your freedom). Third, there 
is freedom properly understood. The idea of the possibility of doing this or that, as we 
wish, while others respect our doing so—we imagine freedom as the province of the will, 
a space where a will can act without the reproach of another will.  
  
                                                        
5 Immanuel Kant, “The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,”	  (Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  translation),	  in	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  (ed.),	  Practical 
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, n. 6:237-8, pp. 393-4. 
6 Idem. 
7 Idem. 
8 Rudolf Stammler, Tratado	  de	  Filosofía	  del	  Derecho, Wenseslao Roces translation, Reus, Madrid, 2007, p. 




IP.1.2. PRIVATE LAW IS LIFE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JUSTICE 
The form of private law is purely conceptual. We cannot physically touch free will, we 
have no immediate images of objects devoid of will, nor do we see the spaces where wills 
unfold themselves freely. These are purely conceptual ideas in the sense that they have 
no immediate correlation to the world of our senses. Yet they can, and actually are there 
to be related to sensible realities. Indeed, this is the office of private law—to account for 
reality in terms of justice. 9 
Take	  what	  the	  German	  Civil	  Code	  called	  “Person.”	  This	  is	  the	  flesh-and-blood adult human, 
conceived as someone who acts according to her desires.10 This is somebody to whom 
deeds, and the consequences that an impartial observer could reasonably attach to them, 
are linked by virtue of her choosing to do the things she did. The person can thus respond, 
where someone else imputes to her a deed or fact, and demand of others authorship 
recognition. Now take	  what	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code	  called	  “biens.”	  These	  are	  the	  objects	  that	  
are not persons, but have a natural or conventional entity.11 Land, work tools, and water 
have natural or corporeal entity because they would be there, among us, even if we 
ignored them. Titles, credits, and servitudes have conventional entity in that, for them to 
exist, we needed to imagine and talk about them. A credit right would not exist if we had 
never made a contract, and in order to make a contract, we need to know what a credit or 
future	  performance	  is,	  and	  talk	  about	  it.	  The	  English	  translation	  of	  “biens”	  is	  “goods,”	  but	  
I	  prefer	  the	  word	  “things.” 
We have brought life to the categories of free will and objects devoid of will. What about 
juridical freedom? Private law describes the significance of freedom within what we call 
“legal	  relations.”12 I will present a basic legal relation in a dialog of two persons making 
law. This fictional dialogue implements a tool that I will use throughout this work—the 
                                                        
9 In a similar sense: “The	  point	  for	  private	   law	  is	  to	   trace	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  dominiums	  of	  the	  wills	  of	  the	  
cohabiting individuals, to determine within which circles the will of an individual must be decisive for 
the individuals that stand in front. Private law attains it with the emanation of commands and 
prohibitions—imperative	  and	  prohibitive.” Bernhard Windscheid, Diritto delle pandette, Carlo Fadda 
and Paolo Emilio Bensa translation, UTET, Torino,	  1902,	  §27,	  p.	  80. 
10 §	  1	  of	  the	  German	  Civil	  Code	  speaks	  of	  “legal	  capacity.”	  The	  German	  Civil	  Code	  went	  further	  to	  state	  clearly	  
that	  persons	  could	  also	  be	  “legal.”	  Book	  1,	  Division	  1,	  Title	  2	  says “Legal	  persons”	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
“Natural	  persons”	  of	  Title	  1). The concept of legal person enables us to see free will in organisms that 
have decision-making procedures, and agents, and resources to execute plans.  
11 "Le	  mot	  "biens"	  comprend	  donc,	  outre	  les	  choses	  matérielles,	  un	  certain	  nombre	  de	  biens incorporels, qui 
sont	   des	   droits,	   comme	   les	   créances,	   les	   rentes,	   les	   offices,	   les	   brevets,	   etc." Marcel Planiol, Traité	  
élémentaire	  de	  droit	  civil, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, Paris, 1928-1932, n. 2171, p. 708. 
12 See various types of legal relations in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions 




common-sense device. Clearly, private law is not only the law of equal freedom, but also 
the law of private actors. In other words, private persons are those who fulfill their equal 
freedom. The jurist may not work in a congress and still wish to develop private law. How 
to do it then? By fulfilling equal freedom as a reasonable person would. This is important 
to elaborate. As the jurist will not conduce a survey of what persons want the law to be in 
this or that case, the jurist picks what she believes it is the common sense. I advance my 
proposal	  in	  X	  sense	  rather	  than	  in	  Y	  because	  I	  think	  that	  the	  rule	  “everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  
do	  X”	  will	  actualize what you, she and he want. Or maybe I choose one of two competing 
alternatives and put it in a way that, even if it is not the prevailing common sense, its pros 
are emphasized to such a degree, and its cons are so little mentioned, that it appears to be 
the reasonable option. The following example is somewhat of an exaggeration, however 
it will support our exploration of the subsequent point. 
One	  will	  say,	  “Sure,	  you	  are	  free	  and	  I	  am	  free,	  we	  can	  each	  do	  as	  we	  like within our equal 
freedom. But, in order to do as we like, we need certain objects,	  those	  things	  we’ve	  talked	  
about. To start with, we need to breathe, drink, eat and sleep. Sometimes air, food, water, 
and	  space	  abound,	  and	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  talk	  about	  them.	  At other times however they are 
lacking, and we still need them. So, let us make a rule that allows us to appropriate those 
things,	  to	  make	  them	  ours	  through	  consumption;	  the	  other	  will	  not	  oppose.”	  “Oh,	  right!”	  
The	  other	  will	  answer,	  “But	  that’s	  not	  the	  end	  of	  it.”	  She	  will	  say,	  “I,	  like	  you,	  need	  to	  breath,	  
eat	   and	  drink,	   and	   sleep.	  But,	   I	   don’t	  want	   to	   sleep	  one	  night	  here, and another night 
there—I want a reliable place to rest. The same for my	  clothing:	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  obliged	  
to keep my cloak always on my body to exclude you from using it—I want to be able to 
leave it, and come back and find it waiting for me. So, let us make a rule by which I, like 
you, am allowed to take things for myself, and you, like I, will recognize and respect that 
act. I know that by making X thing mine, I am making it impossible for you to make it 
yours. In this sense, I am limiting your freedom without your assent. But, insofar as you 
can still develop freely, that you can still make use of the same authorization to 
appropriate things, you cannot say that I hinder your freedom. For, even if you cannot 
appropriate X1, you can still appropriate X2, which is of the same kind. So, let us accept 
the	  possibility	  of	  appropriation	  acts.” 
This fictional dialogue made a piece of private law, a set of declarations arranging a 
present-day exigency in just terms. I want to highlight the aspects that indicate that my 
proposal is a piece of private law. The first and most obvious indication is surely the words 
I	  chose	  to	  use.	  I	  spoke	  of	  “authorization,”	  “freedom,”	  “appropriation,”	  and	  “exclusion.”	  I	  
could	  have	  spoken	  of	  “the	  capacity	  to	  acquire	  things	  and	  rights over	  things.”	  These	  words,	  




interpretation. Certain signs partake of the aesthetics of private law—the most immediate 
and indicative sign that what one is confronted with is a piece of private law.13   
The second indication that my proposal is a piece of private law lies in the fact that the 
proposal concerns an issue in contemporary society. Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth century 
jurist, used the Roman law idea of res communes omnium to say that there are things that, 
owing to their infinitude or inapprehensible nature, cannot but belong to all. Since I 
cannot exclude you from navigating the sea or consuming air, things like the water of the 
sea and the air around us are not appropriable, are inapt to be owned, Grotius argued. 14 
Today, this argument cannot be made. By throwing its waste into the atmosphere, an 
industry prevents me from breathing, factually excludes me from consuming air. It is 
appropriate, then, for law to tackle issues like the scarcity of water, air, land, and other 
basic	  human	  needs.	  That’s	  why	  you	  can	  see	  my	  proposal	  as	  a	  law—it addresses a social 
issue people are concerned about and are debating. 
Thirdly, my proposal is a piece of private law because the value it seeks to specify is the 
rule of equal freedom. These fictional egoists did not sit down to discuss the most efficient 
way of distributing and using available resources, or to remind each other of how their 
grandparents used to deal with scarcity; nor did one individual use her intelligence 
and/or force to overpower the other. They met to agree that they should have equal 
access to basic resources and ownership of things. The idea grounding these 
arrangements was the justice of private law: I got it because you got it.15   
                                                        
13 I	  take	  the	  words	  “law	  words”	  from	  Albert	  Kocourek,	  Jural Relations, MacMillan, Indianapolis, 1927, p. 25. 
See 4.3.2.4.(e)1. 
14 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, Ralph Van Deman Magoffin translation, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1916, Chapter 5. See the very educative passage of Justinian, Institutes, 2.1.  
15 The private law theorist may be concerned	  by	   the	  many	  times	   I’ve	  used	  the	   term	  “need.”	   Indeed,	  our	  
fictional	  persons	  justified	  their	  authorization,	  saying:	  “I	  need	  to	  breath,	  eat	  and	  drink,	  and	  sleep”.	  And,	  I	  
admit,	  considerations	  of	  need	  (“does	  she	  need	  it?”),	  like	  considerations	  of	  merit (“does	  she	  deserve	  it?”),	  
are meaningless in private law. If private law treats us as equals, it is because it assumes that we all share 
(only!) one thing—the freedom to do what we want. So it is that the questions lawyers are expected to 
make and answer are	  (if	  the	  issue	  is	  about	  someone	  who	  damaged	  something	  belonging	  to	  another)	  “did	  
she	  want	  it?”	  and	  (if	  the	  dispute	  is	  over	  to	  whom	  a	  thing	  belongs)	  “who	  wanted	  it	  first?”	  Agreed.	  But,	  I	  
must say that this point is post-developmental—it can be made when, and only when, we have private 
law.  
Lawmakers can avoid the question of origins where the institution is generally accepted. For example, Kant 
begins	  his	  treatment	  of	  property	  with	  the	  question,	  “How	  to	  have	  something	  external	  as	  one’s	  own[,]”	  
implying that	  we	  actually	  need	  or	  want	  to	  know	  how	  to	  do	  such	  thing.	  (“The Metaphysics of Morals,”	  op. 
cit., n. 6:245, p. 401.) But in moments when an institution needs revision, we have to grasp it from its 
roots. And the soundest explanation is, to my mind, that almost every important institution of private 
law—property, contract, and succession—originated in private interests or needs. (See Rudolf von 




Finally, my proposal prescribes a general standard of conduct, which is how private law 
does justice to exigencies and cases. The fictional interlocutors do not come to the idea 
that they can become owners of things by silently	  recognizing	  each	  other’s	  appropriation.	  
They prescribe, explicitly state, a law. Not only that. The law they establish is 
comprehensive enough to apply to a generality of cases, and to stay valid until the parties 
sit down to discuss, and resolve to change	   the	  binding	   law.	  They	  do	  not	   say,	   “Well,	   as	  
things stand today, I will respect your ownership over this or that object, until I change 
my	   mind.”	   Moreover,	   a	   sophisticated	   private	   law	   would	   formulate	   its	   standards	   in	  
technical modes. In my example, the general	  standard	  is	  laid	  down	  as	  a	  “declaration:”	  “I,	  
like	   you,	   can	   take	   things	   for	   myself.”	   I	   could	   have	   proposed	   a	   “norm:”	   “To	   acquire	  
property, a person must take possession of an unowned thing with the intention of being 
its	  owner.”	  It	  would	  have	  served me	  well	  to	  add	  the	  following	  “classification,”	  “The	  modes	  
of acquiring property are occupation, specification, conveyance and mortis causa 
succession.”	  We	  will	  explore	  the	  various	  private	  law	  techniques	  in	  good	  time.16 
As you can see, the juridical understanding of private law involves no sword ensuring law-
abidingness. Yet it does serve states, international organizations, transnational societies, 
and in general, organizational forms endowed with enforcement modes. It gives them the 
tools they need to elaborate law for themselves or their subjects or, to identify and import 
the concept, rule or principle they need from past or coetaneous legislations. Likewise, it 
serves scholars who want to make law proposals or comprehensive private laws, such as 
principles for international contracts or a civil code. So private law is both the set of 
concepts, norms and principles that a code or set of decisions prescribed for the relation 
of two equally free beings and also the potentialities of these legal pieces: their form, 
matter, colors and labels, the ingredients that one can mix to make unmade private law. 
IP.1.3. THE LIFE OF PRIVATE ACTORS: THE MATTER OF PRIVATE LAW 
Social life is somehow independent of private law.17 One could identify the reality referred 
to by the German law of persons, forget about the concept of legal personality, and 
                                                        
justify these needs and interests with the rule of equal freedom, explicate such justification with its 
idiosyncratic techniques, and present the technical construction in its characteristic language. 
16 I	  took	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “legal	  technique”	  from	  Françoise Gény, “The	  Legislative	  Technique	  of	  Modern	  Civil	  
Codes,”	  (Ernest	  Bruncken	  translation),	  in	  Vv.	  Aa.,	  Science of Legal Method, MacMillan, New York, 1921, 
pp. 498-557. 
17 Alan Watson on The Evolution of Law, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985, p. 117 talks about 
“congruence”	  between	  law	  and	  life	  in	  society.	  In	  his	  view,	  “A	  legal	  institution	  is	  a	  social	  institution	  which	  
has been given legal effectiveness and which is being regarded from the legal point of view. Without the 




reinterpret reality from another point of view. You may see a person with a domicile and 
marriage, or Inga, a nice neighbor, lover and Christian—views that have nothing to do 
with private law. The facts of life are independent of private law in that they can be the 
starting point for other stories. 
Independent though they are, the facts of life are nevertheless intimately related to 
private law. First of all, law, with its authoritative voice and appeal, marks the rhythm of 
social movement. Things have to go right, meaning in just directions. But the law is 
influenced by social reality as well; changes in the right or wrong directions undertaken 
by law are always produced outside of the law. This is best seen in cases of legal 
recognition, where a law takes as proper a practice or exigency that had its ambit of 
validity or satisfaction in an alien normative complex. The practices of making titles of 
credit, giving entity to organizations, the exigencies of the modern bankruptcy, of 
choosing the interpretation that favors a conclusion in favour of the valid formation of a 
contract—these and other related practices and exigencies came into existence and 
implementation in an environment called lex mercatoria.18 Private law recognized and 
translated the practices and exigencies of merchants into its language in the twentieth 
century—an eloquent example is found in the 1942 Italian Civil and Commercial Code.19 
Not only recognition but also legal changes in the strict sense occur outside of the law. 
The demand that law include third-class individuals into the private law persona was 
made by the religious, epistemological, environmental, political, economic, and aesthetic 
conditions and forces we call the French Revolution. This social phenomenon made the 
law change because it needed the law to achieve its aspirations. Max Weber gives another 
nice	  example	  of	  legal	  change	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  when	  he	  talks	  about	  the	  “cavere”	  of	  some	  
jurists, this is to say, the ability to formulate an atypical private interest into language 
capable of triggering the coercive machinery of state law. Key words, terms or formularies 
make the law incorporate contractual figures or forms of association that did not exist 
before.20 
                                                        
society exclusively of small peasant farmers there may be law for small peasant farms but not for high-
rises.”	  Idem. 
18 See Francesco Galgano, Lex mercatoria, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2001. 
19 One has to acknowledge that this was merchant and civil law organized in accordance with the fascist 
idea. (See the interesting presentation by fascist lawyer Dino Grandi, Delle Obbligazioni, dei contratti e 
della tutela dei diritti, (Discorso pronunciato il 25 maggio 1940-XVIII alla Commissione delle Assemblee 
legislative per la Riforma dei Codici), Tipografia delle Mantellate, Roma, 1943(?). [In Library of Max 
Planck	  “Ital.	  5754”].)	  In	  any	  case,	  this	  was	  a	  case	  of	  legal	  recognition	  of	  the	  fascist organization of life. 
20 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Guether Roth and Claus Wittich editors, Vol. 2, University of California 




Admittedly, social change troubles those who want to speak of law as a tradition.21 We 
need to explain what it is that has always been there. We may say it is the language and 
the techniques in which the law stylistically arranges its matters. I agree; but I have a 
commitment. What permits law to vary its content without changing is its elastic 
language, powerful technique, and, I would add, justice—its abstract form. Justice is 
present in the many pieces of private law relations. For the jurists the task is to see 
changes and account for them so that justice remains unchanged. Let me try out a difficult 
case: In past private laws, women fell outside of the category of person. One could have 
made the argument that it is fair for women to be outside the legal scene, that they should 
be unsusceptible of response to contract and tort claims. The validity of that argument 
would not imply that the eventual recognition of women as capable persons came about 
because of a transformation in the justice of private law. Maybe women were not showing 
their equality to men, as comparable egoists.22 It was found that they are so, or simply 
that what had been taken as a protection was actually more of a paternalistic hindrance. 
The legal character of an adult woman is an easy case today, and justice as equality has 
remained	  unchanged	  since	  Aristotle’s	  formulation. 
IP.2. THE CRISIS OF PRIVATE LAW 
IP.2.1. CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF PRIVATE ACTORS THAT MADE THE LAST JUST PRIVATE LAWS 
CHANGE 
Arguably, the last comprehensive visions of a just society were made law a long time ago. 
Paradigmatic examples are the Napoleonic Civil Code, 23  and the group of decisions 
assembled as the classical common law.24 But the beliefs, practices and exigencies of the 
individuals that lived under those regimes changed considerably. I am thinking of moral 
liberalism, mass production and media, consumerism and so on. The states’ private laws 
certainly coped with social changes. New laws appeared to contemplate the new practices 
                                                        
21 Martin	  Krygier	  tackles	  this	  issue	  in	  “Law	  as	  Tradition,”	  in	  Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No 2, (Aug. 1986), 
pp. 237-262 
22 “Our ancestors saw fit that ‘females, by reason of levity of disposition, shall remain in guardianship, even 
when they have attained their majority.’”	   Table	   V,	   1	   of	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   XII	   Tables	   (451-450 B.C.) 
http://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/12tables.html (27-07-2015) 
23 Conf. James	  Gordley,	  “Myths	  of	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code,”	  in The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 
42, No. 3, (Summer 1994), pp. 459-505. 
24 You can build a juridical interpretation of the common law with the works of the Toronto law school, like 
Peter	  Benson’s	  conception	  of	  contract,	  and	  Ernest	  Weinrib’s	  conception	  of	  tort	  and	  unjust	  enrichment.	  
See a synthetized view in Ernest Weinrib, The Juridical Classification of The Obligations, Birks, Peter 




and exigencies. At times, the new law relieved the legal categories of inexplicable 
exceptions—the inclusion of the woman in the category of capable persons reinforced the 
thesis that a person is a purposive being. At other times, the new law produced little or no 
change in the private law categories—the concept of property changed little when energy 
was regulated as a movable thing.25 Yet the classical categories could not always be used 
to contemplate the new realities. Sometimes, new legal categories were made to satisfy 
pressing social needs—I am thinking of the worker and the consumer.26 At other times, 
new law used the classical categories to regulate the ungovernable realities. These new 
laws entered the private law, only to deform it.27 The laws on promises are good examples 
of corrupt law. 
IP.2.2. THE LAWS ON PROMISES AS EXAMPLES OF MISTAKEN LEGAL CHANGES 
Before the laws on promises, the common law of contract was about agreed-upon 
exchanges. One party could offer X to another party, in exchange for Y. Offers were, by 
definition, revocable. Until and unless the offeree agreed to give Y for X, the offeror was 
not	  obligated	   to	  give	  X;	   she	   could	   change	  her	  mind,	   revoke	   the	  offer…28 Then cases of 
people making promises emerged. 29  Promises were different from offers in that the 
proponent would suggest to the addressee that she was bound to the proposal; she would 
not revoke it after having made it. Courts found injustice in cases where promisors 
revoked their promises. They granted actions on the part of promisees to demand the 
                                                        
25 The Argentinian 1871 Civil Code, like the French 1804 Civil Code, built its property law around the 
concept of thing. Only things susceptible to separation and possession could be objects of property, and 
the things susceptible to separation and possession consisted, according to the classical definition, of 
matter that one can touch (in the sense of tangibly grabbing). In 1969, a law reform introduced a 
paragraph	  saying,	  “The	  dispositions	  relative	  to	  things	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  energy	  and	  the	  natural	  forces	  
susceptible	  to	  appropriation.”	  (Art	  2311	  in fine). Even if you cannot grab energy, (no one in my country 
would advise you to put your hand on the kind of energy the Civil Code is talking about), you can separate 
it: produce it, store it, and transport it. In this sense, then, there was little change in the law of property, 
even if the concept of thing changed to be no longer confined to things you can grab. 
26 True,	  workers’	  statutes	  took	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  matter	  from	  private	  law.	  But,	  as	  they	  were	  passed	  as	  special	  
laws,	   they	  did	   not	  deform	  private	   law.	   In	  other	  words,	   private	   law’s	   field	  of application shrank; but 
contract law remained untouched. A similar process occurred in jurisdictions where consumer law 
appeared in a statute of its own, separate from general private law. 
27  See the insightful and entertaining historical explanation of the	   law’s	   structural	   crisis by Umberto 
Vincenti, Diritto	  senza	  identità:	  La	  crisi	  delle	  categorie	  giuridiche	  tradizionali, Laterza, Lecce, 2007. 
28 An	  excellent	  exposition	  of	   this	   logic	  appears	   in	  Maurice	  Wormser,	   “The	  True	  Conception	  of	  Unilateral	  
Contracts,”	  in	  The Yale Law Journal, Vol 26, No 2, (Dec. 1916), pp. 136-142.  
29 See	  A.	  W.	  B.	  Simpson,	  “Quackery	  and	  Contract	  Law:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Carbolic	  Smoke	  Ball”,	  in	  The Journal 
of Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Jun. 1985), pp. 345-389 and the teaching decision Alexander Brogden v 




performance of promises.30  How did they do it? They did it with contract law. They found 
some deed on the part of the promisee that indicated that the promisee had indeed 
accepted the promise before it was revoked. In order to do that, the courts had to treat a 
promise as an offer. A problem then emerged with real offers. Someone would make an 
offer—not a promise—and the judges would treat it as a promise. How? By applying the 
new forms of making an offer and acceptance. As a result of the decisions on promises, an 
offeror could be bound to an offer before it was accepted. The common law contract was 
no longer about agreed-upon exchanges.31 
We	  see	  here	   the	   deformation	  of	   one	  of	   private	   law’s	  most	  beautiful	   categories.	   C	   (the	  
contract) was made to do EA (enforce agreed-upon exchanges of rights) and is used to do 
E~A (enforce unagreed-upon exchanges of rights). Now the category no longer does EA 
as it used to (because it also works for unagreed-upon exchanges of rights). Let us look at 
another type of corruption. 
We move to the French Civil Code. This private law used to clearly separate the illicit from 
the licit sources of obligation.32 On the one hand, there were cases where a person, by 
malice	  or	  imprudence,	  invaded	  another	  person’s	  sphere	  of	  right,	  damaging	  an	  object of 
that	  person’s	  right.33 On the other hand, there were cases where two persons, on the basis 
of an agreement, decided to exchange services or things.34 In between these two areas lay 
                                                        
30 See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256, Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd (Goff LJ), 
[1978] 2 ALL ER, p. 559 and ss, and Barry v Davies (t/a Heathcote Ball & Co) [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1962-1969 
(CA (Civ Div)) I discuss Barry v Davies in 2.2. 
31 See, for example, Goff LJ obiter dicta in Daulia, cit,	  p.	  561:	  “once the offeree has embarked on performance 
it is too late for the offeror to revoke his offer." And section 45 of Restatement [Second] of Contracts in 
http://www.lexinter.net/LOTWVers4/restatement_(second)_of_contracts.htm (29-1-2016) 
32 The Code makes the division	  in	  its	  method	  of	  exposition	  (Book	  III,	  Title	  III	  “Of contracts or conventional 
obligations in general”	  is	  followed	  by	  Title	  IV	  “Of engagements which are formed without contract.”)	  and	  
in a specific article (see Art. 1370). The Code conforms to the classical division of justice in voluntary 
and involuntary transactions (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin translation., 2 ed., Hackett, 
Indianapolis,	  1999,	  Book	  V,	  Chapter	  2,	  §13,	  1131a.)	  That	  the	  voluntary	  obligations	  are	  licit	  sources	  of	  
obligation, and that the involuntary obligations are illicit sources of obligation is a relation that I take 
from	  Marcel	  Planiol,	   “Clasification des sources des obligations,”	   in	  Revue critique de legislation et de 
jurisprudence, No XXIII, Paris, (1904), pp. 224-237, who suggestively treats quasi-contracts as 
involuntary illicit acts (p. 229). 
33 Examples are torts like assault and trespass, and the quasi-torts of Book III, Title IV, Chapter II. 
34 Examples are the various contracts regulated in Book III Titles VI-XIV. There are three indications that 
voluntary obligations arise only from agreed-upon exchanges. Donations are not regulated among the 
sources of the obligation; they are regulated before them, after the mortis causa succession (Title I), and 
together with testaments (Title II: Of donations during life and of wills). Second, there is Art. 931 
requiring	  that	  “All acts importing donation during life shall be passed before notaries;”	  namely,	  before	  
the representatives of the state. And finally, even if the general definition of contract (Art. 1011) seems 
to suggest that contracts could be gratuitous, there is Art. 1131 saying that, to obligate, contracts must 




the realm of simply licit interaction. Promising something to another was, like sending 
him a poem, talking about a future contract, or celebrating friendship, neither an illicit nor 
a licit source of obligation. A promise fell into the sphere of the free activity of persons 
because nothing in promissory scenarios could be seen as injustice. At some point, French 
courts began to notice that what happened after the revocation of firm promises could be 
of relevance to the law of obligations.35 A	  plaintiff,	  induced	  by	  a	  defendant’s	  promise	  to	  
sell him something, rejects pending offers, decides not to take holidays, or even takes out 
a loan. The courts did not ask what sorts of interests made promisors bind themselves so 
strongly. They did not seek to apply the justice of licit transactions. They decided to grant 
the promisee a remedy to the damage caused by the revocation. The justification for these 
arrangements came from the idea that whoever engenders expectations in others must 
either meet those expectations or pay for the effects of failing to do so. Courts applied 
what in private	  law	  theory	  we	  call	  “reliance	  theory.”36 The problem for the French law of 
obligations is that courts applied a theory that cannot coexist with the theory of the other 
sources of the obligation. The problem is better seen in what the reliance theory is capable 
of doing. Under the reliance doctrine, many formerly licit activities cause obligations, from 
talking about a prospective contract to entering into a love relation. The just division of 
freedom/obligation was blurred. 
We see here a reasoning that is just only in appearance. T (tort), QT (quasi torts), C 
(contract) and QC (quasi contracts) are made to do J (corrective justice). To ensure that 
this happens we make T, QT, C and QC with the same JT (technical representation of 
corrective justice). The need for more categories to do J appears, and rather than making 
“P”	  (a	  new	  category)	  with	  JT	  (the	  technical	  representation	  of	  corrective	  justice),	  we	  make	  
“mistaken	  P”	  with	  RT	  (a	  technical	  representation	  of	  another	  value). 
The French and the British had problems recognizing promises because the philosophical 
jurists who inspired their laws explicitly neglected promise.37 The writers of the German 
                                                        
35 E.g.	  Cass.	  Civ.	  3éme, 10.5.1968. I deal extensively with this case in 2.3. 
36 Supporting this interpretation of Cass.	  Civ.	  3éme, 10.5.1968 legal comparativist Basil Markesinis et al., The 
German Law of Contract, 2d ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2006, p. 65. 
37 I am not saying that humans began to make promises in the aftermath of classical private law. Promise 
scholars like to remind us that the characters of Greek mythology already knew about promises. 
(Francisco	  Candil	  y	  Bravo,	  “Naturaleza	  jurídica	  de	  la	  promesa	  de	  recompensa	  á	  persona	  indeterminada,” 
in Junta	  para	  ampliación	  de	  estudios	  é	  investigaciones	  científicas, t. XIII,	  Memoria	  3ª,	  1914, pp. 283-339, 
at p. 285, note 3.) Moreover, the Digest of Justinian instituted legal solutions to very interesting 
promissory cases. (Digest, 50,12 De pollicitationibus). What I am saying is that the nineteenth century 
lawyers had no tools, or ignored the tools, to treat promises legally. They could not perceive and treat 
promises simply because the laws they studied said nothing about them. (The French Civil Code has no 
article on enforceable unaccepted promises; the classical common law opinion on unaccepted promises 




Civil Code were not all that concerned with the philosophical thought of the jurists, at least 
when it came to voluntary obligations. Section 657 of the German Civil Code says: 
“Binding	   promise:	   Anyone	   offering	   by	   means	   of	   public	   announcement	   a	   reward	   for	  
undertaking an act, including without limitation for producing an outcome, is obliged to 
pay the reward to the person who has undertaken the act, even if that person did not act 
with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  reward.”38 The promise of a reward binds even without 
acceptance, and (yes, you are reading correctly): the person who meets the condition 
while ignoring the promise (without expectations of the prize) is entitled to claim the 
expectation	  interests.	  Section	  661	  provides	  enforceability	  to	  the	  “Prize	  competition,”	  as	  
Section 780 does for “Promise	   to	   fulfill	   an	   obligation,”	   and	   Section	   781	   for 
“Acknowledgement	  of	  a	  debt.”	  The	  German	  Civil	  Code	  disembarrassed	  itself	  of	  the	  issue	  
of promises by regulating each typical promissory case as an enforceable act of will. And, 
if there were a case for which no provision was made, (like, say the promise of a contract), 
Section §145 establishes that offerors are bound to keep their offers open unless they 
explicitly reserve the power to revoke them. Once again, offerors are by default rule 
bound to their offers. The tendency to recognize each unilateral act of will as obligatory 
in private	   law	   was	   crystalized	   by	   a	   transnational	   private	   law	   called	   “The	   European	  
Principles	   of	   Contract	   Law,”39 which	   says,	   in	   a	   general	   provision,	   “A	  promise	  which	   is	  
intended	  to	  be	  legally	  binding	  without	  acceptance	  is	  binding”	  (Article	  2:107). 
                                                        
Co. [1893]	   1	   Q.B.	   256;	   Savigny’s	   neglect	   of	   promises	   in	   F. C. von Savigny, Le obbligazioni, Giovanni 
Pacchioni	  translation,	  T.	  II,	  UTET,	  Torino,	  1912,	  §61,	  p.	  82-87, esp. 85 attests to the German pre-Civil 
Code mentality.)  
How could that be? Classical private laws are vernacular specifications of the great systematization of 
Roman and customary law that took place in the 16th and 17th century. The jurists who systematized 
private law explicitly neglected the possibility that a promise could obligate without acceptance. Famous 
are the neglects by Grotius (Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an introduction 
by Richard Tuck, Liberty Found, Indianapolis, 2005, Book II, Chapter XI, n. XVI), Pufendorf (Samuel von 
Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, Andrew Tooke translation, Liberty 
Fund, Indianapolis, 2003, Chapter IX, number XVI) and Pothier (Robert Joseph Pothier, A Treatise on the 
Law of Obligations, or Contracts, David Evans translation, Strahan, London, 1806, at n. 4, pp. 4-5, a book 
that considerably influenced the common law; see James Gordley, The philosophical origins of modern 
contract doctrine, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 134 and Joseph M. Perillo, “Robert J. 
Pothier's Influence on the Common Law of	   Contract,”	   in Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Forthcoming. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=610601 (29-1-2016).) In short, classical lawyers, students 
of eighteenth/nineteenth century law ignored how to treat promises because the inspirers of these laws 
explicitly neglected promise.  
38 Section	  658	  (2)	  qualifies:	  “Revocability may be waived in the promise.” 
39  Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European contract law, Parts I and II, Kluwer Law 




In other words, the German Civil Code and the Principles of European Contract Law made 
it so (with various norms or one simplifying general statement) that every promise 
obligates. The question arises: Should all promises obligate?  
The letter of article 2:107 PECL gives ample room for interpretation. The only thing a 
promisor must add to make her promise obligatory in private law is a sign indicating that 
her intention is to be obligated legally. Accordingly, article 2:107 includes such distinctive 
practices as promises to family members, lovers, friends, relative strangers, and promises 
in commercial settings. Furthermore, a person is obligated to maintain her promise 
regardless of what the promisee did or does for the promisor. It is unimportant if the 
promise was made to pay an unenforceable debt or to encourage the promisor to do 
something—the promise obligates even without reciprocation. Finally, since the 
definition of this cause of obligation includes no person other than the promisor, one 
might venture to say, based on the letter of article 2:107, that the promisor would be 
obligated	  even	   if	  no	  one	  else	  heard	   the	  promise…	  The	  reality	  comprehended	   in	  article	  
2:107 is huge. Sooner or later, the legal operator will need some additional material to 
answer the questions arising in the application of this norm. In adjudicating, in clarifying 
promissory terms, in filling gaps, the judge will sooner or later need to invoke the 
justification underpinning article 2:107. Why is it that the promise binds the promisor? 
The explanations in vogue are mainly of four kinds: historical, sociological, moral, and 
economic. The historical and the sociological at some point become either moral or 
economic (see below Title 4). I want to show that the use of one or other of the available 
explanations demands that the user accept things that plainly contradict classical private 
law. 
The moralist says that promises obligate because of the duty of fidelity.40 If you say that 
promises bind because of the duty of fidelity, then you have to admit that gratuitous 
agreements bind too.41 Having	  done	  that,	  you	  have	  dismantled	  contract	  law.	  But	  that’s	  not	  
all. Your next claim must be that the law should punish those who lie. Even if your lie does 
not mature into	  another’s	  tangible	  harm,	  you	  should	  be	  condemned; for just as failing to 
                                                        
40 Comparable arguments in Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass) and London (Eng), 1981 (though in chapter 4, especially pp. 40-43, 
Fried makes a—moral—argument on why promises should be accepted) and Martin Hogg, Promises and 
Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2011, 
p. 106. 
41 Both Hogg (Idem, 274 and ss.) and Fried (Idem, Chapter 3) reject the requirement of consideration as a 




keep a promise is a breach of the duty of fidelity, lying is also a breach of such duty. This 
is okay, but only in the moral domain. 
The economist says that promises obligate because the enforceability rule brings more 
utility to promisors than the unenforceability rule. 42  This is a generalization. There 
certainly are, as the supporters of this thesis assert, cases where breaching a promise 
creates more wealth than performing it. It would be better not to enforce a promise, for 
example, where the social cost of enforcement is greater than the utility of enforcement 
for the promisor.43 The law that uses an economic justification for promises is compelled 
to endorse the second proposition.44 Could such law be called law? 
The private law that incorporates moral or economic justifications must commit to the 
demands of those justifications. That is, if that law wants to be coherent, if it is to hear 
such	  complaints	  as	  “why	  did	  you	  decide	  X	  in	  her	  case,	  and	  not	  also	  in	  mine?”45 
IP.2.2. THERE IS SO MUCH LEGAL MISTAKE THAT PRIVATE LAW IS ABOUT TO LOSE ITS FORM 
There is only one way an ongoing normative practice like private law could corrupt 
itself.46 Private law seeks to bring order to atypical reality. Instead of thinking of unusual 
cases in terms of their possible justice, private law thinks of and judges them in terms of 
“what	  people	  would	  find	  agreeable,”	  “what	  our	  fathers	  would	  do,”	  “what	  a	  good	  person	  
must	  do,”	  or	  “what	  maximizes	  general	  utility.”	  Private	  law	  orders	  reality	  in	  an	  improper 
mode of reasoning. The dictum may have nothing to do with justice. Moreover, justice, 
and the reasoning supporting the new dictum may, in other cases, conclude in a 
contradictory fashion. Nonetheless, the spurious dictum and its justification now belong 
to private law. The new arrangement, though it may be mistaken, forms part of private 
                                                        
42 Richard	  Posner,	  “Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law,” in Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 6, (1977), 
pp. 411-426.  
43 Idem, at 414-15. See the clean explanation in the Appendix, at pp. 425-426. 
44 In other works, Posner uses this mode of reasoning to explain all private law. Richard Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law, 2d ed., Little Brown, Boston, 1977. 
45 Coherence	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  result	  of	  the	  “constant	  and	  perpetual	  will”	  to	  do	  justice	  (Ulpian in Digest of 
Justinian,	   1.1.10pr),	   “an	   effort	   of	   will	   which	   must	   not	   be	   occasional	   but	   generative	   of	   a	   system[.]”	  
Vincenti, op. cit., p. 115. 
46 I am offering a formal explanation of the crisis of private law, an answer to the question, “How is it that a 
coherent private law became	  corrupted?”	  My approach is mainly conceptual. It is inspired by a passage 
of Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, op. cit., p. 301, which says the “…prevailing	   instrumentalist	  
approaches within the legal academy, exemplified by (but not confined to) certain versions of the 
economic analysis of law, systemically distort legal practice. This distortion effaces the characteristic 
concepts of private law, ignores the direct relationship between the parties, and assimilates private law 
into public law. In these respects, economic analysis fails to comprehend private law as the distinctive 




law—conforms it. If private law internalizes various realities through improper modes of 
reasoning, then private law comes to exhibit the mistaken arrangement alongside many 
others. The idea that the arrangement is mistaken loses legitimacy. Private law is a 
phenomenon determined not by a former, singular character, but by its ongoing, multiple 
characters. Private law is no longer coherent—in its form of understanding it is confused. 
We are witnesses to a critical moment. Private law is on the point of transformation.47 We, 
the jurists, can contribute to the transformation—by endorsing the fashionable mode of 
reasoning and professing that law should accept its ultimate consequences—or, we can 
bring	  justice	  back	  to	  private	  law.	  The	  latter	  is	  the	  path	  I’ve	  chosen	  for	  my	  PhD. 
IP.3. WHAT SHOULD THE JURIST DO? 
The methodology of private law responds to two guidelines. The first one says that private 
law exists for regulating our reality. Private law must not be seen as an eighteenth century 
artifact, a historical object,48 admirable for its elegance and storied past. Private law is an 
ongoing practice. The realities brought to life in contemporary society are different from 
those of the modern era. Where new reality has proved itself to be something more than 
a fleeting fashion, private law must strive to elaborate dicta contemplating and regulating 
these realities. The second guideline says that law exists to give its own rule to things. The 
rule of private law is the rule of equal freedom. Justice, the idea the law strives to render 
applicable in social life, is a comprehensive notion. So, law has ample room for new 
realties. However, justice is not all-inclusive. This means that some of the demands of 
social life will fail to enter the private law. Law cannot succumb to every sort of demand 
without losing itself to the past. So, if I had to synthetize the two guidelines of the 
                                                        
47  Alan	   Brudner	   said	   to	   Ernest	   Weinrib	   that	   “Economic analysis cannot be accused of justificatory 
incoherence, for it justifies transactional law in terms, not of a plurality of competing goals, but of a single 
goal of wealth maximization. Nor can it be hurt by criticisms charging that it fails to capture the nexus 
between	   plaintiff’s	   right	   to	   repair	   and	   defendant’s	   liability	   or	   that	   it	   understands	   tort	   law	   in	   terms	  
unwarranted by the concepts and inferential practices embedded within it; for that connection and those 
concepts are relative to a law for hypothetically dissociated persons that, though with us for centuries, 
might be evolving toward a functionalist future of which economists are the heralds.”	  Alan	  Brudner,	  The 
Unity of the Common Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 358. 
48 Aldo Schiavone, Ius:	  L’invenzione	  del	  diritto	  in	  Occidente, Einadi, Torino, 2005, Part I, Chapter 1, n. 5, pp. 
17-18 suggests that private law passed away sometime in the last century and that this sad event gives 
historians the opportunity to study it properly. (Also in English: The invention of law in the West, Jeremy 





methodology of private law in one line I would say that the mission for private law is to 
order reality without losing its character. 49 
Now, how do we continue private law without transforming it? The method I have 
developed consists of five steps: the first one could be said to be sociological, the second 
one critical, the third reflective, the fourth constructive and the fifth evaluative. Let me 
elaborate these steps, and show how I have implemented them. 
IP.3.1. FIND A RARE NEW CASE THAT COULD BE INTERESTING FOR JUSTICE (PART 1) 
The idea is to find cases that are unprecedented in positive laws, but relevant from the 
juridical viewpoint. Sociological studies are useful for this purpose because they are not 
constrained by the concepts of the law. Indeed, sociologists can see beyond, or even 
without, positive legal categories. Sociologists see beyond what our legal categories 
would enable them to see when they look at reality that positive law straightforwardly 
ignores. For example, the sociologist could inform us that a contractual party engages 
herself not only	   with	   her	   counterpart,	   but	   also	   with	   the	   counterpart’s	   clients	   and	  
providers; that business people solve their issues outside of court, with non-adversarial 
modes of solving conflicts; or that contracts comprise both antagonistic and shared 
interests.50 Sociologists see without legal categories when they approach realities for 
which law does have a category. It could be the case that the law has for long (ad)dressed 
an atypical reality with a typical legal concept, disguising its genuine morphology. This 
has been the case for promises. My understanding of the morphology of the juridically 
interesting promise is very much indebted to the observations of Melvin Eisenberg. If it 
weren’t	  for	  the	  sociological	  section	  of	  “Probability	  and	  Chance	  in	  Contract	  Law,”51 I would 
still be thinking of promises as implied contracts (the English law approach, see 2.2), 
atypical delicts (the French law approach, see 2.3), obligationes ex lege (German and 
Italian law approach, see 2.4), or as (moral) promises (the unilateral promise tradition, 
see 3).  
                                                        
49 I take the	  expression	  “the	  mission	  of	  law”	  from	  Emil Lask, “Legal	  Philosophy”,	  in Patterson, Edwin Wilhite 
(ed.) The legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, Kurt Wilk translation, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1950, p. 37. 
50 A classical work of sociological approach to the matters of contract law or, as one may call it, sociology of 
contractual behavior, is Ian R. MacNeil, The New Social Contract: An inquiry into Modern Contractual 
Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980. 





Part	   1	   of	   this	   doctoral	   dissertation	   examines	  practices	   that	  Eisenberg	   calls	   “structural	  
agreements,” 52  and that I, drawing on the reflections of Gino Gorla, choose to call 
“interested	   promises.” 53  These are promises made to increase the possibility that 
something one wants to occur actually comes to pass, like the fake gratuitous promise, 
where a retailer promises a gift to every visitor of her new store. The retailer promises 
the gift not for charitable purposes. She does it because she thinks that if the consumer 
makes the effort to visit her new store—to dress himself, look up the address, and take 
the bus—he will eventually buy something. By making the promise, the retailer has 
increased the chances that something she wants will occur; namely, the sale of a product.  
The question for the jurist is; why should private law look at these promises? The 
sensitive scenario presents itself when the promisor makes the promise, the promisee 
receives and considers the promise, but the promisor then revokes her promise. The 
lawyer could hardly argue that the revocation goes against contractual justice. For, in 
contract law, to bar promise revocation the promisee would have to have accepted the 
promise and given a counter promise or a real right to the promisor. But, the fact that 
contract law has nothing to say does not mean that law in general has nothing to say. Part 
1 settles the hypothesis that the revocation goes against justice in transactions. Even if 
the promisee gives no promise or real right to the promisor, he has listened to the 
promise, taken the promise seriously, and holds it as an acquired right. He will find an 
occasion	  to	  visit	  the	  promisor’s	  store.	  Is	  that	  enough	  to	  bind	  the	  promisor?	  Can	  we	  say	  
that the promisor cannot revoke the promise because, according to transactional justice, 
she got something from the promisee that was equivalent to what she gave with her 
promise? Well, we have to investigate, but it appears to be a relevant case for justice. 
Especially since promisors assure that their promises bind them. In other words, they are 
paying money for chances. 
My case above is a clear example of how sociology can help the jurist. Eisenberg tells a 
story that classical contract law can neither understand nor regulate, and I, through the 
more abstract perspective of justice in transactions, find it explicable as the exchange of a 
promise for a chance. It could have been the case that the reality I found had nothing of 
interest for justice. Then I would have had to acknowledge it, and explain why law cannot 
attend to such issues. The task is not to use law words to describe what society does, 
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wants, or is assumed to want. The jurist must read sociology, but with scrupulous care—
predisposed to reading only juridically interesting practices. 
IP.3.2. APPRAISE WHETHER IT WAS LEGALIZED IN A MISTAKEN FORM (PART 2 AND PART 3) 
In the course of giving legal forms to new phenomena, we need to criticize mistaken 
legislation. This is necessary for two equally important reasons. First of all, denouncing a 
mistake defames its source. Let me explain. In Part 2 of this dissertation, I will show that 
the use of the reliance theory on interested promise decisions corrupts the French law of 
obligations (specifically 2.3). But the reliance theory was not only applied to interested 
promises. It came into private law—not only French private law—in myriad cases, 
including those concerning mistakes in the formation of a contract, unreasonable breach 
of negotiations, gratuitous promises, etc. In denouncing the inimical effects of this theory 
in	  a	  specific	  case,	  I	  make	  the	  reader	  aware	  of	  the	  theory’s	  flaws.	  The	  reader	  can	  then	  find	  
further examples of the same kind of corruption in her own law. 
The second reason we should focus on erroneous arrangements has to do with the 
ultimate goal of the methodological enterprise—the making of new private law. The study 
and criticism of mistaken legislation teaches us what we should not do, which could be 
very important. Let me elaborate this point with an introduction to Part 3—the case of 
the mistaken legal scholarship.  
First in Germany, and then in France,54 jurists developed the idea that a promise creates 
two kinds of obligations: the first one binds the promisor to his word (no promisee is 
involved), and the second binds him to do something at the request of the promisee. One 
might ask why the law should enforce the first type of duty? What sort of duty pertains 
where there is no creditor? In part 3 of this dissertation I read the work of the precursors 
to the latest laws on promises, asking how they could arrive at such conclusions. I discover 
that these scholars were both arguing from improper standpoints, and importing 
concepts from alien legal orders. Only someone who argues from a moral point of view 
can say that a promise binds the promisor even if it never reaches the promisee; only 
someone who builds his theory with conceptual blocks from Germanic—rather than 
juridical private—law could say that obligations do not need a creditor. 
                                                        
54 Heinrich Siegel, Das Versprechen als Verpflichtungsgrund im heutigen Recht, Vahlen, Berlin, 1873. René	  
Worms, De	  la	  volonté	  unilatérale	  considérée	  comme	  source	  d’obligations en droit romain et en droit 
français, (thèse	  pour	   le	  doctorat	  présentée	   et	   soutenue	   le	  mardi	  23	   juin	  1891,	  Université	  de France, 




IP.3.3. THINK OF THE BEST POSSIBLE JURIDICAL SOLUTION (PARTS 3 AND PART 4) 
Still, not all of the promise legal scholarship is mistaken. It has given us a series of 
teachings without which I could never have imagined my proposal. Indeed, the unilateral 
promise scholars saw that persons were making irrevocable promises, and that lawyers 
had no terms to speak of the way a reasonable man would take these promises. The 
lawyer could not think of promises as enforceable because he lacked the terms for such 
thought. If there is no acceptance, there is no voluntary obligation. Yet judges and 
parliaments	  wanted	  to	  enforce	  promises.	  There	  was	  a	  pressing	  practical	  need,	  as	  René	  
Worms liked to say.55 But legal operators applied the existing legal forms. They would 
imply acceptances to find contracts and issue obligationes ex lege. The promise scholars 
reacted against such lack of creativity. The law wants to regulate new realities with 
inadequate rules. The jurist must build theories that effectively address emerging social 
issues. 
So the main lesson we take from the promise scholarship is so that we may propose new 
forms of law. For me, this means we can try to represent unprecedented reality in terms 
that make it look like a concept of private law. But, how do we do it? Do we appeal 
methodologically to the pure idea of justice? That is one choice.56 But, why should we 
become enmeshed in such an argumentative process if we already have similar 
categories? What do I mean? Well, what interested promises try to do is obligate the 
promisor to the promisee. Contract, tort, and unjust enrichment are deemed to be parts 
of the same law of obligations for a reason: they all perform the role of describing 
situations that give place to obligations. The interested promise, in other words, aims at 
being something like contract, tort, and unjust enrichment.  
So, rather than approaching the concept of interested promise from the perspective of 
pure justice, we could better approach it from an understanding of what tort, contract, 
and unjust enrichment are. This is an intermediate perspective. It is higher than contract, 
tort, and unjust enrichment (and so we will not make the mistake of treating the new 
phenomenon as something it is not) but closer to our reality than pure justice. A 
perspective that represents the causes of private law liability, and only the causes of 
private law liability, excludes matters that a perspective of pure justice would include. 
                                                        
55 “[…L]a pression	  de	  besoins	  pratiques[…]”	  Worms, De la	  volonté…, op. cit., p. 84. 
56 Namely, think of the various possible regulations to the case of promise and choose the best. I will do this, 
but at the end of another process. I will firstly build a proposal (the proposal that I intuitively find the 
best possible private law regulation) and then conflate it against the other possible alternatives. See the 




What is more, a form representing the causes of obligation would also represent the 
technical outlook that the new concept must adopt. I want to build not only a new cause 
of private law liability, but a cause of private law liability that a contemporary legal system 
would want to admit. Today, the causes of obligation are built in a form that enables 
operators to apply them to an indeterminate number of cases. In other words, they are 
systematic private law concepts, and not situational cases to which the law attaches a legal 
consequence, like the actions of Roman law or common	   law	   primitive	  writs.	   “For	   the	  
reason that Aulus Agerius promised a reward to Numerius Negidius, if it appears that 
Numerius Negidius should pay ten thousand sesterces to Aulus Agerius, Judge: condemn 
Numerius Negidius to pay ten thousand sesterces to Aulus Agerius, and if the claim should 
not be proved, discharge him."57 Could I deliver such cause of obligation to a modern 
private	  law?	  Certainly	  not…	  So,	  based	  on	  these	  considerations,	  I	  realized	  that	  I	  must	  firstly	  
imagine a structure representing all causes of obligation. The question is: What does a 
cause of obligation look like? 
Section 1 of Part 4 builds the mould for a new legal concept. It transcends existing just 
determinations of tort, contract, and unjust enrichment, to attain a set of conditions under 
which all kinds of obligation could arise.	  This	  framework	  largely	  follows	  “Misfeasance	  as	  
an	  Organizing	  Normative	  Idea	  in	  Private	  Law,”	  by	  Peter	  Benson.58 My aim was to build a 
form with which I could determine the interested promise as another cause of obligation. 
You can also read this section as a theory, or the general guidelines to a theory, of private 
law obligation. 
Section 2 of Part 4 answers arguments against the possibility of a methodology of private 
law. Can we build new private law categories? Can private law make progress and 
conserve its form? These issues have an audience in the arena of legal formalism. No one 
endorsing legal realism or legal positivism would argue that if law changes, it loses its 
character. Yet, we are taught that formalists maintain that the process that made the law 
made all possible law; that legal provisions are indefeasible; and that, consequently, the 
task of the jurist is limited to subsuming cases in categories to which the law attaches 
consequence.59 After a great deal of research, I have failed to find anyone endorsing these 
three claims. Still, there are critics who say that we, the formalists, believe these things. 
So, I have to take their arguments seriously. Title 1 of Section 2 of Part 4 dedicates itself 
                                                        
57 Inspired from Gaius, Institutes, IV, 40,41 and 43. 
58 Peter	  Benson,	  “Misfeasance	  as	  an	  Organizing	  Normative	  Idea	  in	  Private	  Law,”	  in	  University of Toronto Law 
Journal, 60, (2010), pp. 731-798. 




to finding a suitable philosophical foundation for the claims of the caricatured formalist. 
It	  finds	  it	  in	  what	  I	  call	  “legal	  monism,”	  a	  thesis	  that	  holds	  that	  all	  law	  is	  contained	  in	  a	  
single proposition; an impossibly wrong principle that, if it has been carefully analyzed, 
warrants the validity of the deduced law. The indisputable validity of the law exhaustively 
deduced from this principle secures what we formalists call the autonomy of private law. 
My strategy against the standard view of legal formalism is more evasive than 
confrontational. In effect, title 2 of Section 2 of Part 4 develops a different conception of 
the first principle of law. This conception agrees with monism that all possible private law 
can be justified by the principle of justice. But it disagrees that law is deduced from the 
principle. In the view of legal formalism, I maintain, law is the result of the application of 
the principle to real-life scenarios. Life could present various scenarios, and the principle 
would apply to these scenarios in very different ways. That explains why Roman law, 
French private law, along with the future private law, could, despite their differences, be 
considered three different expressions of the same private law. Likewise, law can be 
revised. From this view I derive a new conception of the autonomy of private law. This 
conception demands that private law maintain its distance from other disciplines. But, at 
the same time, it demands that private law cope with reality. Autonomous characters 
cannot be held to the past; they make themselves adequate to the context where they 
happen to be placed. 
IP.3.4. BUILD IT… (PART 4 AND PART 5) 
The aspirations of the methodology of private law have been validated. Not only do we 
know that we can make new legal concepts, we have also discovered that this is what the 
jurist ought to do, that the autonomy of private law demands it. The question then 
emerges: how do we do it? How do we effectuate legal constructions? Section 3 of Part 4 
elaborates rules for making private law. 
Title 1 begins with an examination of what sort of judgment legal construction is. I 
distinguish legal construction from the most typical of the legal judgments, namely, 
adjudication. I acknowledge that the distinction between adjudication and construction 
becomes thin when adjudication consists of applying an existing legal concept to a difficult 
case. However, I elaborate an argument for the claim that it is always possible to 
distinguish repetition from invention. Legal construction turns out to be a synthesis of an 
inapplicable legal concept with the image of a new operative concept. Title 2 sets out the 
procedure for making law. First of all, the jurist must predispose herself to interpret 
juridically (4.3.2.1). Secondly, the jurist must find an exigency or practice that is in tension 




concept she or he believes the new reality to be, like the idea of authorization, subjective 
right or cause of obligation. This is what we call technical characterization (4.3.2.3). The 
jurist must now mentally overlap the reality she wants to determine as law with the high 
concept she intuits the reality to represent, and talk about the one in a way that a listener 
could be hearing about the other. In other words, the jurist must describe the reality in 
such a way that another jurist could read it as an example of the high legal concept. This 
final step is what we call legal determination (4.3.2.4). 
In determining the new concept, the jurist must use private law techniques. 
“Declarations”	  are	  useful	  when	  the	  jurist	  wants	  to	  map	  out	  normative	  realities:	  delineate	  
extensions, depict features, adjudicate places, and elaborate comparisons, in the style of 
the French Civil Code. The jurist may also want to make a readily applicable piece of law. 
The jurist must speak in the conditional form, where for every fact X follows a legal effect 
Y.	  This	  is	  the	  German	  “norm-making technique.” Subtitle 4.3.2.4 discusses these and other 
legal	  techniques,	  with	  special	  attention	  to	  “conceptualization.”	  I	  will	  try	  to	  explain	  what	  a	  
legal concept is, in the strict sense, and propose the modern common law concept of 
contract as an example.  
Obviously, not all of a construction is new law; constructors make use of existing 
operative concepts. But construction is not all about combination either. The time comes 
when the jurist must create precise new figures. What name do we give the new form? We 
cannot take the names of other legal concepts. Formalism demands that each legal 
concept have its own, exclusive name. The jurist can certainly recycle, but may also want 
to make new names. How do we invent private law names? Title 2 of Section 3 of Part 4 
finishes trying to sketch out directives for inventing words that bear the aesthetics of 
private law.  
Part 5 can be read in various ways. The most coherent reading is to understand it as a 
demonstration that the methodology of private law works. Indeed, the first five sections 
are dedicated to determining the interested promise as a new voluntary cause of 
obligations. The interested promise acquires a new name: The unilateral promise. The 
unilateral promise specifies each one of the requirements that Section 1 of Part 4 said a 
cause of obligation must exhibit. The result is a new cause of obligation, a phenomenon 
ordered by the logic of corrective justice, structured like contract, tort, and unjust 
enrichment, and presented with names that sound like the words of private law. The last 
section of Part 4 dedicates itself to showing that the concept of unilateral promise fits with 
the contract, tort and unjust enrichment. This implies that the unilateral promise has its 
own field of application, or that its reception by a private law will not produce the effect 




classification of the obligations that present each one of the causes (included the 
unilateral promise) in its distinct place. Second, I compare the unilateral promise with the 
figure most akin to itself—the contract. Finally, to state the things that a just law would 
want to hear about a legal proposal on promises, I explain why the unilateral promise 
would not serve to enforce gratuitous promises or promises among friends and lovers. 
Part 5 is also dedicated to the legal practitioner. It deals with scenarios like promises 
made by mistake and violence (5.2.3.1a.1.), cases where it is not clear whether the 
proposal was declared as a promise or as an offer (5.2.3.2(c)1), promises of illusory 
performances (5.2.2.1.c.4), jocular promises (5.2.3.1d.1), promises in family contexts 
(5.2.3.1(d)), and firm gratuitous promises (5.2.3.1e2). It occasionally gets into the 
peculiarities of promises in the field of construction contracts (see for example 
5.2.2.2.c.3), promises of reward for a found item (5.2.2.1.(a)), and the everyday fact of firm 
offers to the public (5.2.3.2.(c)). It analyzes various modes of extinction of promissory 
rights (5.6.2.2), and the implications of the right of the promisor (5.6.3). 5.6.3.2.1 makes 
the provocative claim that the promisor has an action of restitution as against the third 
party who profits from her chance without her authorization. 
If there is something that Part 5 can contribute to the philosophical scholarship on 
promises, it is the special attention it pays to the role of promisees. The vast bulk of 
scholarship on promises centers on the promisor. Some go so far as to neglect the 
promisee. Here you will find long pages dedicated to examining the role of promisees in 
simple and interested promises. Indeed, 5.3 is exclusively dedicated to arguing that 
promisees have a role to perform in the practice of making promises, and 5.4 embarks on 
a detailed analysis of the act by which promisees create expectations that enrich 
promisors. 
IP.3.5. …AND TEST THE CONSTRUCTION (PART 6) 
Part 5 construes the unilateral promise as an interaction whereby two parties exchange 
“rights.”	  A	  promisor	  gives	  a	   right	   to	  a	  performance	   to	   the	  promisee,	  and	   the	  promisee	  
produces the chance from which the promisor benefits. The promisor perceives the value 
of this chance, I maintain, as one who acquires a right to the benefits of the thing of 
another... (Please see 5.3 and 5.4). Part 5 creates a way of understanding interested 
promises as an exchange of rights. You see two reciprocal transfers, an exchange of a 
“promissory	  right”	  for	  the	  “right	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  chance.”	  However,	  Part	  5	  does	  not	  
evaluate the legal concept. The question we must answer to test this formal structure is 





There are at least 500 years of debate on the subject of whether promises can transfer 
rights. The question is whether someone who neither requests nor accepts the promise 
can be deemed to have acquired the promissory right. The pragmatic jurist may miss the 
nerve of such a question: How could someone dislike the opportunity for benefit? 
However	  the	  question	  has	  a	  raison	  d’être.	  Rights	  are	  like	  extensions	  of	  our	  personalities.	  
When someone finds our things, they find our very selves. So, a long line of jurists—which 
begins with Hugo Grotius, and includes authorities like Robert Joseph Pothier—would 
argue that a credit right must be willed in order to be acquired, either by request or 
acceptance. Otherwise the promisee finds her personality altered by the unilateral choice 
of the promisor, which undermines his freedom. 
Some unilateral promise scholars have chosen to evade this perennial puzzle. They find it 
overly dogmatic, and without practical value. 60  I am very happy to say that, after 
struggling with it, I think I have found a response. My response is that promisors have the 
freedom to make promises. If my predecessors want to avoid rejecting the possibility no 
only of promises, but also contracts and right transfers in general, they must accept that 
the freedom to make promises permits persons to impose rights on non-accepting parties. 
I ground the freedom to make promises in the broader freedom (or privilege) to contract 
obligations, which I justify in a methodological appeal to pure justice. 
Now, granted that one could transfer a right to a non-accepting promisee, should we also 
accept that the promisor could benefit from these unilateral interventions? Does 
something change when your promise not only grants a right to me, but also induces me 
to do something you want? Section 2 of Part 6 gets into an everyday fact of contemporary 
capitalist life: the fact that we are constantly bombarded with interested promises. Not 
only do they fill our mailboxes, interested promises also reach us by radio, TV, email, 
pamphlets, and mobile phones. We read them on publicity boards, giant posters, and 
newspapers, everywhere. This everyday fact is solid proof that companies get something 
out of making of these promises. But, it also shows the other side—that we tolerate 
strangers engaging us in their business. We, without meaning to, create the chances they 
are looking for.  
                                                        
60 Enrico Camilleri refers to the argument as an “argomento	  squisitamente	  dogmatico	  frutto	  del	  pensiero	  
giusnaturalistico	   e	   della	   pandettistica[.]”	   La formazione unilaterale del rapporto obbligatorio, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2004, p. 28. Francesco Di Giovanni insightfully notes that one who responds to this 
argument is one who confirms the meta-theory from which the argument comes, Le promesse unilaterali, 
CEDAM, Padova, 2010, p. 61. In	  his	  opinion,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  “demystify”	  the	  argument	  rather	  than	  contest	  
it (Idem, p. 74)	  and	  to	  address	  the	  “interesting”	  question,	  which	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  cause	  (“consideration”)	  




Here my voice lowers its tone. It recognizes the trickery of these practices, but asks; what 
can we do? There are only three possible reactions. First, we make law prohibiting, 
criminalizing the practice. Second, we simply permit the practice—which amounts to 
saying that we abstain from proposing anything, and leave the matter to general contract 
law. Or, we could choose to regulate it. After discarding the first two alternatives, as well 
as some modes of regulation, like punitive damages, I conclude that the best we can do is 
to regulate it the way I have presented in Part 5. However, recognizing that some 
companies could abuse of their freedom to make promises, I have devised an instrument 
to prevent such abuses (6.2.3.2). 
IP.4. WHY JUST PRIVATE LAW? 
Let me end this introduction with an answer to the question; why should we do just 
private law? 
IP.4.1. BECAUSE HISTORY IS PAST LAW… 
Studying the history of law is instructive. It informs us about previous experiences with 
law, and explains how and why a present rule, concept, or principle unfolded in its current 
form. What is more, this is useful knowledge; it helps us understand our laws, and also 
apprises us of legal solutions from the past that can be recycled. But, for the jurist, doing 
history can also be a distraction. 
A good example of this is found in the work of Reinhard Zimmermann. In his vast, learned, 
accessible, and very informative scholarship, Zimmermann proposes and implements 
what	  he	  calls	  “the	  historical	  and	  comparative	  approach.”61 Its task is to build a European 
legal scholarship. What are the steps of this approach? It begins by identifying areas of 
law that are important for the European project, like doctrines, rules, or concepts related 
to contract, tort, restitution, or the law of succession. Having identified a piece of interest, 
we then turn ourselves towards its origins. All paths lead to Rome. From Rome, we walk 
down the timeline; we go from archaic Roman law to classical Roman law, spend a good 
deal of time in post-classical or Justinian Roman law, then see how the eleventh century 
Bolognese received the Digest of Justinian, find out what Bartolo said, ask how the 
Canonists affected legal development, discuss the work of the scholastics of Salamanca 
and the reactions of the humanists, mention the contributions of the rationalists, and, 
                                                        
61 See	   the	  program	  in	  Reinhard	  Zimmermann,	   “Savigny’s	   legacy:	   legal	  history,	  comparative	   law,	  and	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  European	   legal	  science”,	   in	  Law Quarterly Review, 112, (Oct. 1996), pp. 576-605 and 
Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today, 




finally, explain how the jurists of the emerging nation-states received and modified the 
Ius commune. The work of the legal historian has come to an end. Now, the legal 
comparativist enters the scene. Her sources are the various private state laws of Europe. 
She will find commonalities on all levels: principles and rules, terminology, methods of 
exposition, ways of reasoning, etc. etc. Still, she will find differences. Where there are no 
such	  commonalities,	  she	  must	  compare	  different	  national	  solutions:	  “Is	  the	  law	  of	  contract	  
based on	  the	  notion	  of	  promise,	  or	  consensus?	  …	  When	  is	  a	  mistake	  sufficiently	  serious	  to	  
affect	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  contract?	  …	  In	  what	  way	  does	  contributory	  negligence	  on	  the	  part	  
of the injured party influence his claim for damages? ... How does the law deal with the 
restitution	  of	  unjustified	  enrichment?” 62 Answers to these questions indicate the various 
ways	  in	  which	  a	  legal	  problem	  can	  be	  solved.	  “It	  therefore	  paves	  the	  way	  towards	  critical	  
evaluation	  and	  rational	  choice…”63 
Zimmermann does great work. He gives us a lot of historical material of great juridical 
interest: various legal pieces solving specific social issues in different ways. Moreover, he 
orients us in the right direction: in choosing from among the different solutions, we must 
use	   “critical	   evaluation	   and	   rational	   choice.” 64  But here is my question: what does 
Professor	  Zimmerman	  mean	  by	  “critical	  evaluation	  and	  rational	  choice?” 
The legal historian responds ambivalently...65 
                                                        
62 Reinhard	  Zimmermann,	  “Savigny’s	  legacy…”	  op. cit., p. 603. 
63 Idem, p. 603. 
64 Idem. 
65  As	   to	   the	   question	   of	   “rational	   choice,”	   I	   find	   Zimmerman’s	   work	   rather	   perplexing.	   In	   his	   article	  
“Savigny’s	  legacy…”	  op. cit.,	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  Savigny’s	  method,	  which	  is	  to	  study	  some	  sort	  of	  
classical law with the intention of abstracting principles of law and then using them to build the modern 
law. (See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, William Holloway translation, 
vol.	   1,	   Higginbotham,	   Madras,	   1867;	   conf.	   Joachim	   Rückert,	   “Friedrich	   Carl	   von	   Savigny,	   the	   Legal	  
Method, and the Modernity of Law”, in Juridica International, Vol. XI, 2006.) Indeed, Zimmermann talks 
about the connections among legal institutions, coherence, the system of private law, principles of law, 
and	  other	  related	  notions.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  “rational	  choice”	  with	  which	  we	  evaluate	  and	  build	  law	  
cannot	  but	  be	  a	  choice	  according	  with	  private	  law	  principles.	  But,	  in	  another	  article,	  “Derecho	  Romano	  
y Cultura Europea,”	  (translated	  by	  Salgado	  Ramírez),	  in	  Revista de Derecho Privado, No 18, (2010), pp. 
5-34, Zimmermann goes in the opposite direction. Here, private law is presented as a reservoir of rules 
and principles for all tastes. The Roman jurists, with their differing views, gave different, sometimes 
contradictory opinions in like cases. These opinions—the private law—were used again and again by 
rulers, judges, and scholars of different times and places. They would choose one or another opinion, 
and apply, amplify, reduce or modify it at their convenience. There is nothing like coherence in private 
law. This view actually impedes us from inferring a concept of private law. There is nothing with which 
one could distinguish private law from other normative orders, like canon law or lex mercatoria. One is 
left with the impression that the only distinctive feature of private law is that it was once written in 
Latin.	  Now,	  what	  does	  “rational	  choice”	  mean	  in	  this	  new	  context?	  If	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  choosing	  one	  




The	  jurist’s	  task	  is	  to	  say	  what	  the	  law	  is	  in real or hypothetical disputes, and when the 
conflict at stake cannot be solved by legal norms, to say what the just outcome ought to 
be. If we tell the	  story	  of	  “How	  the	  law	  of	  contracts	  evolved	  so	  that	  contract	  is	  now	  about	  
agreement	  with	  patrimonial	  content,”	  or	  “Why	  it	   is	  that	   the old, and potentially useful, 
Canon law category of promise was neglected by the rationalist thinkers of the 16th 
century” - if we look into these extremely interesting, and per se relevant, historical 
questions, we are nevertheless distracted from what we are called to do. We would have 
occupied our time drawing lines, and explaining discontinuities, and never get down to 
addressing the issue. Our challenge today is that we have no Code with solutions. Rather, 
we must implement a mode of reasoning. And being trained in the art of the just and good 
is its own priesthood.66 When we distract ourselves by doing historical research, other 
scholars will do the work that we are called by vocation to do. This is a reason for jurists 
to leave historians to do their work, and to embed ourselves in the office of thinking about 
social issues in terms of justice. 
IP.4.2. …SOCIOLOGY IS REDUCIBLE… 
The	   label	   “sociology	   of	   law”	   includes	   a	   plurality	   of	   studies. 67  The most practical—to 
identify areas of social conflict, and the mechanisms by which society spontaneously 
resolves them—is nowadays reductive.  
Take the work on promises by Professor Melvin Eisenberg. Like all works of legal 
sociology,	  his	  article,	  “Probability	  and	  chance	  in	  contract	  law,”	  begins	  with	  a	  criticism	  of 
law: 
From the middle of the nineteenth century until the first part of the twentieth century, 
contract law was dominated by a school of thought now known as classical contract law. 
The teachings of this school were based on the premise that contract law, like geometry, 
could be developed by deduction from axiomatic rules. Like geometry, classical contract 
law tended to be static rather than dynamic, and binary rather than continuous. Given 
                                                        
rule.	  The	  work	  of	  the	  jurist	  then	  consists	  in	  identifying	  the	  ruler’s	  mode	  of	  reasoning	  and	  building	  the	  
private law in a way such that the ruler could like to choose it. 
66 “Anyone may properly call us the priests of this art, for we cultivate justice and profess to know what is 
good and equitable, dividing right from wrong, and distinguishing what is lawful from what is unlawful; 
desiring to make men good through fear of punishment, but also by the encouragement of reward; 
aiming (if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a pretended philosophy.” Digest of Justinian, 1.1.1. 
67 See the essays in Michael Freeman (ed.), Law and sociology, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New 
York, 2006 and Mathieu Deflem, Sociology of Law: Visions of a Scholarly Tradition, Cambridge University 




these characteristics, it is not surprising that classical contract law had difficulty coping 
with	  probability	  and	  chance…68  
In other words, society brings a new issue to law—transactions involving chances—and 
law, owing to its antiquated methods, fails to solve it. Eisenberg now makes a sociological 
observation. Agents are	   increasingly	   making	   what	   he	   calls	   “structural	   agreements,”69 
whereby one party promises something to another without requiring either a promise or 
an act in exchange, like firm offers and reward promises. The key to understanding these 
transactions, Eisenberg suggests, lies in the psychology of promisors: they make promises 
to increase the probability of an exchange. 
A firm offer is made not for altruistic reasons, but for self-regarding reasons—to increase 
the probability of exchange. In deciding whether to accept an offer, an offeree must make 
an investment, in the form of deliberation and, in some cases, out-of-pocket costs. The 
offeree is more likely to make such an investment, or is likely to make a greater 
investment, if he is sure the offer will be held open while the investment is being made. 
The purpose of a firm offer is to induce the offeree to make such an investment so as to 
increase the probability of exchange.70 
Okay, but what should the law do with these promises? Here is the answer: 
It is in the interests of offerors as a class that firm offers be enforceable, because under a 
regime of unenforceability, offerors cannot utilize firm offers to achieve their ends.71  
The law should enforce these promises because a certain class of persons wants the law 
to do it. Professor Eisenberg generalizes a new transaction form from the reality of 
contractual behavior, and generalizes the reason for the enforceability of such a 
transaction from the very same reality. The class of offerors wants the law to enforce 
structural agreements, because otherwise they cannot induce promisees to consider 
promises in a way that increases the probability that they will make an exchange. A jump 
from the sociology of business practices to economic theory seems reasonable:  
The concept of structural agreements, which is central to Part II of this Article, provides a 
direct link between transaction-cost economics and contract law doctrine. A major 
concern of transaction-cost economics is the manner in which various forms of 
                                                        
68 Melvin	  A.	  Eisenberg,	  “Probability and Chance in Contract Law”, UCLA L. Rev., 45, (1997-1998), pp. 1005-
1076, at p. 1008-9. 
69 Idem, p. 1009. 
70 Idem, p. 1019. 




governance structures can maximize the likelihood that economic transactions will be 
seen to completion, resulting in gains to both sides. A structural agreement is a governance 
structure that is designed and intended to promote the probability of gains through 
trade.72  
The reasoning is this: If a class of persons wants to maximize the likelihood of effectuating 
transactions, and economic theory teaches us the means to produce such effects, then the 
rules of economy should be enacted as the rules of law. This is true even if these persons 
are not actually following the economic rules, because the economic rules are what they 
would want the law to be if they knew of their efficiency. The problem with the sociology 
of law is that it flows into a strand of functionalism.  
IP.4.3. …AND ECONOMY IS ABOUT EFFICIENCY. 
Wealth maximizing is, I think, the dominant functionalism in American and European 
Union private law. Richard Posner has argued for over forty years that justice demands 
that	  law	  be	  “wealth	  maximizing.”	  The just dictum is the rule or decision that creates the 
most wealth. So, if a lawgiver is to pass a law, or a judge has the authorization to develop 
a new rule or the discretion to tilt a preexisting rule in one direction or another, she or he 
must rule or decide in a way that maximizes the utility of extant resources.73 
Now the problem for the jurists is one of competence. Those of us who received a classical 
legal education lack the tools for making economic analyses, and therefore show 
ourselves incapable of saying what the most efficient thing to do is. This is also true for 
those who venture into economic studies with a view to making an academic paper. I base 
this claim on my experience in the European University Institute, a transnational 
university dedicated to the study of law, economics, history, and political science. I have 
felt the distance of our discipline from serious economic thinking when traditionally 
educated lawyers present economic analyses before professional economists.74 
Yet my argument cannot rest here. We can always change legal education to provide 
students with the proper tools for economic analysis. Robin West recently complained 
                                                        
72 Idem, p. 1010. 
73 Richard Posner, Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm In Common Law Adjudication, Hofstra 
Law Review, 8, (1979), pp. 487-507. 
74 “Questo	  mutamento	  di	  paradigma	  e	  il	  farsi	  politico	  da	  parte	  del	  giurista	  di	  tipo	  continentale	  europeo	  non	  
gli ha ridato quel prestigio e quell'autorevolezza che agognava: il suo rincorrere valori sempre nuovi, 
paladino del pluralismo, ma poi schierato ora da una parte ora dall'altra, questo suo andare ondivago ha 
finito con il consegnarlo definitivamente alla seconda o terza linea nel movimento di divisione delle 




that the top American law schools better prepare their students for reasoning like 
economists than like jurists.75 But, is this the right thing to do? I want to suggest that it is 
not.	  And	  I	  stress	  the	  word	  “right”	  because	  the	  grounds	  for	  my	  claim	  are	  legal.	  I	  want	  to	  say	  
that past, present, and future generations of economists—and functionalists in general—
have	  no	  right	  to	  vanquish	  private	  law’s	  conceptual	  apparatus. 
It took us centuries to develop our powerful explanatory tools. Distinctions like quaestio 
facti and quaestio iuris, right in rem and credit right, termination of action as opposed to 
caducity of right; correlatively-structured notions like right and duty, power and liability, 
privilege and no-right, immunity and disability; departmental divisions like persons, 
things, property, and causes of private law obligations; the imaginary of legal lacunae and 
transfer of right; cannons of interpretation, like literal interpretation, the scope of the 
norm, historical and systematic interpretation; notions like the reasonable man, good 
faith, and the nature of the thing; an extraordinary articulable theory of the norm; and a 
rich and profound scholarship on the freedom of will, which includes classifications of 
intentional	   behavior	   in	   kinds	   and	   degrees.…	   These	   are	   not	   only	   powerful	   tools	   for	  
describing patterns of behavior. They are explanatory of the just, of life in accordance with 
justice. 
The issue at stake is not that others are using our concepts. To the extent that their use 
does	  not	   damage	  our	   concepts’	   core	   significations,	   one	   could	   tolerate,	   give	   them,	   as	   it	  
were, a right to the use of our working tools. After all, distinctions like questio facti and 
quaestio iuris and correlatives like duty and right are more of a communal use, a use 
which,	  when	  used	  according	  to	  the	  thing’s	  reasonable	  uses,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  exclude	  
others from their use.  The issue at stake is that others are distorting our heuristic tools—
transmitting them to others and other generations in ways that prevent us from using 
them	  as	  we	  used	  to.	  What	  do	  I	  mean?	  Everything	  lies	  in	  our	  tools’	  labels. 
“Justice,”	   “law,”	   “duty,”	   “right,”	   “tort,”	   and	   “contract”	   are	   all	   words	   that	   excite	   in	   the	  
listener not only attention and caution, but also feelings ranging from veneration and 
respect to fear. Many other symbols may provoke these attitudes and feelings, but of all 
such symbols, those belonging to juridical discourse are particularly efficacious—
especially when it comes to caution and veneration. People feel the impact of the words 
“duty,”	  “right,”	  and	  “wrong”	  because	  these	  words	  have	  traditionally	  been	  associated	  with	  
the proper understanding of justice: equal treatment, generality, and impartiality; in other 
                                                        
75 Robin L. West, Teaching Law: Justice, Politics and the demands of Professionalism, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2014 (on pages 89-92 the author gives advice on legal education reforms that would 




words, the common good. 76  Economists present their reasoning, premises, 
considerations, and conclusions, using the words of juridical discourse.77 At first, the new 
meanings are not clearly understood. People hear the legal words, and think of their 
traditional meanings. But, as they are heard again and again, in different contexts, the new 
meanings begin to be assimilated. As assimilation occurs, the respect and authority that 
has always been attached to the words is conveyed to the new meanings. Now, as the 
words of justice appear with new meanings, the old meanings begin to lose actuality. 
Economic	   concepts	   displace	   law	   concepts.	   For	   “person,”	   we	   understand	   “efficient	  
economic	  agent,”	  for	  “contract,”	  “market	  dynamics”	  and	  for	  “right,”	  “wealth-maximizing 
behavior.”	  The	  concepts	  of	  free	  will,	  rights	  commutation,	  and	  equal	  freedom	  pass	  away.	  
In dressing economic concepts in legal words, fake jurists profit from the respect attached 
to justice and its associated vocabulary while contradicting its significances, expelling 
justice from our implicit understanding of the social good. The result is respect for the 
concepts of efficiency, and the oblivion of justice and its rules.78 
IP.4.4. IF LAW IS TO BE SOMETHING, IT MUST BE RULES FOR THE MAKING OF JUSTICE 
My argument comes down to this: If the work of historians is to elaborate narratives about 
the past, the work of sociologists is to explain human conduct and the work of the 
economist is to elaborate rules for achieving goals in the least expensive way—and if all 
of these disciplines have their own methodology and point—what is the method and 
purpose of law? It seems pretty obvious to me that if law is to do something, this is the 
elucidation of rules for life according to justice. 
                                                        
76 “La faz simbólica del lenguaje adquiere especial relevancia respecto al discurso de la ley también, porque 
él no sólo goza de presunción de neutralidad, como lo hace el lenguaje corriente en un análisis 
superficial,	   sino	   que	   se	   lo	   considera	   incluso	   justo.”	   Gonzalo	   Casas	   and	   López	   Testa,	   Daniela,	   “Una	  
dogmática	  deconstructiva	  del	  Código	  Civil	  y	  Comercial”,	  in	  La Ley: Actualidad, No 93, (21/5/2015), pp. 
1-4, at p. 3. See also Chaïm	  Perelman, Justice, law, and argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning, 
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980, p. 24. 
77 “Instead of functioning as vehicles of thought, the legal concepts are at most labels pinned to conclusions 
once economic analysis has done all the work.”	  Weinrib,	  Corrective Justice, op. cit., p. 304 (for examples 
see	  the	  title	  “Causation	  and	  Intention”	  pp.	  303-305.) 
78 Would my claim that law must only make just law imply that all regulation oriented to establish efficiency 
would be eradicated from law? Well, economy could still regulate the life of private individuals, in the 
way that a company might contract an economist to think of the most efficient regulation for its internal 
life. (In consonance with its etymological sense of eco-nomos or norms for the administration of the 
home, the place of private, unaccountable life.) But it cannot be the criteria for laws of social life. Yet, if 
there are various possible just laws, and one is conducive to the achievement of other values like wealth 
maximization, then one could choose the just law with the added value of maximizing the resources of 





1. THE INTERESTED PROMISE: AN ATYPICAL (JURIDICAL?) TRANSACTION 
This part focuses on the phenomenon that we will incorporate into the private law. 
Section 1 utilizes the sociological research of Melvin Eisenberg to elaborate what I call the 
“interested	   promise”.	   Section	   2	   calls	   attention	   to	   the	   unprecedented	   character	   of	   the	  
interested promise: classical private law provides no terms for identifying and enforcing 
such promises. Section 3 strives to understand these promises in private law terms. Here 
I establish the central hypothesis of my case study: that the interested promise could be 
interpreted as a classical private law transaction. The relevant facts are that the promisor 
obligates	  herself	  to	  “gain”	  the	  chance	  that the promisee does what she wants. The chance 
that the promisor gains seems to be produced by the promisee. 
1.1. THE INTERESTED PROMISE AS A TRANSACTION 
1.1.1. THREE PECULIAR PROMISES 
Ann announces a reward for her lost jewelry. In the announcement, Ann is very clear 
about the terms and conditions of the reward, and states vehemently, that she will not 
withdraw	  the	  proposal	  “until	  recovery	  of	  the	  lost	  property.” 
Ms.	  Smith	  writes	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  general	  contractor	  Mr.	  García,	  indicating	  to	  him	  that	  she	  
will provide the service X at the cost of $1,000. In the letter, Smith states in bold letters 
that	  García	  can	  count	  on	  the	  service	  proposal	  as	  a	  “firm	  offer.” 
The	  new	  Magazine	  “T”	  enters	  into	  the	  market	  with	  a	  provocative	  campaign.	  The	  company	  
posts letters to potential consumers promising one-year	  subscriptions	  “free	  of	  charge”.	  
The addressed consumers just have to order the magazines—they have no financial 
obligation to continue the subscription. 
1.1.2. THE PECULIARITY OF THESE PROMISES: LACK OF PERCEIVABLE RECIPROCATION 
There is something striking about all these cases. Lawyers are accustomed to think that 
when a person utilizes the words of law to undertake an obligation, it is because the 
beneficiary of the obligation undertook a reciprocal obligation or gave something in 
exchange, whether a tangible thing or an action. Our cases cannot be thought of this way. 
Yes, they feature a person obligating herself to do something at the request of another, 
but at the same time the parties who would benefit from these obligations seem to be 
neither obligating themselves nor giving any perceivable thing to the promisor. 
Let’s	  take	  a	  close	  look.	  Ann	  appears	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  she	  will	  pay	  a	  reward	  to	  whoever	  
happens to provide information leading to the recovery of her lost jewelry. It is clear that 




a legally assured chance: if they happen to know the whereabouts of the lost jewelry, they 
can claim a sum of money. In contrast, it is not clear what Ann gets in exchange for her 
obligation. No beneficiary did any observable thing in exchange for the chance they 
accrued: Nobody obligated himself, for example, to look for the lost jewelry; nobody acted 
(say, began to look for the jewelry) or paid (say, one euro) for the assured chance. Yet, if 
they take Ann seriously, the beneficiaries will think that she deems herself obligated to 
her promise, and that she will save the promised sum for the uncertain but possible case 
that one of them provides the information that leads to the recovery of her property. 
Likewise, Smith obligates herself to provide a certain service at a fixed cost in the case 
that	  García	  requires	  it.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  obligation	  benefits	  García.	  He	  receives	  a	   legal 
option to	  make	  a	  contract.	  This	  option	  warrants	  that,	  if	  he	  chooses	  Ms.	  Smith’s	  service,	  it	  
will	  be	  done	  for	  the	  sum	  quoted	  in	  the	  promise.	  García	  has	  no	  duty	  to	  choose	  the	  service	  
of	  Smith;	  by	  this	  option,	  he	  is	  free	  to	  choose	  Smith’s	  service	  or	  to	  ignore	  Smith’s	  promise	  
and	  do	  the	  work	  with	  a	  third	  party.	  As	  another	  clear	  benefit,	  he	  can	  use	  Smith’s	  option	  to	  
negotiate a better contract with third party subcontractors. In contrast, it is again unclear 
what the benefit would be for the promisor, Ms. Smith. She did not receive a payment in 
exchange	   for	  her	  option,	   as	   if	   for	   example	  Mr.	  García	   had	  paid	   $100	   for	   the	  promised	  
option. Yet Ms. Smith has to keep available the materials and workers needed to effectuate 
the promised service. For, to judge from her promise,	  Mr.	  García	  can	  legally	  require	  the	  
assured service.  
The	  third	  case	  appears	  even	  more	  extravagant.	  Magazine	  “T”	  promises	  to	  give	  one	  year	  of	  
magazines	   to	  each	  of	   the	   letters’	   recipients.	  Each	   recipient	   separately	   receives	  a	   claim 
right to demand from Magazine	  “T”	  a	  year	  of	  free	  magazines,	  but	  Magazine	  “T”	  seems	  to	  
have acquired nothing in exchange.  
Why is it that promisors make such promises? Why would the promisors want to legally 
obligate themselves to the promisees? 
1.1.3. THE MISSING INFORMATION: PROMISORS MAKE THESE PROMISES TO INDUCE THE PROMISEES 
TO DO SOMETHING THEY WANT 
Why	  is	  it	  that	  Ann,	  Ms.	  Smith	  and	  Magazine	  “T”	  want	  to	  obligate	  themselves?	  Sociological	  
observations give us a hint.79 These agents want to obligate themselves in order to induce 
                                                        
79 By sociological studies I refer to studies that aim to identify and describe the practices of private citizens 
in the civil society. These are not legal studies. They do not derive their inferences from legal norms, 
doctrines and principles, or practical ideas of reason. As researchers in this field like to say, they study 
what	  private	  citizens	  “actually	  do”.	  For	  this	  reason,	  these	  studies	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  legal	  ideas.	  They	  
can see beyond what the positive law or justice says or would say. These studies do not necessarily have 
to be independent from legal studies. They do not necessarily have to be published in sociology journals. 




other agents to do something they want. By granting their respective promisees with an 
assured chance, option or claim, these promisors give the promisees reasons to look for 
the lost jewelry, buy the proposed service or become consumers of the new magazine. 
These	  promises	  don’t	  necessarily	  provide	  promisors	  with	  what	  they	  ultimately	  want.	  It	  is	  
not assured that Ann will have her jewelry back, that Smith will sell her service, or that 
Magazine T will recruit consumers. Yet the promises increase the likelihood that the 
promisors will get what they want. Other commercial tools like contractual offer do not 
have this effect. We call this phenomenon the creation of a chance. Agents in civil society 
are paying for these chances. It is paramount to elaborate this further. 
1.1.3.1. SINCE THEY CAN’T GET WHAT THEY WANT… 
All these agents want a certain thing. Ann wants to recover her lost jewelry, Ms. Smith to 
sell	  her	  services,	  and	  Magazine	  “T”	  to	  recruit	  consumers.	  These	  agents	  want	  these	  things,	  
but for one reason or another they have no means to get them directly. Ann may have 
found it too expensive to pay for a detective who, committing himself to look for the lost 
jewelry, cannot even guarantee the satisfaction of her wish. Ms. Smith cannot simply 
demand Mr. García	  to	  buy	  her	  service.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  Magazine	  “T”.	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  commercial	   instrument	  called	  a	  “contract”	   is	  either	  inefficient	  and/or	  ineffective	  in	  
providing them with what they want. 
1.1.3.2. …PROMISORS RECUR TO INDUCE PROMISEES TO DO WHAT THEY WANT. 
When they cannot get what they want, these agents will try to improve their probability 
of success by inducing others to do what they want. 
They first elaborate a business proposal. This proposal emphasizes the benefit to the 
recipient of the proposal.	  For	  example:	  “I	  will	  reward	  you	  in	  the	  case	  that	  you	  happen	  to	  
find	  my	  lost	  jewelry”;	  “You	  have	  the	  option	  to	  demand	  the	  service	  X	  from	  me	  if	  you	  ever	  
want	  it”;	  “You	  have	  a	  claim	  on	  a	  one-year	  magazine	  supply.”	  The	  chance	  to	  receive	  the	  
reward, the option to make the contract and the claim to the magazines are all things that 
the	  recipient	  has	  “gratis”,	  at	  his	  disposal.	  There	  is	  nothing	  detrimental	  for	  the	  addresses	  
in	  these	  proposals:	  they	  don’t	  have	  to	  do	  anything.	  The	  promisors	  want	  the	  promisees to 
take these proposals as convenient choices for action. As we will see in more detail in 5.2., 
                                                        
of the law, other times as the annunciation of a new legal order. We use them as indicators of possibly 
interesting legal phenomena. See IP.3.1. and 4.3.2.2. 
The study from which I draw my own account is Eisenberg, Melvin A., Probability and Chance in Contract 




promisors design their proposals in close consideration of the interests and comparable 
choices of their promisees. 
They present these proposals in the form of a promise. These agents want to present the 
proposal as a firm proposal, something that stands from the moment of its reception and 
remains in place. They do not make the validity of the proposal conditional on the accord 
of the addressee. They are not interested in knowing whether the addressee likes the 
proposal or not. They may even speculate that their addressees are prima facie aloof to 
the proposal. Primarily, they want the addressees to know that the chance, option or claim 
is there, available for them, as an acquired right.  
To invigorate the promise, the promisors communicate it with a language that resembles 
the	  language	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  law’s	  language	  is	  clear	  and	  venerable;	   it	   inspires	  security.	  
Recognizing these attributes in the language of the law, they adopt legal-sounding 
language	   for	   their	   purposes.	   Hence	   they	   use	   words	   like	   “firm	   offer,”	   “irrevocable	  
proposal”	   and	   the	   like—words which, though lacking a clearly defined legal concept, 
invoke the law and its serious aura. They make (let us say)	  a	  “legally	  intended	  promise”. 
The expected outcome is that promisees find these proposals comparatively attractive 
choices.	  Let	  me	  go	  back	   to	  Ann’s	   case.	  Before	  her	  promise,	   someone	  who	  knew	  of	   the	  
jewelry’s	  whereabouts	  might	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  provide the requested information. Say 
that Ludvig knows that Jonathan, a thief, stole and now possesses the jewelry. Ludvig 
wants to provide the requested information to Ann and the police. However, he knows 
that by doing so he puts his safety at risk. After Ann’s	  promise,	  all	  other	  things	  being	  the	  
same, he has an incentive to provide the information. He may put himself at risk, but 
stands to earn a significant sum of money. The promise has increased the probability that 
the promisee (Ludvig) will do what the promisor (Ann) wants. We can refer to this 
inducement effect as the creation of a chance. I dedicate 5.4. to a detailed study of this 
phenomenon.  
Promisors chose to make promises rather than simple offers because they see that offers 
do not create the desired chance. Ms. Smith, who is well acquainted with the dynamics of 
work	  contracts,	  knows	  very	  well	  that	  the	  general	  contractor	  won’t	  consider	  her	  service	  if	  
she presents it as an offer. The general contractor solicits proposals to determine the costs 
of a project. Since offers state the terms and cost of services, they do serve to calculate 
costs—but offers can be changed and revoked. The general contractor will not consider 
the offer because he cannot make a definite calculation with an offer that is revocable at 
will. If she just makes an offer, Smith is unlikely to sell her service. Similarly, the 




magazine consumer would change his/her preference and choose a new magazine if they 
just put the new magazine on sale. 
Promisors	   pay	   the	   costs	   of	   their	   promises	   even	   if	   they	   don’t	   know	  whether	   they	  will	  
ultimately get what they want. If acting prudently, Ms. Smith will have to freeze part of 
her assets. She will no longer be able to sell her work and capital in a way that could 
frustrate	  García’s	  option.	  For	  example,	  she	  shouldn’t	  offer	  the	  same	  service	  to	  a	  third	  party	  
if it would prevent her from carrying out the promised work. Yet she still makes the 
promise based on the consideration	  that	   the	  possibility	  that	  García	  buys	  her	  service	   is	  
worth	  more	  than	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  obligation	  she	  incurs.	  Likewise,	  when	  Magazine	  “T”	  gives	  
away free issues, the commercial team has made a scientific calculation: if 30 claimants of 
the free magazines go on to buy a yearly subscription, they will pay for the magazines 
wasted on the 70 claimants who consumed the free issues but did not subscribe to the 
magazine. Promisors make an analysis that the chance they obtain through their promise 
is worth the cost they pay. 
1.1.3.3. MORE EXAMPLES 
We can summarize the observations above in two points. First, lawyers can find sense in 
cases where agents ideate exchange proposals and present them to others as legal 
commitments. These two elements—the proposal and the promise—make sense when 
thought of in connection with another point: that promisors obligate themselves in order 
to induce the promisee to do something they want. Second, the point of all these cases is 
different to the point of other types of cases. It differs from other, more immediate means 
of acquiring what one wants, in that it procures a chance to gain something, not an 
immediate gain—rather than procuring me the fact that another does what I want, the 
promise procures me the chance that another does what I want. 
I want now to elaborate a third point: there are more cases like these. The examples 
provided	  so	  far	  illustrate,	  respectively,	  a	  “promise	  of	  reward”,	  a	  “promise	  of	  a	  contract”,	  
and	  what	  I	  call	  a	  “fake	  gratuitous	  promise”. 80 I chose these types of promises because of 
                                                        
80 Note that the same types of promises could manifest themselves with different content. Another promise 
of a reward would be this: Captain C promises all the effects in vessel T to the person who saves T from 
shipwreck. A very particular type of promise of a reward is the so-called “promise of a prize.” Here, the 
promisor offers a prize to the winner of a challenge. The promisees are either specifically appointed 
promisees (I promise X, W and T that whoever does X will be entitled to claim the prize P) or individuals 
of an addressed public (I promise that anyone who does X will be entitled to claim P). The promisees 
obtain the right to compete for a prize and the promisor obtains the benefit of the chance. For example, 
in the promise of a prize for a scientific discovery, the promisor obtains the chance that many able 
researchers will compete to discover whatever the promisor needs to be discovered. We think of 
multiplied affords trying to do what the promisee wants. The announcement usually establishes that 




their popularity; only with popular examples could I best explain the more general 
concept and its rationale. But other cases show the same form. 
In	   a	   “bonus	   promise”, a person grants to her dependent or affiliate the right to have 
something if he or she accomplishes a task. For example, Company A promises its 
employees a bonus of three months salary if production is increased by 30%. University 
B promises its PhD candidates that it will increase their scholarships by 5% with each 
language test they pass. The company is evidently interested in increasing their sales. 
Better-prepared PhD candidates make a better university. Thus there is a greater chance 
that the company will sell more or the university will gain prestige, which is what 
promisors of this kind generally want. Bonus promises are like promises of reward. The 
difference is that there is a pre-promissory link between the promisor and promisee.  
In	  a	  “unilateral	  warranty”,	  the	  promisor	  says	  to	  the	  promisee	  that	  the	  promisee can make 
a certain contract with a third party with the confidence that the promisor will pay as a 
subrogate of the latter. For example, constructor A promises bank B that if B loans $X to 
subcontractor C, A guarantees the debt. At first glance there is no benefit for A. The 
missing information is that A has a shared interest with C. As she is more solvent than C, 
and B knows it, A makes a promise to encourage B to do something she wants: make the 
loan to C. 
                                                        
discovery,	  “without	  further	  compensation”.	  We	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  promise	  in	  
2.2., where we deal with an example of this type of reward promise: the announcement of auctions with 
the	  clause	  “without	  reserve”. 
Other examples of a promises of a contract could include: (1) Company A promises that it will maintain 
Y´s	  price	  for	  3	  months;	  (2)	  A	  promises	  to	  employ	  B	  if	  B	  quits	  B’s	  job	  or	  B´s	  current	  employer	  fires	  B; (3) 
Retailer A makes vending machine X selling products X1, X2 and X3 to any pedestrian B paying a fixed 
price;	  (4)	  Seller	  A	  promises	  a	  2%	  commission	  to	  broker	  B	  if	  B	  sells	  A’s	  real	  estate	  at	  the	  price	  of	  $X	  or	  
more.  
Other examples of the fake gratuitous promise include: (1) Laboratory F promises any buyer of product 
P that P is effective; (2) Laboratory A promises a gift to any consumer of medicine A1 who contracts 
influenza in the week following consumption; (3) Developer A promises free holidays to B so that A can 
sell	  something	  to	  B;	  (4)	  Shop	  A	  promises	  a	  gift	  to	  anyone	  who	  visits	  A’s	  shop	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  visitor	  







The advertisement appeared in a London journal, the Pall Mall Gazette, November 13, 
1891. It had the rhetorical power to induce Mrs Carlill to purchase the carbolic smoke ball. 
She consumed the remedy, got the influenza and claimed the reward. Company failed to 
honour the promise and refused to pay. See a short discussion of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke 
Ball Co. in 4.3.3.1.(D1). 
Taken	   from	  A.	  W.	  B.	  Simpson,	   “Quackery	  and	  
Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke 
Ball,”	  in	  The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No 







Another is the case of the so-called	   “lettre	   de	   patronage”.	   The	   promisor	   says	   to	   the	  
promisee that the promisee can make a certain contract with a third party with the 
confidence that the promisor will do whatever is necessary for the third party to pay her 
debt.	  Controlling	  Company	  A	  promises	  bank	  B	  that	  if	  B	  loans	  $X	  to	  A’s	  subsidiary	  Company	  
C, A will do whatever is necessary to ensure that C has funds to meet its obligation with B. 
The promisor is not obligating herself to pay in case of a default by the main debtor, as in 
the unilateral warranty. Here, the promisor instead obligates herself to do whatever is 
necessary for the main debtor pay her debts. There are plenty of similar cases.81 The title 
of credit should be intelligible in the same mode too.82 
1.1.4. THE TRANSACTION CALLED “INTERESTED PROMISE” 
Now, in the light of these three points—in summary, that some typically peculiar cases 
are intelligible in the same mode, that the intelligence of these cases is different than the 
intelligence of other cases, and that the most popular examples of these cases seem not to 
exhaust the possible variants of these cases—we can infer the following conclusion: there 
is a new transaction mode.83 
I will call this transaction mode the interested promise, for the obvious reason that, 
although the promisor obligates herself unilaterally, she obligates her self for the 
                                                        
81 The case of a promise of payment or recognition of debt—by which I promise you to pay an unenforceable 
debt—could also be included in this category. In fact, the 1942 Italian Civil Code characterizes it as a 
“unilateral	   promise”	   (Art.	   1988).	   But	   “…regarding	   the	   promises	   regulated	   in	   Title	   IV	   [unilateral	  
promises],	  only	  the	  promise	  to	  the	  public	  (art.	  1989	  ss.)	  …	  is	  unarguably fitting in the genre [unilateral 
promise] and is productive of obligatory effects of transactional origin. On the promise of a payment and 
the recognition of debt, an authoritative scholarship not only doubts whether they could be 
distinguished, because to recognize a debt implies the promise of performing it and vice-versa, but also 
holds that they must be taken away from the field of the transactional autonomy to the field of evidence, 
more	  precisely	  to	  the	  field	  of	  confession…”	  Pietro Rescigno,	  “Obbligazioni	  (nozioni),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del 
Diritto,	  Vol	  XXIX,	  Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  1979,	  p.	  159. 
82 There are three typical cases of the title of credit. (1) A signs a note promising to pay $X to B at the place 
and time Y; (2) A	  signs	  a	  note	  ordering	  A’s	  agent to pay $X to B at place and time Y; (3) A signs a note 
promising to pay $100 to any holder of the note at place and time Y. The reason that A obligates herself 
to pay, as in the other interested promises, must not be looked at the text of the promise (as lawyers 
unfortunately do) but at the transaction where the promise is inserted. A promises to pay $X to B 
because A received some tangible thing from B, will receive some tangible thing from B, speculates to 
receive some tangible thing from B, or hopes to do some fruitful business with B. The title of credit could 
be issued in order to give rather than pay something, as when sugar warehouse A issues a note promising 
10 tons of sugar to any holder by Y day. 
83 I	  draw	  on	  Ernest	  Weinrib’s	  conceptualization	  of	  form.	  See	  “Legal	  Formalism:	  On	  the	  Immanent	  Rationality	  
of	  Law”,	   in	  Yale Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 6, (May, 1988), pp. 9466-1016, at pp. 958-961. Note that I 
formalize this transaction mode not as a legal transaction but as a mode in which agents in civil society 
promise an obligation for a chance. In other words, no claim is advanced as to whether this social reality 




acquisition of a benefit—not disinterestedly, charitably or gratis.84  This benefit, the thing 
that the promisor acquires, is a chance, the increased likelihood that the promisee does 
what	  the	  promisor	  wants.	  I	  want	  to	  emphasize	  that	  I	  use	  the	  name	  “interested	  promise”	  
to refer to a social practice, not to an existing legal act. 
1.2. THE INTERESTED PROMISE HAS NO REPRESENTATION IN CLASSICAL PRIVATE LAW 
1.2.1. THE INTERESTED PROMISE INTENDS TO CAUSE AN OBLIGATION 
The interested promisor uses words that any reasonable person would take as legal. She 
invokes these words to ensure that the promisee takes the promise as a seriously 
intended promise, and therefore will consider it seriously, creating the chance that the 
promisor is looking for. But in using legal words, the promisor is not only giving the 
promisee reasons to take her promise seriously, but also submitting herself to the game 
of private law. 
In the world	  of	  private	  law,	  what	  the	  interested	  promisor	  is	  trying	  to	  do	  is	  called	  a	  “cause	  
of	   obligation”.	   Causes	   of	   obligation	   are	   facts that a private law orders as criteria for 
identifying and justifying obligations. (Please see 4.1.) 
1.2.2. THE INTERESTED PROMISE DOES NOT FIGURE AMONG THE CAUSES OF OBLIGATION… 
But if we look at the French Civil Code or at the set of rules, concepts and doctrines 
defining the classical common law, we find no cause of obligation for the interested 
promise. 85  The general categories with which a lawyer would identify obligations in 
interactions are the tort and the contract. And tort or the idea of an action for correction 
of harm caused by a wrong and contract or the idea of an action for the enforcement of an 
agreed exchange of rights are, as we will see from different angles, different in character 
with the interested promise. On the other hand, the provisions that classical private laws 
                                                        
84 I take the phrase from the Italian doctrine. There, the link between the voice and the transaction mode 
seems to have acquired usage. One	  commentator,	   for	  example,	   refers	   to	  our	  promises	  as	  “quelle	  che	  
ormai si suole chiamare <<promesse	   interesate>>”.	   Francesco	   Di	   Giovanni,	   Le promesse unilaterali, 
CEDAM, Padova, 2010, at 92 (The italics are mine). Gino Gorla was probably the first author to use this 
term. See Gino Gorla, Il contratto: problemi fondamentali trattati con il metodo comparativo e casistico, 
Vol	  I,	  Giuffrè,	  Milano,	  1954,	  in	  §	  14-16,	  especially	  at	  §	  16,	  pp.	  188	  and	  ss. 
85 I only consider classical private laws.	  I	  don’t	  take	  the	  German	  Civil	  Code	  as	  a	  classical	  private	  law	  because,	  
in my opinion, this book is not primarily a book on justice applied to transactions between free agents. 
Yes, much of it is definitively determined by the idea of corrective justice. (See 4.1.1.1. and 4.1.2.3.) But 
many critical points—like the norm establishing that offers are irrevocable by default rule (§145) or the 
absence of the doctrine of cause or consideration—cannot be thought of as juridical determinations. My 
hypothesis is that these examples were determined to serve the interest of a class—the merchants. For 




establish for what they considered atypical cases contemplate cases of enrichment 
without cause, harm without fault and duties towards relatives in need; nothing like a 
provision	  saying	  “a	  promise	  of	  a	  reward	  binds	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  reception.”	  In	  short,	  
classical private laws present no legal terms regulating the practice of making interested 
promises.86 
1.2.3. …NOR IT CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS A CONTRACT 
Still, if we had to dress an interested promise with modern legal cloth, what legal dress 
would we choose? We would choose the contract. The interested promise aims to create 
a voluntary obligation between promisor and promisee, and in classical private laws the 
only	  cause	  of	  voluntary	  obligations	  is	  the	  concept	  called	  “contract”.	  Could	  we	  represent	  
the interested promise as a contract? Let us investigate. 
1.2.3.1. TO START WITH, IT IS DIFFICULT TO FRAME A PROMISE AS AN OFFER 
In juridical private law, the formation of a contractual obligation requires that an offer 
meet an acceptance with consideration. The formation process begins with an offer. Can 
we frame a promise as an offer? 
An offer is an invitation to accept an exchange of rights. The concept of offer was designed 
for	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  person	  says	  to	  another:	  “Look,	  I	  want	  to	  give	  you	  X	  and	  you	  to	  do	  
Y,	  so	  why	  don’t	  we	  agree	  that	  I	  will	  give	  you	  X	  and	  you	  will	  do	  Y?”	  But	  a	  promisor	   is not 
addressing someone with the intention to agree with him on something. She is addressing 
                                                        
86 Interestingly enough, the Digest of Justinian provides an institution with which a lawyer could see and 
treat interested promises. This institution is the pollicitatio or promise of a person to a city (res publicae), 
concerning the giving of a sum of money or donation of a certain type of work. This promise would bind 
when it was made in view of acquiring an honor, like a public office. For example, a Roman citizen, in 
view of the coming elections for the position of magistrate, declares to the public that he will rebuild the 
city pillars if he is elected. The declaration of this promise bound the promisor, although the 
actualization	  of	  the	  condition	  conditioned	  the	  promise’s	  performance.	  See	  Digest	  of	  Justinian,	  50,12	  De 
pollicitationibus. The analogy with interested promises is evident. 
But the pollicitatio did not survive to	   the	   private	   law’s	   rationalization.	   In	   a	   juridical	   private	   law,	  
voluntary obligations arise when the promisee accepts a promise and makes the required counter-
promise or act. See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an introduction by 
Richard Tuck, Liberty Found, Indianapolis, 2005, Book II, Chapters XI, VI and XII (Conf. Peter Benson, 
Grotius’s Contribution to the Natural Law of Contract, Canadian Journal of Netherlandic, Vol. 6, 1985.) 
Here the pollicitatio is seen as a matter of Roman positive law. Hugo Grotius, op. cit., Chapter XI, n. XIV. 
Robert Joseph Pothier, to many historians the father of Book Three of the French Civil Code, takes 
Grotius’s	  views	  to	  say:	  “A	  pollicitation,	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  mere	  natural	  law,	  does	  not produce what 
can	  be	  properly	  called	  an	  Obligation”	  Robert	  Joseph,	  Pothier,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Obligations,	  or	  
Contracts, David Evans translation,	  Strahan,	  London,	  1806,	  §	  4	  p.	  5.	  The	  French	  Civil	  Code	  says	  nothing	  
about the pollicitatio, nor, as far as I am concerned, does the classical common law. See an historical 
review in Javier Habib, La voluntad como fuente de obligacion: Revista historica y perspectivas de futuro, 




someone with the intention of giving him something. In promises, promisors say to 
promisees,	  “Look,	  I	  want	  to	  give	  you	  X	  in	  the	  case	  that	  you	  do	  Y,	  so	  be	  sure	  that	  I	  will give 
you	  X	  in	  the	  case	  that	  you	  do	  Y.”	  The	  act	  is	  rather	  different. 
So the answer is no. The language of offer is not suitable for promises because promisors 
are not looking for acceptance. As we have said, an interested promisor could guess that 
someone is aloof to receiving a promise from her and yet still make it, so that the 
addressee has it and considers it. (More in 5.3.2.1./2.) 
The inappropriateness of the concept of a contract for the interested promise could 
emerge with even greater clarity. We must just force the interpretation. What happens if 
we present an interested promise as an offer anyway? 
1.2.3.2. A POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION: THE COMMON LAW’S OFFER OF A “UNILATERAL 
CONTRACT” 
As a matter of fact, there is a kind of offer that looks very much like a kind of interested 
promise.	  In	  this	  offer,	  the	  offeror	  says	  to	  the	  offeree	  “I	  will	  give	  you	  $100	  if	  you	  walk	  across	  
the	  Brooklyn	  Bridge.”87 
Anglo-Americans	  know	  the	  transaction	  proposed	  in	  this	  offer	  as	  a	  “unilateral	  contract.”	  
The contract is unilateral in that it causes obligation only to one party of the transaction. 
Only the offeror will be obligated to give something to the offeree. As this is somewhat 
comparable to the interested promise, one could be tempted to take an interested 
promise as an offer contemplating a unilateral contract.  
So Ann makes her promise to the public and the public understands it as an offer of a 
unilateral	  contract.	  In	  the	  public’s	  mind	  Ann	  said,	  “I	  will	  give	  you	  $100	  if	  you	  find	  my	  lost	  
jewelry.” 
1.3.2.3. THE ISSUE: THE POWER OF REVOCATION NEUTRALIZES THE POINT OF THE 
INTERESTED PROMISE 
 
The interpreter who is acquainted with the law of unilateral contracts88 will think this 
way:	  Ann	  is	  not	  interested	  that	  I	  say,	  “Yes,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  recover	  your	  lost	  property.”	  She	  is	  
                                                        
87 See	  Maurice	  Wormser,	  “The	  True	  Conception	  of	  Unilateral	  Contracts”,	  in	  The Yale Law Journal, Vol 26, No 
2, (Dec, 1916), pp. 136-142. 
88 Nobody	  better	  than	  Wormser	  explains	  the	   justice	  of	  unilateral	  contracts:	  “It	   follows	  logically	  that	  A	  is	  
perfectly within his rights in withdrawing his offer before B has accepted it by walking across the 
bridge—the act contemplated by the offeror and the offeree as the acceptance of the offer. A did not 




not calling for my commitment. She is interested that I find her lost property and give it 
back. She invited me to accept her duty to pay me a reward with a deed. To acquire the 
right of her promise, accordingly, I must do what she wants. Unless and until I do what 
she wants, she has no obligation towards me. As there is no obligation, she can act as if 
she had never made the offer. She just has to tell me that she is not interested that I 
recover her lost jewelry. As I know that she can revoke the offer, I have reasons to fear 
that Ann will repent and withdraw. Her proposal comes with a natural risk—that 
someone else delivers after I spent time and resources looking for the jewelry. But in 
addition to this risk, there is another—that Ann might revoke the promise as soon as she 
wishes and without justification, even one second before I delivered the jewels. There is 
nothing I can do. Verbal acceptance is ineffective against an offer of a unilateral contract. 
She wants to be obligated only if I fully perform the requisite act. Since I run too high a 
risk, I have fewer incentives to embark on the enterprise. As a result, what Ann wanted—
that I embark on the enterprise of looking for her lost property—will probably not 
happen. For, considered as an offer, the interested promise is not appealing me enough. 
In conclusion, agents propose exchanges to others through legal promises to give them a 
reason to participate in their proposals. But they cannot obtain what they want. The 
category with which a person would best interpret	  an	  interested	  promisor’s	  messages	  is	  
the offer of a unilateral contract. But, as illustrated above, when they think of the promise 
as an offer, they have no sufficient reasons so as to participate in the proposal—they 
therefore never create the sought chance. 
1.3. HYPOTHESIS: THE INTERESTED PROMISE COULD BE THOUGHT OF AS A JURIDICAL 
TRANSACTION 
Interested promisors cannot be said to be obtaining what they want because we assume 
that promisees think with the old private law categories. The blunt fact is however that 
agents in contemporary civil society do understand what interested promisors say and 
want with their promises. Not only that. Promisees many times rely on their promises. 
                                                        
and what A asked for from B, was a certain and entire act.  B understood this. It was for that act that A 
was willing to barter his volition with regard to $100. B understood this also. Until this act is done, 
therefore, A is not bound, since no contract arises until the completion of the act called for. Then, and 
not	  before,	  would	  a	  unilateral	  contract	  arise.	  Then,	  and	  not	  before,	  would	  A	  be	  bound.”	  Idem,	  p.	  137.	  “To	  
the	  writer’s	  mind,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  unilateral	  contract is thus as just and equitable as it is logical. So long 
as there is freedom of contract and parties see fit to integrate their understanding in the form of a 
unilateral contract, the courts should not interfere with their evident understanding and intention 
simply	  because	  of	  alleged	  fanciful	  hardship.”	  Idem.,	  at	  138.	  “The	  writer	  can	  see	  no	  injustice	  whatever	  in	  
the operation of the doctrine of unilateral contract. It is logical in theory, simple in application, and just 




This is to say, they begin to look for the lost jewelry, incur in expenses in view to make the 
promised contract, order the magazine year subscription, and so on and so forth. 89 So, in 
the world of life of in contemporary reality, the power of revocation turns to play in the 
promisor’s	  favor.	  Promisors	  profit	  from	  the	  fact that people believe their promises and 
may and many times decide to embark on doing what they want, and, in addition, they 
keep the power to repent and withdraw their proposal. In other words, promisors get the 
chance they want and keep the power to give it back without paying what it cost them. 
We see a mismatch between private law and social reality! Could private law regulate 
these promises?90 
Before proceeding, let me clarify some concepts. To regulate is to put an order to a certain 
circumstance.	  “This	  party	  said	  X	  in	  conditions	  Y	  to	  that	  other	  party”	  is	  a	  circumstance.	  To	  
this	   circumstance,	   the	   regulation	   attaches	   an	   order.	   “This	   party	   will	   have	   to	   do	   X	  
whenever	  the	  other	  party	  demands	  it”.	  Still,	  all	  regulation	  presupposes,	  necessitates	  and	  
exhibits,	  a	  regulative	  idea.	  For	  example,	  “we	  will	  order	  that	  every	  interested	  promisor	  will	  
have to act in accordance with her promise because doing what one promises enhances 
the	  welfare	  of	  the	  civil	  society.”	  The	  “because”,	  or	  the	  reason	  that	  grounds	  the	  regulation, 
exhibits the regulative idea (of the regulated practice). The regulative idea is the 
justification	   or	   explanation	   to	   the	   question	   “Why	   is	   it	   that	   this	   order	   follows	   that	  
circumstance?” 
                                                        
89 “The fact of the matter […] is that very reasonable people spend substantial time and money doing the 
sorts of things that unilateral contracts	  attempt	  to	  induce	  them	  to	  do.”	  Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing 
Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26, U.C. DAVIS L. REV., (1992), pp. 1-86, 
at pp. 32-33. 
90 The following is the attitude that I chose to resist: 
From the middle of the nineteenth century until the first part of the twentieth century, contract law was 
dominated by a school of thought now known as classical contract law. The teachings of this school were based 
on the premise that contract law, like geometry, could be developed by deduction from axiomatic rules. Like 
geometry, classical contract law tended to be static rather than dynamic, and binary rather than continuous. 
Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that classical contract law had difficulty coping with probability 
and chance, because rules that center on those elements tend to be dynamic rather than static, and continuous 
rather than binary.  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  realms	  of	  chance	  and	  choice… 
Eisenberg,	   “Probability	   and	   Chance…”,	   op. cit., pp. 1008-9. After having explained why contract law 
cannot work with the interested promises, the author choses to change the perspective from which to 
see and treat the unexplained material. What I do is rather different. I accept the critic but I do not change 
perspective. As the jurist that I want to be in this work, I want to see and treat these promises from the 
perspective of private law. But as the concepts of classical private law prevent me from seeing and 
explaining what I want to see and explain, what I do is to give some steps back, as it were, to have a 
better view point. In Part 4 I reach the point of view of	  justice	  in	  transaction…	  but always looking from 




1.3.1. THE INTERESTED PROMISE APPEARS AS A REGULATED PRACTICE 
To be sure, the practice of making interested promises presents itself to the law as already 
regulated. The promisors obtain the benefit of the chance because the promisees believe 
in the interested promises. And the promisees believe the interested promises because, 
for	  some	  reason,	  they	  think	  that	  from	  the	  circumstance	  “promise”	  there	  follows	  the	  order	  
“voluntary	  obligation.”	  If	  promisees	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  promises	  they	  are	  addressees	  
of,	  they	  wouldn’t	  find	  the	  promise	  an	  interesting	  business	  proposal, and therefore would 
not be encouraged to participate in it. 
If	   the	   law	   is	   interested	   in	   regulating	   the	   interested	  promise,	   the	   law	  shouldn’t	   get	   too	  
much	  into	  the	  question	  of	  “what	  should	  follow	  from	  the	  circumstance.”	  If	  at	  all,	  private	  
law should recognize the interested promises as they are.91 
But if this is so, what regulative idea could private law use to explain the linkage between 
the circumstance (interested promises) and its natural rule (promisors should do in 
accordance with their promises)? 
There are many ideas dictating that promises should be enforced and the law whose aim 
is	  to	  attach	  an	  “obligation”	  to	  the	  circumstance	  “interested	  promises”	  could	  adopt	  any	  one	  
of them. As a matter of fact, the reason that specific promisees believe in specific 
interested	  promises	  is	  already	  a	  regulative	  idea.	  Mr.	  García	  could	  believe	  that	  Ms.	  Smith’s	  
promise	  will	  be	  performed	  because	  Mr.	  García	  knows	  that	  Ms.	  Smith	  is	  a	  good	  Catholic,	  
and Catholics must do what they promise.92 I would think the same of my promisor if I 
know	  that	  she	  read	  Kant’s	  Critics	  of	  Practical	  Reason	  and	  endorsed	  Kantian	  ethics	  as	  her	  
morality. The principle of Catholic moral theology is different to the principle of Kantian 
ethics. Nevertheless, they both conclude that promises should be kept. 
1.3.2. THE (UN)IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW 
As a mater of fact, the study from which I first learned of interested promises presents us 
not only with the circumstance and the rule, but also the regulative idea. 
                                                        
91 I develop this claim in 6.2.2. 
92 As a matter of fact, medieval canonic law established an obligation to promise. Not in order to take care 
of the utilitas privata, but in order to take care of the utilitas publica of the ecclesiastic society, which 
demands the repression of the sin tangens periculum animarum.	  Guido	  Astuti,	  “Contratto	  (dir.	  interm.)”,	  
in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Vol IX,	  Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  1961,	  pp. 759-784, n. 9., pp. 774-6, spec. at p. 775 
(arguing that the factor that canonic law takes into account to establish the obligation of promise is its 




it is in the interests of offerors as a class that firm offers be enforceable, because under a 
regime of unenforceability, offerors cannot utilize firm offers to achieve their ends.93 
Eisenberg believes that actors are making these promises and committing to perform 
them because it is in their interest as a class to make and perform these promises. 
Moreover, he believes that the law is gradually enforcing these promises as it recognizes 
that they serve the interest of commerce. Finally, he sees this development as a just legal 
development. Eisenberg, in other words, thinks that the reason that promisors commit to 
their promises is the same reason that the law is enforcing and ought to continue 
enforcing the promises that benefit promisors. The social regulation and the legal 
regulation	  are,	  in	  Eisenberg’s	  thought,	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing. 
I believe that private law has another, more proper regulative idea to implement here: 
private law could regulate the interested promises in accordance with justice, which is its 
own, proper regulative idea. 
1.3.3. JUSTICE IN THE INTERESTED PROMISES: “A PROMISE FOR A CHANCE” 
Recall what we have said about the interested promises. The promisor wants the promise 
to obligate her to the promisee so that the promisee takes the promise seriously and 
considers its content as a possible spur for action—thereby creating the chance that he 
does what the promisor wants. 
Now, it is the case that in just private laws, a person becomes obligated to do something 
to another when, in a legal transaction, the debtor of the obligation obtained something 
that the creditor of the obligation gave in exchange, or lost against his will. (See 4.1.3, 
specifically 4.1.3.3.2.)  
                                                        
93 Eisenberg,	  “Probability	  and	  Chance…”,	  op. cit., p. 1019. The jump from sociology of business practices to 
economic theory seems reasonable:  
The concept of structural agreements, which is central to Part II of this Article, provides a direct link between 
transaction-cost economics and contract law doctrine. A major concern of transaction-cost economics is the 
manner in which various forms of governance structures can maximize the likelihood that economic 
transactions will be seen to completion, resulting in gains to both sides. A structural agreement is a governance 
structure that is designed and intended to promote the probability of gains through trade. As shown in Part II, 
contract law should make structural agreements enforceable to implement that design and intention. 
Increasingly, contract law is doing exactly that. 
The reasoning in general is this: if what the business class wants is to maximize their resources and 
economic theory teaches us how to do that best, then the rules of economics must be enacted as the law, 
even if merchants are not actually following them, for these economic rules are what the merchants 




We could say that the interested promise, as a cause of obligation, involves a person losing 
something—contracting an obligation—in order to gain some other thing—the chance 
that the promisee does something she wants. 
A first question then becomes whether the benefit (rectius: chance) that the promisor gets 
comes from the promisee. If the answer to this question happens to be affirmative, then, 
prima facie, the interested promise is susceptible to juridical regulation—more 
specifically,	  we	  could	  attach	  a	  “promissory	  obligation”	  to	  the	  promise	  that	  the	  interested	  
promisor makes to the promisee. 
It seems to me that there is such transfer in our case. In other words, the benefit that the 
promisor gets seems to be a benefit that comes from the promisee. 
One reason indicates this: 
If the addressees of these promises are the promisees, and the beneficiaries of these 
promises are the promisors, then, where does the benefit come from if not from the 
promisee? 
The justice of the case could therefore be this: The promisor must commit to the promise. 
If you use the promise of a reward to gain the chance that I look for your lost jewelry, I 
could use the chance you gained to prevent you from revoking the promise. For you 
cannot have gained the chance and avoid paying what it cost you—namely, the assurance 
that you will keep the promise or voluntary obligation. 
So there seem to be an exchange or commutation in this transaction. The commutation 
(or	  reciprocity)	  of	   the	   interested	  promise	  seems	  to	  about	  a	  “promise”	   for	  a	  “chance	   to	  
perform	  a	  willed	  transaction”. 
This exchange pattern can be observed in all typical interested promises: In a promise of 
reward for an act, the promisor assures the promisee that she will give him something if 
he happens to perform a certain activity, and in so promising, the promisor acquires the 
chance that the promisee will perform the requisite act. In a promise of a contract, the 
promisor assures the promisee that she will celebrate a certain contract with him, 
because in so promising, she acquires the chance that the promisee choose the promised 
option in lieu of a third option. Finally, in the fake gratuitous promise, the promisor 
assures a gift to the promisee, and thus obtains the chance that the promisee engages in 
some other sort of transaction. 





2. THE RECENT LAWS ON (INTERESTED) PROMISES DEFORM PRIVATE 
LAWS 
2.1. THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF INTERESTED PROMISES 
2.1.1. AN ARGUMENT AS TO THE IRELEVANCE OF MY ENQUIRY: PRIVATE LAWS HAVE ALREADY 
DEALT WITH THESE PROMISES 
Part 1 showed that classical private laws provide no term with which a lawyer could 
demand the enforcement of an interested promise. Moreover, it ended up suggesting that 
private law could develop a category for such promises, given their intuitive juridical 
relevance. The reader could agree with my remark and yet find it irrelevant. Whether 
private law should contemplate these promises, and how, are unnecessary questions. The 
question is whether the promisor can revoke the promise in spite of the benefit that she 
acquired, and contemporary private laws provide an arsenal of tools for dealing with this 
question.94 
Take the Common law decision Barry v. Davis.95 An auctioneer tried to revoke his promise 
to sell a lot to the highest bidder under the argument that the only bid placed was derisory. 
The court found that the refusal	   to	   sell	   the	   lot	   amounted	   to	   a	   breach	   of	   a	   “collateral	  
contract,”	   to	   which	   the	   parties	   entered	   when	   the	   plaintiff	   placed	   the	   bid.	   The	  
consideration	   thereof	   was	   found	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   “benefit	   to	   the	   auctioneer.”	   The	  
defendant made the promise knowing	  that	  “attendance	  at	  the	  sale	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  increased	  
if it is known that there is no reserve.”	  We	  see	  here	  a	  court	  applying	  the	  figure	  of	  a	  contract	  
to enforce a typical interested promise. A lawyer could use this figure to make her own 
case. 
Or take the French private law arrangement in Cass.	  Civ.	  3éme,	  10.5.1968.96 A real estate 
broker promised to sell real estate to the plaintiff for a fixed period of time. When the 
plaintiff wanted to execute the option, the defendant refused to sell the land. He said he 
was no longer interested in selling. The court did not enforce the sale and buy-option. 
                                                        
94 A similar argument was made in the context of French private law. It is unnecessary to build a special 
theory for promises, given that other categories, especially tort and contract, could do the justificatory 
work. The most popular version is found in Marty et Raynaud, Droit Civil, T 2, Vol 1: Les obligations, 
Sirey, Paris, 1988, n. 355 and ss. For a critical analysis see Marie-Laure Izorche, L’avènment de 
l’engagement	   unilateral	   en	   droit	   privé	   contemporain, Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-
Provence, 1995, pp. 34-38. 





However, it entitled the plaintiff to recover the “domages-intérêts”, which is the detriment 
he suffered owing to the revocation of the promise. We hence see the application of a 
second legal tool to another interested promise scenario. With this remedy, accordingly, 
a plaintiff could demand relief from the harsh results of an interested promise revocation. 
There is still a third, more direct means of treating interested promises. The German Civil 
Code provides special norms that make promises obligatory from the moment of their 
declaration.97 §657	  and §658 deal with the promise of a reward, §661 deals with the 
promise of a prize for the winner of a competition and §145 serves to enforce promises 
of contracts. These norms say nothing about why the promise binds. The late nineteenth 
century legislator possibly overlooked the fact that promisors obligate themselves 
unilaterally in the hope of promisees doing something they want. But the idea that 
someone obligates herself by her promise, which is what I suggest ought to be the legal 
effect of an interested promise, is familiar to a student of the German Civil Code. 
Now with these materials in hand the reader could say that there is no need to wonder 
whether and how private law should order interested promises. Postclassical private laws 
have already answered my question! Where practice demands the law to enforce an 
interested promise, the law must respond with a statute providing enforcement of the 
requested type of promise. Where the judge has to deal with a case for which there is no 
extant legal provision, he or she can invoke the figure of a contract or impose the 
“domages-intérêts”	  remedy. 
2.1.2. THE THREE SOLUTIONS AND THE NEED FOR EVALUATION 
Can these solutions pass without examination? Let us revise them superficially. The first 
two solutions utilize classical private law tools. The first utilizes the concept of contract 
to obligate the promisor to perform the promise. It is obvious that the operator must 
implement a fiction to treat the promise as a contract. This is already a reason to evaluate 
the	  figure	  called	  “collateral	  contract.”	  The	  second	  solution	  utilizes	  a	  tort	  remedy	  to	  relieve 
the promisee of the injury caused by revocation. There is an obvious criticism of this 
solution: do we want to recognize promises or grant relief to the injuries of revocation? 
But a more pressing issue arises here. It has to do with what is left in the system once a 
judge treats a previously licit	   activity	  as	  a	   tort.	  This	   solution	  will	  be	  examined	  as	   “the	  
reliance theory.”	  The	  third	  solution	  is	  the	  “doctrine	  of	  the	  obligatio ex lege”	  or	  the	  idea	  
                                                        
97 I utilize The German Civil Code, Revised ed. as amended to January 1, 1992, Simon L. Goren translation, 





that duties follow from facts because the legislator so wills it. The issue here is two-fold. 
On one hand, it could be that the German legislator regulated promises in a way that 
contradicts the demands of justice. In this case the ex lege obligations may answer the 
question of the promise’s enforceability, but incorrectly. On the other hand, the ex lege 
obligations are case-by-case solutions. To each typical promise a specific legal provision. 
But interested promises constantly grow in diversity. Can we solve the issue of the 
enforceability of the interested promise with a case-by-case approach? 
Each of the three following sections will be dedicated to evaluating each of the three 
solutions. The three sections follow the same method of exposition: Firstly, the sections 
present a solution in a particular context. The contract approach will appear in the context 
of English private law, the reliance theory in French private law and the ex lege obligations 
are described as they appear in the German Civil Code (For a justification of these choices, 
see 2.1.3.). Secondly, the sections abstract the solutions from the contexts where they 
appear to clarify their conceptual structure. This step is taken in order to see the accuracy 
with which the solution at stake tackles the interested promise in general. Does it cover 
the whole promissory phenomenon? If not, what remains outside? Are these inaccuracies 
significant? On the other hand, what is the nature and scope of the promissory obligation 
under each approach? 
The three sections finish with a critical appraisal. The question is not only whether the 
figure, theory or norm treats the interested promise in accordance with the reciprocity 
that is characteristic of private law, but also whether the figure, theory or rule fits with 
the systematic structure it happens to be placed within, whether these pieces can cope 
with their task of doing justice to a promise revocation without compromising the 
concepts and divisions with which the private law exposes the bases of liability. To 
illustrate: The first solution aims to regulate the interested promises in accordance with 
an existing category—the contract. This theory will be satisfactory if it can provide a 
solution to the problem of interested	  promises	  without	  compromising	  the	  contract’s	  form.	  
The concept of contract will be compromised (or corrupted) if, after the arrangements 
that are necessary for accommodating the interested promise, the law of contract is no 






2.1.3. SOME SPECIFICATIONS 
In essence, this part is an analysis of legal doctrine, not a comparative law text. I have 
placed the three legal pieces in specific legal orders because I think that a legal piece must 
be analyzed in a normative context. I have chosen three legal contexts rather than one to 
show that three legal orders are implicated in my case. More specifically, the fact that 
three private laws have treated interested promises chimes with my hypothesis that the 
interested promise is an interesting case for private law. And I have chosen English, 
French and German private law as the three main contexts for obvious reasons—these 
are the most idiosyncratic and most influential bodies of private law.  
The combination of solution and context owes its complexion to strategic reasons. I could 
have chosen to find the doctrine of the obligationes ex lege in any of the other two legal 
systems. As a matter of fact, both the English and French private laws have ex lege 
obligations for the enforcement of interested promises.98 I’ve	  chosen	  to	  analyze	  the	  ex lege 
obligations in the German context because I wanted them to be incontrovertibly in a legal 
system. Both the French and the English lawyer could say that these norms do not really 
belong to private law. The French scholar could say that the ex lege obligations are 
exceptional extra-Code norms. The English lawyer could argue that the ex lege obligation 
is not common but statutory law. These arguments could not be made in the German 
context. In that context, the ex lege obligations are definitively in the legal system, without 
possible controversy. 
I situate the reliance theory in the context of French private law because I did not want to 
analyze the contract approach in this context, while British private law does utilize the 
contract approach. I did not want to analyze the contract approach in the context of the 
French private law because it is not yet clear whether French law has endorsed the 
objective conception of human agency. In other words, French law sometimes engages in 
considerations of the subjective intention of a party at a voluntary interaction, a 
consideration that is absent in English private law and is more consonant with the theory 
of justice that my work endorses. However, I must admit, the origins of the double 
                                                        




contract analysis can be found in French scholarship,99 and the strongest developments 
in reliance theory have been made in the common law world.100 
2.2. THE “COLLATERAL CONTRACT” (AND ITS DEFORMING EFFECT) 
2.2.1. BARRY VS. DAVIS 
Barry	  saw	  the	  arrival	  of	  two	  new	  engine	  analyzers	  to	  Mr.	  Cross’s	  auction	  house. On the 
viewing day, Barry spoke to Mr. Cross, who said that the machines would be sold at noon 
on	  25	   June	   “without	  reserve.”	  Barry	  attended	   the	  auction.	  When	   it	   came	  to	   the	  engine	  
analyzers, Mr. Cross said to those present that the machines were to be "sold that day," 
that	  each	  was	  worth	  £14,000,	  "ready	  to	  plug	  in	  and	  away	  you	  go."	  First	  Mr.	  Cross	  tried	  
first to obtain a bid of £5,000.	  There	  was	  no	  bid.	  Then	  he	  tried	  £3,000;	  still	  no	  response.	  
He	  hence	  asked	  what	  bids	  there	  were	  for	  the	  machines.	  Barry	  bid	  £200	  for	  each.	  No	  other	  
bid was made. Mr. Cross canceled the auction sale. He said to those present: "I think I am 
justified in not selling at an auction without reserve if I think I could get more in some 
other way later." Barry took the auction house to court, claiming breach of contract. 
The	  County	  Court	  held	   for	   the	  plaintiff.	   “[T]here	  was	  a	  collateral	  contract	  between the 
auctioneer and the highest bidder, constituted by an offer by the auctioneer to sell to the 
highest	   bidder,	   which	   was	   accepted	   when	   the	   bid	   was	   made.”	   It	   is	   “the	   general	   and	  
reasonable	  expectation	  of	  persons	  attending	  at	  an	  auction	  sale	  ‘without	  reserve’	  that	  the	  
highest	  bidder	  would	  and	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  the	  lot	  for	  which	  he	  bids.”	  The	  defendant	  
appealed: The judge was wrong in law to find that the holding of an auction without 
reserve amounts to a promise by the auctioneer to sell the goods to the highest bidder. 
And even if the judge were right, a bid cannot amount to consideration for such a promise. 
The bidder can withdraw his bid at any time, how could a proposal to buy constitute 
consideration if the proponent can revoke it? The bidder is making	  an	  “illusory	  promise”	  
to do something if he feels like it.  
                                                        
99 The	  doctrine	  of	  “avant-contrat	  tacite”	  suggests	  that	  proposals	  of	  this	  type	  combine	  an	  offer	  to	  sell,	  which	  
remains open for acceptance, and an offer to keep the option to sell open, which is deemed accepted 
when the offeree receives the offer to sell. The latter acceptance is assumed on the grounds that such a 
proposal is only beneficial to the offeree. Charles Demolombe, Traité	   des	   contrats	   ou	  des	   obligations	  
conventionnelles en general, t. I, Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1877, n. 65, p. 64. 
100 “Many	  would	  locate	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  movement in 1936 with the publication of the influential article, 
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 Yale L. J. 52, 373 (1936-1937).”	  
P.	  S.	  Atiyah,	  “Book	  Review:	  Charles	  Fried,	  Contract	  as	  Promise:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Contractual	  Obligation,”	  in	  




The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Firstly, Warlow v. Harrison was authority for 
the proposition that in such cases a collateral contract existed between the auctioneer and 
the bidder. Secondly, the consideration for such a contract existed in the form of both a 
detriment to the bidder, since his bid could be accepted with the fall of the hammer, and 
a benefit to the auctioneer, because the bid could drive the bidding up. In addition, they 
hold,	  “attendance	  at	  the	  sale	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  increased	  if	  it	  is	  known	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reserve.”	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  found	  entitled	  to	  “recover”	  the	  sum	  of	  £27,600,	  which	  was	  the	  
difference	  between	  the	  bid	  and	  the	  machine’s	  market	  price.101 
We find in Barry vs. Davis an example of interested promise. Mr. Cross advertised the 
auction in a way that the average user of the items that were to be auctioned would find 
attractive. Barry was one of them. He not only created the expectations that Mr. Cross 
induced him to create but also relied on them. Barry attended the auction. Yet Mr. Cross 
did not do what he promised. He did not sell the lot to the highest bidder. Barry claimed 
performance and the Court found justice in his claim. How? It used the figure of a 
“collateral	  contract.”	  But	  what	  is	  a	  collateral	  contract?	  According	  to	  the	  judgment,	  it	  is	  a	  
“contract	  constituted	  by	  an	  offer	  by	  the	  auctioneer	  to	  sell	  to	  the	  highest	  bidder,	  which	  was	  
accepted	  when	  the	  bid	  was	  made.”	  But	  does	  this	  mean,	  for	  example, that, in the case that 
a third party makes a higher bid, the auctioneer is nonetheless obligated to sell the lot to 
the bidder with whom he made the collateral contract? The judgment does not clarify this 
question. We want to know more about this figure, for it seems to work with interested 
promises. Let us abstract the figure from the case, study it with the help of some good 
common law scholarship and evaluate how well it could work with interested promises. 
2.2.2. THE FIGURE CALLED “COLLATERAL CONTRACT”  
A	   “collateral	   contract”	   is	   a	   contract	   implicated	   in	   another	   contract. 102  How is such a 
contract formed? Within the offer of contract X, is an implied subsidiary or collateral offer 
                                                        
101 Barry v Davies, cit. For comments, see: Steve Foster, “Auctions without reserve: Warlow v. Harrison 
revisited,” in Cov. L.J., 5(2), (2000), pp. 108-113 (arguing that the fair correlate of binding the auctioneer 
to his promise to not revoke is to bind the auctioneer to his bid). Colin Perkin, Auctions without reserve: 
a rejoinder,” Cov. L.J., 5(2), (2000), pp. 114-116 (in disagreement with Foster, arguing—in my opinion, 
correctly—that the reciprocation for the obligation of the auctioneer is found in the fact that the promise 
will attract more public attention to the auction and eventually increase their commission.) 
102 Conf. Richard Stone, The Modern Law of Contract, 6th ed,	  Cavendish,	  London,	  2005,	  at	  145	  “A	  collateral	  
contract	  generally	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  unilateral	  contract,	  under	  which	  one	  party	  says	  ‘if	  you	  enter	  into	  
contract	  X,	  I	  will	  promise	  you	  Y’.	  The	  consideration	  for	  the	  promise	  is	  the	  entering	  into	  contract	  X.”	  For	  
the best exposition of the collateral contract see D. O. McGovney, “Irrevocable Offers,” 27, Harv. L. Rev., 
(1914), pp. 644-663. This is the case that McGovney has	  in	  mind:	  ‘Let us assume a concrete case: A. says 




of an obligation to not revoke the offer of contract X. The acceptance and consideration 
for this “collateral	  offer”	  is	  condensed	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  offeree	  does	  something	  with a 
view to accepting the offer of contract X. When this occurs, a collateral contract is formed, 
which obligates the offeror to not revoke the offer of contract X. 
Let me illustrate how this figure applies to interested promises. When someone makes an 
interested	   promise	   (the	   auctioneer	   advertises	   the	   auction	   with	   the	   clause	   “without	  
reserve”	  or	  a person who lost something promises a reward to the public), the promisor 
is actually making two separate offers, rather than one promise! The first one, named 
“principal	  offer,”	  offers	  an	  obligation	  (to	  sell	  the	  lot/to pay a reward) in consideration for 
a fact (whoever places the highest bid/whoever returns the lost item). This offer 
contemplates a classic unilateral contract. The offer of an obligation becomes an 
obligation when the offeree performs the requisite act, which constitutes the acceptance 
of	  the	  offer.	  The	  second	  or	  ‘collateral’	  offer	  also contemplates a unilateral contract, but of 
a more abstract nature: this is a unilateral contract that obligates one to make another 
unilateral contract. The offeror offers to not revoke the principal offer (to sell the lot to 
the highest bidder, to pay the reward to whoever returned the lost thing) in consideration 
for the fact that the offeree does something with a view to accepting the principal offer 
(place a bid/begin to search for the lost item). This act constitutes the acceptance of the 
collateral offer. When the offeree begins to perform the acceptance of the principal offer 
or accepts the collateral offer, the collateral contract is formed. By this contract, the 
offeror loses her ability to revoke the principal offer (cancel the auction or revoke the 
promise of a reward) and the offeree consequently accrues the right to fully accept the 
principal offer (if his bid is the highest, then win the bidding process, or ignore the 
revocation and continue searching for the lost item). 
This approach copes with some of the typical issues arising where legal operators try to 
apply the standard offer and acceptance scheme to interested promises. First of all, the 
acceptor of the collateral contract is not obligated to complete the performance required 
in the principal offer. (The bidder can revoke the bid before the auctioneer declares it 
highest; the person who embarks on a search for the lost thing has no duty to continue 
searching.) This is so because the thing that the acceptor pays in consideration for her 
right to complete the performance is not an obligation but an act that she has already done 
(placed a bid or begun to search the lost thing). Secondly, third parties could also acquire 
a right to accept the principal offer. They need only accept the collateral offer (place a 
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higher bid or search for the lost item). This does not imply that every acceptor of the 
collateral offer has a right to the thing offered in the principal offer. The person who would 
acquire the right to the obligation offered in the principal offer (the right to the auctioned 
lot or to claim the reward) is the person who accepts the principal offer (the one who won 
the bidding process or returned the lost item to the owner).  
It is important to notice however that in the double contractual approach, the promisor is 
not obligated from the moment that the promisee receives the promise. The promisee 
must have commenced the performance of the requested act—accepted the collateral 
offer. This requirement could be practically insignificant. In the majority of cases it will be 
easy for a plaintiff to argue that he had begun performing before the revocation. Especially 
since, in English private law, the acceptance of a unilateral contract is a non-receptive act; 
it took place even where the acceptee-offeror ignored it.103  
The double contract approach is quite an effective tool. With the insignificant compromise 
of having to begin her part in the promised transaction, the promisee can deem herself 
entitled to demand the promisor not neglect the promise. However, the problem with the 
contract approach is not so much its effectiveness in dealing with interested promises. 
The problem is rather that it becomes part of contract law. 
2.2.3. THE COLLATERAL CONTRACT’S DEFORMING EFFECT, OR ON HOW IMPLIED TERMS DEFORM 
CONTRACT LAW 
2.2.3.1. THE FORM OF CONTRACT LAW: AGREED EXCHANGE OF RIGHTS 
The point of contract law is to enable private actors to exchange their present or future 
assets in the manner that they so desire. 104 It is by attending to this desideratum that 
private law developed the concept of contract. The offer is the proposal whereby the first 
person determines the terms of the intended exchange. The acceptance is the act whereby 
the second person agrees to the terms of the offered exchange. The voluntary obligation 
and consideration are the terms or elements of the exchange. Through the voluntary 
                                                        
103 “…and if the person making the offer, expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient 
to act on the proposal without communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the condition 
is a sufficient acceptance without notification.”	  Judge Bowen in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 
1 Q.B. 256. Conf. G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 7th ed., Stevens, London, 1987, p. 31. I would have 
loved	  to	  use	  the	  Smoke	  Ball	  case	  in	  this	  section.	  But	  none	  of	  the	  judges	  use	  the	  name	  “collateral	  contract”	  
to elaborate their decisions, even though I think they applied that figure. 
104 Two	  sources	   inspire	  this	   title:	  Peter	  Benson,	  “The	  Unity	  of	  Contract	  Law,”	   in	  Benson,	  Peter	  (ed.),	  The 
Theory of Contract Law: New Essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2001, pp. 
118-205	  and	  Maurice	  Wormser,	  “The	  True	  Conception	  of	  Unilateral	  Contracts,”	  in	  The Yale Law Journal, 




obligation a person obligates a future performance at the request of the other person, 
while through the consideration the creditor of the obligation commits to another 
performance of her own or performs a certain act, like a transfer or a deed.  
The unilateral contract is, like all contracts, a prefabricated mode in which persons can 
effectuate exchanges. In an offer of a unilateral contract, the offered obligation becomes 
an obligation of the offeror to the offeree when the offeree performs the act requested in 
the offer. Until the offeree fully performs the requested consideration, the offeror does 
not acquire the thing she wants as an exchange for her obligation, and so, the offeree does 
not	   acquire	   a	   right	   to	   the	  offeror’s	  performance;	   for	   the	   contractual	   exchange	  has	  not 
occurred. 
2.2.3.2. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRACT AND INTERESTED PROMISE 
The social practice of contractual exchange has much in common with the social practice 
of making interested promises. Nevertheless, there are some remarkable differences. As 
we saw in 1.2.3.1., the promise of interested promise cannot be reduced to the offer of 
contract. The promisor is not asking the promisee to promise her something or perform 
an act as consideration for her promise. She is making him a promise. There is also little 
in common between taking an interested promise and accepting a contractual offer. The 
acceptance of a contractual offer is not only the externalization of the will to be the 
creditor of the contractual obligation, but also, and even more importantly, it is the 
performance of the act by which one transfers the thing requested in exchange for the 
contractual obligation; acceptance is undertaking the correlative obligation, transfer or 
deed.105  
Finally, the thing that the interested promisor gains in an interested promise has little to 
do with the thing that the offeror gains in a contract. The consideration for a contractual 
obligation can, by definition, take the form of a reciprocal contractual obligation or the 
performance of a certain deed. It is either the obligation I have as against you to do, give, 
or not do a certain thing, or the act whereby I give a certain thing to you, or perform a 
certain deed. The reciprocity that I find latent in the interested promise is of a different 
nature. It consists in a chance, the probable but uncertain eventuality that someone does 
something. In contrast with deeds, it has no visible manifestation, and in contrast with 
obligations, it requires no volition by the promisee (I fully elaborate the nature of chance 
in 5.4.). 
                                                        




2.2.3.3. BARRY V. DAVIS IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF AN INTERESTED PROMISE 
Barry v. Davis undoubtedly deals with a promissory advertisement. The auctioneer 
promised Barry that he would auction a certain lot on a certain day and that this lot would 
be sold to the highest bidder. Why did he do that? He did it because he thought that the 
assurance provided by such a promise would encourage Barry, as it would encourage 
anyone in his position, to participate in the bidding. The greater the public participation 
in the bidding process, the better his chance of selling the lot well. 106 
Both the County Court and the Court of Appeal saw the advertisement as an interested 
promise. The County Court noted the promissory nature of Mr. Cross’ declaration when it 
said:	   “[I]t would be the general and reasonable expectation of persons attending at an 
auction	  sale	  ‘without	  reserve’	  that	  the	  highest	  bidder	  would	  and	  should	  be	  entitled to the 
lot	  for	  which	  he	  bids.”107 The appeal court saw that this promise produces a benefit for 
the	  promisor	  when	  it	  said:	  “[A]ttendance at the sale is likely to be increased if it is known 
that	  there	  is	  no	  reserve.”108 In other words, the auctioneer advertises the auction with the 
clause	  ‘without	  reserve’	  in	  order	  to	  improve the chance that more people will attend the 
sale.  
Hence	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  could	  see	  the	  injustice	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  deed.	  If	  
the auctioneer advertises the auction	  with	  the	  clause	  ‘without	  reserve’	  then	  it	  is	  “fair	  and	  
logical”109 that the auctioneer should sell the lot to the highest bidder. So they decided to 
rectify the injustice caused by the	   defendant’s	   refusal	   to	   sell	   the	   lot.	  How	  did	   they do 
justice after the non-performance of the promise? 
2.2.3.4. YET THE COURTS TREATED THE INTERESTED PROMISE AS A CONTRACT 
The court did justice to the non-performance of the promise through the law of contract. 
In	  advertising	  the	  auction	  with	  the	  clause	  ‘without	  reserve’,	  the	  auctioneer is making an 
offer of an obligation to sell the lot in consideration for the offeree placing the highest bid. 
A successful bid accordingly constitutes acceptance and consideration for the obligation 
to sell the lot. According to the judge, the defendant-auctioneer breached a contract when 
                                                        
106 Conf. Colin Perkin, op. cit.,	  p.	  116:	  “As with other unilateral agreements, there is absence of mutuality of 
obligation,	  but	  auctioneers	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	  advertise	  the	  sale	  of	  property	  ‘without	  reserve’,	  which	  is	  a	  
deliberate and commercial decision, perhaps made upon their advice to the seller, with the purpose of 
encouraging bidding and increasing their commission.” 
107 Barry v Davies, cit., p. 1964, D. 
108 Idem, p. 1967, H. 




she withdrew the lot after the plaintiff had placed his bid. On what grounds did the 
auctioneer make herself liable? 110 On the grounds that: 
There was a collateral contract between the auctioneer and the highest bidder constituted 
by an offer by the auctioneer to sell to the highest bidder which was accepted when the 
bid was made.111 
As to consideration, in my judgment there is consideration both in the form of detriment 
to the bidder, since his bid can be accepted unless and until it is withdrawn, and benefit to 
the auctioneer as the bidding is driven up.112  
2.2.3.5. WHAT DID THEY HAVE TO DO TO TREAT THE INTERESTED PROMISE AS A CONTRACT? 
Collateral contract? Offer? Acceptance? Consideration? In order to make the defendant 
liable for breach of contract, the judges had to imply a collateral offer of a unilateral 
contract in the principal offer and, more remarkably, the judge had to invent a new 
conception of acceptance of a unilateral contract. They found that beginning to perform 
the act required by the principal offer amounted to acceptance of the collateral offer. The 
defendant advanced a very good argument against consideration in such an implied 
contract. Bidding could never be an actual benefit for the auctioneer, for the bid is but an 
offer, and offers can be revoked. In other words, the bidder can revoke the alleged 
consideration. This, they argued, amounts to a discretionary promise, a promise the 
performance of which depends on the promisor—an illusory consideration.113 Since the 
appeal court could found reason to support the argument of the defendant, the Appeal 
introduced the new conception of consideration for a unilateral contract. The Court said: 
“Moreover,	  attendance	  at	  the	  sale	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  increased	  if	  it is known that there is no 
reserve”.114 
Justice was thus served, but, as I will now show, at the risk of jeopardizing the idea of 
contract law. 
                                                        
110 One would expect the court to have argued something like, in cases where the performance of the activity 
requested in the offer of a unilateral contract depends on some kind of collaboration by the offeror 
(winning the bid depends on the auctioneer letting the hammer fall), the offeror must act in good faith 
and do whatever is required so that the offeree could perform the requested activity. Since there was no 
higher	  bid	  than	  the	  plaintiff’s,	  the	  defendant	  should	  have	  exacted	  the	  bidding	  process	  or	  declared	  the	  
plaintiff as the winner of bid. But this was not the ratio decidendi. 
111 Barry v Davies, cit., p. 1964, E. 
112 Idem, p. 1967, H. 
113 Idem, p. 1965, A-C. 




2.2.3.6. DEFORMING CONTRACT LAW, OR THE EFFECT OF IMPLYING ACCEPTANCE AND 
CONSIDERATION 
After having enforced the interested promise with the figure of the collateral contract, the 
court incorporated new versions of acceptance and consideration. 
Now, acceptance of a unilateral contract in English contract law not only means that the 
offeree of a unilateral contract performs the act required in the offer. It also means that 
the offeree begins to perform the act required in the offer. 
Now, consideration for the obligation of a unilateral contract in English contract law not 
only means the act that the debtor of the obligation wants in exchange for the obligation, 
it also means an increased likelihood that such act takes place.115 
In themselves, these new versions of acceptance and consideration are not undesirable. 
They help us to deliver justice in the case of non-performance of an interested promise. 
Combined with the Barry v. Davis implied offer of a unilateral contract (rectius: with an 
interested promise), these elements help us to articulate a just decision—since the 
promisor benefitted from the chance she sought, it is unfair that the promisor neglects the 
promise. But these new versions of acceptance and consideration are undesirable in the 
law of contract. For, considered in connection with their natural correlate (namely: with 
the proper understanding of an offer of a unilateral contract) these new conceptions of 
acceptance and consideration serve to articulate legally correct (but) unjust judgments.  
Think of the following hypothesis. A declares to B that A will pay a sum to B if B performs 
a certain act. A is clear with B that A wants to be obligated to give the sum to B if and only 
if B performs the requested act. In other words, A makes an offer of a unilateral contract 
to B. A is making an offer of a unilateral contract because A wants to reserve to herself the 
power to change her mind, to revoke the offer, until B fully completes the act that she 
wants. B is well aware of this. For some reason B finds the proposal convenient and, 
willing to run the risk of revocation, begins to perform. Now A revokes the offer before B 
completes	  the	  performance.	  Unhappy	  with	  A’s	  decision,	  B	  demands recompense from A 
for	  breach	  of	  contract.	  To	  do	  this	  he	  says:	  First,	  A’s	  offer	  was	  an	  offer	  contemplating	  a	  
unilateral contract. Second, this offer was accepted. I accepted this offer when I 
commenced to perform the requisite act (B quotes Barry v. Davis). Finally, the acceptance 
                                                        
115 Conf. Neil Andrews, Contract Law,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2011,	  n.	  3.47,	  p.	  71:	   “The	  
‘implied	   collateral’	   obligation	   is	   a	   juristic	   tool	   deployed	   to	   achieve	   a	   contractual	   solution in pre-
contractual	  contexts,	  where	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  case	  demands.	  Indeed,	  [one	  can	  see]	  the	  court’s	  willingness	  





of this offer was backed with consideration, for immediately after I was communicated 
the offer, I made it more likely that A would get what she wanted (B quotes Barry v. Davis).  
In my opinion, B has a case as against A. The judge may easily miss the fact that, in Barry 
v. Davis,	  the	  “offer	  of	  a	  unilateral	  contract”	  was	  actually	  an	  interested	  promise.	  Namely,	  a	  
proposal that is so firm and so convincing that it gives reasons to its addressee to take it 
as a right, a fact that increases the likelihood that he decides to act as the promisor desires. 
To an English judge, Barry v. Davis was	  about	  an	  offer	  of	  a	  unilateral	  contract.	  So	  was	  A’s	  
offer to B. Now, as the beginning of the performance amounts to acceptance and the 
hearing of an offer augments the likelihood that the offeror gets what she wants, then B, 
who did all of this, has a case against A. 
I think this case is legally correct. Judges are expected to read rules in accordance with 
their systematic intelligibility. In other words, in law, an offer must be understood in its 
connection with the concepts of acceptance and consideration. And this feature of 
sophisticated legal systems implies the banishment of the	  rule’s	  factual	  bases.	  In	  other	  
words,	   in	   law,	   this	   offer	   or	   that	   offer	   are	   both	   equally	   an	   offer.	   This	   is	   why	   Barry’s	  
conception	  of	  acceptance	  and	  consideration	  can	  be	  used	  in	  disregard	  of	  Barry’s	  factual	  
bases.	  As	  Lord	  MacMillan	  puts	  it,	  “The	  danger	  attendant on all doctrines which are found 
on presumptions, implications or fictions originally thought to be equitable is that they 
are apt to be extended by a process of logical development which loses sight of their origin 
and carries them far beyond the reach of any such justification as they may have originally 
possessed”.116 
2.2.3.7. TO FINISH WHERE WE STARTED: CONTRACT LAW IS NO LONGER ABOUT AGREED-UPON 
EXCHANGE OF RIGHTS 
Now, a common law private law can enforce an offer before acceptance by means of the 
new conceptions of acceptance and consideration. A person who wanted to be obligated 
if and only if the offeree fully performs the act requested in the offer could find herself 
stopped from using of her power of revocation. Contract law is no longer the means by 
which private actors exchange their present or future assets in the manner they most 
desire. Barry v. Davis has corrupted it. 
The theoretical implications of Barry v. Davis have been rendered in soft law in the two 
major common law private laws. 
                                                        
116 In Radcliffe, AC 215, p. 235. Quoted in Pierre J.J. Oliver, Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science, 




Goff LJ stated obiter on the issue of revocation of a unilateral offer: 
Whilst I think the true view of a unilateral contract must in general be that the offeror is 
entitled to require full performance of the condition which he has imposed and short of 
that he is not bound, that must be subject to one important qualification, which stems from 
the fact that there must be an implied obligation on the part of the offeror not to prevent 
the condition becoming satisfied, which obligation it seems to me must arise as soon as 
the offeree starts to perform. Until then the offeror can revoke the whole thing, but once 
the offeree has embarked on performance it is too late for the offeror to revoke his offer.117 
And Section 45 of the Restatement [Second] of the Law of Contracts stated: 
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not 
invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or 
begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of it. 
(2)	  The	  offeror´s	  duty	  of	  performance	  under	  any	  option	  contract	  so	  created	  is	  conditional	  
on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the terms of the 
offer.118 
2.3. THE RELIANCE ARRANGMENT (AND ITS DEFORMING EFFECT) 
2.3.1. CASS. CIV. 3ÉME, 10.5.1968 
In “Immobiliere	  Rivera	  Holliday,”	  the	  defendant	  conceded	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  sell	  one	  of	  
its properties	   to	   “Y,”	   a	   real estate agent. “Y”	   in	   turn	   granted an option to buy the 
defendant’s	  property to	  “X,”	  the	  plaintiff.	  This option gave “X”	  the	  right	  to	  buy	  the	  property 
until	  15	  December	  1963.	  “X”	  gave	  notice	  to	  “Y”	  of	  his	  eventual	  use	  of	  the	  option	  and	  later,	  
by letter dated on 27 November, requested that the defendant contact a notary with a 
view to effectuating the sale option granted by	  “Y.”	  On 3 December the defendant sent a 
letter	  to	  “Y”	  letting	  him	  know	  that	  such	  a	  sale	  could not be executed as he was using his 
                                                        
117 Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd, (Goff LJ), [1978] 2 ALL ER, p. 561. This case follows Errington 
v. Errington & Woods, where a father promised his son and daughter-in-law he would transfer ownership 
of	  a	  house	  if	  they	  paid	  off	  the	  remaining	  mortgage	  installments.	  “The	  father’s	  promise	  was	  a	  unilateral	  
contract [which] could not be revoked by him once the couple entered on performance of the act, but it 
would	  cease	  to	  bind	  him	  if	  they	  left	  it	  incomplete	  and	  unperformed…”	  Denning	  LJ	  [1952]	  1	  KB	  290,	  P.	  
295,	  CA.	  A	  commentator	  cited	  this	  case	  to	  “suggest	  that	  the	  offeree	  is	  protected	  whenever	  he	  starts	  to	  
perform,	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  offer.”	  Neil	  Andrews,	  Contract law, op. cit., n. 3.43, p. 68. However, the author 
says	  that	  “whether	  commencement	  of	  performance	  should	  always have	  the	  effect	  of	  fettering	  the	  offeror”	  
depends on the context of the case, this view being held in Luxor (Estbourn) Ltd. V. Cooper, (1941) [1941] 
AC 108, HL. Idem, n. 3.40, p. 66 and n. 3.45, pp. 69-70. 




“freedom	  of	  disposition” to revoke “Y”’s	  agency.	  “X”	  had	  notice	  of	  this	  fact	  and	  claimed	  
damages from “Immobiliere	  Rivera	  Holliday”. 
The Court of Appeal ordered	   “Immobiliere	   Rivera	  Holliday”	   to	   pay	   the	   sum	   of	   15000 
FRANCS to	  “X”,	  under the heading of “domages-intérêts”.	  The	  basis	  for	  this	  judgment	  was	  
that Immobiliere had caused a prejudice to X by refusing to act in accordance with a 
“proposition	  of	   sale”	   that	   “X”	  had	  accepted.	   Immobiliere	  appealed	   the	   judgment	   to	   the	  
Court of Cassation arguing that Immobiliere revoked the proposal in question before that 
“X”	  accepted	  it.	  So,	  if	  any	  pre-contractual dealings (pourparlers) had existed between the 
parties, these dealings did not amount to an agreement. The Court of Cassation dismissed 
the appeal. The main ground was this: 
Notwithstanding that an offer of sale can in principle be revoked as long as it is not 
accepted, it is another case where the one from whom it emanated expressly bound 
himself to not revoke the offer before a certain date 119 
French jurists treat this arrangement as one that establishes the principle that an offeror 
who has fixed a delay to accept the offer incurs an “obligation”	  to	  maintain	  the	  offer.120 
Opinion	  is	  divided	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  bases	  of	  the	  offeror’s	  liability.121 The Court says 
nothing of relevance to such questions. If we judge from the remedy and the accounted 
facts however, we have grounds to conclude that the arrangement applies what Anglo-
American	  jurists	  call	  “reliance	  theory.” 
The Court gave force to an unaccepted offer and granted the recovery of the lost 
expenditures because, in my view, the Court found it reasonable that the plaintiff relied 
on the proposition of sale. This characterization is supported by the interpretation of legal 
comparatist Basil Markesinis, who, comparing the German private law on the one hand, 
and	   French	   and	   English	   on	   the	   other,	   sees	   that	   “unlike	   the	   latter	  which	   treats	   such a 
                                                        
119 “MAIS	  ATTENDU	  QUE	  SI	  UNE	  OFFRE	  DE	  VENTE	  PEUT	  EN	  PRINCIPE	  ETRE	  RETRACTEE	  TANT	  QU'ELLE	  
N'A PAS ETE ACCEPTEE, IL EN EST AUTREMENT AU CAS OU CELUI DE QUI ELLE EMANE S'EST 
EXPRESSEMENT ENGAGE A NE PAS LA RETIRER AVANT UNE CERTAINE	   EPOQUE”	  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000006977226&dateTexte 
120 Jacques Flour, Aubert, Jean-Luc	  and	  Sauxes,	  Éric, Droit Civil, Les obligations, t. 1: L’acte	  juridique, 13d ed., 
Sirey, Paris, 2008, p. 109. 
121 The dominant opinion is that the court manifestly implements the theory of the unilateral engagement. 
“An	   offer,	   valid	   till	   15	   December	   1963,	   accepted	   expressly in 24 October of the same year (with 
confirmation of 27 November), cannot be revoked in 3 December, not because it was accepted, but 
because	   it	   must	   have	   been	   maintained	   till	   15	   December.” Izorche, L’evènment	   de	   l’engagement	  
unilateréral	  en	  doit	  privé	  contemporain, op. cit., n. 156, p. 117. However, the criticism is made that if the 
court recognized an engagement by unilateral will why did it sanction the non-performance of the 
promise	  with	  the	  “domages-intérêts?”	  Jacques Flour, Aubert, Jean-Luc and Sauxes,	  Éric,	  Droit Civil…, op. 




premature revocation as being without effect, the former systems (American 
“Restatement	  (Second)	  Contracts,	  para	  90(1);	  France,	  [our	  case]	  Cass.	  Civ.	  3éme,	  10	  mai	  
1968, Bull civ, III, no 209) regard such a revocation as effective, but require the offeror to 
pay	  to	  the	  disappointed	  offeree	  damages	  equal	  to	  his	  ‘reliance	  interest:’ ie, damages that 
will restore him to the position he was in before	  the	  offer	  was	  made.”122 
2.3.2. THE RELIANCE THEORY 
The reliance theory aims to be a source of obligation. Three conditions must be in place 
for the formation of a reliance obligation. 123  First, a person does or says something 
suggesting that she intends to follow a certain course of conduct. In our case, 
“Immobiliere,”	   represented	   by	   “Y,”	   stated	   to	   “X”	   that	   “X”	   had a right to buy one of its 
immovable goods until 15 December. Second, a reasonable person develops the 
expectation	   that	   the	   suggested	   course	   of	   conduct	   will	   be	   followed.	   “X,”	   acting	   as	   the	  
average individual who receives a firm proposition of sale, acted on the idea that he could 
prepare himself for the sale. Finally, the person with the expectations relies upon the 
expectations, incurring reasonable expenditures. I imagine, for French case law is 
typically	  frugal	  with	  facts,	  that	  “X”	  did	  something	  with a view to buying the property, like 
rejecting a comparable offer or taking a loan to buy the property, something that could 
have cost him 15000 FRANCS. Anyone in “X’s” position would reject a less convenient 
offer but no reasonable person would, for example, gamble her liquid assets with a view 
to obtaining the money for the property. Now, if these elements are verified and the 
expectation-inducing person contradicts her suggested course of conduct, the reliant-
person	   can	   claim	   the	   “reliance	   interest”.	   According to this claim, the defendant must 
return the plaintiff to the position he would be in had	  he	  never	  relied	  upon	  the	  defendant’s	  
conduct.  
How well does the reliance theory tackle the issues emerging in interested promise 
scenarios? I can elaborate two possible answers, the first rigorous and unfavourable, the 
second generous and favourable.
                                                        
122 Basil Markesinis et al., The German Law of Contract: a comparative treatise, 2d ed., Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, 2006, at 65. 
123 I draw from Hugh Collins, The law of contract, 2d ed., Butterworths, London, 1993, p. 69. 
 
 
                
The idea that we are responsible for the 
detriments that a person suffered in virtue of 
having reasonably relied on the idea that we 
made her have by promising her something 
or suggesting that we will do or continue 
doing something appeared in different 
doctrines or principles. James Gordley (in 
Foundations of Private Law, at p. 290) traces 
the idea back to the Dominican theologian 
Cajetan (in picture 1, receiving Martin 
Luther, available 
at https://it.wiki 
pedia.org/wiki/Tommaso_De_Vio)  to  whom  a  “promisee  was  owed  
nothing as a matter of justice unless he had suffered damage 
because the promise was first made and  then  broken.”  (Quoted  in  
Gordley, Philosophical Origins, at p. 73). The idea reappears in an 
influential article by Rudolf von Jhering (picture 2 in 
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_von_Ihering), where it beco-
mes the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, which was received by 
the provisions of many twentieth century civil codes. 
 
In the common law world, the idea was 
made  famous   in  an  article  called  “The  
Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages”,  by  Lon  Fuller   (picture  3   in  http://www.lonlfuller.org)  
and his pupil William Perdue (there is discussion on whether it was 
indeed the master who wrote it). Patrick Atiyah, author of the 
monumental The Rise and Fall of 
Freedom of Contract (in the last 
picture, from my own library), 
argued that liability would be 
better understood if the category 
“contract”   were replaced for the 
what he called “benefit   based  
liability”,   “reliance-based   liability”  
and   “wholly   executory”   contract   or   promise.   In   his   view   the  
first  two  are  “the  paradigm  cases  of  obligation”,  while  the  third,  
if  not  “a  projection  of   liabilities  normally based on benefit or 
reliance”,   is,   “by   the   standard   of  modern   values,   very   weak  
compared with the grounds for the creation of benefit-based 





Picture 1: Cajetan (Tommaso De Vio) receiving Martin Luther 
Picture 4: Atiyah's Books 
Picture 2: Rudolf von Ihering 





The favourable thesis would say that the reliance theory could be very useful to relieve a 
promisee of the harsh results that he could suffer where the promisor unduly revokes the 
promise. 124 
The unfavourable thesis would hold that the reliance theory treats the promise as 
something that it is not. Under the reliance doctrine, a promise is a risk-creating act. When 
someone receives a promise, someone is being put in a situation of risk—that one acts in 
reliance to the promised fact that the promisor later never happens to perform. But, as 
Charles Fried remarked, a promise is not like a pit that the promisor dug in the road.125 A 
promise is a right conferral act. If the law is to deal with promises, the law must treat them 
as what they are. The natural remedy for breach of an interested promise cannot be the 
reliance damage, whatever the extention of it may be. The remedy, if at all, must be the 
value of the expectations created with the promise. 
Now, even if we concede the point to the favorable opinion, and say that the theory 
adequately deals with the exigencies of promise making, I would not use this doctrine to 
regulate interested promises. This is because using the theory for this purpose leaves it 
in the realm of private law. The problem with positing the reliance theory in private law 
is that the theory debunks a fundamental division. Namely, the division between the 
deeds that engage one person to another in an obligation and the deeds that one can do 
without	  the	  others’	  reproach.	   
2.3.3. THE RELIANCE ARRANGEMENT’S DEFORMING EFFECT, OR HOW RELIANCE ARRANGMENTS 
BLUR THE FREEDOM/OBLIGATION DIVIDE  
2.3.3.1. ONE MESSAGE IN ART 1370: ON THE ONE HAND, OBLIGATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, 
FREEDOM 
The French private law, as stated in its most important sources, adheres to a tradition of 
classifying the obligations in accordance with their causes. The French Civil Code divides 
the obligations into two main branches, those arising from a contract and those arising 
                                                        
124 True,	  the	  reliance	  theory	  does	  not	  grant	  the	  promisee	  the	  “expectation	  interest;”	  namely,	  an	  action	  for	  
compensation of the frustrated expectations. However, it seems that courts have no better means to 
quantify the reliance damage than the value of the thing promised. (Daniel Farber and Matheson, John, 
“Beyond	  Promissory	  Estoppel:	  Contract	  Law	  and	  the	  “Invisible	  Handshake”,	  in	  The University of Chicago 
Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn, 1985), pp. 903-947.) In other words, the reliance damage could be 
granted to put the promisee in the situation he would have been in had the promise been performed. 
125 For	  the	  reliance	  theory	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  promise	  “is	  like	  a	  pit	  I	  have	  dug	  in	  the	  road,	  into	  which	  you	  fall.	  I	  
have harmed you and should	   make	   you	   whole.”	   Charles	   Fried,	   Contract	   as	   Promise:	   A	   Theory	   of	  




from the other categories or situations to which the Code attaches an obligation (Art. 
1370). These other categories or situations are what the French call “sources de la 
responsabilite extra-contractuel.”	    The difference between the contract, on the one hand, 
and the other categories or situations like the quasi-contract, delict and quasi-delict on 
the other hand, is that only the contract category enables parties to voluntarily impose 
obligations on each other. 
There is another message latent in this classification. The Code makes it plain that persons 
incur no obligations if, in interacting with one another, they neither celebrate a contract, 
nor effectuate an illicit or licit but unjust interaction. The point is, in French legal terms, 
to separate the acts that engage persons in obligations from the range of simply licit 
interaction. 
2.3.3.2. WHAT THE RELIANCE DOCTRINE DOES, AND THE CODE CIVIL ALSO DOES 
To be sure, the reliance theory proffers	   solutions	   that	   the	   Code’s	   categories	   already	  
satisfy. As stated earlier, the reliance theory would impose an obligation on a person 
whose inconsistent conduct induced another to act in a manner detrimental to his 
interests. If the inconsistency on which the plaintiff relied amounts to an impingement on 
the	  plaintiff’s	  rights,	  then	  the	  interaction	  qualifies	  as	  illicit and the Code, as the reliance 
doctrine, obligates the defendant to pay the damages suffered by the plaintiff. These are 
cases of deceit (Art. 1382) and bad faith in contractual dealings.126 If the defendant gained 
something out of the reliant-party’s	  detriment,	  then	  the	  interaction	  amounts	  to	  an	  unjust 
enrichment and the Code, (with certain limitations) like the reliance doctrine, obligates 
the defendant to make restitution of the accrued value to the plaintiff. These are the cases 
of negotiorum gestio (1372 and related articles) and indebitum (1377 and related 
articles). 
2.3.3.3. WHAT THE DOCTRINE DOES BUT THE CODE DOES NOT 
What the reliance theory demands but the Code resists is relief for injuries that arise in 
cases of simply licit and not unjust interactions, like, paradigmatically, the detriment one 
party may suffer through the	   other’s	   unforeseen	   breach	   of	   a	   contractual	   negotiation.	  
These	  interactions	  are	  simply	  licit	  in	  that	  someone	  acts	  without	  infringing	  someone	  else’s	  
                                                        
126 French jurists have long argued that there is a duty to act with prudence and diligence when entering 
into contractual negotiations. A. Colin et Capitant, H., Cours	  élémentaires	  de	  droit	  civil, t. II, 9th ed, Dalloz, 
Paris, 1942, p. 220. See the jurisprudence quoted in Jeremy Antippas, “De	  la	  bonne	  foi	  précontractuelle	  
comme fondement de l'obligation	  de	  maintien	  de	  l'offre	  durant	  le	  délai	  indiqué,” in Revue Trimestrielle 




rights and not unjust in that, albeit someone may lose something due to another’s	  
contradictory conduct, the loss of the one cannot be imputed to the other as a gain. 
In	  the	  system	  of	  the	  Code	  Civil,	  such	  injuries	  are	  imputed	  to	  the	  sufferer’s	  own	  act,	  they	  
are	  comparable	  to	  a	  person’s	  misuse	  of	  her	  own	  thing.	  Once	  again,	  if	  the injury arose out 
of	  another’s	  wrongful	  conduct,	  as	  when	  one	  breaches	  her	  duty	  to	  deal	  with	  others	  in	  good	  
faith, then the damaged party can argue that the defendant was negligent or negotiated in 
bad faith or committed a fraud. But then the conduct was illicit. Or if someone happens to 
gain something out of a licit and not contractual interaction, as when the plaintiff gave 
him something by mistake, then the plaintiff has a claim on restitution. But then the 
interaction	  falls	  in	  one	  of	  the	  Code’s	  articles	  on unjust enrichment. 
However the doctrine wants to grant another value to these losses. How will it do this? By 
neglecting a part of the system where it aims to situate itself, as evinced in Cass.	  Civ.	  3éme,	  
10.5.1968. 
2.3.3.4. WHAT THE COURT OF CASSATION HAD TO DO TO SATISFY THE DOCTRINE’S DEMAND 
The defendant was entitled to recover the “domages-intérêts” from the plaintiff. On what 
factual basis did the Court hold the parties to such an obligation? The court affirmed that 
this was because the defendant revoked the offer. On what legal ground is such behaviour 
liable? The court chose to say “Notwithstanding that an offer of sale can in principle be 
revoked as long as it is not accepted, it is another case where the one from whom it 
emanated expressly bound himself to not revoke the offer before a certain date.”	  Akin to 
a faithful reliance theorist, the court debunked the contract formation process. To the 
court, an offer may cause an obligation even without acceptance. The court neglected the 
role of acceptance in the process of transforming a licit interaction into an obligatory 
relation.  
Thus, the reliance doctrine enters into French private law. It does so as an alternative to 
the contract. Contract is no longer the only means by which persons can transform their 
licit interaction into a juridical relationship. If a person acts in a reliable way, which 
another person relies upon, the reliance is detrimental to the latter, and the former 
deviates her conduct from the expected course, then the latter has an action for the 
recovery	  of	  the	  “domages-intérêts”	  as	  against	  the	  former.	  The	  plaintiff	  can	  demand	  the	  
defendant place him in the situation he was before the reliance-creating act. This is a way 






2.3.3.5. THE UNJUSTNESS OF THE ARRANGEMENT 
To be sure, one has legal grounds to say that acceptance is unnecessary for certain 
contracts. After all, when Art. 1108 mentions the four essential conditions for the validity 
of a convention, in relation to consent it requires: “The	  consent	  of	  the	  party	  who	  obligates	  
himself.”127 One can say that the consent of the offeree is not necessary for the creation of 
a voluntary obligation. But one cannot dispense with the concept of acceptance without 
further elaboration. For there is also the venerable wording of art. 1131, which says: “An	  
obligation without a causa, or with a false causa, or with an illicit causa, cannot have any 
effect.”	  Art. 1131 mandates justice in voluntary transactions. Causa means that, in the 
transaction, I gave something for the obligation that you assumed. After doing away with 
the concept of acceptance, the court must have considered reciprocity in relation to the 
obligation of the offeror. As one	  commentator	  has	  asked,	  “Quelle	  est	   la	  cause	  de	  <<cet	  
engagement autonome>>?128 
The pertinent question is this, why should the offeror be obligated to the offeree if the 
offeror gained nothing in his interaction with the offeree?  
There is a reason why the only one responsible for misuse of property in licit pre-
contractual dealings is the owner of the lost property himself. This reason is that no one 
can be said to have gained what the other lost. Had my negotiation been illicit, say by 
pretending we are reaching an agreement so that you close no contract with my 
competitor, I could compensate you for lost opportunities. Here however, as in any illicit 
interaction, your lost profit is also my gain. Even if no tangible thing passed into my 
possessions, I frustrated a contract between you and my competitor. To you this was a 
loss, to me it was a gain, and my gain caused you a wrong, for I obtained it by deceiving 
you. This interaction, which looks licit, is in actuality illicit.  
Alternatively, I promise you that if you build a wall in my house I will pay you X sum. 
Before you complete the work, I revoke the offer. Here you have a claim on me for 
restitution.129 Even if the only possible acceptance of my offer was your building of my 
wall—and, in this sense, I could licitly revoke my offer, for there was no binding 
contract—you can still have a claim for restitution. You have a right against me because 
                                                        
127 This argument is made by Rodolfo Sacco, "Formation of Contracts," in Vv. Aa., Towards a European Civil 
Code, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004, Chapter 19, pp. 353-362. 
128 Commenting	  on	  a	  case	  of	  cession	  of	  creances:	  Augustin	  Boujeka,	  “De	  l’art	  de	  constater	  un	  engagement	  
unilateral	  sans	  en	  tirer	  les	  consequences	  juridiques,”	  in	  Recueil Dalloz, (2004), p. 1969-1970, at n. 5. 




your acts benefited me. You can recover your misspent expenditures because after your 
detriment I am better off in the same measure that you are worse off. The interaction, 
albeit licit, amounts to an unjust result. The point is that we must elaborate when doing 
justice in rare cases! 
2.3.3.6. TO FINISH FROM WE STARTED: THE BLURRED DIVISION OF THE OBLIGATIONS 
The reliance theory may allow promisees to demand relief from the injury suffered as a 
result of the	  promisor’s	  undue	  breach	  of	  promise.	  But	  it	  does	  that	  without	  reference	  to	  
the gain that the promisor got by the undue breach of the promise. In other words, the 
reliance theory is not concerned with the question of justice. The basis for imposing an 
obligation is the simple fact that someone caused another to act in detriment to himself. 
But then almost literally every expectation producing conduct could mature into a cause 
of obligation, from breach of contractual negotiations, to not fulfilling a promise of dinner, 
to unexpectedly quitting a relationship. To persons in private law it becomes quite 
difficult to ascertain which conduct would place them in an obligation. Hence, inserted in 
private law the reliance theory and its demands blur the just division between freedom 
and obligations. 
Does my conclusion imply that we should pay no attention to the realm of the licit life of 
persons? No, it does not. This realm is the field of innovation. There is where private 
actors, through the licit use of their freedom, create new forms of things, associations and 
interactions. The jurist must look closely to these new forms since some of them may 
come with juridical implications. In this connection, the reliance theory and its case law 
is important for the jurist. It shows us sensible episodes of contemporary life. I am 
convinced that innovation must be made in the law of delicts. Perhaps the jurist should 
reconsider the classification	  of	  the	  person’s	  rights.	  My	  PhD	  attempts	  to	  innovate	  the	  law	  
of voluntary transactions. From a classical private law perspective, the interested promise 
has no obligatory implications; it is a licit and not unjust interaction. I believe that the 
promise ought to obligate the promisor, but not only because the promisor may cause 
another to rely on the promise, but also because the promisee could rely on the promise 
and this possibility constitutes a benefit for the promisor. I point out the cause or justice 
of	  the	  promisor’s	  obligation.	  If	  I	  manage	  to	  sufficiently	  depict	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  
such possibility is a benefit for the promisor, we will then have a model of a just cause of 
obligations. What we used to see as a simple interaction—or a revocable offer—in fact we 
see as a voluntary transaction. I am sure that the new cause of obligation will deal with 





2.4. THE OBLIGATIONES EX LEGE (AND THEIR INHERENT RISK) 
2.4.1. BGB §657, AND SIMILAR PARAGRAPHS 
§657	   of	   the	   German	   Civil	   Code	   (BGB)	   prescribes:	   “A	   person,	   who	   by	   public	   notice	  
announces a reward for the performance of an act, in particular for the production of a 
result, is bound to pay the reward to any person who has performed the act, even if he did 
not	  act	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  reward”.	  §657	  (2)	  establishes	  that	  “Revocability may be waived 
in	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  reward”	  and	  that	  “in	  cases	  of	  doubt,	  a	  waiver	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  setting	  
of a period of time for undertaking	  the	  act.” 
In this way, the main source of German private law makes a promise of a reward 
obligatory from the moment of its declaration. BGB provides comparable solutions to 
typical	  interested	  promises	  in	  other	  sections:	  §661 deals with the promises of a prize for 
the winner of a competition, §661	   deals	   with	   promissory	   advertisements,	   §780 with 
promises to perform an obligation and §781 with cases where someone acknowledges a 
debt by promise. 
2.4.2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE OBLIGATIO EX LEGE 
In my interpretation, the means by which the German legislator introduced these causes 
of obligations into its law of obligations adhere to what professor Mayer-Maly	  called	  “the	  
doctrine of obligatio ex lege”.130 
The doctrine of obligatio ex lege is a mode of justifying obligations. According to this 
doctrine, a given circumstance gives rise to an obligation when a validly enacted norm has 
attached	  an	  obligation	  to	  the	  given	  circumstance.	  The	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  “why	  does	  
X obligation follow from	  Y	  circumstance?”	  is	  “X	  obligation	  follows	  from	  Y	  circumstance	  
because	  the	  law	  says	  it.”131 This is a very flexible mode of justifying obligations. Such is its 
                                                        
130 Theo Mayer-Maly,	  “Divisio	  Obligationum,”	  in	  The Irish Jurist, Dublin, (1966\1967), pp. 375-385, at p. 383. 
131 The doctrine of the obligatio ex lege or, better, of the lex qua supreme source of Ius is, with its related 
item	  of	  the	  “legal	  certainty”,	  the	  presupposition	  of	  the	  State	  private	  law. 
Con la moderna "certezza del diritto" siamo immersi, dunque, ben all'interno di una ampia serie di arnesi 
mitologici	  di	  cui	  la	  modernità	  giuridica	  è	  straordinariamente	  doviziosa.	   
Il	  primo	  è	  lo	  Stato	  quale	  unico	  produttore	  di	  diritto,	  al	  quale	  consegue,	  dapprima,	  il	  mito	  della	  legge	  quale	  unica	  
fonte	  capace	  di	  esprimere	  la	  volontà	  generale	  e,	  quindi,	  quello della sua intrinseca giustizia e della indiscutibile 
infallibilità	  del	  legislatore. 
Il	  secondo	  è	  che	  la	  produzione	  del	  diritto	  ha	  termine	  con	  la	  promulgazione	  del	  testo	  contenente	  la	  volontà	  del	  
legislatore quale unico produttore, con la rilevantissima conseguenza (rilevantissima precisamente per 




explanatory power that a valid norm could link an obligation to almost every imaginable 
circumstance. 
Ex lege obligations could be seen also as a legislative technique. As such, ex lege 
obligations are propositions that establish causes of obligation in the form of conditionals. 
“If	  Y	  happens	  then	  X	  must	  be	  the	  case.”	  This	  technique	  requires	  elaboration of two basic 
premises:	  the	  “situational	  case”	  and	  the	  “legal	  effect.”	  The	  situational	  case	  is	  the	  factual	  
basis of the obligation. It is a description of a possible state of affairs. Every possible fact 
or agency could be established as a situational case, from the fact of being a son to the act 
of announcing a reward for the performance of a deed. Usually, a lawgiver would describe 
the situational case in scrupulous detail, for this establishes the immediate factual basis 
of	   an	   obligation.	   The	   “legal	   effect,”	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   the	   obligation	   linked	   to	   the	  
situational case. It is a description of what ought to be the case after every manifestation 
of the situational case. The legislator would generally draft the legal effect in the form of 
a traditional obligation—a relation by which A has a duty to do or give T, and B a right to 
claim the owed T. But nothing prevents the lawgiver from drafting the legal effect in 
another form, for example where the fact X pertains; the law attaches the duty that B do 
T, without mentioning the creditor. Such is the versatility of the ex lege obligations.132  
It goes without saying that lawmakers would attach a legal effect to a situational case 
because they find it appropriate that such effect follows from such case. The desideratum 
is that private law obligations observe a value, and that this value be transactional justice. 
But as we will see, ex lege obligations can be enacted to attend to the demands of a special 
class, which may run contrary to the demands of justice. 
One can now see how useful the ex lege obligations are for rendering interested promises 
enforceable. The lawgiver has to institute a promise as a situational case—a person 
announces a reward to the public—and link it to a legal effect—the promisor is bound to 
pay the reward to any person who has performed the act. So expedient is this method that 
                                                        
nella rigida scansione logica del sillogismo benedetto in tante pagine illuministiche. Ecco, chiaramente  in che 
consiste, essenzialmente, la cosiddetta certezza del diritto. 
Paolo	  Grossi,	  “Sulla	  odierna	  “incertezza”	  del	  diritto,”	  in	  Giustizia Civile, n. 4, (2014), pp. 921-955, at p. 926. 
132 This legislative technique, qualified by Natalino Irti as “logicist”	  or	  “intellectualist”,	  is	  mastered	  firstly	  in	  
Ernest	  Zitelmann’s	  book	  Irrtum	  und	  Rechtsgeschäft, 1879, and later in the work of Hans Kelsen. It was 
the theoretical response to the need for a rational calculus demanded by the emerging modern 
capitalism in the late nineteenth century Germany. “In	  questo	  quadro,	  il	  contratto	  è	  una	  tra	  le	  fattispecie;	  
il	  rapporto	  giuridico	  ne	  è	  l’effetto.”	  Natalino	  Irti,	  Un	  contratto	  <<incalcolabile>>,	  in	  Rivista Trimestrale di 
Diritto e Procedura Civile, Vol 69, No 1, 2015, pp. 17-23, at n. 1, p. 19. Contrast, however, my remarks in 




almost every 20th century Civil Code implemented it. Italy133 and Portugal134 are good 
examples.135 Other countries legislated on promises in separate statutes, like France136 
and New York.137  
2.4.3. TWO PROBLEMS WITH EX LEGE OBLIGATIONS 
The doctrine of the obligatio ex lege cannot however pass without examination. I have 
identified two orders of problems here. The first one is of a contingent nature. It says that 
the doctrine of the obligatio ex lege is so flexible that, in using it, a lawmaker can introduce 
anti-juridical dictums into the private law. I use the German Civil Code to make this point. 
The second criticism recognizes that a legislator could use this doctrine to regulate 
promises in accordance with justice. As the doctrine of the obligatio ex lege could serve 
whatever goal, it could also serve justice. However, I argue that this ultimately cannot be. 
An ex lege obligation consists of a legal solution to a specific case. But interested promises 
are so fertile that, even where the legislator may be thought to have regulated all typical 
interested promises, another interested promise will appear, demanding equal treatment. 
2.4.3.1. ON HOW EX LEGE OBLIGATIONS (COULD) ECLIPSE JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW 
I want to elaborate this proposition: The doctrine of the obligatio ex lege enabled the 
German legislator to introduce anti-juridical dictums into its law of obligations. 
Take	  §657	  of	  the	  German	  Civil	  Code.	  “A	  person,	  who	  by public notice announces a reward 
for the performance of an act, in particular for the production of a result, is bound to pay 
the reward to any person who has performed the act, even if he [the latter] did not act 
                                                        
133 Arts. 1987-1991 (recognizing the promise of payment, recognition of debt and the promise to the public). 
134 Arts. 457-463 (recognizing the promise of payment, recognition of debt, the promise to the public and 
the promise of a prize for the wining of a challenge). 
135 See Pablo Lerner, "Promises of Rewards in a Comparative Perspective," in Annual Survey of International 
& Comparative Law, Vol 10, No 1, (2004), Article 4. Available at http://digitalcommons. 
law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/4 
136 “The	   law	  of	  10	  of	   June	  of	   1978,	   relative	   to	   the	   “information	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   consumers	   in	   the	  
domain	  of	   certain	   operations	  of	   credit”,	   in	   the	   field	  of	   immovable	   goods,	   disposes, in its art. 5, first 
paragraph,	   that	   “the	   deliver	   of	   the	   offer	   obligates	   the	   loaner	   to	   maintain	   the	   conditions	   that	   itself	  
indicates	  during	  a	  minimal	  term	  of	  fifteen	  days	  to	  count	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  emission”.”	  Quoted	  by	  
Jacques Ghestin, Traité	  de	  Droit Civil. Les obligations. Le Contract: formation, 2d ed, LGDJ, Paris, 1988, 
n.220, p. 236. 
137 Section 5-1109 of the New York General Obligations Law says: “Except	  as	  otherwise	  provided	  in	  section	  
2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code [....] when an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing 
[...] which states that the offer is irrevocable during a [stated] period [....] the offer [is irrevocable during 
that	  period.]”	  Quoted	  in	  Melvin	  Eisenberg,	  “Probability	  and	  Chance	  in	  Contract	  Law,”	  UCLA	  L.	  Rev., 45, 




with	  a	  view	   to	   the	   reward”.	  Accordingly, under German private law the promisor of a 
reward is obligated to pay the reward to a person who, ignoring the promise, performs 
the act requested as the condition for the reward. It is obvious that the German legislator 
had some principle in mind at the time of establishing this norm. Be it the Germanic legal 
tradition, the autonomy of the will or a requirement of commerce, the legislator thought 
that	   §657	   prescribed	   what was due to the case of a reward-promise. Whatever the 
legislator thought however, he could have never thought of justice in transactions. 
Let me be graphic: Ignoring your promise of a reward, I find your lost property. I am aware 
of the fact that the thing I found belongs to you and I decide to return it to you. Nobody 
can say that I returned your lost property with a view to claiming the reward that you 
promised me. Then I come to know of your promise. My lawyer advises me to claim the 
reward and I do so. You deny the performance and I advance a claim against you in court. 
The claim I want to make is (in the German) of a Forderung against you. This is to say, a 
right I have to a performance of yours, which is the correlative of your duty to enact the 
promised performance.138 This claim entitles me to the situation I would be in had you 
performed the promise—the so-called	  “positive	  Interessen.”139   
The question is very simple: Could I claim a performance that I have never acquired? As a 
general rule, persons acquire performances when they accept offers.140 One could make 
the argument that someone acquires a performance by knowing of the act that granted it. 
After all, performances consist of expectations of future deeds 141  and persons can 
engender expectations by knowing (and only after knowing) the expectation-creating act 
(promise).142 But how can someone demand another to put her in the position she would 
be in had the performance been effected, if she has never acquired the performance? To 
be able to claim the reward, I must have carried out the work with the view to actualize 
my Forderung to the reward. And, to acquire the Forderung to the reward or performance, 
                                                        
138 See Bernhard Windscheid, Diritto delle pandette, Carlo Fadda and Paolo Emilio Bensa translation, UTET, 
Torino, 1902, t. II, at §250-§252. 
139 Idem, §257. 
140 Old §305 BGB (now §311 (1)). See Bernhard Windscheid, op. cit., at §305. 
141 I	  am	  taking	  notice	  that	  “expectations	  as	  the	  content	  of	  a	  right	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  expectations	  of	  
the	  right”	  Fernando	  López	  de	  Zavalía,	  Derechos Reales,	  Zavalia,	  Buenos	  Aires,	  1989,	  t.	  1,	  §3,	  n.	  2,	  e),	  p.	  48.	   
142 The addressee	  must	   just	   “take	  cognizance	  of	   the	  act	  of	  promising	   itself,	  he	  must,	   as	  we	  would	  put	   it	  
somewhat more exactly, consciously take in the promising (des Verprechens innewerden).”	   Adolf	  
Reinach, “The	  A	  Priori	  Foundations	  of	  Civil	  Law,”	  (translated by John Crosby), Aletheia, issue 3, (1983), 




I must have at least known of your Forderung-conferring act.143 Whatever the grounds for 
§657, it is clearly not focused on transactions between persons. 144 
Another juridical mistake of the BGB is found in §145.	  “Whoever	  offers	  to	  another	  to	  enter	  
a	  contract	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  offer,	  unless	  he	  has	  excluded	  being	  so	  bound.”	  Here the BGB 
links the fact of making an offer without stating the will to keep the power of revocation 
to the legal inability to revoke the offer. 145  This norm responds, according to the 
exposition of motives, to “a requirement of commerce.”146 Justice may serve commerce in 
many ways, after all, juridical private law is about justice in transactions and commutative 
justice is about ensuring exchanges. However there are instances where the demands of 
justice are incompatible with the interests of merchants. The situational fact of §145	  is 
one such instance. Justice in voluntary transactions dictates that voluntary obligations are 
                                                        
143 Windscheid’s	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  the	  promisor	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  obligated	  to	  any	  other	  than	  to	  
one whom performs the requested condition, and not before such performance. Moreover, the promise 
or Auslobung must be accepted to have effect. Acceptance takes place when the addressee performs the 
required	  act.	  No	  one	  who	  has	  performed	  without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  reward	  “would	  have	  reason	  to	  the	  
established reward, and I do not think that the jurisprudence	  will	  ever	  decide	  to	  recognize	  such	  maxim.”	  
Windscheid, op. cit., §308, note 5, p. 194. Interestingly enough, Windsheid recognizes the binding nature 
of some unilateral acts. For example the pollicitatio, or the promises that are made to a city supported 
by a just cause. See idem, §304. 
144 Mayer-Maly’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  obligation	  of	  socially	  typical	  conducts	  is	  pertinent: 
Where can we find the reason for this strange elevation of statute as a source of obligation? In continental 
states it is unquestionably the means of finding a way out of an embarrassing situation, such as always arises 
when a new cause of obligation does not fit into the categories of the existing system. As the new legal 
provision is a statutory provision, obligatione	  ex	  lege	  regularly	  helps	  to	  give	  an	  explanation	  by	  using	  the	  “to-
be-explained”.	  And	  nothing	  could	  be	  more	  attractive.	   
Mayer-Maly, cit., p. 383. 
145 Conf. Basil Markesinis, op. cit.,	  p.	  64:	  “this	  binding	  effect	  can	  be	  avoided	  if	  the	  offeror	  expressly	  states this 
in	   the	   offer	   using,	   for	   instance,	   such	   words	   as	   ‘offer	   subject	   to	   change’	   (Angebot freibleibend) or 
‘revocable	  offer’	  (Angebot widerruflich).”	   
None of the major contract laws endorse this rule. Without exception, the principle is that unless the 
offeror states it otherwise offers are revocable until acceptance. Nils Jansen and Zimmermann, Reinhard, 
Contract Formation and Mistake in European Contract Law: A genetic Comparison of Transnational 
Model Rules, Oxford J Legal Studies, 31 (4), (Winter 2011), pp. 625-662, at 13. 
146 Motive	  zu	  dem	  Entwurfe	  eines	  Bürgerlichen	  Gesetzbuches	  für	  das	  Deutsche	  Reich as translated in Arthur 
von Mehren and Gordley, James, The Civil Law System: an introduction to the comparative study of law, 
2d ed., Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Co., 1977, p. 877. Interestingly enough, there is a passage 
where	  the	  German	  legislator	  sees	  a	  possible	  justification	  for	  the	  bindingness	  of	  business	  proposals.	  “The 
binding effect of the offer also corresponds to the rationally probable intention of the offeror himself. 
This is most apparent in the cases in which the offeror has set a certain time within which the declaration 
as to acceptance is to take place. The setting of such a period has, according to everyday conceptions, 
not only the meaning that the period within which the offer may be accepted is limited, but at the same 
time the meaning that the offeror binds his hands for this period.”	  Idem.	  And	  why	  would	  he	  be	  interested	  
in	  binding	  his	  hands?	  Because	   “the inclination to enter into contract negotiations would, in general, 
become	   less…”	   Idem.	   Yet,	   to	   justify	   the	   bindingness	   of	   business	   proposals,	   the	   proposal	   must	   be	   a	  




enforceable when they were produced as an item of exchange.147 Under	  §145,	  an	  offeror	  
who merely forgot to say that she wishes to retain the power of revocation can be stopped 
from	  revoking	  the	  offer	  by	  the	  offeree,	  for	  she	  is	  “bound	  by	  the	  offer.”	  It	  is	  not	  clear what 
“bound	  by	  the	  offer”	  means.148 Whatever it means, it seems that its effect is quite similar 
to a self-imposed obligation. The revocation of the offer will not be taken as such, and the 
offeror can take a reasonable time to accept the offer. Such a rule, as it is presented, goes 
against justice in exchange. 
I set aside the question of whether the German law of obligations was determined in 
accordance with justice in transaction. One could interpret that it was. The Code talks 
about the obligations as particulars of a general idea—all the obligations are included in 
the	   book	   “The law	  of	   obligations”—and the norms on tort and unjust enrichment are 
clearly about compensation and restitution.149 However, norms like §657 and §145 are 
clearly not about justice in transactions. The problem lies not only in the cases thereby 
regulated, but also in their systemic implications. Once enacted, these norms form part of 
the private law. If there are two, three or four such norms, they can be counted as legal 
mistakes or exceptions. However when there are more, or are constitutive of an important 
part of the law of obligations like contract law, they engender a risk. The judge can invoke 
them as a means of extending private law—filling gaps, solving hard cases and so on. Their 
principle of regulation becomes the idea with which the judge must rule on 
unprecedented	   cases.	   This	   is	   what	   Savigny	   famously	   called	   the	   “systematic	   canon	   of	  
interpretation.”	   Private	   law	   then	   begins	   to become incoherent, remaining as such or 
becoming something else. (See IP2.2.) The interests of commerce, the tradition of a people 
or the morality of freedom has either eclipsed or displaced the distinctive character of 
private law. 
2.4.3.2. THE INJUSTICE OF THIS TECHNIQUE: THE CASE OF ART 1987 ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 
One of the points of ruling with the ex lege obligations is to make clear that only the 
decided cases give place to obligations.150 The BGB makes this claim in a provision about 
                                                        
147 See long discussions in 4.1.4. and 5.2.2.1. 
148 See discussion of this point in 3.2.1.1. 
149 See argument in 4.1.1.1. (e). 
150 Art.	   1090	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Civil	   Code	   is	   abundantly	   clear.	   “Las obligaciones derivadas de la ley no se 
presumen.	  Sólo	  son	  exigibles	  las	  expresamente	  determinadas	  en	  éste	  Código	  o	  en	  leyes	  especiales,	  y	  se	  
regirán	  por	  los	  preceptos	  de	  la	  ley	  que	  las	  hubiere	  establecido;	  y,	  en	  lo	  que	  ésta	  no	  hubiere	  previsto,	  por	  




legal transactions in general. 151  Other Civil Codes state the same in relation to our 
question. The paradigm is Art.	  1987	  of	  the	  Italian	  Civil	  Code,	  which	  says:	  “The	  unilateral	  
promise of a performance does not produce obligatory effects outside of the cases 
admitted	  by	  statute.”152 
The Codice Civile here aims to resolve a tension.153 On the one hand, there is the necessity 
to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  “exigencies”	  of	  promissory	  transactions.	  Treating	  them	  as	  
unilateral acts—and not as agreements—is	  “more	  appropriate	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  thing.”	  
On the other hand, the Code wants to	  maintain	  the	  indemnity	  of	  contract	  law:	  “It	  would	  
not be possible to make the unilateral promise operate unlimitedly without disrupting the 
field	  of	  application	  of	  contract”.154 The	  “programmatic	  enunciation	  of	  Art	  1987”	  resolves	  
the tension by saying that only the promises admitted by statue obligate without 
acceptance. 
But Art. 1987 gave rise to complications soon after its enactment. 155  New promises 
appeared in civil society that had no place in the short and numerus clausus list of 
                                                        
151 Old §305,	  now	  §	  311	  (1)	  says:	  “Obligations	  created	  by	  legal	  transaction	  [rechtsgeschäft] and obligations 
similar to legal transactions. In order to create an obligation by legal transaction and to alter the contents 
of	  an	  obligation,	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  parties	  is	  necessary,	  unless	  otherwise	  provided	  by	  the	  statute.”	  
In other words, unilateral legal transactions must be recognized by a special law, which provides for its 
enforcement. §657, which recognizes the enforceability of the Auslobung or promise of a reward, is one 
such special law. Conf. W. Flume, Allgemeiner	  Teil	  des	  Bürgerlichen	  Recht, 2 ed., Berlin 1975, pp. 135 and 
ss. Quoted in Pablo Lerner, "Promises of Rewards in a Comparative Perspective," op. cit., p. 62, note 60. 
152 Ex lege obligations are not made to establish general grounds of liability.	  Suppose	   I	  say,	   “If	  a	  person	  
makes a unilateral promise, then a person is obligated to perform.”	  This	  statement looks very much like 
an obligatio ex lege in	  that	  it	  adopts	  the	  form	  of	  a	  conditional:	  If	  “unilateral	  promise”	  then	  “obligation.”	  
But this norm is not an obligatio ex lege. It is not saying, “A person, who by public notice announces a 
reward for the performance of an act, in particular for the production of a result, is bound to pay the 
reward to any person who has performed the act, even if he [the latter] did not act with a view to the 
reward”.	  It is not describing a situational case or type of promise. The statement starts	  with,	  “If	  a	  person	  
makes a unilateral promise.”	  And this starting point demands the following specification: What is a 
unilateral promise? What the norm is doing is recognizing a new category of obligations. The legislator 
must then specify what is understood as a unilateral promise. She could say that unilateral promises are 
all promises intended to be obligatory without acceptance. Or add to this definition the requirement of 
a cause. Whatever the formulation, the legislator would be setting out a general basis for the recognition 
of liability in promises. This is more than validating typical interested promises. The degree of 
specification with which a norm describes the situational case seems to be constitutive of obligationes 
ex lege: they must be readily applicable situational cases. See the interesting remarks in Emilio Betti, 
Teoría general de las obligaciones, t. II, José	  Luis	  de	  los	  Mozos	  translation, Revista de Derecho Privado, 
Madrid, 1970,	  §II,	  n.	  8	  in	  fine	  p.	  57;	  Françoise Geny, Methods	  d’interpreation	  et	  sources, 2 ed, Librairie 
générale	  de	  droit	  et	  de	  jurisprudence,	  Paris,	  1919, n. 80, p. 185. 
153 Relazione del Ministro Guardasigilli Grandi al Codice Civile del 1942, Libro IV Delle Obbligazione, at n. 783, 
p. 177. Available at http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/site/home/pubblicazioni/collana-studi-
storici-e-giuridici/articolo6388.html 
154 Idem, at n. 781, p. 176. I solve this very nice conceptual issue in 5.7. 
155 One could conjecture that the norm was due to the fact that the Italian legislator could not perceive the 




enforceable unilateral promises. Disputes in relation to the new promises would arrive to 
court and the courts would have no remedy other than to reject these demands. Studies 
on the character of these cases proliferated. The insightful doctrine of Gino Gorla argued 
that these promises are intelligible as an exchange of a right for a chance. In other words, 
Gorla discerned the	   unity	   of	   the	   “promesse	   unilaterale”	   and	   its	   specific	   difference	   as 
against the contract. But the problem remained. How to ground this new general source 
of obligations given the explicit dismissal of art 1987?156 We can now see the problem. 
For example, in a case of a	  “letre du patronage”	  (see	  1.1.3.)	  before an Italian court, the 
court can either stick to the letter of the law or think systematically. If the Court sticks to 
the	  positive	  law,	  a	  neglected	  “letre du patronage”	  must	  not	  be	  enforced.	  Art. 1987 is very 
clear that enforceable promises are promises admitted by statue, and no legislation has 
so	   far	  provided	  enforcement	   for	   the	   “letre du patronage.”	  However, if the court thinks 
systematically it must enforce the promise, because in	   light	   of	   Gorla’s	   position, this 
promise is analogous to promises that the Court must enforce. One could still argue that 
the way out of this problem involves ruling on the atypical case with a new provision. 
Persuasive scholarship has outlined the inconveniences of this legislative technique.157 I 
want to add that the issue of justice remains. Nothing guarantees that this atypical case 
will be the last atypical interested promise. In other words, if a law chooses to legislate 
promises on a case-by-case basis, even when it manages to cover all the extant interested 
promises, the law creates the possibility of injustice. 
Given that we have finally discovered the character of promises (See 1.1.4.), perhaps the 
solution is to do with them what, in the time from Bartolo to Grotius, was done with the 
various Roman law contracts—transform them into a single general category. We will 
hence satisfy Mayer	  Maly’s	  prescription: “It is necessary to reduce into categories the 
essential	  causes	  which	  lead	  to	  an	  obligation.”158 
                                                        
42. Then the interested promises were rare cases. In other words, they were so few that it was difficult 
to perceive a general explanation for them all. As Giorgianni has pointed out, the case-by-case treatment 
of	   the	   unilateral	   promise	   “was	   probably	   connected	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   cause”.	   Michele Giorgianni, 
“Appunti	  sulle	  fonti	  dell’obbligazione,”	  in	  Rivista di Diritto Civile, I, (1965), pp. 70-75, at p. 73. They could 
not see that what the promisor was seeking with her promise was to induce the promisee to do 
something she wants.  
156 See the discussion in Francesco Di Giovanni, Le Promesse Unilaterali, CEDAM, Milano, 2010, p. 55 and ss. 
157 Ewan	  McKendrick,	  “Taxonomy:	  Does	  it	  matter?,”	  in	  Johnston,	  David	  and	  Reinhard	  Zimmermann	  (eds.),	  
Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2002, pp. 627-657, specially Section III, pp. 632-638. 
158 Mayer-Maly, op. cit.,	  p.	  384:	  “In the year 3000 our future colleagues may find a vast sphere of activity 
because they will not be able to believe that distinguished professors of modern civil law have written 
what they actually have written. The difficulty the romans had with their divisio obligatonum is our 




2.BIS SUMMARY. RELEVANCE OF MY HYPOTHESIS 
Contemporary private laws do provide tools for dealing with interested promises. 
However, these tools are problem-causing solutions. They are solutions because they 
offer legal responses to the intuitively unjust revocation of a non-accepted interested 
promise. Yet they are problem-causing solutions because they corrupt the laws where 
they are implemented. Allow me to outline the conclusions. 
The collateral contract can be an effective tool for enforcing interested promises, 
especially those that condition the performance of the obligation on an act by the 
promisee. With this legal figure, one can present the promise as an offer, the 
commencement of the required act as the acceptance of such offer, and the creation of the 
chance as consideration for the alleged obligation. The lawyer must elaborate only two 
facts. Firstly, she must show that the offeree commenced to perform the act required in 
the promise. And second, she must show that the latter act had as an effect an increase in 
the probability that the promisor gets what she wants—recover the lost thing, make the 
promised contract, etc. With these facts in hand, accordingly, a plaintiff can prevent the 
promisor from revoking an interested promise. However, the collateral contract corrupts 
contract law. The law that implements such a figure is a law that creates new versions of 
acceptance and consideration. Now, acceptance of a unilateral contract not only means 
performance of the act required in the offer, it also means commencement of the 
performance. Now, consideration for the obligation of a unilateral contract not only 
means the act that the debtor of the obligation wants in exchange for the obligation, it also 
means an increase in the probability that such an act takes place. With these two concepts 
in hand, a plaintiff can prevent a defendant from revoking a true offer of a collateral 
contract. An offeror who wanted to be bound if and only if the offeree fully performed a 
certain act happens to be bound without having the offeree perform this act. As a result, 
contract law is no longer about agreed exchanges—it has been deformed or corrupted. 
The reliance doctrine is probably the least pertinent of the three solutions. Since what it 
protects is the detriment that a promisee suffered in reliance on a promise, the doctrine 
cannot be used to demand compliance with the promise. However the gravest imposition 
is visited upon the private law that implements the doctrine. Private law fundamentally 
divides the acts that obligate persons from the acts that persons can engage in freely. The 
obligations are justified not only by the fact that the act of one caused another to act to 
her detriment. In addition, the person who makes another act in detrimental reliance 
must be enriched in some way. Tort explains this enrichment with the concept of wrong - 
the idea that doing beyond what one is permitted is like profiting from the fact of not 




demand performance of a voluntary obligation only without having given something in 
exchange. The reliance doctrine is not concerned with the question of justice. Rather, the 
basis for imposing an obligation is the fact that someone caused another to act with 
detriment to herself. But then almost every expectation inducing conduct could mature 
into a cause of obligation, from the breach of contractual negotiations, to not respecting a 
promise of dinner, to unexpectedly quitting a relationship. To persons in private law it 
becomes quite difficult to assert what conduct would place them in an obligation. Inserted 
in private law, the reliance doctrine and its demands blur the just division between 
freedom and obligations—it corrupts the private law. 
Of all the solutions revised, the doctrine of the obligationes ex lege is the most effective 
one. A lawgiver must just identify the promise she wants to enforce and institute such 
promise as the antecedent of a voluntary obligation. The interested promise thus becomes 
a valid cause of obligation. Yet within this doctrine inheres a risk. Such is its malleability 
that lawgivers can use it to determine unjust law. We saw unjust transactional law in §657	  
of the German Civil Code. However, this is a contingent criticism. The same procedure 
could regulate promises in accordance with justice. Nevertheless, as we could see in the 
case of the Italian Civil Code, this technique is inadequate in the case of interested 
promises. The ex lege obligations are case-by-case solutions, to each typical promise a 
specific legal provision, while the interested promises constantly grow in diversity. Where 
the legislator may be thought to have fashioned just solutions for all the extant interested 
promises, civil society will have developed another unprecedented and therefore 
unenforceable interested promise. This possibility is itself an injustice. In enforcing the 
accounted for, typical interested promise and not enforcing the unprecedented atypical 
interested promise, the law fails to treat like cases alike. 
To finish where we started: whether private law should deal with interested promises 
and how it should do so, is an interesting and unsettled question. Even if contemporary 
private laws deal with these promises, they have not yet found the correct way to do it. 
Moreover, most of the solutions that private laws have so far produced are problem-







3. AN ALMOST JUST SOLUTION: THE CONCEPT CALLED “UNILATERAL 
PROMISE” 
The current laws on promises, or as we can call them after our critical revision, the 
inimical private law arrangements, date from the mid-nineteenth century. This was when 
the classical private laws began to face new or atypically challenging realities. 159  An 
exegete of the French civil code like Demolombe would construe a version of the collateral 
contract to justify the irrevocable character of firm offers of sale.160 Savigny, a modernizer 
of Roman law, would wonder whether the promise of a reward should be enforced before 
acceptance, concluding that such a hypothesis is contrary to principle, that in any case the 
promisee could have an action for the recovery based on the detrimental reliance. 161 The 
cases of interest are not only the firm offers of sale and reward-promises. Mid-nineteenth 
century jurists also considered cases like titles of credit, marriage promises and 
stipulations for the benefit of third parties.  
The idea arose, first in Germany and then in France, that these promises should be 
explained by a simpler idea, the idea that whenever one declares the intention to be 
obligated to do something, one is obligated to do such thing. 162  German and French 
                                                        
159 The socioeconomic context where the recent interest in unaccepted promises flourished is well depicted 
in A. W. B. Simpson,	  “Quackery	  and	  Contract	  Law:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Carbolic	  Smoke	  Ball,”	  in	  The Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Jun, 1985), pp. 345-389 and the teaching decision Alexander Brogden v 
Metropolitan Railway Company, (1876–77) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 666-698. 
160 The	  doctrine	  of	  “avant-contrat	  tacite”	  suggests	  that	  offers	  to	  the	  public	  combine	  an	  offer	  to	  sell,	  which	  
remains open for acceptance, and an offer to keep the option open, which is deemed to be accepted when 
it becomes known to the offeree. The latter acceptance must be assumed on the grounds that the 
proposal is only beneficial to the offeree. Charles Demolombe, Traité	   des	   contrats	   ou	  des	   obligations	  
conventionnelles en general, T. I, Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1877, n. 65, p. 64. 
161 The case of an offer made by public means to pay a sum in compensation for notice of a fact or the 
restitution of a lost thing cannot be resolved by saying that the performance of the fact gives action to 
claim the offer, nor can it be solved by saying that the offer has no legal effect at all. The promised sum 
will be paid voluntarily, as occurs in many cases of debts arising from gambling, which are paid many 
times more often than the debts are endowed with an action. As a question of justice, Savigny finishes, 
whosoever incurred expenses while performing the act in question will have an actio doli as against the 
offeror for the recovery of the expenditures. F.C von Savigny, Le obbligazioni, Giovanni Pacchioni 
translation,	  T.	  II,	  UTET,	  Torino,	  1912,	  §61,	  p.	  82-87, especially at p. 85. 
162 It goes without saying that the rule that promises must be kept is as old as our Western civilization. The 
very Digest of Justinian instituted legal solutions to very interesting cases of promises (See Digest of 
Justinian, 50,12 De pollicitationibus). What I am saying is that the nineteenth century lawyers had no 
tools to treat unaccepted or unrequested undertakings. They could not perceive and regulate promises 
simply because their legislation said nothing about them. The jurists that systematized the classical 
private laws explicitly neglected the possibility of an undertaking binding without request or 
acceptance. Such possibilities are famously neglected by Grotius (Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and 
Peace, edited and with an introduction by Richard Tuck, Liberty Found, Indianapolis, 2005, Book II, 
Chapter XI, n. XIV), Pufendorf (Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of 




scholars developed this idea in the form of a new basis for imposing obligations. The 
Germans	   called	   it	   “Versprechen”	   (promise)	   and	   the	   French	   “declaration	   unilateral	   de	  
volunté”	  (unilateral	  declaration	  of	  will).	  Interestingly	  enough,	  a	  similar	  phenomenon took 
place in the common law world too. In the middle of the twentieth century, a movement 
of Scottish scholars reacted against the common law of contracts, arguing that a historical 
legal category of their own provided a better basis for the enforcement of promises. The 
Scottish	  category	  is	  almost	  identical	  to	  the	  French	  “declaration	  unilateral	  de	  volunté”	  and	  
the	  German	  “Versprechen”.	  They	  called it	  “unilateral	  promise.” 
We need to bypass this category. Not only because the national private laws dedicated a 
great deal of scholarship to it, but also and principally, because the most influential 
projects of international private laws have claimed it as their own. Indeed, probably the 
most provocative contribution of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) is its 
section	  on	  promises.	  Under	  the	  rubric	  “Unilateral	  promise,”	  Art.	  2:107	  states:	  “A	  promise	  
which is intended to be legally binding without acceptance is binding.”	  This	  recognition	  
has made of the unilateral promise an authorized solution to the problem of promises in 
private law. It could therefore be the case that this new voluntary cause of obligation fills 
the legal vacuum noted in Part 1. Maybe this must be the legal form of promises and the 
best alternative to the arrangements dismissed in Part 2. 
Section 1 focuses on the three seminal works on unilateral promise. The first three 
headings are dedicated to the works	  of	  Heinrich	   Siegel,	  René	  Worms	  and	   the	   Scottish	  
institutionalists. I want to show that these three works have three points in common: 
Their definition of unilateral promise, the interest that made these scholars develop a new 
legal concept, and the tradition with which these scholars engage. The first section 
finishes by arguing that Art. 2:107 of the PECL shares these characteristics. Section 2 
criticizes the concept of unilateral promise. The unilateral promise scholars developed a 
new private law concept because they found that practice demanded legal innovation. 
Thus they claimed that private law should recognize the obligatory character of all 
promises intended to be legally binding. The problem I see is that rather than justifying 
this concept from a legal perspective, they relied on alien justificatory ideas, like the 
doctrine of the autonomy of the will. This meant the legal concept they presented was not 
actually a legal concept. However, there is a lot to learn from these progressive scholars. 
The first and most important lesson is that jurists can react against the status quo of the 
                                                        
Joseph Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or Contracts, David Evans translation, Strahan, 
London, 1806, n. 4, pp. 4-5), a book which had a significant impact in the the common law. Conf. Joseph 
M. Perillo, “Robert J. Pothier's Influence	  on	  the	  Common	  Law	  of	  Contract,”	  in Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 




law. Like the unilateral promise scholars, one can build for the continuation of one’s	  
private law—make new law for new realities. Section 3 develops this lesson and infers 
others	  that	  contribute	  to	  and	  connect	  us	  with	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  PhD’s	  enterprise. 
3.1. THE CONCEPT CALLED “UNILATERAL PROMISE” 
3.1.1. HEINRICH SIEGEL’S VERSPRECHEN 
In 1873 Heinrich Siegel, a Viennese historian of German law and private law theorist, 
wrote what is probably the basic reference treatise on the question of promises and 
private	   law.	   In	   ‘Das Versprechen als Verpflichtungsgrund im heutigen Recht,’163  Siegel 
defends the thesis that a unilateral promise could be regarded as a source of duties or 
Verpflichtungsgrund. 
Siegel was struck by a series of increasingly important cases, including the offer to an 
absent party, the irrevocable offer, the bid by auction, the promise of a reward and the 
promise of a prize, the titles of credit to the bearer, and the stipulation in benefit to a third 
party. To Siegel, the complications to explain the obligations arising from these acts were 
originated in the doctrines that the Germans received from the Romans. The remotest 
antecedent of the idea of a contract is the Roman verbal contract called stipulatio. In the 
formation of a stipulatio, a second person would obligate himself to do something by 
accepting the request of a promise made by the first stipulator, or creditor of the 
obligation. In contrast, the manner of forming voluntary obligations in the Germanic laws 
featured a debtor who first assumed a duty to do something and then a second person 
who would receive (Annahme) the duty, which already existed. If in the Roman stipulatio 
the historical and logical prius was the creditor, in the Germanic laws the historical and 
logical prius was the debtor. The procedure for assuming obligations in German law 
placed the debtor—rather than the creditor—as the first and most important actor.164  
Siegel nevertheless shared many commitments with the German followers of the Roman 
law tradition. He was keen on abstraction and a follower of the will theory. The all-
encompassing abstraction of the period was the category called the “juridical	  
transaction,”	  a	  generalization	  that	  represented all acts susceptible of creating, modifying 
                                                        
163 Heinrich Siegel, Das Versprechen als Verpflichtungsgrund im heutigen Recht, Vahlen, Berlin, 1873. I follow 
the	  interpretations	  of	  Paolo	  Recano,	  “Profili	  storici	  della	  promessa	  unilaterale,”	  in	  Rassegna di Diritto 
Civile, fasc. 1, (2006), pp. 168-223 at n. 3, pp. 199-205 and Francisco	  Candil	  y	  Bravo,	  “Naturaleza	  jurídica 
de	   la	   promesa	   de	   recompensa	   á	   persona	   indeterminada,” in Junta	   para	   ampliación	   de	   estudios	   é	  
investigaciones	  científicas, t. XIII,	  Memoria	  3ª,	  1914, pp. 283-339 at pp. 297-300. 




and extinguishing legal effects, from the testament to the contract, which was the 
paradigm. The will theory held that the legal effects of the legal acts were ultimately 
grounded in the will of the persons, which had a creative power recognized by the legal 
order. The legal order recognizes the creative power of the individual, who utilizes it by 
means of diverse legal acts.165   
The Germanic model of contractual obligation, infused with the will theory, enabled Siegel 
to elaborate a theory for the problematic promises: 
When someone, by his own initiative desires to obligate himself with an offer, why is it 
that	  the	  law	  should	  not	  concede	  it?	  Shouldn’t	  his	  conduct	  be	  governed	  by	  his	  unilateral	  
manifestation of will?166   
If the will of the individual had such a creative capacity, it should be autonomous enough 
so as to put to itself a duty to do something. To Siegel, given the actual development of 
transactions in society, whether a person could constitute himself a debtor by his own 
word could not be in doubt.167  
Having elaborated his theory from the perspective of the will theory, Siegel had to face a 
counter-argument.	  True,	  one	  can	  modify	  one’s	  sphere	  of	  rights by unilateral will, but a 
voluntary obligation, the object of a promise, also modifies	  the	  creditor’s	  sphere	  of	  rights. 
The promisee acquires a right to which he does not consent. Through promise, therefore, 
someone acquires a right without deciding so. How can that be?168  
Siegel eschews the	  argument	  with	  the	  following	  distinction.	  One	  thing	  is	  the	  “obligation	  
to	  execute	  the	  promise”	  and	  another	  thing	  is	  the	  “obligation to keep the promise.” 169 The 
obligation to execute the promise is an obligation in the Roman law sense—namely, an 
obligation backed with an action of the creditor to demand performance. The obligation 
to	   keep	   one’s	   promise	   is	   the	   necessary	   antecedent	   of the obligation to execute the 
promise. Thus Siegel can say that a simple promise, given certain conditions, binds a 
                                                        
165 Independently of the considerations related to the cause (abstraktionwille). For further explanations see 
Paolo	  Recano,	  “Profili…,”	  op. cit., p. 200-1, especially note 101. 
166 Heinrich Siegel, op. cit., p. 49 
167 “…regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  promisor	  obtains	  a	  benefit	  with	  the	  promise	  or	  not.”	  Heinrich Siegel, op. 
cit., p. 50. 
168 I engage with this argument in 6.1. 
169 Heinrich Siegel, op. cit., pp. 20 and 41-45.  Even	  if	  we	  accepted	  that	  the	  promise	  modifies	  the	  addresse’s	  
sphere of rights, this legal phenomenon also occurs in other parts of private law. In the case of extra-
contractual responsibility—tort law—the tortfeasor creates a right on the part of the victim by choosing 




person to keep his promise. In the promise of a reward (Auslobung), for example, the 
promisor has only a duty to keep his word; the obligation to execute the promise arises 
when the promisee performs the requisite act. Since the promisor is not obligated to 
someone but simply obligated, nobody suffers an unconsented attribution of a right. 170 
Siegel did not argue that promise is the only source of voluntary obligation.171 Nor did he 
construe a general theory of the unilateral promise. His contribution was his revision of 
the dominant view that agreement is the only way to create voluntary obligations, 
developing the idea that unaccepted promises could sometimes create obligations, and 
illustrating this thesis by application to the most important cases of his time.172 
3.1.2. RENÉ	  WORMS’S VOLUNTÉ	  UNILATÉRALE 
René	   Worms,	   founder	   of	   the	   “Revue	   Internationale	   de	   Sociologie”	   and	   professor	   of	  
political economy, set out in his doctoral dissertation—“De	   la	   volonté	   unilatérale	  
considérée	  comme	  source	  d’obligations	  en	  droit	  romain	  et	  en	  droit	  français”—to explore 
whether the theory envisaged by Siegel could be read into Roman (Part 1/2) and French 
private laws (Part 2/2).173 
Part 1 of De	   la	   volonté studies whether the theory of the binding effect of unilateral 
declarations of will had any instantiations in Roman law. Worms finds four possible cases, 
of which the pollicitatio and the votum are the best candidates.174 A pollicitatio consist in 
                                                        
170 Interestingly, he says that acceptances of promises are always accessorial. They are accessorial in that 
they are a condition for the formation of the obligation insofar as the promisor posited it as a condition 
for the formation of the obligation. Heinrich Siegel, Das Versprechen, 20 and ss. 
171 Of the eight cases studied in his work only the following four are seen as unilateral promises: promise to 
the public, title of credit to the bearer, bill of exchange, and the contract for the benefit of a third party. 
Paolo Recano,	  “Profili…,”	  op. cit., p. 203.  
172 The work appears more often as a form of criticism of views like that of Savigny, which rejected that law 
had to accept that a promisee acquire a right without having accepted it on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  “exigencies	  
of commerce.”	  Of	  special	  consideration	  was	  the	  case	  of	  stipulation	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  third	  parties.	  Conf. 
Adolfo di Majo, Le Promesse Unilaterali,	  Giuffrè,	  Milan,	  1989,	  p.	  24. 
173 René Worms, De	  la	  volonté	  unilatérale	  considérée	  comme	  source	  d’obligations	  en	  droit romain et en droit 
français,	   (thèse	  pour	   le	  doctorat	  présentée	   et	   soutenue	   le	  mardi	  23	   juin	  1891,	  Université	  de	  France,	  
Faculté	  de	  droit	  de	  Paris,	  by	  René	  Worms),	  A.	  Giard,	  Paris,	  1891. 
174 A third case is the promise to an indeterminate person, which Worms dismisses on the grounds that 
Roman law provided no action for the enforcement of such a promise. (Idem, Part. I, Chp. II, II.) The last 
case is that of stipulation for the benefit of a third party, which is also dismissed. (Idem, Part. I, Chp. II, 
I.) Even if post-classical Roman law recognized an action for the third party beneficiary, the action arose 





a promise made by a person to a city concerning a sum of money or a certain deed.175 A 
votum is a promise made by a person to a deity that seeks to propitiate a good or avert an 
evil.176 Though the examined texts suggest that the obligations of pollicitatio and votum 
arise from a unilateral declaration of will, the principle in classical Roman law is that a 
declaration of will to do something in favor of another cannot birth an obligation without 
agreement of the beneficiary. The post-classical Roman law dispensed the requisite of 
acceptance for the pollicitatio and the votum in view of the special character of the 
addressees of these declarations. Since both are moral persons (in one case a city, in the 
other a god), they are unable to accept or reject the proposal. Worms believes that Roman 
law dispensed with the requisite acceptance in these two isolated exceptional forms of 
obligations	  to	  satisfy	  “pressing	  practical	  needs.”177 
Part 1 concludes that a general theory of unilateral declarations cannot be inferred from 
the Roman law texts. The principle in Roman law is that obligations emerge from 
agreements. To see the movement towards the reformulation of this rule we must look at 
the contemporary law. 
Part 2 of De	  la	  volonté studies French laws and decisions to find applications of the new 
theory. Worms identifies two main instances in the cases he analyses. The first one occurs 
where someone obligates himself to an indeterminate person, as in the case of an 
individual releasing into circulation a title obliging him to pay money to whomever bears 
the title and makes a claim on its value. The obligation emerges even if the requester is 
indeterminate at the moment the title entered into circulation. The creditor is the person 
who happens to bear the title at the moment of its claim.178 But practice demands even 
more, Worms says. It requires that a person could obligate himself not only as to an 
indeterminate person but also as to a thing, an entity devoid of will. This is the promise to 
establish a foundation, by which someone obligates himself to give money or do a work 
                                                        
175 Part II Chapter III extensively studies the polliticatio, answering questions like who can be the addressee 
of a pollicitatio, who can be obligated by a pollicitatio, under which conditions does the pollicitatio bind 
the author? He explores the conditional pollicitation and the effects of the pollicitation, like the 
obligation of the promisor, the sanctions in case of non-performance and the extinction of the obligation. 
Idem, pp. 41-55. 
176 Part II Chapter IV studies the vote in the same analysis that he studies the pollicitatio. Idem, pp. 61-74. 
177 Idem, pp. 82-84. 




to establish a non-profit organization. The creditor of such a proposal is the entity 
emerging from the declaration itself. 179 
The second case of interest for Worms is that of contract itself. Chapters VI and VII of Part 
II advance a general theory of the contractual offer. The offer is a unilateral juridical fact 
that engenders its own legal consequences. The legal consequences of an offer are two-
fold, the obligation to honor the given word and the obligation to perform the promised 
performance.180 This theory has application not only to firm promises like the option to 
make a contract, but to all contracts. After all, “what is a contract if not an offer and an 
acceptance?”181 The offeror engages himself on condition that the other party engages 
himself reciprocally, which is the counter-obligation that the acceptance  formulates. The 
acceptance accordingly is simply the condition that gives effect to the engagement first 
initiated by the promisor with his unilateral declaration of will. It follows from this that 
each party was obligated by his declaration of will. Acceptance is not the cause of the offer, 
but simply the condition under which the offeree can make a claim on the offeror. Each of 
the two manifestations, the offer and acceptance, are autonomous. Each would have its 
own conditions, effects, its own dates of expiration, because each one has its own cause, 
and	  each	  suffices	  to	  bind	  its	  author;	  “this	  is	  what	  is	  logical	  and	  necessary.”182 
Worms attempts to decipher the rationality of things. History shows a movement towards 
the recognition of the individual will as a source of law. In Roman law this is but dimly 
observable. The actual legislation evinces a certain prudence, recognizing that the 
unilateral declaration of will creates obligations in certain specific cases. The social needs 
begin to push aside	  the	  old	  tradition	  and	  “force	  the	  jurists to build the new theory.”183 “It	  
is no longer about a mere bunch of exceptional cases, it has become a system that tends 
                                                        
179 “Bien	  plus,	  elle	  paraît	  exiger	  meme	  qu’on	  puisse	  s’obliger,	  toujours	  par	  sa	  seule	  volonté,	  non	  plus	  meme	  
envers	   une	   personne	   indeterminée,	   mais	   envers	   une	   chose,	   envers	   une	   oevre:	   tel	   est	   le	   cas de la 
promesse	  de	  foundation.”	  Idem, p. 90. 
180 Idem, p. 171 
181 Idem, p. 184 
182 Idem, pp. 190-191. A purely consensual contract is composed of two obligations, one at the charge of 
each party. Each of these obligations requires only the consent of the party that obligates himself, and 
his capacity to do so. Each has its own object and each has its own cause. Each one can produce effects 
independently of the other, for if it happens that the thing that one party has obligated herself to do is 
not realized, the other party will not be released from his own obligation. Moreover, the two obligations 
can split into two separate things, as in the contract par correspondence. So for what reason should we 
look for the meeting of two wills? Can we affirm that such a meeting	  occurs?	  Isn’t	  it	  simpler	  to	  see	  the	  
two obligations as distinct things? Hence, even in the field of contracts the new theory has important 
applications. Idem, p. 185. 




towards genericity.” 184 Such a belief is based on the données that summarize the evolution 
of	  law	  itself.	  “What	  characterizes	  this	  trend,	  in	  effect,	  is	  the	  constant	  progress	  that	  law	  has	  
done in the direction of the human	   will’s	   emancipation.”185 The theory has not been 
assured	  in	  all	  its	  points.	  But… 
the moment comes, we believe, where the validity of the engagement undertaken by a 
unilateral declaration of will must be fully recognized, without prejudice, of course, as to 
this other principle, that no one can become a creditor against his will. These two 
principles, seemingly opposed, are in reality mutually implicated, because both of them 
are not but the consequence of the sovereign rights that must be recognized to the 
individual will. The increasing comprehensive recognition of these rights will be the work 
of the future. Reason and history assure us that such a work will be accomplished.186 
3.1.3. THE SCOTTISH UNILATERAL PROMISE 
With the Union of 1707, Westminster could enact law for Scotland and the House of Lords 
became	  Scotland’s	  final	  court. 187 Since the law lords generally ignored the peculiarities of 
Scots law, they judged Scottish cases from the common law perspective. Scottish private 
law thus entered a process of transfiguration.	   The	   common	   law’s	   rules,	   concepts	   and	  
classifications gradually overarched the specificities of Scottish private law. By the second 
half of the nineteenth century, Scots	  law	  “was	  away	  from	  the jus commune.”188 
The eclipse of Scottish private law found opposition in a movement of jurists that arose 
in the middle of the twentieth century. T. B. Smith, the main scholar in this field, claimed 
Scottish private law was not only a variant of the common law, but also of the civilian 
tradition.189 This depicts Scottish private law as having a hybrid nature. Moreover, certain 
institutions of Scottish private law explain civil and commercial practices better than the 
                                                        
184 Idem, p. 94. 
185 Idem, 199. Law	  in	  Worms	  is	  the	  jurists’	  ascertainment and progressive systematization of the judicial 
decisions inspired by the pressing social needs. When the social needs make the judiciary issue certain 
decisions according to which in certain cases the debtor can obligate himself without agreement of a 
second party, the jurists try to coordinate those decisions and work out theoretical explanations. They 
will find precedents in roman and Germanic laws and also a rational foundation to the idea that a person 
can by his own will obligate himself. Idem, 90-91. 
186 Idem, p. 200. 
187 See John W. Cairns, “Historical Introduction,” in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard Zimmerman, (ed), A History 
of Private Law in Scotland, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 15 and ss. 
188 Claire	  McDiarmid,	  “Scots	  law: The turning of the tide,”	  in	  Juridical Review, Vol 3, (1999), pp. 156-169, at 
p. 158.  
189 See T.B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative, Oceana, Edinburgh, 1962. For a critical review: F. H. 
Lawson,	  “Review	  of Studies Critical and Comparative by T. B. Smith,” in Harvard Law Review, Vol 77, No 




common and civil private laws. Central examples are the Ius Quaesitum Tertio (or the issue 
of the third party beneficiary in contracts), and unilateral promises. 
The unilateral promise is presented as “A	   uniquely	   Scots institution.”190  A unilateral 
promise	  is	  “a	  declaration	  by	  which	  one	  party	  commits	  itself	  to	  some	  future	  performance	  
in favour of another, and to which commitment it binds itself as a result of that declaration 
alone.”191 This concept can live within the Scottish legal system because Scottish private 
law does not restrict the formation of voluntary obligations to the common	  law’s	  offer and 
acceptance model, and	  never	  fully	  endorsed	  the	  doctrine	  of	  consideration.	  Indeed,	  “Scots	  
law	  has	  a	  tradition	  of	  enforcing	  promises.”192 The Court of Session, which was the highest 
court	  for	  Scottish	  legal	  matters	  before	  Scotland’s	  incorporation	  into the United Kingdom, 
has been enforcing promises since at least 1551. Examples include both onerous and 
gratuitous promises, like a promise to warrant a loan of money, a bare promise to pay an 
annuity, a case of an option to purchase a shop, and a promise to keep an offer open.  
One may wonder however, why was it that Scottish courts, unlike all other private law 
courts, implemented the concept of unilateral promise? The answer for the institutionalist 
is mainly historical. During the fifteenth century, it was common for Scottish jurists, 
moralists and philosophers to distinguish the act of promising from the act of agreeing. 
Viscount	   Stair,	   “the	   father	   of	   Scottish	   law” 193  to these writers, treated promise as 
something different from contract.  
                                                        
190 Reinhard Zimmermann, Visser, Daniel and Reid,	   Kenneth	   “Formation	   of	   Contract,”	   in	   Zimmermann,	  
Reinhard, Kenneth Reid and Daniel Visser (eds.) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: 
Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, at 53.  
191  Martin	   Hogg,	   “Promise:	   The	   neglected	   obligation	   in	   European	   Private	   Law,”	   in	   International and 
Comparative law quarterly, Vol 59, (April 2010), pp. 461-479, at pp. 461-2. 
192 William	  McBryde,	  “Promises	  in	  Scots	  Law,”	  in	  The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 42, 
No 1, (Jan. 1993), pp. 48-66, at pp. 55 and 60, where he gives many examples. Though on p. 60 he says: 
“It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  imagine that promises were or are frequently enforced in Scottish courts. The 
reality is probably that few practitioners and judges have acquired a familiarity with this area of law. In 
the last 25 years there has been only one reported case with a clear unilateral promise. The case is 
Bthgate v. Rosie, in which a mother promised to pay for the repair of a shop window damaged by her 
son.”	  Conf.	  Laura Vagni,	  who	  maintains	  that	  Scotland	  does	  not	  enforce	  purely	  gratuitous	  promises.	  “The 
Enforceability of Promises in Scotland and in The European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis from 
an Italian Perspective,” in Comparative Law Review, Vol. 2. Available at http://www.comparative 
lawreview.unipg.it/index.php/comparative/article/view/43 (27-1-2016) 
193  “The Scots Grotius was James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair. For in the same way that Hugo Grotius' 
Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheydlaid down Roman-Dutch law in the mid-seventeenth 
century, the publication of Stair's Institutions some fifty years later constituted Roman-Scotch law.” 
Kenneth Reid and Zimmerman, Reinhard, “The development of legal doctrine,”	   in Kenneth Reid and 





Stair begins by distinguishing three forms of will manifestations: desire, resolution and 
engagement. 194 Desire is a tendency of inclination of the will towards its object. This first 
motion of the will is insufficient to constitute a right. A resolution is an expression of an 
intention that one will do something in the future, which similarly cannot impose 
obligations on the utterer. The source that binds the will cannot lie solely in the will itself, 
hence it is always open for a person who resolved to do something, even where the 
intention is to benefit another, to change his mind. "It remainsth then that the only Act of 
the Will, which is efficacious, is that, whereby the Will confersth or states a power of 
exaction in another, and thereby becoming ingaged to that other to perform."195 This last 
act	  of	  the	  will	  is	  the	  “Engagement.” 
Having distinguished nonobligatory and obligatory resolutions, Stair then divides the 
obligatory acts in two classes, the absolute and pure (promise), and the conditional 
(pollicitatio and contract).	  He	  says:	  “the	  Obligatory	  Act	  of	  the	  Will,	  is	  sometimes	  absolute	  
and pure, and sometimes conditional, wherein the condition relates either unto the 
Obligation	  itself,	  or	  to	  the	  performance”196 When the condition affects the obligation we 
are in the presence of	  a	  contract:	  “the	  very	  Obligation	  itself	  is	  pendent,	  till	  the	  condition	  
be purified, and till then it is no obligation, as when any offeror tender is made, there is 
implyed a Condition, that before it becomes Obligatory the party to whom it is offered 
must	  accept.” 197 When the condition affects the performance we are in the presence of a 
pollicitatio. The conditional obligations bind upon the granting thereof and cannot be 
recalled;	  “yet	  they	  are	  only	  to	  be	  performed,	  and	  have	  effect,	  when	  the	  condition	  shall be 
                                                        
194 James Viscount of Stair, The institutions of the law of Scotland, the Heir of Andrew Anderson, Edinburgh, 
1693, n. 10.2. p. 91. (Available in Google books) 
195 Idem, n. 10.2. in fine, p. 91. 
196 Idem, n. 10.3, p. 91-2. The interpretation of this paragraph is controverted. I	  follow	  G.	  MacCormack,	  “A	  
note	  on	  Stair’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  pollicitatio,”	  in	  Juridical review, Vol 21, (1976), at pp. 121-126. The other 
thesis holds that the threefold classification appears in the Institutions but was not meant by Stair. It is 
the result of a mistake produced by the editors of the Institutions. The true division is twofold, promise 
(which includes pollicitation) and contract. MacCormack advances more convincing reasons. Another 
reason	  to	  follow	  MacCormack’s	  view	  is,	  in	  my	  humble	  opinion,	  that	  Stair	  uses	  the	  words	  “conventional	  
obligation”	  in	  the	  quotation	  from	  Grotius,	  and	  in	  this	  quotation,	  (precisely,	  Iure	  belli,	  XI,	  XVI),	  Grotius	  is	  
talking about the Roman pollicitatio. T.B. Smith, "Pollicitatio - Promise and Offer, Stair v. Grotius," in Acta 
Juridica, 1958, (1958), pp. 141-152. (However Smith sustains that this is an incorrect division, that 
pollicitatio is not something different from promise and offer but the genus that comprehends them. As 
a firm, enforceable promise, the pollicitatio is an unconditional unilateral act, which binds the maker 
immediately after it is made. But a pollicitatio can also be an offer; this occurs when one someone 
conditions the obligation of his pollicitatio on the acceptance of the creditor.) 
197 “[A]n offer accepted is a Contract, because it is the Deed of two, the Offerer and Accepter.”	  James	  Viscount	  




existent.” 198 Finally comes the promise:	  “But	  a	  promise	  is	  that	  which	  is	  simple	  and	  pure,	  
and	  hath	  not	  implied	  in	  it	  as	  a	  condition,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  another.”199  
He then engages in argument with Grotius, to defend the view that promises can obligate 
without acceptance: “In	  this	  Grotius	  differeth;	  holding,	   ‘that	  acceptance	   is	  necessary	  to	  
every conventional obligation in equity, without consideration of positive law,” and to 
prevent that obvious objection, that promises are made to absents, infants, idiots or 
persons not yet born, who cannot accept, and therefore such obligations should ever be 
revocable, till their acceptation, which in some of them can never be; he answereth, that 
the civil law only holdeth, that such offers cannot be revoked, until these be in such 
capacity	  to	  accept	  or	  refuse.’	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  reality,	  which	  Grotius	  neglects,	  shows 
that promises can be obligatory without acceptance. Stair finds support in the authority 
of	  other	  law:	  “promises	  now	  are	  commonly	  held	  obligatory	  the canon law having taken 
off the exceptions of the civil law, de nudo pacto.” He finishes with the following 
clarification:	  “It	  is	  true,	  if	  he	  in	  whose	  favour	  they	  are	  made,	  accept	  not,	  they	  become	  void,	  
not by the negative non-acceptance, but by the contrary rejection. For as the will of the 
promiser	  constitutes	  a	  right	  in	  the	  other,	  so	  the	  other’s	  will,	  by	  renouncing	  and	  rejecting	  
that	  right,	  voids	  it,	  and	  makes	  it	  return.”200  
Stair’s	   classification	   of	   the	   engaging	   acts	   and	   strong	   recognition	   of	   the	   obligatory 
character	  of	  simple	  promises	  would	  “set	  Scots	  law	  on	  a	  path	  different	  from	  some	  other	  
civilian	  systems	  and	  also	  from	  the	  common	  law.”201 This	  is	  why	  today,	  in	  Scots	  law,	  “a	  man	  
may bind himself informally more or less to the same extent as in England a man might 
bind himself by the so-called contract under seal—which,	   incidentally,	   if	   Grotius’	  
reasoning were sound, could create no enforceable obligation.202 The unilateral promise 
provides solutions to problems that cannot conveniently be resolved by the offer and 
acceptance model. Indeed, 
                                                        
198 Idem, n. 10.3, p. 91-2. 
199 Idem, n. 10.4, p. 92. 
200 “…This	  also	  quadrates	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  right,	  which	  consists	  in	  a	  faculty	  or	  power	  which	  may	  be	  in	  
these, who exerce no act of the will about it, nor know of it; so infants truly have right as well as men, 
though they do not know, nor cannot exerce	  it.”	  Idem, n. 10.4, p. 92. The existence of rights, Stair argues, 
not	  only	  depends	  on	  the	  right	  holder’s	  will. 
201 MacBryde, op. cit., p. 56. 
202 TB	  Smith,	  “Pollicitatio…,”	  op. cit., p. 147. (Though on p. 149 Smith goes on to complain that the unilateral 





All legal systems wish to recognize, in some types of circumstance, the efficacy of such 
unilateral promises, but they often do so by forcing promise to wear the borrowed 
clothing of contract. This not only distorts a proper understanding of contracts, but it 
displays a lack of honesty about why liability is being imposed, for the reality is that it is 
being imposed because the promisor has unilaterally bound himself by his declaration of 
will to undertake a specific performance. Nothing else is needed by way of explanation, 
and attempts to explain liability by reference to fictional acceptances of such promises, or 
by an assertion that it is detrimental reliance which is being protected, are an unhelpful 
and misleading addition.203 
3.1.4. THE CONCEPT CALLED UNILATERAL PROMISE 
It would be unreasonable to assimilate the works of Siegel, Worms and the Scottish 
institutionalists, but we can certainly relate them on three significant points.  
First of all, these works share a practical interest. The unilateral promise scholars do not 
get into questions like whether someone could commit to a promissory obligation by 
internally intending it, as the Salmantine scholastics did.204 The cases they tackle are of 
firm offers, promises of a reward, titles of credit, stipulations for the benefit of a third 
parties, gratuitous promises, and in general, cases where the recipient of a promise had 
neither requested it nor had the opportunity to accept it. They see conflicts of interest in 
interactions for which their legislation has no	  solution.	  The	  concepts	  of	  “Versprechen,”	  
“declaration	   unilateral	   de	   volunté”	   or	   unilateral	   promise	   are	   constructed to offer a 
response to issues arising in interactions between persons. 
Secondly, they present their solutions in the form of another cause or source of obligation. 
They do not elaborate the new concept in the context of a new law, as was arguably the 
case with the Canon lawyers, who built their concept of promissio in the context of a law 
dedicated to inducing the faithful towards a path to salvation. 205 The unilateral promise 
                                                        
203 Martin Hogg, Promises and contract law: comparative perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge and New York, 2011, at 109. 
204 See discussion in James Gordley, The philosophical origins of modern contract doctrine, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1991, p. 79 and ss. 
205 Medieval Canon lawyers have argued that a promisee could, based on the Canon law rule against perjury, 
demand performance to the non-performing promisor. See	  the	  authors	  quoted	  in	  Enrico	  Dell’Acquila,	  
“La	  promesa	  unilateral	  como	  fuente	  general	  de	  obligaciones,”	  in	  Revista de Derecho Privado, Tomo LXIII, 
(1979), Madrid, pp. 796-806, at n. 6 pp. 803-804, Enrico Camillieri, La formazione unilaterale del 
rapporto obbligatorio, Giappichelli, Torino, 2004, p. 4-7 and Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, Oxford, 1996, p. 542-544. I believe that whether canon law demanded the enforcement of 
promises or not is irrelevant for private law. Canon law is categorically different to private law. One has 




scholars write to their respective private laws. They wanted their laws to recognize their 
unilateral promise and they wanted such recognition to be made in the same form as the 
contract and the tort. Not as a contract, neither as a tort—but as that which defines 
contract and tort. They wanted private law to recognize the unilateral promise as a 
general category for identifying obligations in interactions. The most eloquent example of 
this can be found in Worms’ book, in clear reference to the classification of Art. 1370 of 
the French Civil Code—“The	   unilateral	   declaration	   of	  will	   as	   a	   source	   of	   obligations.”	  
Another clue as to the engagement of these scholars with the private law tradition lies in 
their noticeable concern with replying to arguments contrary to their own positions. 
Hence, Stair engages with Grotius, and Siegel with the German followers of Roman law. 
Finally, and probably most importantly, these scholars defined promise in precisely the 
same way. First, it is paramount for them all that promise be the external manifestation 
of	  the	  promisor’s	  will.	  This	   is	  to	  say,	  promise	   is	  a	  declaration.	  Second, it is a means by 
which one can obligate oneself to do something for the benefit of another regardless of 
the	  beneficiary’s	  consent, promise is a unilateral act. Third, valid unilateral promises have 
a complete and licit object. A promise concerning things extra commercium would for 
example be void. Fourth, these writers explicitly or implicitly divide the effect of a promise 
in two; the duty that immediately and necessarily arises from the promise, and the 
obligation that could eventually mature. The obligation is a duty to do something at the 
request of another, and it matures where the promisee performs the deed with which the 
promisor conditioned the exigibility of the promise.  
                                                        





3.1.5. RECEPTION BY AN INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW: ART 2:107 PECL 
The Principles of European Contract Law,206 “taken	  to	  constitute	  a	  general	  conceptual	  and	  
systematic foundation for the process of the harmonization of European contract 
law[,]”207 prescribes, in Article 2:107, that: 
A promise which is intended to be legally binding without acceptance is binding. 
I want to elaborate three points. First of all, the new concept appears under a proper 
name—“unilateral	  promise.”208 This is in an important fact, for in the culture of private 
law, the rules, concepts or principles with a name of their own are the institutions of the 
private law.209 
Second, the unilateral promise appears as a cause of obligation. Although the principles 
of European contract law are principles of contract law, they include the concept of 
unilateral promise, and include it as an alternative to the contract. The unilateral promise 
is an alternative to the contract in that it does the same thing. Contract is a model for 
forming obligations. Two persons form an obligation when one accepts the offer of the 
other. The unilateral promise is another model for forming obligations. One person, by 
her own will, can obligate herself to do something for the benefit of another. The concept 
of unilateral promise is there to give legal representation to the cases that do not fit with, 
or as many unilateral promise scholars like to say, cannot be explained by, the offer and 
acceptance model. 210  Undoubtedly, it would have been desirable for the unilateral 
                                                        
206  Ole Lando and Beale, Hugh, Principles of European contract law, Parts I and II, (prepared by the 
Commission on European Contract Law, chairman, Ole Lando), Kluwer Law International, Boston, 2000. 
207 “The PECL may be taken to constitute a general conceptual and systematic foundation for the process of 
the harmonization of European contract law. In particular, however, they offer a neutral reference point 
for an organic assimilation of private law – one which can serve (and does, indeed, increasingly serve) 
as a source of inspiration for the traditional agents of legal development in Europe: legislators, judges, 
and professors.”	  Reinhard Zimmermann, “The Principles of European Contract Law,” in Florian Faust 
and	  Thüsing, Gregor (eds.), Beyond	  Borders:	  Symposium	  in	  Honour	  of	  Hein	  Kötz, Heymanns, Köln, Berlin 
and München, 2006, pp. 111–48, at p. 141. 
208  The name unilateral promise appears in Art. 1:07, which says that the Principles apply with any 
appropriate	  modifications	   to	   “unilateral	   promises	   and	   to	   other	   statements	   and	   conducts	   indicating	  
intention.” 
209 The tradition of naming concepts goes back to Roman times, where only the contracts with names were 
enforceable,	  like	  “stipulatio”,	  “commodatum”	  and	  “emptio-venditio.”	  The	  innominated	  contracts	  were,	  
in principle, unenforceable. This could be said of all the situational cases that gave right to an obligation, 
see Max Kaser, Derecho romano privado, 5th ed, José	  Santa	  Cruz	  Teijeiro translation, Reus, Madrid, 1968, 
§33,	  p. 1. 
210 The same can be inferred from the place in which the unilateral promise is mentioned. Article 2:107 
precedes	  the	  section	  on	  “offer	  and	  acceptance,”	  and	  is	  included	  in	  a	  section	  with	  general	  provisions	  on	  
the formation of voluntary obligations, like Conditions for the Conclusion of a Contract, Intention, 




promise to appear in a chapter	  of	  its	  own,	  but	  the	  PECL’s	  treatment is justifiable in that it 
is not a book on obligations.211 
Finally, as in Siegel, Worms and the Scottish institutionlists, the unilateral promise is a 
practical concept. It is there to ground the cases that cannot be explained by the offer and 
acceptance model. Page 157 of the PECL mentions two cases: 
First, a fake gratuituous promise: 
Illustration 1: When the Gulf War started in 1990 the enterprise X in country Y published 
a statement in several newspapers in Y promising to establish a fund of 1 million Euros to 
support the widows and dependent children of soldiers of country Y who were killed in 
the war. After the war X tried to avoid payment, invoking big losses recently made. X will 
be bound by its promise.212 
Second, a letter of patronage: 
Illustration 2: C sends a letter to the creditors of its subsidiary company D, which is in 
financial difficulties, promising that C will ensure that D will meet its existing debts. The 
promise is made in order to save the reputation of the group of companies to which C and 
D belong. It is binding upon C without acceptance since it is to be assumed that C intends 
to be bound without the acceptance of each creditor.213 
The Principles of European Contract law was meant to elaborate a “set	  of	  general	  rules	  
which are designed to provide maximum flexibility and thus accommodate future 
development in legal thinking in the field of	  contract	  law.”214 The	  arbitrator,	  as	  “the	  Court”	  
or any other user	  of	  the	  principles,	  “may	  adopt	  the	  solution	  provided	  by	  the	  Principles	  
                                                        
Only. Moreover, Art. 1:101 provides that the articles on contract formation could be applied to unilateral 
promises. In doing so, the PECL relates and differentiates contract from unilateral promise. 
211 The	  comment	  to	  the	  rule	  begins	  like	  this	  “An	  offer	  is	  a	  promise	  which	  requires	  acceptance.	  An	  offeror	  is	  
not bound by its promise unless it is accepted. Other promises are binding without acceptance and they 
are	  nevertheless	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  contracts	  albeit	  with	  some	  modifications.”	  The	  statement	  “the	  promise	  
must	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  contract”	  must	  not	  mislead	  the	  reader.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that,	  in the PECL, the 
unilateral promise is a kind of contract. The PECL is a good private law book. In our tradition, we utilize 
these fictions when we recognize that a relevant legal phenomenon is similar to a sophisticated legal 
institution but yet is different enough that we might not characterize it as a species of the other. In these 
scenarios we describe the legal phenomenon in question with a degree of license, using what some call 
techniques of analogy. The jurist can avail himself of the rules of the sophisticated institution, always 
minding the fact that he is ordering a new creature, that the case at hand only shares a similarity with 
the source of inspiration.  
212 Ole Lando and Beale, Hugh, Principles…, op. cit., p. 157. 
213 Idem, p. 157. 




knowing	   that	   it	   represents	   the	  common	  core	  of	   the	  European	  systems.”215 The writers 
admit that the project sometimes allows the solution of one European system to prevail 
over another, or invents new solutions. This attitude is characterised as “progressive	  
development.”	  216  Article	   2:107	   is	   “interesting	   and	   innovative,”217  without doubt. The 
question I want to pose is whether it is just. Is Article 2:107, and the theory encapsulated 
therein a progressive development of just private law? 
3.2. TODAY’S UNILATERAL PROMISE IS NOT A PRIVATE LAW CONCEPT 
I will submit two criticisms of the standard conception of unilateral promise. Both are 
elaborated from the perspective of just private law. 
3.2.1. TODAY’S UNILATERAL PROMISE MISSES THE OTHER PERSON OF LEGAL PHENOMENA 
According to the standard version of the unilateral promise, a person becomes obligated 
by her promise provided that she declared her irrevocable intention to be obligated to do 
something and the object of the obligation is licit and complete. I want to note that this 
mode of conceptualizing the unilateral promise implies the following normative 
possibility: A person would become obligated to do something before, or regardless of the 
fact that the promisee takes notice of the promise.218 
This possibility is implicit in the wordings of Parr 2:107 of the PECL,219 and is explicitly 
endorsed by some unilateral promise scholars. In the case of stipulation for the benefit of 
a third party, according to both Siegel and Worms, A grants the benefit of a right to C by 
declaring	  a	  promise	   to	  B.	  C	  acquires	   the	  benefit	  even	   if	  he	  or	  she	   ignores	  A’s	  promise.	  
Martin Hogg, a Scottish institutionalist writer, opines the same in the case of the promisee 
                                                        
215 Idem, p. XXIV. 
216 Idem, p. XXIV, note 6. 
217 Nils Jansen and Zimmermann, Reinhard, “Contract	  Formation	  and	  Mistake	  in	  European	  Contract	  Law:	  A	  
genetic	  Comparison	  of	  Transnational	  Model	  Rules,”	  in	  Oxford J Legal Studies, Vol 31, No 4, (Winter 2011), 
pp. 625-662, at p. 17. 
218 Other unilateral promise norms do not incur in this first error:	  “La	  promessa	  unilaterale,	  se	  fatta	  per	  
scritto	  e	  per	  una	  durata	  non	   indeterminata,	  obbliga	   il	  promittente	   tostoché	  sia	  giunta	  a	  notizia	  della	  
persona	   cui	   è	   destinata,	   a	  meno	   che	   questa	   rifiuti.”	   Commissione	   Reale	   per	   la	   Riforma	   dei	   codici	   – 
Commission	  française	  d’etudes	  de	  l’union	  legislative	  entre	  les	  nations	  alliées	  et	  amies, Progetto di Codice 
Italo-francese delle obbligazioni e dei contratti, (Testo definitivo approvato a	  Parigi	  nell’Ottobre	  1927),	  
Roma, 1928, Art. 60. 
219 It	  only	  says	  “A	  promise	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  legally	  binding	  without	  acceptance	  is	  binding”.	  Although	  
the	  commentary	  states	  “The	  promise	  must	  of	  course	  be	  communicated	  to	  the	  promisee	  or	  to	  the	  public.”	  




of a promise of reward performing the requisite activity in ignorance of the promise.220 
This version extreme of the theory was made private law in Germany and England.221  
I want to shed light on the fact that this normative possibility stands in manifest 
incoherence with the other branches of private law liability, or causes of obligations. 
Indeed when we study the traditional causes of private law obligations we see that the 
party who becomes a debtor interacts with the party who becomes a creditor. Tort is 
possibly	   the	   best	   example	   to	   illustrate	   the	   “relational	   aspect”	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   the	  
obligation. In tort, the relation manifests itself in the requirement that the wrong of the 
tortfeasor in fact damages the victim. Car accidents, batteries and libels vividly portray 
the connection between debtor and creditor. The fast car, long hand or adverse comment 
of one caused the broken leg, black eye or reputational damage of the other. The idea is 
that the creditor suffered damage because the debtor illegally provoked its effective 
cause. It would be very difficult for a private law practitioner to argue that a person is 
responsible for the damages that another person suffered if he or she is unable to prove 
that the alleged debtor acted, by herself or through someone under her control, in a 
manner conducive to the cause of the damage. Tort systems that depart from this mode 
                                                        
220 “The	  conceptual	  benefit	  of	  seeing	  such	  promises	  of	  reward	  as	  unilateral	  promises	  is	  that	  the	  obligation	  
is properly recognized as coming into being immediately upon the	  promisor’s	  intention to be bound is 
objectively communicated (rather than when accepted in some way) and that it can be enforced by a 
promisee	  even	  if	  he	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  reward	  when	  he	  performed	  the	  stipulated	  conduct.”	  Promise 
Hogg,	  “The	  Neglected	  Obligation	  in	  European	  Private	  Law”,	  cit., p.	  470.	  Criticizing	  Scots	  law’s	  tendency	  
to assimilate reward cases to the English law, T.B. Smith expects Scots law, which has accepted a general 
doctrine of obligation by unilateral declaration of will, to treat reward promises like the German law, 
which grants a right to ignorant performers. T.B. Smith, "Pollicitatio - Promise and Offer, Stair v. Grotius," 
in Acta Juridica, 1958, (1958), pp. 141-152, at p. 149.  
221 §657	  of	  the	  German	  Civil	  Code	  (BGB)	  prescribes:	  “A	  person,	  who	  by	  public	  notice	  announces	  a reward 
for the performance of an act, in particular for the production of a result, is bound to pay the reward to 
any	  person	  who	  has	  performed	  the	  act,	  even	  if	  he	  [the	  latter]	  did	  not	  act	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  reward”. See 
discussion in 2.4.3.1. In the common law, the extreme was made law in Williams v Carwardine, (1833) 5 
C. & P 566; 4 B & Ad. 621, where the act conditioning the exigibility of the promised performance (£20) 
was provision of information leading to the discovery of the murderer of the promisor’s	   brother.	  
Whether the information had been proffered with a view to the £20 reward, or whether it had been due 
to the moral affliction caused by the fact that the murderer was the husband of the plaintiff was 
irrelevant for the courts. What mattered was that the plaintiff provided the requested information. “18. 
Mr. Justice J. Parke. If the plaintiff comes within the conditions of the handbill, I think she is entitled to 
the	  reward.	  The	  jury	  will	  probably	  find	  that	  the	  £20	  was	  not	  the	  motive.	  We	  may,	  I	  think, assume that it 
was not. The motive was the state of her own feelings. My opinion is, that the motive is not material; and 
that,	   if	   she	   comes	   within	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   handbill,	   that	   is	   sufficient.”	   Thereby	   the “Verdict	   for	   the	  
plaintiff-Damages	   £20.”	   “20.	   […]	   It	   is	   to	   be	   taken	   as	   found	   by	   the	   jury,	   that	   the	   plaintiff	   gave	   the	  
information which led to the discovery of the murderers; but that she did not give that information for 




of building tort claims depart, at the same time, from the classical mode of justifying 
private law obligations.222 
Let me pass over the case of contract to make a more illuminating comparison. It is 
probably only in the case of unjust enrichments that a party ignores the event that 
engages her in an obligation with another. For example: strong rain ruins my	  house’s	  
fence and I am on holidays, my neighbor cannot contact me and yet decides to fix it. I am 
obligated to restitute to him the value he spent to my benefit. Another example: the phone 
bill arrives home and I am on holidays, the cleaning lady finds it unnecessary to bother 
me and decides to pay these debts for me. Once again I am obligated to make restitution 
of the expenditures. In these cases I become obligated to someone by a fact that I ignore. 
Now, if we accept that someone may become a debtor while ignoring the causative event, 
Siegel, Worms and the Scottish institutionalists could say, we must also accept that 
someone may become a creditor while ignoring the causative event. The unilateral 
promise, like the negotiorum gestio, features a person who becomes enriched without 
having a contract with the impoverished party—I make the promise, it does not reach 
you, and yet you become enriched. Is this a correct analogy? 
No, it is not. The analogy does not obtain because the gestor of the negotiorum gestio does 
make contact with the dominus negotii.	  Even	  if	  I	  am	  absent	  while	  you	  are	  fixing	  my	  house’s	  
bench, even if I ignore the fact that you are paying my debts, your agencies are 
nevertheless interfering with my personality. For my house and debt are parts of my be-
longings—they are like extentions of my being. Here the relational aspect manifests itself 
in the fact that the enriched and obligated person received value from the impoverished 
person, or automatically accrued it after of the latter’s	  deed.	  Nothing	  like	  this	  happens	  in	  
the case where someone makes a promise that never reaches the promisee. 
My argument can be formulated like so: If we want to construe the unilateral promise as 
a cause of obligation, then the unilateral promise must look like the tort, the unjust 
enrichment and the contract, which are the existing causes of obligation. The standard 
definition of unilateral promise makes no reference to the interaction between the person 
who is to be the debtor and the person who is to be the creditor, which seems to be a basic 
feature of all causes of obligation. Thus, I conclude, the standard version of the unilateral 
promise cannot qualify as a cause of obligation.
                                                        
222 It goes without saying that the wrongful interference of the creditor must cause damage to the content 
of	  the	  debtor’s	  right.	  And	  so,	  the	  broken	  leg	  in	  our	  example	  amounts	  to	  harm	  because	  the	  leg’s	  indemnity	  
is part of the object of the	   creditor’s	   right	  against	   the	  debtor.	   See	  Ernest	  Weinrib,	  Corrective Justice, 






Business certainty, the circulation of property, the firm, trust, good faith and assurance: Goals and values needed 
by an emerging state that wills to become an industrial power. Law as the general rule established by the 
authority  makes  it  possible.  Civil  codes’  private  laws  are  more  political  than  juridical  achievements. The difficulty 
involved in the task of creating law under the presupposition that law is a coercively enforced general rule has to 
do  more  with  calculating  how  to  most  effectively  advance  the  authority’s  agenda  than  with  finding  a  form  that  
states the justice of cases. 
 
 
1. Die Proklamation des Deutschen Kaiserreiches by Anton von Werner (1877), depicting the proclamation of the 
foundation of the German Reich (18 January 1871, Palace of Versailles). Left, on the podium (in black): Crown Prince 
Frederick (later Frederick III), his father Emperor Wilhelm I, and Frederick I of Baden, proposing a toast to the new emperor. 
Centre (in white): Otto von Bismarck, first Chancellor of Germany, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Prussian Chief of Staff. 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Empire  
 
2.  Bürgerliches  Gesetzbuch  1896  in  https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bürgerliches_Gesetzbuch 
 
 





The same conclusion can be reached from the perspective of the concept of private law 
obligation: An obligation is a sort of necessity that someone does something. For someone 
to be obligated by private law, there must be a person to whom the something is owed, or 
who has the correlative right to request the owed performance.223 In other words, for you 
to be obligated, another like you must have a right as against you. This right of mine as 
against you amounts to a belonging of mine, an extension of my personality. From the 
moment I have a right as against you, I have a new power of action—the possibility to 
request of you the object of your duty. It follows from this that before I had this new power 
of mine I must have had an encounter with it, otherwise I would never have had that right. 
The right depends for its existence on its addition or attachment to me—the metaphor of 
the acquisition or reception of the personal right applies. This meeting may be 
involuntary; I did not decide to acquire the promised right. However it needs to meet me, 
as when someone acquires a power to accept an offer by learning of the offer. Otherwise 
there is no extension of my personality.  
We see that becoming a creditor requires an act, and that such an act must consist in a 
relation in between the debtor and the creditor. A promise, like any phenomenon that is 
to be considered a cause of obligation, needs to be relational. The jurist who wants to build 
promise as a cause of duty-right relations must be ready to specify the factual conditions 
under which the promisee takes the (credit which is the) correlative of the obligational 
duty. Otherwise there can be no basis for liability. A promise that does not interfere with 
a promisee cannot be an effective cause of private law obligation. 
3.2.1.1. AM I MISSING THE POINT? 
Still, Siegel, Worms and the institutionalits could respond that I missed the point of their 
theory. What follows from a unilateral promise is not an obligation in the classical private 
law sense. It is not a duty correlated with a right. The immediate outcome of the unilateral 
promise is a duty of the promisor to keep her promise. From the moment she states the 
promise she is obligated to act in accordance with the order established by the promise. 
Since the promise creates a legal scenario where someone is a beneficiary, this someone 
can enjoy this benefit if he or she so desires. But this someone does not participate in the 
creation of the private legal order. This order emerges from the unilateral will of the 
promisor. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the beneficiary knew of the promise when 
he or she performed the activity that was established as the condition for the reward. His 
or her agency takes relevance only after he or she is in a position to decide whether to 
                                                        
223 The	  famous	  definition	  “Obligatio est iuris vinculum quo, necessitate, adstringimur alicuius solvendae rei, 




claim the granted benefit, and decides to do so. Only then does the beneficiary become a 
creditor, and the promisor a debtor in the private law sense.  
This theory has great explanatory capacity. It helps us to justify the obligations of various 
types of undertaking, like the various interested promises, the stipulations to the benefit 
of a third party, the testament and the bequest. However, the theory of the legal effect of 
non-communicated promises is incomplete and I cannot imagine a way to complete it 
without defying basic tenets of private law.224 
The question to be answered is: Who holds the promisor to her promise in the interval 
between	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  promise	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  creditor?	  One	  answer	  is	  “no	  
one”—there is no such person. 225 However, if I am obligated to do something without a 
party in favour of whom I am obligated, whether I do what my duty requires is left up to 
me. We are at pains to argue that my duty is legal. We need someone who could demand 
compliance in the eventuality that the promisor tried to revoke before the creditor enters 
                                                        
224 This	  criticism	  seems	  to	  have	  already	  been	  made	  in	  Siegel’s	  times:	  “…the	  thesis	  of	  Siegel,	  that	  the	  promise	  
derives both a duty to keep the word and a duty to perform the promise, has been significantly objected 
on the grounds that the first duty has no juridical character and therefore the second no effective 
relevance…”	   Bernhard Windscheid, Diritto delle pandette, Carlo Fadda and Paolo Emilio Bensa 
translation, Torino, UTET, 1902,	  §304,	  p.	  179,	  note	  12. 
225 Some could reply that even duties to oneself have creditors. For example, when I was committing myself 
to finishing my PhD, I was implicitly unfolding myself into two - promisor and promisee. This view is 
persuasive. However, I am tempted to think that one could be obligated without a creditor. I, without a 
doubt, could meaningfully think that I am obligated to do something (full stop). I think that what is good 
is to do whatever a reasonable individual would think due in the given circumstances, and, in endorsing 
this formula and applying it to my desired plan, constrain myself to do some certain thing. For example, 
I believe that everybody would agree that long projects are to be completed once they are considerably 
developed unless exceptional circumstances impede completion and, in view of this, commit myself to 
finishing my doctoral dissertation. Nothing, not even the idea itself, can claim to be the creditor of my 
obligation to finish my PhD. Though being obligated conceptually requires the obligated party to do 
something, the creditor is not a conceptual requirement for obligation in its general sense. Here the 
words of Radbruch are pertinent: 
Il	  dovere	  morale	  è	  dovere	  verso	  la	  coscienza,	  verso	  il	  migliore	  io,	  verso	  Dio	  nel	  proprio petto, o comunque noi 
possiamo esprimere con perifrasi il fatto che esso viene ascritto solo alla legge morale, non a qualsiasi altra 
forza che ordini e pretenda. 
Gustav Radbruch, Introduzione alla scienza giuridica, Dino Pasini and Carlo A. Agnesotti translation, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 1961, p. 83. For a discussion of the curious case of self-promises see Stan Husi, “The 
importance of self-promises,”	  in	  Sheinman, Hanoch (ed), Promises and agreements: Philosophical Essays, 




on to scene.226 The best candidate seems to be the state.227 If I make a promise, I am 
obligated to the community as a whole. It is the community who will reproach me in a 
case of non-compliance. Even if my promise points to you as the beneficiary, I am not 
obligated as against you but to the community as a whole, which will ensure that I keep 
faith with my promise and that you enjoy the benefit thereby established for you. But in 
this scenario you are not a promisee, properly speaking you are a beneficiary of my 
undertaking. For the same reason, you do not hold a right of action in reproach of my non-
performance of the undertaking. The holder of the right of action is the community, which, 
as the entity entrusted to make me meet the terms of my promise, holds this right as 
someone that has no choice other than to demand performance. The community cannot 
renounce the right of action. Moreover, as the action against the promise’s non-
performance is a public action, the holder of the action must prosecute me in any case of 
non-compliance. The state has to do it more as a matter of duty than as a matter of interest, 
even where there is no private person interested in my promise. I do not think that the 
unilateral promise scholars are ready to accept such an extreme view of their theory.228 
                                                        
226 Once	  again,	  Radbruch:	  "Solo	  quando	  Eva	  si	  presentò	  ad	  Adano,	  Venerdì	  a	  Robinson,	  per	  essi	  cominciò,	  
accanto alla morale, ad essere valido anche il diritto. La legge morale vale per l'uomo nel suo isolamento, 
effettivo o pensato, la legge giuridica	  per	   gli	   uomini	   nella	   loro	   convivenza,	   per	   la	   comunità	  umana."	  
Introduzione…,	  cit., at 85.	  Contra:	  the	  suggestive	  view	  of	  Fernando	  López	  de	  Zavalía,	  Derechos Reales, 
Zavalia,	  Buenos	  Aires,	  1989,	  t.	  1,	  Capítulo	  1,	  §2	  esp.	  VI-VII, who argues that Robinson had rights before 
Viernes’	  arrival	  to	  the	  island. 
Once again, for my obligation to be legal someone must have the choice to demand my compliance in 
case of incompliance. And it is obvious that someone must know of this entitlement for her to be able to 
demand this of me. Otherwise the possibility of reproach never existed. And if you happen to know of 
my promise after I have regretted having made it, then you cannot claim something against me, for you 
have learned of a revoked promise. 
227 Here an almost poetic view of the public law conception of contractual obligation: 
The true is that all obligation, contractual or not contractual, arise, among all, of one high and deep unilateral 
will: that of the lord; be it hereditary or semi-divine, be it an elected, profane lord legislating at his will. Thus 
the only origin of the obligations formed without contract. As to the conventional obligations, they arise 
primarily out of this grand unilateral will called public authority, and then, of the petite unilateral will of every 
contractual party that, reflecting that external and superior commandment and in conformity with their given 
latitude, commands himself, both lord and subject, and commands himself obedience of the commandment of 
the other.”  
Gabriel Tarde, Les	   transformations	  du	  droit:	  étude	  sociologique, F. Alcan, Paris, 1893, p. 123. See 6.1., 
where I explain why this conception of contractual obligation cannot be a private law conception of 
contractual obligation. 
228 Once they have accepted this extreme, they must, of necessity, neglect the division between private law 
and public law. (See the interesting reflections of Weinrib, Corrective Justice, op. cit., Chapter 9, 2, b), pp. 
306-312, especially at pp. 309-10.) Some simply cannot do it, for they use the private law/public law 
dichotomy in their argumentation. Worms, for example, maintains that the pollicitatio and the votum 
belong, properly speaking, not to the private law but, respectively, to the Roman public law and the Droit 




Indeed nor am I, as someone interested in determining a new private law transaction, 
ready to establish a solution of such kind. 
3.2.2. TODAY’S UNILATERAL PROMISE MISSES THE RECIPROCITY OF JUST PRIVATE LAW 
OBLIGATIONS 
Now I want to talk about the fact that the legal order that recognizes the standard 
conception of unilateral promise is a legal order for which purely charitable promises 
confer enforceable rights. Neither Siegel nor Worms attended to this implication of their 
unilateral promise. However one of the Scottish institutionalists is especially emphatic on 
this point. Martin Hogg says: 
Promise is capable of offering a suitable explanation of unilateral undertakings to effect a 
donation.229 
I want to suggest that, without its own version of the idea of cause or reciprocity of the 
obligation, the unilateral promise cannot present itself as a cause of obligation. Indeed, in 
their own way, all causes of obligation manifest the reciprocity requirement. 230 Contract 
does this through its requirement of cause or doctrine of consideration.231 The accepter 
                                                        
229 Martin Hogg, Promises and contract law…, op. cit., p. 465, where he lauds the European Draft Common 
Frame of Reference,	  which,	  in	  the	  num.	  56,	  entitled	  “Minimal	  substantive	  restrictions”	  says: 
The absence of any need for consideration or causa for the conclusion of an effective contract, the recognition 
that there can be binding unilateral undertakings and the recognition that contracts can confer rights on third 
parties all promote efficiency (and freedom!) by making it easier for parties to achieve the legal results they 
want in the way they want without the need to resort to legal devices or distortions 
“This	  principle,	   [suggests	  Hogg],	  correctly	   identifies	  personal	  autonomy	  and	  efficiency	  as	   two	  strong	  
reasons for recognizing both unilateral undertakings and third party rights (other manifestations of 
promise might similarly be justified), and the avoidance of distortion of the law as a strong reason for 
not forcing transactions to adopt inappropriate legal forms in an attempt to avoid structural barriers to 
validity. It is encouraging to see the drafters of the DCFR adopt this view, as it aligns with what has been 
argued	  throughout	  this	  work.”	  Martin Hogg, Promises	  and	  contract	  law…, op. cit., p. 466. 
230 In this	  sense,	  “ogni	  prestazione,	  attribuzione	  patrimoniale,	  o	  spostamento	  di	  ricchezza	  che	  dir	  si	  voglia,	  
deve essere sorretto da una adeguata giustificazione, che ne costituisce la causa”	  Francesco	  Di	  Giovanni,	  
Le promesse unilaterali, CEDAM, Padova 2010, p. 64 
231 For	  the	  common	  law	  see	  Peter	  Benson,	  “The	  idea	  of	  Consideration,”	  in	  University of Toronto Law Journal, 
Vol 61, No 2, (Spring 2011), pp. 241-278.  
Three points of the French Civil Code indicate that voluntary obligations are only about agreed exchange. 
Firstly, donations are not regulated among the sources of the obligation; they are regulated before them, 
together with testaments (Title II: Of donations during life and of wills) and after of the mortis causa 
succession (Title I). Secondly, there is Art.	  931	  requiring	  that	  “All acts importing donation during life 
shall be passed before notaries”,	  this	  is	  the	  State	  intervening	  to	  render	  the	  agreement	  enforceable.	  And	  
finally, even if the general definition of contract in Art. 101 seems to suggest that the contract could be 
gratuitous, there is Art. 1131, which says that to obligate, the obligation must have a lawful causa: 
namely, consideration on the eyes of the law. 
The same cannot be said of the German BGB, which does not talk about causa because its law of contract 




of a contractual offer owns the obligation not only because the offeror offered it to him, 
but also because acceptance implies giving to the offeror the thing for which the offeror 
offered the obligation. Acceptance can signify contracting a synalagmatic obligation, 
transferring an in rem right or performing some certain act. Whatever the case, something 
must always be given in exchange. We will return to this in 4.1.4. and 5.2.2.1. 
Curiously enough, tort evinces the same idea of reciprocity. The case of negligence is 
illustrative. If fast driving causes harm to another, the driver is responsible not only 
because she crashed into the other person but also because driving fast signified taking 
what belongs to that person. What belongs to them in this case is the freedom to traverse 
public spaces without concern for the threat posed by fast drivers. What the driver gains 
is the cost that an otherwise diligent person would have paid in the same circumstance: 
(time and attention devoted to exercising due care, driving cautiously.) The harm to the 
victim is the loss of something that she owned before the tort occurred. The wrong of the 
tortfeasor	  is	  not	  only	  the	  causal	  antecedent	  of	  the	  victim’s	  harm	  but	  also	  the	  reason	  by	  
which the tortfeasor must pay for the harm caused to the victim. Requiring that the harm 
of the victim be caused by a wrong of the tortfeasor signifies that the tortfeasor was 
enriched, as it were, with the effectuation of the wrong. Wrong, in private law, is 
“something	  like	  the	  self-seeking indulgence of passion.”232 
In proving that the agreement had consideration and that the tort was wrongfully caused, 
the contractual creditor and the tort victim prove the justice of their case.233 The same 
goes for cases of unjustified enrichment: I have a claim to restitution because you 
enriched yourself at my expenses without my authorization. In stark contrast, however, 
                                                        
and consideration. They derived the contractual obligation from the creative force of individual wills. 
(See	  Paolo	  Recano,	  “Profili	  storici	  della	  promessa	  unilaterale,”	  in	  Rassegna di Diritto Civile, fasc. 1, (2006), 
pp. 168-223, at p. 201, note 101.) 
232 Sir Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the Principles of Obligations arising from Civil 
Wrongs in the Common Law, 4th ed., Stevens and Sons, London, 1895, p. 9. Also the interesting opinion 
of Pufendorf: 
in	  case	  a	  Man	  be	  hurt	  or	  injur’d	  by	  another,	  in	  any	  respect,	  the	  Person	  who	  stands	  justly	  charg’d	  as	  Author	  of	  
the Wrong, ought, as far as it lies in his Power, to make Reparation. For otherwise it would have been a vain 
Command not to harm another, if the Party who actually suffers such a Harm, must be content to put it up 
without farther Notice, and leave the Offender to enjoy in Peace the Fruit of his Injury, never obliging him to 
refund, or to restore.  
Samuel Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, Basil Kennett translation, printed for J. Walthoe, R. 
Wilkin, J. and J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, T. Ward, and T. Osborne, London, 1729, Book 3, Ch 1, num. 2, p. 214 
(emphasis omitted). 
233 “[…C]orrelativity marks the character of private law as a distinctive normative order. No justification 
that does not participate in this character can find a coherent place within private law. Correlativity 
accordingly excludes considerations, no matter how appealing, that focus unilaterally on one or the 




the creditor of a unilateral promise is not expected to prove the justice of his right. The 
promisee can be said to have acquired a right as against the promisor by virtue of the 
promise alone, as the standard conception of unilateral promise grounds the promissory 
obligation only on the fact that someone manifested the will that she be obligated.  
A concept that aims to stand as a cause of obligation must work out its own specification 
of the reciprocity requirement. The lack of this requirement, from a juridical perspective, 
troubles the justifiability of the unilateral promise. Let me demonstrate the unappealing 
character of the unilateral promise explanation with the hypothetical case offered in the 
following title.  
3.2.2.1. HOW COULD A PROMISEE ARGUE THAT A PROMISOR IS OBLIGATED UNDER ART 2:107 
PECL? 
The Principles of European Contract Law are a scholarly set of private law principles, 
rules and concepts. There is no authority with effective coercive power behind these 
rules. If you make a contract invoking these principles, if you and your contracting party 
agree that your contract will be governed by the Principles of European Contract Law, you 
could respond to	  your	  partner’s	  reticence	  to	  behave	  according	  to the	  PECL’s	  default	  rules 
by saying, “You	  agreed	  to	  order	  all	  conduct	  relatable	  to	  our	  contract	  in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  PECL’s default	  rules.”	  Can	  you	  utilize	  this	  argument	  against	  a	  promisor who invoked 
the principles but revoked the promise before you claimed performance? Suppose that 
the	  promise	  you	  received	  said	  something	  like	  “the	  present	  promise	  and	  all	  its	  relatable	  
scenarios	   will	   be	   ordered	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   PECL.”	   The	   promisor revokes the 
promise before you accept it and you claim breach of promise. For that you invoke Art. 
2:107 of the PECL. You are basically saying that since she wanted to be obligated by her 
promise she should be obligated to honour this promise. She replies that you have not 
submitted yourself to the same legal regime, that before you did so by claiming 
performance, she revoked her promise and her own subjection to the PECL. What would 
you	  say?	  “Your	  unilateral	  promise	  implied within it a unilateral commitment	  to	  the	  PECL?”	  
Another, more powerfull rejoinder would be,	   “Well,	   right,	   I	   did	   not	   submit	   to	   these	  
principles expressly, but in receiving your promise, I gave something to you—the value of 
the chance that I would do as you wanted.” (See part 5) In the absence of consent, the 
argument that the promisor got something from the promisee due to the promissory 
transaction itself gives much more weight to the claim for performance made by one party 





3.2.3. SOME REMARKS AS TO THE CONCEPT’S JUSTIFICATION 
The unilateral promise scholars see that their respective laws do not recognize promise 
as a cause of obligation. Discontented with their laws, they look for a theory that could 
explain the obligation of promise. Siegel reverts to the Germanic laws, Worms to some 
form of sociology, and the Scottish institutionalists to their historical law. 
Notwithstanding their diversity, they eventually converge on the same idea of the 
autonomy of the will. Sooner or later the commonplace justification becomes the doctrine 
of the autonomy of the will. I want to say something about this mode of justifying promises 
in private law. 
3.2.3.1. ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL AS A MODE OF JUSTIFYING LEGAL 
CONCEPTS 
The principle of autonomy of the will holds: Do whatever you want insofar as the maxim 
with which you ordered your conduct could be elevated as a universal law of action.234 
We can be governed by this principle because, as goes without saying, we recognize 
ourselves as the authors of our own conduct. We believe that every conscious action that 
we take is a reflection of a previous intention to so act, however vague or imprecise. And 
we intended the conduct that we effected because we, and none other than we, chose and 
combined the maxims or patterns with which we internally elaborated (projected) our 
conduct.  
Those who test maxims for action in the laboratory of the principle of the autonomy of 
the will are the moral scientists. It is these moral scientists that must have approved the 
maxim	  on	  promise.	  They	  might	  have	  evaluated	  whether	  a	  maxim	  saying	  “Do what you 
promise,”	  could	  or	  could	  not	  be	  elevated	  as	  a	  maxim	  for	  the	  moral	   life	  of	  all	  purposive	  
being, and concluded for or against such elevation. Moralists hold that the maxim on 
                                                        
234 Why have we decided to be governed by the golden rule of autonomy? Reason has shown us that there 
is no better principle than autonomy and therefore we postulate it as the rule of production for the 
maxims of our moral life. The reasoning is this: we all are free and like to be free. But sometimes our 
freedom confronts us. As we have reason, we ask this question: How could we be free without conflict? 
We will be free without confrontation if we are free while congnisant that other free beings want to be 
free too. So let us do what permits us to be free in harmony with others. 
I have elaborated all these reflections based on my readings of Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the 
metaphysics of morals, Allen W. Wood translation, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002 and 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of practical reason, Mary Gregor translation, in The Cambridge Edition of the 





promise—we	  can	  call	  it	  “the	  duty	  of	  fidelity”	  —is indeed a moral maxim; hence your duty 
to do what you have promised. 
We must do what we promise, and not doing what we promise is a breach of the promise 
and of the maxim on promises. Here the breach of a promise is not harming another 
person, taking what belongs to another or frustrating the expectations of others. Here 
breaching	  a	  promise	  means	  disrespecting	  one’s	  own	  autonomy.	  Disrespecting	  one’s	  owns	  
autonomy?	   Aren’t	   we	   talking	   about	   the	   maxim	   on	   promise? Since the maxim was 
determined by the principle of autonomy, breaching the maxim on promises is, at the 
same	  time,	  disrespecting	  autonomy.	  So	  when	  one	  violates	  one’s	  promise,	  one	  is	  breaching	  
three things: the promise, the maxim on promises, and the principle of autonomy. 
But if we must do what we promise because promise is a maxim of autonomy, we must 
also do what the other maxims of autonomy request, for what is ultimately cherished is 
the principle of autonomy. And if we think that the maxim of promise is a legal maxim, we 
must also think that the other maxims of autonomy are legal maxims, for if we follow this 
sort of moral reasoning we also follow Reason, and reason is coherent. In other words, 
where we legalized one maxim of autonomy with the argument that its breach is a breach 
of the source of our moral freedom, then someone may have reason to ask: But why is X a 
maxim of autonomy and not Y?  The preeminent question for those who think like 
moralists and talk about law is this: 
If one has to do what one has promised because autonomy says so through its maxim on 
promise, how can we avoid following the other maxims of autonomy, like: 
do not lie, 
be faithful to your lover, 
be punctual, 
etc. etc. etc.?235 
The autonomy jurist must be ready to jettison the requirement of actual damage from 
tort. 
The unilateral promise scholars look for a theory that explains the obligation of promise. 
Having found it, and explained the obligation of promise, they postulate the theory as a 
                                                        
235 I refrain from listing maxims that have to do with conduct in respect of ourselves, like exercise, do not 




legal theory. My method differs. I look for a theory of private law in  conditions in which I 
could elaborate the obligation of promise. I look for a theoretical commonality shared by 
promise and the other causes of obligation. Given our private law, how and to what extent 
could we incorporate the social practice of promise? 
I	  would	   like	   to	   finish	   this	   discussion	  quoting	  Gino	  Gorla’s	  words	  on the principle that 
simple promises obligate in private law: 
In realta un simile principio sarebbe cosi poco pratico, cosi poco giusto, che nessun 
ordinamento	  moderno	  é	  arrivato,	  almeno	  per	   la	  promessa	  non	   formale,	  ad	  accoglierlo,	  
salvo alcuni casi eccezionali. Impegnare una persona verso qualcuno, per la parola, per la 
semplice pollicitatio, senza che questo qualcuno abbia mostrato, in qualche modo, di farvi 
affidamento, sembra quasi assurdo.236 
3.3. SOME LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS DOCTRINAL FAILURE 
We can draw some useful conclusions from the study of the unilateral promise 
scholarship.  
First of all, 
3.3.1. WE COULD ELABORATE A NEW CAUSE OF OBLIGATION 
The unilateral promise scholars adverted to a need. They saw that private actors were 
making irrevocable promises that were taken not as offers but as promises. They also 
found that what seemed reasonable for the common person had no means of explanation 
for the lawyer. The lawyer could not think of promises as enforceable because she lacked 
the means to do it. Judges and parliaments wanted to enforce these promises. There was 
a	   “social	   need,”	   as	  Worms	   likes	   to	   put	   it.	   The	   orthodoxy	  would	   presume	   acceptances, 
develop reliance doctrines and issue obligationes ex lege. The unilateral promise scholars 
found these attempted solutions insufficient or inadequate and thus reacted against the 
mainstream. They were progressive jurists. They thought it right to innovate in private 
law. 
This is their main lesson—we can bring innovation to law. The problem, as I see it, is that 
they developed something other than a piece of private law. They wanted to develop a 
new cause of obligation but they developed something other than a cause of obligation. 
Instead of departing from that which makes the contract, tort and unjust enrichment 
                                                        




particulars of the “cause of obligation”	  genus, they departed from the perspective that 
favoured their task by arguing that promises obligate. The task for us is to remake the 
enterprise, but from a legal perspective. Given our private law, how and to what extent 
could we incorporate the social practice of promise? 
3.3.2. THIS NEW CAUSE OF PRIVATE LAW LIABILITY MUST LIE NEXT TO THE CONTRACT WITHOUT 
OVERLAPPING IT; IT MUST COMPLEMENT THE CONTRACT, NOT REPLACE IT 
Some unilateral promise scholars say that this new source of obligation has been 
constructed not to replace the contract but to complement it in its function of enforcing 
voluntary undertakings.237 This is a correct view.238 However, we must be cognisant that 
the way in which these scholars defined this new cause of obligations made their 
statement merely rhetorical. 
As a matter of fact, if we establish a norm by saying: “A	  promise	  which	  is	  intended to be 
legally binding without acceptance is binding,”	   the	   concept	   thereby	  underpinning,	   the	  
concept of unilateral promise ends up debilitating the definition of contract qua agreed 
exchange of rights. 239  For if the enforceability of a unilateral promise requires no 
consideration from the side of the promisee, then why would consideration be a requisite 
for contract formation? But the unilateral promise dismantles the concept of contract in 
another way: It leaves room to construe the contract as a unilateral undertaking 
conditioned by the fact of acceptance. Contract therefore is no longer the bilateral act par 
excellence, where the offer of one party is separated only by the time of its manifestation 
from the acceptance of the other party. It then becomes difficult to explain just doctrines 
                                                        
237 MacBryde, Promises in Scots Law, op. cit., p. 49 acknowledges the co-existence of promise and contract 
when	  he	   says	   “it	   is	   necessary	   to	   distinguish	   between	   a	   promise	   and	   an	   offer”	   and	   latter	   details	   the	  
different legal implications of these two acts. Idem, 50. Though in idem, p. 51 MacBryde seems to see the 
structural consequences of making bare promises enforceable. 
238 Francesco	  Di	  Giovanni	  disagrees.	  To	  him	  “Ogni	  discorso	  intorno	  alle	  promesse	  unilaterali	  non	  può	  evitare	  
di	  essere	  un	  discorso	  interno	  al	  contratto.”	  Le promesse unilaterali,	  Cedam,	  Padova,	  2010,	  at	  p.	  3.	  “[S]e	  si	  
costruisse	   la	   figura	   del	   contratto	   non	   già	   sull’idea	   dell’accordo,	  ma	   –per esempio—proprio facendo 
riferimento alla promessa o alle promesse recipoche in quanto generatrici di un vincolo, il consueto 
criterio	  distintivo	  tra	  contrato	  e	  promessa	  unilaterale	  ci	  verrebe	  a	  mancare.”	  Idem, p. 4. The question Di 
Giovanni poses is whether we include one more category of cause of obligations or we reformulate the 
contract so as to include the interested promises. Di Giovanni choses the latter (idem, at p. 75-79 and ss.) 
It is also the position of Rodolfo Sacco, "Formation of Contracts," in Vv. Aa., Towards a European Civil 
Code, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004, Chapter 19, pp. 353-362. 
239 The exposition of motives of the 1942 Italian Civil Code, which clearly adverted that: “It	  would	  not	  be	  
possible to make the unilateral promise operate unlimitedly without disrupting the field of application 
of	   contract”.  Relazione del Ministro Guardasigilli Grandi al Codice Civile del 1942, Libro IV Delle 





like unconscionability, the exception from performance in	   case	   of	   the	   other’s	  
nonperformance (exceptio non adimpleti contractus), among others.240  
There is another reason why the distinctiveness between contract and unilateral promise 
should be made crystal clear. This is that private lawyers of all jurisdictions are 
accustomed to thinking of contractual transactions in contractual terms. Almost all 
unilateral promise scholars are aware of this fact, and often acknowledge it with regret, 
as if it were the reason for the non-recognition of the unilateral promise. We must rather 
see the phenomenon as an indicator of how to introduce correct changes to the law 
prudentially. Contract law could actually relieve itself of a burden if the appropriate 
unilateral promise was placed next to it. Lawyers would have an easier means of thinking 
about “weird	  contracts,”	  like	  the	  collateral	  contract	  seen	  in	  2.2. 
3.3.3. THE NEW CAUSE OF OBLIGATIONS MUST BE SET OUT TO GROUND THE PROMISES THAT 
TROUBLE PRIVATE LAW, OR ONLY THE PROMISES EXHIBITING GIVING AND TAKING 
The unilateral promise scholars made a mistake by focusing on promises intended to be 
irrevocable. We simply cannot do that. For the emergence of an obligation it is insufficient 
that someone hurt herself, lose property or, as in our case, promise something. It is also 
necessary that another person gain something in relation to	  the	  other’s	  loss, like enhanced 
freedom of action or enrichment, or give something in exchange. We must focus on 
promisors who intended to, and actually did gain something with their promises. Indeed, 
the promises that the most representative private laws seek to enforce exhibit the 
premises of the law of obligations. I am referring to the reward promises, the contract 
promises, the fake gratuitous promises and the cases seen in 1.1.3.4. 
We must be very careful to avoid understanding gratuitous promises within the remit of 
the new category. Private laws cannot but be reluctant to enforce informal gratuitous 
promises. They simply cannot explain their obligation; they are irrational or juridically 
uncaused.241 The task for us is to propose a conception of the unilateral promise that 
could cover the juridically relevant promises, while leaving aside the juridically irrelevant 
relationships.	  As	  Giorgianni	  graphically	  puts	  it,	  “we	  must	  individuate	  an	  area	  wherein	  the	  
                                                        
240 See	  the	  insightful	  explanations	  elaborated	  in	  J.	  E.	  Penner,	  “Voluntary	  obligations and the scope of the law 
of contract,”	  in	  Legal Theory, Issue 2, (1996), pp. 325-357, at 333-4.	  See	  also	  Peter	  Benson,	  “The	  Idea	  of	  
Consideration,” in University of Toronto Law Journal, 61, (2011), pp. 241-278.  
241 See the many persuasive reasons adduced by Mindy Chen-Wishart, “In defense of consideration,” in 




unilaterally undertaken performance escapes from the idea of mere gratuitous 
attribution.”242  
In fulfilling this task we would have adjusted the unilateral promise to the promises that 
trouble the private laws. Private law would have a better tool with which to address rare 
cases. It would no longer need to stretch the contract, blur the borderlines between 
freedom and liability, or produce insufficient ex lege obligations (See 2.5.). As a matter of 
fact, if a private law incorporated this new concept, all its corruptive arrangements would 
become futile, automatically abrogated. The natural consequence being this: The classical 
private law categories will readopt their healthy shape. 
3.3.4. THE NEW CAUSE OF OBLIGATION MUST BE A GENERAL CATEGORY OF PRIVATE LAW LIABILITY, 
THIS IS TO SAY, IT MUST PROVIDE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF NOT ONLY TYPICAL INTERESTED 
PROMISES BUT ALSO ATYPICAL INTERESTED PROMISES 
Jurists focused on promises in the late 19th century. At that time promises seemed rare. 
The	  only	  clear,	   identifiable	   feature	  was	  that	   they	  were	  products	  of	  someone’s	  will.	  We 
now have better means of interpreting them. We discovered that promisors make these 
promises to obtain a chance. Through these cleverly made promises promisors induce 
promisees to consider doing things they want them to consider, from engaging in a 
contract to becoming consumers of their products. We called this phenomenon the 
creation of a chance (see 1.1.3.). These two concepts, promise-making and chance-
creation, help us to elucidate interested promises as private law transactions. We can use 
these two concepts to elaborate the unilateral promise as a general cause of obligation. If 
a contract comprises an offer of an obligation and an acceptance with consideration, the 
new unilateral promise could comprise an act of promise and a chance-creation act.  
The need to elaborate this concept systematically is not only technical but also juridical. 
Justice requires it because, even if the law could identify all the typical interested 
promises and establish special norms for their enforcement, nothing ensures the law 
would do justice to all cases, that no other interested promise will appear, demanding 
justice.243 If a new promise happens to appear, and the law offers no provision for its 
enforcement, the legal stage is set so that a promisor makes a promise, gets the benefit of 
the chance and then decides to revoke the promise, doing injustice to the promisee  
                                                        
242 Michele	  Giorgianni,	  voce	  “Causa	  (dir	  priv),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto,	  t.	  VI,	  Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  1960,	  p.	  x. 




(See 1.3.). So, to treat like cases alike, we must elaborate a general category for the 
enforcement of both the typical and atypical interested promises. 
In conclusion, we have to take the generalization called interested promise and 
conceptualize it in a way that looks like a tort, contract, and unjust enrichment. The by-
product of this juridical construction will be a just solution to the problem of promises. 





4. WE MUST TREAT THE INTERESTED PROMISE AS ANOTHER CAUSE OF 
OBLIGATION 
This part is divided into three large sections. Section 1 asks what is a cause of obligation? 
Section 2, can we build new causes of obligation? And section 3, how do we build new 
private law? One could think of these three sections as three separate parts. Each one 
addresses relatively autonomous questions and equals in size the previous parts. I place 
them together in a single fourth part, because combined they make up the fourth step of 
my argument. 
4.1. WHAT IS CAUSE OF OBLIGATION? 
The study of the unilateral promise scholarship showed us the right attitude towards 
promises.	  We	  shouldn’t	  be	  conservative.	  We	  could	  try	  to	  craft	  a	  solution	  that	  fits	  the	  new	  
reality as exactly as possible. But we also learned from the mistakes of the progressive 
scholarship. We should not miss the shot. If we want to treat promises as a new legal 
institution	  we	  must	  treat	  them	  in	  the	  law’s	  mode,	  not	  from	  a	  moral	  viewpoint.	   
The form that seems more apt for the interested promise is that of the contract, tort and 
unjust enrichment—namely	  a	  cause	  of	  obligations.	  But	  what	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  “cause	  of	  
obligation?”	  More	  precisely,	  where	  do	  we	  find	  such	  a concept? And what does cause of 
obligation mean? These two questions will be answered under the first two headings. 
Heading 1 will say that the idea of a cause of obligation is found in private law. We see the 
concept of cause of obligation when we read laws that say things	  like	  “the	  obligations	  arise	  
from the contract, the delict, the quasi-delict and the quasi-contract.”	  Heading 2 defines 
the idea that renders the various causes of the obligation classifiable. We will find two 
possible meanings for such a general idea. Legal formalism, with its thesis that cause of 
obligation means justice in transactions, will defeat the thesis of legal positivism. 
But the work of this section is not yet complete. We need to describe the concept of a cause 
of obligation; what are its constitutive features? If we want to formulate the interested 
promise as a concept that looks like the contract, tort and unjust enrichment, we need to 
have an idea of what the thing representing those various concepts itself looks like; we 
need the mould that the interested promise must adopt. Title 3 finishes this section by 





4.1.1. A CONCEPT (OF CAUSE OF OBLIGATION) LIVES IN THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE OBLIGATIONS 
Here I will show laws of different epochs that classify obligations in accordance with their 
causes. This is an important point. Firstly because it shows that the bases of private law 
liability	  vary	  in	  number	  and	  form	  as	  private	  law	  approaches	  diverse	  “times”	  or	  realities.	  
And secondly, and equally importantly, we will see that the (so-called	  “grand”) idea that 
the various causes of the obligation are different types of one genus lives within the very 
private law itself. It is not theoretical caprice. Private law demands of the theorist a 
unitary explanation of the basis of private law liability. 
4.1.1.1.1. DICTUMS CLASSIFYING THE OBLIGATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CAUSES 
(A) GAIUS 
The first example of such classification appears in a book written in the first century after 
Christ by the classical Roman jurist Gaius.244 Part 1 of The Institutes245 is about	  “persons”	  
and	  Part	  2	  about	  “things.”	  Part	  3 is	  about	  the	  “actions”	  or	  claims	  that	  one	  person	  may	  make	  
of another concerning things. Some such claims are obligations, the legal necessity that a 
person give or do something to another.  
In Part 3 Gaius says:	  “Let	  us	  now	  proceed to the obligations. These are divided into two 
main species: for every obligation arises either from contract or from delict.” 246 Gaius is 
saying here that we must expose the law of obligations from the facts that, according to 
the law, obligate one party to another. In this Gaius innovated. Obligations were classified 
not in accordance with the facts that placed them, but in accordance with their possible 
contents; whether the obligation required the giving of a thing or service. And Gaius’	  
                                                        
244 Conf. Mario	  Talamanca,	   “Obbligazioni,	   (dir.	   rom.),”	   in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto, t.	  XXIX,	  Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  
1979, p. 41. Also Savigny, according to whom, all Roman text known to his time followed Gaius. Le 
obbligazioni, Giovanni Pacchionni translation, t. II, UTET, Torino, 1912,	  §51, p. 3. 
One	  cannot	  but	  notice	  the	  resemblance	  between	  Gaius’	  division	  of	  the	  obligations	  and	  Aristotle’s	  division	  
of corrective justice:  
This second species has two parts, since one sort of transaction is voluntary, and one involuntary. Voluntary 
transactions (for instance, selling, buying, lending, pledging, renting, depositing, hiring out) are so called 
because their principle is voluntary. Among involuntary transactions some are secret (for instance, theft, 
adultery, poisoning, pimping, slave-deception, murder by treachery, false witness), whereas others involve 
force (for instance, imprisonment, murder, plunder, mutilation, slander, insult).  
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin translation, 2 ed, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1999, Book V, 
Chapter	  2,	  §13,	  at	  1131a. 
245  I utilize Francis De Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius, Part I, Text with critical notes and translation, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946 (Hereinafter: Gaius, Institutes.) 
246  “Nunc transeamus ad obligationes. quarum summa divisio in duas species deducitur: omnis enim 




innovation had a notable impact. Many law books will present the law of obligations with 
this same	  method.	  The	  question	  will	  be	  “On	  what	  facts	  would	  it	  be	  true	  of	  a	  defendant	  that	  
he	  owed	  the	  plaintiff	  such	  and	  such	  a	  fixed	  thing	  or	  quantity?” 247 
(B) JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 
Another version of the classification appears in the Institutes of the emperor Justinian, 
which	  “deduces	  the	  obligations	  into	  four	  species:	  obligations	  arise	  from	  contract,	  or	  as	  
though from contract, or from a delict, or as though from a delict.”248 
Three	  centuries	  separate	  Gaius	  and	  Justinian’s	  Institutes, and it seems to be that in this 
period new causes of obligation appeared in Roman private law. 249 These causes seemed 
anomalous in relation to the contracts and the torts. Yet the writers of the new Institutes 
found that in some sense some of them looked like the contracts and that in some other 
sense	  the	  others	  looked	  like	  the	  torts.	  Hence,	  after	  dealing	  with	  the	  contracts,	  Justinian’s	  
Institutes deals with the quasi-contracts,250 including the negotiorum gestio, by which the 
beneficiary of an unrequested agency was obligated to pay for the benefit received,251 the 
indebitum solutum, by which the receiver of a mistaken payment was obligated to restitute 
the sum, 252  the tutela, where the guardian can sue the ward for outlay incurred in 
                                                        
247  Peter Birks,	   “Definition	   and	   Division:	   A	   Meditation	   on	   Institutes	   3.13,”	   in	   Birks,	   Peter	   (ed.),	   The 
Classification of the Obligations, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p. 17. 
248 “Sequens	  divisio	  in	  quattuor	  species	  diducitur:	  aut	  enim	  ex	  contractu	  sunt	  aut	  quasi	  ex	  contractu	  aut	  ex	  
maleficio	  aut	  quasi	  ex	  maleficio.”	  Justinian, Institutes, 3, 13, 2. I utilize J.B. Moyle translation available in 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5983/5983-h/5983-h.htm (6-7-2015) and the translation available in 
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/Law508/Roman%20Law/JustinianInstitutes.htm (6-7-2015) 
(Hereinafter: Justinian, Institutes.) 
249 To many authors the four-membered classification is a continuation of a tripartite classification, which 
appears in the Digest of Justinian 44, 7, 1pr, as belonging to the same Gaius of the bipartite classification. 
It	  says:	  “Obligations	  arise	  from	  a	  contract,	  a	  delict,	  or	  in	  a	  particular	  mode	  from	  other	  various	  causes	  of	  
the	  obligation”.	  I	  utilize	  http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian.html (6-7-2015) and the translation 
available in http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Anglica/D44_Scott.htm#VII (27-1-2016) 
(Hereinafter: Justinian, Digest.) 
Emilio Betti argues that, if Gaius created a miscellaneous receptacle to group all the emerging figures 
that were anomalous to the contacts or to the torts, the Byzantines created the obligations quasi ex 
contract and obligations quasi ex delict by assimilating some of the various figures to one of the two 
classical categories and the rest to the other classical category. Teoría general de las obligaciones, t. II, 
José	  Luis	  de los Mozos translation, Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1970,	  §II,	  ns.	  3-6, (with very 
interesting remarks on the constructive methods of the Roman jurists). 
250 Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27. 
251 Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27, 1. 
252  Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27, 6-7.	   Interestingly:	   “an obligation, indeed, which is so far from being 
contractual, that, logically, it may be said to arise from the extinction rather than from the formation of 
a contract; for when a man pays over money, intending thereby to discharge a debt, his purpose is clearly 




managing his property,253 and other cases.254 Likewise, after dealing with the torts, the 
Institutes deals with the obligations that look like torts without actually being torts,255 
including effusum et delectum, by which someone is liable to compensate the harm caused 
by	  things	  thrown	  down	  or	  fallen	  from	  one’s	  terrace,256 the damnum injuria vel furtum in 
navi canpona stabulo factum, where ship-owners, inn and stable keepers are liable for 
willful damage or theft committed in their ships, inns, or stables by some or one of their 
servants or employees,257 and other cases.258 
(C) THEOPHILUS’ TRANSLATION 
The Institutes of Justinian were published in Latin, but Theophilus, one of its three 
writers, only translated them into Greek. He wanted a version for his students at the 
university of Beirut. In this translation the	   terms	   “as	   though	   from	  a	   contract”	   and	   “as	  
though	   from	   a	   tort”	   appear	   in	   the	   form	   “as	   from	   a	   though-contract”	   and	   “as	   from	   a	  
thought-tort.”	  The	  Byzantines	  felt	  impelled to fully substantivize the new concepts. 259 
This turn had a notable impact on the development of later classifications. The book that 
the first European jurists studied in twelfth century Bologna was a Latin translation of 
Theophilus’	   Greek	   version	   of the	   Institutes.	   This	   is	   why	   Accursius’s	   Magna Glosa and 
                                                        
money is thus paid is laid under an obligation exactly as if he had taken a loan for consumption, and 
therefore he is liable to a condiction.” Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27, 6. 
253 Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27, 2. 
254 Firstly,	   the	  communio:	   “where	  persons	  own	  property	   jointly	  without	  being	  partners,	  by	  having,	   for	  
instance, a joint bequest or gift made to them, and one of them is liable to be sued by the other in a 
partition suit because he alone has taken its fruits, or because the plaintiff has laid out money on it in 
necessary	  expenses”	  Justinian,	  Institutes,	  3,	  27,	  3-4.	  And	  secondly,	  the	  legatum	  per	  damnationem:	  “So,	  
too, the obligation of an heir to discharge legacies cannot properly be called contractual, for it cannot be 
said that the legatee has contracted at all with either the heir or the testator: yet, as the heir is not bound 
by a delict, his obligation would seem to be quasi-contractual”	  Justinian,	  Institutes,	  3,	  27,	  5. 
255 Justinian, Institutes, 4, 5. 
256 “…[T]he reason why his liability cannot properly be called delictual being that it is usually incurred 
through the fault of some other person, such as a slave or a	  freedman.” Justinian, Institutes, 4, 5, 1. 
257 Interestingly: “the	  action	  which	  is	  given	  in	  such	  cases	  is	  not	  based	  on	  contract,	  and	  yet	  as	  they	  are	  in	  
some sense in fault for employing careless or dishonest servants, their liability would seem to be quasi-
delictal.” Justinian, Institutes, 4, 5, 3. 
258 The other two cases are the iudex qui litem suam facerit or obligation incurred by a judge who delivers 
an unjust or partial decision, (Justinian, Institutes, 4, 5, fr.) and the positum et suspendum, where a son 
in power places or hangs something from a balcony in a way that is dangerous to the public (Justinian, 
Institutes,	  4,	  5,	  2.,	  a	  rather	  public	  law	  obligation…). 
259 Theoph. II, 27, 3, 5; IV, 5 fr, quoted by Emilio Betti, Teoría general de las	  obligaciones…, op. cit. §II,	  n.	  6	  in 




Bartolo’s	   commentaries	   classify	   the	   obligations	   into	   four	   well	   rounded	   categories:	  
contract, quasi-contract, delict and quasi-delict.260 
(D) R. J. POTHIER, THE CODE CIVIL AND THE FIRST CODICE CIVILE 
To modern eyes many cases historically included in the categories of quasi-torts and 
quasi-contracts were at odds with the ideas of tort and contract that had recently been 
consolidated. If the torts were about willfully or negligently committed wrongs, it seemed 
difficult to say that the damage caused by things spontaneously falling from terraces was 
an almost-tort. On the other hand, if contract was about the agreement of two parties, how 
could a tutor be responsible for the acts of the ward under an almost-contract if, as in the 
case of many quasi-contracts, not even the tutor had consented the charge? Robert J. 
Pothier solved these issues in a new, five-membered classification.261  
First comes the contract, which meant agreement made with the aim of forming an 
obligation.262 The second cause of obligation is the quasi-contract, which has to do with 
acts of persons that are permitted by the law but nonetheless obligate the actor as to the 
other or the other as to the actor, without having made an agreement.263 Then comes 
delict, which means a fact by which one person, by dolus or malice, causes damage or any 
other tort to another.264 The quasi-delicts are the acts by which a person, without malice 
but due to an imprudence that cannot be excusable, causes some damage to another. 265 
                                                        
260  The	   influence	   of	   Justinian’s	   four-membered	   division	   has	   been	   qualified	   as	   “little	   praiseworthy.”	   It	  
induced the glossators and commentators to elaborate a concept of quasi-contract that could be 
relatable to the concept of contract, while the historical cases of the concept of quasi-contract could be 
related to the contract cases only improperly and falsely. “E	  purtroppo	  si	  è	  dovuto	  compiere	  un	  lungo	  e	  
penoso lavoro dottrinale e giurisprudenziale, per correggere le dottrine	  suddette.”	  Nicola	  Stolfi,	  Diritto	  
Civile, v. III, Le Obbligazioni in Generale, UTET, Torino, 1932, n. 230, p. 113. 
261 Robert J. Pothier, Traité	  des	  Obligations, Paris, 1764, n. 2. (Available in Google Books)  
262 Idem, n. 3. 
263 Idem, n. 113. He mentions three cases. First, the acceptance that an heir makes in relation to succession 
is a quasi-contract vis-à-vis the legatee; this is a fact permitted by the law, which nevertheless obligates 
the heir as against the legatee to pay the legate established by the deceased testator, even if there was 
no agreement between heir and legatee. Second, when one pays by error of fact a thing that one does 
not have to pay, the payment of such thing is a fact that obligates one who has received the payment; 
this is true even if we could not say the mistaken payer and the receiver agreed that the receiver will 
return the payment . Pothier adds the negotiorum gestio without making any significant point (though if 
I got it right, he says that the dominus negotii must pay to the gestor	  “all	  that	  which	  he	  has	  disbursed”)	  
and finishes saying that there are other examples of quasi-contracts. Idem, n. 113. As to the explanation, 
Pothier	   says	   “[I]t	   is	   the	   sole	   law	   or	   the	   natural	   equity	   which produces the obligation, in making 
obligatory the fact from which it results. This is why these facts are called quasi-contracts; because 
without	  being	  contracts,	  nor	  even	  delicts,	  they	  produce	  the	  obligations	  as	  the	  contracts.”	  Idem, n. 114. 
264 Idem, n. 116. 




The	  fifth	  category	  includes	  the	  obligations	  that	  arise	  by	  “the	  sole	  authority	  of	  the	  law.”266 
This category includes events by which a party becomes obligated to do something 
without an act on his part, like the tutela (a former quasi-contract) and the effussum et 
delectum (a former quasi-tort).267  
We find the five-membered classification in Art. 1370 of the French Civil Code268 and in 
many of the Civil Codes influenced by the latter. For example, Art. 1097 of the 1865 Italian 
Civil	   Code	   says:	   “On	   the causes of the obligations: The obligations derive from the 
statutory law, from contract or quasi-contract, from delict or quasi-delict.” 269  The 
innovation in relation to Art. 1370 French Civil Code is that the causes of obligation appear 
clearly enumerated, no example is admixed into the categories and, as is often noted, the 
ex lege obligations appear first in the list.270  
                                                        
266 Idem, n. 123. 
267 To be frank, the effussum et delectum is not enumerated in n. 123. But neither is it included as a quasi-
delict in nn. 116-122. The damnum injuria vel furtum in navi canpona stabulo factum is included among 
the quasi-delicts, under the interesting argument that, “it	  has	  been	  established	  so	  that	  patrons	  have	  more	  
care	  in	  serving	  themselves	  of	  good	  servants.”	  (n.	  121.)	  Still,	  in	  n.	  123	  in fine Pothier says that "On peut 
rapporter beaucoup d'autres exemples d'obligations qui ont pour seule & unique cause la loi." I gave the 
example of the effussum et delectum to illustrate my point. 
268  After dealing with the obligations that arise out of contract (Book III, Title I and subs.), the Code 
introduces	  the	  chapters	  “On	  quasi-contracts”	  and	  “On	  delicts	  and	  quasi-delicts”	  with the polemic Article 
1370: 
Certain engagements are formed without any agreement intervening, neither on the part of him who obligates 
himself nor on the part of the one toward whom he is obligated. Some result from the sole authority of the 
law; others arise form an act personal to him who finds himself obligated. 
The first are engagements made involuntarily, such as those between neighboring owners, or those of 
guardians and of other administrators who may not refuse the function which is conferred upon them. 
Engagements which arise from an act personal to him who finds himself obligated result either form quasi-
contracts or from delicts or quasi-delicts; they constitute the subject-matter	  of	  the	  present	  Title.” 
I utilize: The French Civil Code (as amended to July 1, 1976), John H. Crabb translation, Fred. B. Rothman 
& Co, New Jersey, 1977. 
269 Likewise,	  Article	  1.089	  of	   the	  1871	  Spanish	  Civil	  Code	  says:	   “Las	  obligaciones	  nacen	  de	   la	   ley,	  de	   los	  
contratos	  y	  cuasi	  contratos,	  y	  de	  los	  actos	  y	  omisiones	  ilícitos	  o	  en	  que	  intervenga	  cualquier	  género	  de	  
culpa	  o	  negligencia.” 
270 This is something that Italian and Spanish jurists generally remark upon. For the Italians, see Michele 
Giorgianni, “Appunti	  sulle	  fonti	  dell’obbligazione,”	  in	  Rivista di Diritto Civile, I, (1965), pp. 70-75, at p. 71; 
for a Spanish perspective, see	  Augustín	  Ignacio	  Pena Lopez, “Criterios de sistematizacion de las fuentes 
de las obligaciones,”	  in	  Actualidad Civil, No 4, (1993), pp. 717-735, at p. 725. 
One	  of	  Betti’s	  central	  claims	  in	  his	  account of the evolution of the classification of the obligations is that 
the Romans, in contrast with modern jurists, would never impute an obligation to a party without an act 
on	  his	  part	  that	  could	  cause	  it;	  an	  act	  that	  required	  the	  actor’s	  awareness	  of	  the	  fact that such act causes 
obligations. 
Nada repugna tanto a la conciencia juridica de los romanos como admitir que un vincula doloroso y fuera de 
lo corriente, que somete una persona bajo el poder de otra—que es como concebian la obligatio—pudiese 
producirse por si mismo, ope legis, sin el conocimiento y la voluntad de la persona misma que ha de ser 




 (E) THE CLASSIFICATION IN THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 
In German private law the classification appears not in a special provision but in the 
method of organization (or table of contents) of its Civil Code (BGB). The BGB271 is mainly 
divided	  into	  Books.	  The	  “Second	  Book”	  is titled “The	  law	  of	  obligations”,	  and is divided 
into sections. The first six sections deal with the possible content of obligations, the 
performance or regular mode of extinction of obligations, the impossibility to perform, 
the irregular modes of extinction of obligations, assignment of claim-rights, assumption 
of debt, and plurality of debtors and creditors. Having established what is common to 
almost all the obligations, the Second Book moves to deal with the various causes of 
obligations.	  Indeed,	  the	  last	  Section	  of	  the	  Second	  Book	  is	  called	  “Particular	  Obligations,”	  
and is divided into 25 Titles, which set the causes of the obligation alongside each other: 
First the typical contracts (e.g. Title 1 deals with the sales contract, Title 6 with the 
contract	  of	  service,	  and	  so	  on),	  then	  the	  unilateral	  promises	  (Title	  20),	  then	  the	  “unjust	  
enrichment”	  (Title	  24)	  and	  finally	  the	  “delict”	  (Title	  25). 
We see that the BGB classifies the obligations in a traditional and explicit manner. The 
classification follows the tradition of classifying the obligations in accordance with their 
causes because it gives different treatment to obligations according to the different events 
that cause them to arise. The BGB could have adopted a different approach, like dividing 
the obligations according to their possible content—whether they relate to a fixed thing, 
a quantity, or a service—or their purposes—whether they assure expectations, 
compensates losses, prevent or punish deeds, etc. What is more, the BGB states the 
classification explicitly. The indicia of the classification are the very wordings of the BGB. 
The BGB first deals with the general concept	  of	  “obligation”	  (first	  seven	  sections),	  then	  
treats the	   “particular	  obligations”	   (Section	  7)	   in	  different	   title-groups, each title group 
separated	  by	  titles	  that	  talk	  about	  “Contract”	  (Title	  1),	  “Unjust	  enrichment”	  (Title	  24)	  and	  
“Delict”	  (Title	  25). That the BGB explicitly classifies the obligations in accordance with its 
causes	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  according	  to	  Dernburg	  and	  von	  Tuhr,	  “the	  legends	  of	  
                                                        
sin tener en cuenta la conducta del sujeto individual, que piuedadar lugar a una obligacion en virtud de un 
hecho o de una situacion, prescinidiendo de un acto de parte. 
Emilio Betti, Teoría	  general	  de	  las	  obligaciones…, op. cit.,	  §II,	  n.	  8,	  at	  47-48. 





the	  sections,	  titles,	  etc.,	  facilitate	  the	  Code’s	  employment	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  are	  part of 
the	  law,	  and	  therefore,	  they	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  the	  interpretation.”272 
(F) THE CLASSIFICATION IN MODERN COMMON LAW 
It was not only the codified private laws that classified obligations in accordance with 
their causes, the modern common law did too.273 
In the Preface to the first edition of The Law of Tort Pollock revealed himself as 
consciously engaged in the exercise of writing an English law of obligations. The book was 
dedicated to Willes J, and Pollock recalled that that most learned of judges had always 
urged the writing of an English law of obligations. Pollock then observed that the 
completion of a book on the law of tort, added to a book on the law of contract, did not of 
course constitute a whole law of obligations. Winfield ventured further into the missing 
sector, but it was not until Goff and Jones [wrote The Law of Restitution] that real headway 
was made into the area which Pollock said remained to be explored beyond contract and 
tort.274 
                                                        
272 Andreas von Tuhr, Derecho	  Civil,	  Vol.	  1:	  Teoría	  General	  del	  Drecho	  Civil	  Alemán,	  Tito	  Ravá	  translation,	  
Marcial Pons, Madrid, 1998, p. 12, following Arrigo Dernburg, Diritto delle obbligazioni,	  6°, Francesco 
Bernardino Cicala translation (?), Bocca, Torino, 1903,	  §7. 
Let me add this argument: The BGB does not mention concepts of obligation and contract. Yet, no one 
would argue that the BGB works without a clear-cut idea of obligation and contract. Analogically, even 
if the BGB includes no classificatory provision, the BGB does classify the obligations in accordance with 
their causes. 
273 “Unlike	  the	  civil	  law,	  the	  common	  law	  was	  not	  shaped	  by	  the	  work	  of	  jurists	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  Traditionally,	  
those learned in law were either judges or practitioners. There was little legal literature beyond the 
reports of decided cases. A few treatises had been written, such as Coke's Institutes, but they were 
unsystematic in the extreme. The Common lawyers did not try to be systematic. Their law was organized, 
not by categories such as tort or contract, but by writs, such as assault and battery or assumpsit. A 
constellation of past cases determined when each writ could be brought. There was not much order in 
the case law.	  […]	  Beginning	  with	  Blackstone,	  matters	  changed.	  Treatise	  writers	  reorganized	  the	  common	  
law into doctrinal categories and formulated rules to explain the cases, borrowing a good deal from civil 
law. Their method was like that of the Roman jurists and their continental successors. They worked in 
symbiotic relationship with the law as declared by state authority, which, for them, was case law. They 
tried to explain this law in a more systematic way by rules and doctrines which the judges who had 
decided these cases did not distinctly have in mind. Judges then drew upon their work to decide new 
cases,	  thus	  providing	  them	  with	  further	  starting	  points.	  Their	  work	  shaped	  the	  modern	  common	  law.”	   
James Gordley, “The State's Private Law and Legal Academia,”	  in	  Jansen, Nils and Ralf Michaels (eds.), 
Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law, Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen, 2008, pp. 640-1 (arguing that both 
the common and civil law traditions are about jurists working in symbiotic relation with public 
authorities). 






Worms inaugurates a tradition of writing thesis about promises in France; the most noteworthy are:  R. Elias, 
Théorie  de  la  force  obligatoire  de  la  volonté  unilatérale,  Paris,  1909  ;  A. Goldberg,  Essai  d’une  théorie  générale  
de  l’engagement  juridique  par  volonté  unilatérale  d’après  le  Code  civil  allemand, Paris, Larose et Thorin, 1913 ; 
J. Chabas,  De  la  déclaration  de  volonté  en  droit  civil  français,  Paris,  Sirey,  1931  ;  P. Carous,  La  volonté  unilatérale-
Source  d’obligations  en  droit  privé  moderne,  Lille,  Douriez-Bataille, 1938. More recently M.L., Mathieu-Izorche, 
L’avènement  de  l’engagement  unilatéral  en  droit  privé  contemporain,  Aix-en-Provence, Puam, 1995. 
 
(Picture  taken  from  the  original,  Worms,  René,  De  la  volonté  unilatérale  considérée  comme  source  d’obligations  
en droit romain et en droit français,   (thèse   pour   le   doctorat   présentée   et   soutenue   le   mardi   23   juin   1891,  







These three books, Professor Birks points out, provide the common lawyer with an almost 
complete law of obligations. Birks does not mean that the classificatory debate should be 
closed.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  common	  lawyer	  must	  “reconnect”	  with	  the	  tradition	  endorsed	   
by the classical common lawyers. Indeed, in his book The classification of the obligations, 
Birks invites common law jurists to try out classifications or share their views on the 
classificatory	  enterprise.	  Birks’s	  contribution	  is	  addressed	  to	  the	  common	  lawyer	  who	  is	  
interested in finding similarities between the common and continental private law. Ernest 
Weinrib not only classifies the obligations in accordance with their causes, but also argues 
that such classification is internal to the common law. Understanding the criterion with 
which the obligations are classified is having the standpoint from which to criticize 
arrangements on private law liability.275 
The scholarly idea of a common law of obligations achieved institutional significance in 
1995. The Law Society and the Council of Legal Education talk about	  “Obligations	  I”	  and	  
“Obligations	   II”	   in	   their	   statement	   on	   the	   subjects	   that	   are	   compulsory	   for	   aspiring	  
lawyers. 276  The	   word	   “Obligation”	   was	   absent	   in	   the	   previous	   statement.	   As	   Birks	  
remarks, the terminology was chosen to remind English lawyers that they do have a law 
of	  obligations.	  Without	  such	  terminology,	  “there	  would	  be	  few	  young	  common	  lawyers	  
able so much as to contemplate contract and tort as coordinated parts of one law of 
obligations.”277 
4.1.1.2. A CONCEPT OF “CAUSE OF OBLIGATION” IS IMPLICIT IN THESE CLASSIFICATIONS 
What Gaius, Theophilus, Pothier and the writers of the Italian Civil Code actually intended 
with their classifications is a question I cannot answer. I am far less ready to conclude that 
the writers of the BGB or the developers of the modern common law sought to classify the 
obligations in the way that more or less explicitly appear classified in their texts. What I 
am ready to point out is what any serious reader of those classifications would infer. This 
inference is that the items listed in the classification are particulars of a general concept, 
cause of obligation. Whether you classify the obligations in tort and contract, or in tort, 
contract and unjust enrichment, or in statutory law, contract, tort, quasi-contract and 
quasi-tort, whatever item you put along with another as members of a classification, of a 
                                                        
275 Ernest	  Weinrib,	  “The	  Juridical	  Classification	  of	  The	  Obligations,”	  Birks,	  Peter	  (ed.),	  The Classification of 
the Obligations, Oxford, New York, 1997, pp. 37-55. 
276  The Law Society and the Council of Legal Education, Notice to Law Schools regarding Full-Time 
Qualifying Law Degrees (Jan., 1995). Quoted in Peter Birks,	  “Definition	  and	  Division…,”	  op. cit., p. 2, note 
2. 




single family, you must by necessitation, relate them as particulars of a genus, of a single 
sort of thing. The contract is a cause of obligations inasmuch as the tort, albeit dealing 
with different interactions to tort. But for contract and tort to be causes of obligations, 
they must be identical in something—something that makes them kinds of the same 
genus.278 This thing that contract and tort share as causes of obligation is the abstraction 
that	  I	  call	  “cause	  of	  obligation.”279 
4.1.1.3. IF ANYTHING, THIS CONCEPT DEMANDS COHERENCE AMONG THE CAUSES OF THE 
OBLIGATION 
You submit yourself to an intelligence test. There you see a diagram containing various 
items. The first item you see is a dog. The dog makes you think of your childhood, pet-
shops, your parents and first neighborhood. But then you see a crocodile—you hence 
discard all your previous memories. Your biography has nothing to do with crocodiles. 
Still, aligned, as they are, in a suggestive way, dog and crocodile demand some sort of 
generality, a coherent explanation. You may think that the dog is a mammal and the 
crocodile a reptile and that both dog and crocodile form part of the animal kingdom. Or 
you may relate them as	  parts	  of	  the	  collection	  of	  your	  city’s	  museum. You may say one 
thing or the other, depending on the perspective from which you see them, a perspective 
that can be self-constructed, as arbitrarily imposed by you the observer, or inferred from 
the very text, as if you wanted to approve the intelligence test. The task becomes easier if 
the list includes a third kind of animal, or a picture of a museum’s	  façade. 280 
                                                        
278 “It	   is	  obvious	   that	   the	   logical	   form	  must be absolutely equal to all the objects of the species which it 
determines.	   Its	   objectivity	   lies	   in	   this	   “ratio	   indifferentiae”	   (to	   quote	   the	   Sotics),	   so	   that	   it	   may	  
comprehend equally the various contents of different examplars and represent them only in what is 
identical	  and	  essentially	  common.”	  Giorgio Del Vecchio, The Formal Basis of Law, John Lisle translation, 
MacMillan, New York, 1921, p. 80. 
279 The phraseology appears in legal monuments like the Digest of Justinian (Dig. 44,7,1pr.) and 1865 Italian 
Civil	  Code	  (Art.	  1097).	  Its	  natural	  competitor	  is	  “source	  of	  obligation,”	  which	  appears	  in	  Robert	  J.	  Pothier, 
Traité	  des	  Obligations, op. cit…,	  n.	  2,	  and	  the	  French	  scholarship	  in	  general.	  The	  pro	  of	  using	  “source	  of	  
obligation”	  is	  that	  it	  imports	  to	  our	  concept	  the	  color	  that	  the	  phraseology	  “source	  of	  the	  law”	  obtains	  
from the concept that itself connotes. Conf.	  Pietro	  Rescigno,	  “Obbligazioni	  (nozioni),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del 
Diritto,	  t.	  XXIX,	  Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  1979,	  p.	  149.	  I however choose to use the expression	  “cause	  of	  obligation”	  
because it is less metaphorical. Even if metaphors could serve us in talking about law, the space or 
artifact	  to	  which	  “source”	  refers,	  its	  standard	  physiognomy	  and	  the	  activity	  to	  which	  it	  is	  related,	  is	  not	  
useful to convey the image that I want to develop in the text. See 4.1.3.4.1-2. 
280 These small changes in context open two wholly different doors. One invites you to think of amphibians, 
fish…	   you	   may	   end	   up	   thinking	   of	   humans	   as	   part	   of	   the	   animal	   kingdom.	   The	   other	   pushes you 
somewhere else. You think of wood and marvel, a nineteenth century building, Charles Darwin, the 




The point I am trying to make is that items in a classification demand a common 
explanation and, in its turn, the chosen explanation determines the intelligibility of the 
items classified. The same must obtain in law. 
In	  today’s	  most	  widely accepted conceptions of law, law is not a natural order—an order 
for which someone who acts unlawfully is someone who deviates from the natural way of 
being.281 On the contrary, we believe that law is a group of rules that humans developed 
in tandem with other aspects of their culture. Law is a judgment about what must follow 
certain circumstances, given a desired goal, idea of reason, tradition or procedure. So, in 
law, a law is a law because an intelligence or will elaborated it in accordance with a self-
constructed idea of what law should look like. This ought to be the law because this law 
promotes X desired goal, manifests this or that principle of practical reason, resembles 
our	  father’s	  law, or was validly enacted. Given the purposive nature of law then, what sort 
of generality are we to give our legal classifications? 
Cause of obligation is not external to the causes of obligation as the concept of animal is 
external to the things that you could class under the sub-concepts of mammal or reptile. 
The will that said; “from this circumstance must follow an obligation,”	  and	  added	  “this	  
link of circumstance and obligation	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  another	  cause	  of	  obligation”	  is	  a	  
will which, if it took the classificatory enterprise seriously, ordered the obligation in 
accordance	  with	  the	  genus	  “cause	  of	  obligation.”	  From	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  enactment	  on,	  
the only possible interpretation for this link of circumstance and obligation is one of a 
cause of obligation, whatever that means. The genus (cause of obligation) is in this sense 
internal to the particular (causes of the obligation). A cause of obligation, unlike a dog, is 
                                                        
281 An example of this way of thinking appears in Cicero, De re publica: 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it 
summons to duty by its commands, and averts form wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its 
commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to 
try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it 
entirely. We cannot be freed form its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves 
for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different 
laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, 
and there will be one master and ruler, that is God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, 
and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying human nature, and by reason 
of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered 
punishment. 
C. Walker Keyes translation, Putnam, New York, 1928, III, xxii, 33 (Italics are mine). Also eloquent is 
Ulpian: 
Natural law is that which all animals have been taught by Nature; this law is not peculiar to the human species, 
it is common to all animals which are produced on land or sea, and to fowls of the air as well. From it comes 
the union of man and woman called by us matrimony, and therewith the procreation and rearing of children; 
we find in fact that animals in general, the very wild beasts, are marked by acquaintance with this law. 




a creature defined by the agent who classified it that way. In this sense jurists play God. 
For the jurist to say this thing is a cause of obligation it is akin to God saying this thing is 
an animal and shall be interpreted thus. 
4.1.2. CAUSE OF OBLIGATION AS JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS 
4.1.2.1. TWO “MATTERS” FOR COHERENCE: LEGAL POSITIVISM VS. LEGAL FORMALISM 
What is the thing that makes contract and tort causes of obligation? Or, what is the 
character that makes the items classified as causes of obligation causes of obligation? 
What is there in tort that makes it look like a contract and in contract that makes it look 
like a tort? The answer to these questions depends on the definition one puts to work in 
pursuit of the coherence demanded by the abstract concept of cause of obligation.282 
4.1.2.2. LEGALISM EXPLAINS TOO MUCH, AND TOO LITTLE  
There are two main answers to the question. The standard answer says that one cause of 
obligation looks like the others in that all are about a situational case to which the law has 
attached a legal effect. All causes of obligation are kinds of the same genus because all are 
final products of a certain procedure by which human behavior became the antecedent of 
an enforceable demand. So, if all causes of obligation establish, on the one hand, a type of 
situational	  case	  (like	  “agreement	  with	  patrimonial	  content,”	  “wrongly	  caused	  harm”	  and	  
“enrichment	  without	   cause”),	   and	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   a	   type	  of	   constraint	   (like	   “act	   in	  
accordance with the agreement,”	  “compensate for the inflicted	  damage”	  and	  “restitute	  the	  
enrichment”),	  it	  is	  because	  the	  situational	  facts	  and	  constraints	  have	  been	  linked	  as	  causes	  
and effects by a legislature, court or some other authorized will.283  
                                                        
282 In some sense we are all formalists. "L'attività	   giuridica,	   nonché	   opporsi	   e	   resistere	   al formalismo, 
s'identifica	  appieno	  con	  esso,	  e	  senza	  di	  esso	  non	  potrebbe	  neppure	  concepirsi.	  Il	  formalismo	  non	  le	  è	  
estraneo	   ed	   arbitrario,	   ma	   essenziale	   e	   costitutivo:	   è	   attività	   giuridica	   soltanto	   nel	   grado	   della	   sua	  
formalità."	  Natalino Irti, La cultura del diritto civile, UTET, Torino, 1990, p. 122, arguing that even the 
realists	  are	  somehow	  formalists.	  The	  question	  for	  all	  of	  us	  is	  “What	  is	  the	  form	  of	  our	  chosen	  form?” 
283 Almost all jurists writing in the period of 1850-1970 follow the same pattern of thought. Few show their 
pattern of thought as clearly as Pena Lopez: 
The obligations, insofar as they are legal effects, need for their birth of the same presuppositions (of born): a 
fact	  that	  is	  recognized	  by	  a	  norm	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  its	  birth… Hence there is no obligation without a norm that 
attributes	  to	  a	  fact	  the	  significance	  of	  producing	  them…	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  norm	  is	  
source of obligations: in the sense that efficient cause of the obligatory relationship is inexcusably the norm…	  
All juridical relationship, and so the obligatory relationship, born from the mandate in which a juridical norm 
consists,	  and	  the	  holder	  of	  all	  mandate	  or	  of	  all	  juridical	  norm	  is	  the	  juridical	  order…	  But	  the	  norm,	  as	  we	  have	  
been saying, does not produce the obligatory relationship but as a consequence of certain facts that the very 
norm is contemplating as productive of obligations. So that the fact assumes, in between the norm and the 
obligatory relation, the role of mediator for the production of the former, in that it is the determinant condition 




In the legalist conception then, cause of obligation is the validly enacted will by which a 
certain situational case is the necessary antecedent of an enforceable demand. This is a 
powerful way of explaining the similarities among the various causes of obligation in 
organized societies. However, this theory fails both through excess and through 
insufficiency.  
Legalism explains too much because, by means of its explanation, one can end up mixing 
contracts, torts and unjust enrichments with things that, from a practical perspective, 
have nothing to do with contracts, torts and unjust enrichments. To wit, if the common 
pattern is that an authority had validly linked a fact to a duty, then a contract is as much a 
cause of obligation as is a tax base. The hyper-inclusivity of legalism renders the 
classificatory enterprise senseless (compare 4.2.2.1 with 4.2.3.1). On the other hand, 
legalism has a shortage of explanatory power. Legalism explains too little because it fails 
to explain the case of obligations outside state-like organized societies. Is Argentina 
obligated to pay a loan received from a private actor? The creditor will	  say,	  “Yes,”	  on the 
basis of the	  argument:	  “We	  made	  a	   loan	  contract.”	  But	  Argentina	  could	  say	  “So	  what?”	  
Now the creditor must justify. The legalist justification must look like an answer to this 
question:	  “What	   is	   the	  validly	  enacted	  norm	  according	  to	  which	  a	  contract	  signed	  by	  a	  
state and a private actor is	  the	  antecedent	  of	  an	  enforceable	  obligation?”	  The	  legalist	  finds 
herself in difficulty.	  She	  cannot	  point	  to	  her	  state’s	  private	  law	  (for	  Argentina is sovereign 
in relation to other states or, to prevent an argument, the contract was signed in mare 
liberum and	   no	   judicial	   authority	   is	   therein	   referred)	   nor	   she	   can	   point	   to	   Kelsen’s	  
international	  law	  (for	  the	  case’s	  creditor	  is	  not	  a	  state	  like	  Argentina). 
4.1.2.3. CHOOSING JUSTICE AS COHERENCE 
There is another theory for the likeness or coherence that the causes of obligation must 
exhibit.284 This theory maintains that the causes of obligation are similar because they are 
all about justice in transactions (between persons and concerning things). 
This theory shares with legalism the view that law is an act of will. Legal consequences do 
not follow naturally from phenomena. A judgment linking a fact to another could be legal 
even if, as a matter of fact, the factual consequence never followed from the factual 
antecedent. But these two theories differ in many respects. To start with, to the jurist, the 
                                                        
Augustín	   Ignacio	   Pena	   Lopez, “Criterios de sistematizacion de las fuentes de las obligaciones,”	   in	  
Actualidad Civil, No 4, (1993), pp. 717-735, at p. 717. 
284 I	  am	  inspired	  mainly	  by	  Peter	  Benson,	  Ernest	  Weinrib,	  Fernando	  López	  de	  Zavalía,	  Werner	  Goldschmidt,	  




will that links a fact to an obligation is not an arbitrary will—something a Hobbesian 
legalist could accept. The will that links a fact to an obligation uses a specific kind of 
reason, a reason that precedes her, him or it. And this kind of reason is thicker than the 
kind of reason that other (less realist) legalists would find necessary to link obligations to 
facts. If for democratic legalists this reason is a process, for the jurist it is a principle; 
namely, the rule of equal freedom or, as it manifests itself in the law of obligations, 
equality in transactions.285 
An implication of such principle-based law is that anyone can say that an obligation must 
follow from a fact. To be a lawgiver you need to learn private law, know how to argue in 
terms of justice. It is inessential that others legitimate you with a power to make law. 
Another difference is that in the	   legalist’s	  view	  the	   link	  between	  obligation	  and	   fact	   is	  
external to the obligation and the fact. If the authority did not say that from X fact follows 
Y obligation, nobody can say that Y obligation follows from X fact. Some legalists say that 
the dictums	  of	  the	  authority	  are	  the	  “efficient	  causality”	  between	  facts	  and	  legal	  effects.	  
To the jurist this is not the case. Obviously someone had to convincingly argue that X fact 
is a cause of obligation so that X fact would be recognized as a cause of obligation. But this 
does not mean that X was not a cause of obligation before someone referred to it as such. 
The obligation was in X in the sense that X was more or less susceptible of being 
interpreted as a cause of obligation. This is true even in the case of silence or contradiction 
by the authority.286 
Now if cause of obligation means justice in transactions, how do the various causes of the 
obligation express justice in transactions? 
We	   begin	  with	   one	   interpretation.	   “A	   person	  who,	  willfully	   or	   negligently,	   unlawfully 
injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another is bound to 
compensate	  him	  for	  any	  damage	  arising	  therefrom.”	  Section	  823	  of	  BGB	  draws on private 
law-language.	  It	  says	  “A	  person,”	  “unlawfully	  injures,”	  the	  “right	  of	  another,”	  “is	  bound”	  or	  
has	  an	  obligation	   “to”…	  but we see beyond. The way in which the text connects these 
words	   and	   qualifies	   and	   complements	   them	   with	   key	   terms	   like	   “negligently,”	  
“compensate”	   and	   “freedom”	   suggests	   that	   the	   text	   is	   intended to specify corrective 
justice. Briefly put, delict assigns a compensatory duty to any person who, maliciously or 
imprudently, trespasses the limits of her right to injure the body, health, freedom, 
                                                        
285 See Introductory Part.1. 




property	  or,	  in	  general,	  a	  thing	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  another’s	  right.	  The obligation hence 
is placed to correct a right violation.287 
The delicts in the BGB do justice to illicit interactions. One would expect to see a similar 
conception of contract in the BGB, where tort and contract are species of the same 
genus. 288  The BGB does not define contract however. But there are versions of the 
juridical conception of contract. In the juridical conception, contract is about exchange of 
rights. Before the contract, I see you as the owner of the thing I want and you see me as 
the owner of the thing you want. In the contract we agree that each one will transfer to 
the other what the other wants. Injustice in this licit or pacific interaction occurs when 
one party refuses to give what the other has acquired. One can read this conception of 
contract in Art. 1101	  and	  1131	  of	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code.	  The	  former	  says:	  “A	  contract	  is	  an	  
agreement by which one or more persons obligate themselves toward one or more others 
to	  give,	  to	  do	  or	  not	  to	  do	  something.”	  The	  latter	  says:	  “An	  obligation	  without causa, or 
with	  a	  false	  causa	  or	  with	  an	  illicit	  causa,	  cannot	  have	  any	  effect.”	  Causa	  is	  the	  thing	  the	  
debtor wanted from the creditor and acquired through the contract.289 
4.1.3. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH PRIVATE LAW OBLIGATIONS ARISE 
What does a cause of obligation look like? There are theories of just contract law and of 
just tort law. 290  There is even a theory of the emerging juridical category of unjust 
                                                        
287 The German system of tort law differs to others like the French and Italian. Whereas German tort law 
establishes certain protected interests, setting out numerous clausus in relation to these interests by 
which the infringement of the protected interests only gives rise to a corrective obligation, the French 
model establishes a general principle, establishing a kind of atypicity of the protected interest, by which 
every damage occasioned by a intentional or negligent conduct gives rise to a corrective obligation. In 
my view, these two theories must be seen as complementary. Whereas the French system establishes 
the principle of tort law, the idea that you must correct all damage wrongfully caused to another, the 
German model specifies this principle in readily applicable concepts (please see 4.1.5.1). Interestingly 
enough, we are told that the jurisprudence of France and Italy apply the more down-to-earth approach 
of	  the	  Germans.	  There	  is	  an	  “orientation	  of	  the	  scholarship	  and	  the	  judges	  towards	  a	  “selection”	  of	  the	  
interests	  deserving	  care	  […]	  The	  “selective”	  technique	  consists	  of	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  [idea	  of]	  illicit	  fact	  
to	  [various]	  illicit	  types.”	  Pietro	  Rescignio,	  “Obbligazioni	  (dir.	  priv.),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto, t. XXIX, 
Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  p.	  155.	  See more in 3.2.2. and the theory in 4.1.3. 
288 See 4.1.1.1.1. (e) and the doctrine elaborated in 4.1.1.3. 
289  Three facts indicate that voluntary obligations arise only in exchanges. Firstly, donations are not 
regulated among the sources of the obligation; they are regulated before them, after of the mortis causa 
succession (Title I) and together with testaments (Title II: Of donations during life and of wills). 
Secondly, even if the general definition of contract (Art. 1011) seems to suggest that contracts could be 
gratuitous, Art. 1131 says that, to obligate, contractual obligations must have a lawful causa; in other 
words,	   be	   reciprocated	   by	   a	   valid	   consideration.	   Lastly,	   Art.	   931	   requires	   that	   “All acts importing 
donation during life shall be passed before notaries,”	  namely	  before	   the	  representatives	  of	   the	  state,	  
which	  means	  that	  enforceable	  donations	  are	  not	  a	  privates’	  affair. 
290 Peter	  Benson,	   “The	  unity	   of	  Contract	   Law,”	   in	  Benson,	  Peter	   (ed.),	  The Theory of Contract Law: New 




enrichment. 291  But there is no systematic exposition of the legal category by which 
contract, tort and unjust enrichment are particulars of the same kind. I need such a 
theory.292 I need to have a clear image of the constituent parts of the cause of obligation 
because my endeavor seeks to determine a new particular of this kind. And I cannot use 
the theory of a particular cause of obligation, for if I mould the interested promises with 
the abstract form of contract, tort or unjust enrichment, I would be either denaturalizing 
the interested promises or deforming the chosen form, which is something we want to 
avoid.293 
So, once again, what are the features that a transaction must exhibit for it to look like a 
cause of obligation, or what are the conditions under which obligations arise?294 
4.1.3.1. THERE ARE TWO PRIVATE LAW PERSONS 
The concept of cause of obligation presupposes two persons and, to be one of these 
persons, to be able to participate in a cause of obligation, an entity must in principle pass 
three tests. These tests require free will, independence and separation. Let me develop 
briefly. 
Having free will is the first requisite. Someone under an obligation to do something is 
someone who has, as the classical definition puts it, 295  to do something by legal 
necessitation. Now, a condition for the law to impose a duty to do X on someone is that it 
                                                        
The idea of Private Law,	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   Cambridge	   Mass.,	   1995,	   Chapter	   6	   “Negligence	  
Liability”	  and	  Chapter	  7	  “Strict	  Liability”. 
291 Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford,	  2012,	  Chapter	  6	  “Unjust	  Enrichment”. 
292 The	  closest	  to	  what	  I	  require	  is	  Peter	  Benson,	  “Misfeasance	  as	  an	  Organizing	  Normative	  Idea	  in	  Private	  
Law,”	  in	  University of Toronto Law Journal, 60, (2010), pp. 731-798, from which I draw to a considerable 
extent. 
293 Explaining the interested promise in terms of an existing legal concept denaturalizes the interested 
promise. However, as the law leaves the interested promises without legal explanation, individuals 
demand the law to order the issues arising in interested promise scenarios. And if the law orders such 
issues with the existing legal concepts, the law deforms the existing legal concepts. This is more or less 
the argument of Part 1 and Part 2. 
294 This is not an exercise of induction. Induction would consist of generalizing the common features of 
contract, tort and unjust enrichment. What I am doing here is, if you wish, an exercise in transcendence. 
I am distinguishing experience from form in the causes of the obligations. Transcendence believes that 
every fact of law is a fact of law due to a form of law, which is beyond the given law, and thus can be 
distinguished,	  “forming	  a	  potential	  centre	  for	  an	  indefinite	  number	  of	  other	  [legal]	  experiences.”	  Giorgio 
Del Vecchio, Formal bases of law, op. cit., n. 55, p. 76. What I am looking for is knowledge of the conditions 
under which all possible just cause of obligation could be explained. It is an insight into the nature of one 
and	  every	  just	  cause	  of	  obligation,	  “that	  while it is the condition of being for that object, it is likewise the 
condition	  of	  an	  indefinite	  number	  of	  similar	  objects.” Idem. 




is possible that X will never occur and that the occurrence of X depends on the debtor. So 
the debtor must be able to make X occur. Hence the free will requirement, by which an 
entity must have proven that she, he or it is able to modify the world in pursuit of self-
made projects (to do X). 
 
Someone is independent when she is recognized as the owner of certain choices, as 
someone who can exclude others from deciding for her in specific areas. The slave is not 
such a person, and for that reason, he could never be a victim of	  his	  master’s	  wrong.	  A	  
norm establishing that a slave could demand corrective obligations of the master would 
be self-defeating. If the slave demanded the master to compensate him the damage that 
he suffered at her hands, the master would be able to demand the slave to release her. The 
only obligation is between master and slave, establishing that the slave must do what the 
master says. Even if the slave has free will, everything the slave does is conditioned by the 
master’s	  approval. 
Someone is separate where her or his deeds are imputable only to her or his name. 
Woman and man are independent in the French Civil Code. Yet, when married, they 
cannot engage themselves in contracts, and this makes sense. Marriage (or the community 
of goods) implied a transformation:	  From	  a	   “she”	  and	  a	   “he”	   they	  became a	   “we.”	  And	  
contract implies that one party loses something that another acquires. Now, if my 
disposition of my goods is at the same time a disposition of your goods, how could you be 
said to have acquired something? The persons of the obligation must be separate from the 
beginning of the obligation to its end. If I happen to acquire a credit X that Demetrio had 
as against you and I then give you this credit in payment of a debt I owe you, you are no 
longer a debtor of the credit X, for you cannot be both debtor and creditor of the same 
credit.296 
Legislation on contract, tort and unjust enrichment are so explicit on the bipolarity of the 
causes of obligations that they generally name the involved persons with correlatively 
related	  names,	  or	  statuses.	  Tort	  law	  talks	  about	  a	  “tortfeasor”	  and	  a	  “victim,”	  which	  means	  
that there cannot be a tortfeasor without a victim or victim without tortfeasor. Contract 
                                                        
296 “When	  the	  capacities	  of	  creditor	  and	  of	  debtor	  are	  united	  in	  the	  same	  person,	  a	  merger [confusion] is 
made	  by	  law	  which	  extinguishes	  the	  debt.”	  French	  Civil	  Code, Art. 1300. More examples could be added: 
Where two distinct assets (patrimonium) come to belong to one person, as when one person inherits 
the whole assets of another, the law tries to link each asset to different persons. Where the agent is 
interested in acquiring something from the principal, as if I wanted to buy the house I was commissioned 
to sell, the contract is valid only insofar as I paid the prize established by the principal; there is no space 




law	   goes	   even	   further.	   It	   not	   only	   has	   a	   general	   law	   of	   “offerors”	   and	   “acceptors,” it 
determines	  further	  the	  typical	  relations	  of	  “vendor”	  and	  “buyer,”	  “loaner”	  and	  “loanee,”	  et	  
cetera. The same occurs with typical unjust enrichments, like the negotiorum gestio, 
which	  is	  an	  interaction	  between	  the	  “gestor”	  and	  the	  “dominus negotii.” 
One could say that a personality-recognizing act precedes the formation of every cause of 
obligations. 297  The kiosk owner who asks the tobacco buyer for identification is 
recognizing the prospective buyer as a person before selling him the thing. In 
transnational private law, certain actors become of transnational relevance due to the fact 
that they effectuate transactions with well-established transnational actors. In receiving 
money from a natural person, Argentina is recognizing him or her as something like itself. 
From this point the individual has become a transnational private law persona, other 
transnational players will recognize her in the same manner as Argentina.298 
4.1.3.2. EACH PERSON WITH A SPECIFIC RIGHT OVER A THING 
Someone with a right over a thing is someone who can exclude others from doing 
something with the thing, like using it, enjoying its fruits, or disposing of it.299 Persons 
come to the interactions that cause obligations with a specific right over a specific thing. 
To illustrate, the victim of the tort of battery comes with a right over a human body. This 
right entitles her to exclusively use and even dispose of her body. The tort of battery 
consists of disposing	  of	  the	  victim’s	  body	  without	  her	  authorization.	  When	  the	  defendant 
Y fractures the leg of the victim, Y is harming, indisposing the body of X. At the moment of 
the interaction, the defendant has or should have recognized the leg as that of the victim 
and therefore been aware of her duty not to dispose of it without the	   victim’s	  
authorization. We see this right as functional to the interaction because, for the 
interaction called battery to have taken place, the victim must have come with the so-
                                                        
297 I think I took this idea from an unpublished article by professor Peter Benson, who generously shared it 
with me. The article was about the distinction between right in rem and right in personam. I cannot find 
it so as to double check and quote.  
298 Should other international actors impute international law obligations to private actors on the grounds 
that they have been dealing with bearers of these obligations? This is the question that Rebecca Schmidt 
and I tackle in an article under preparation. 
299 See	  Fernando	  López	  de	  Zavalía,	  Derechos Reales,	  Zavalia,	  Buenos	  Aires,	  1989,	  t.	  1,	  §3,	  pp.	  44-63. Professor 
Benson would say that the persons who come to a cause of obligation are persons who come related in 
a twofold manner. First, in an immunity-disability relation, by which one owns some thing or interest 
and the other can do nothing but to recognize that, and secondly, in a duty-right relation, by which the 
owner has a claim to exclude the non-owner from use, fruit and disposition of the owned thing. Peter 
Benson,	  Misfeasance…,	  op. cit., pp. 751-777, especially at p. 766. In the text I avoid this two-steps analysis 




called	  “right	  of	  bodily	  integrity.”	  In the absence of this right, a situation difficult to imagine, 
though nonetheless possible, the tortfeasor would have violated nothing. 300 
Suppose	  now	   that	   I	   have	   the	   “right	   of	   usufruct”	   over	   the	   stable	   of	  Danielle.	   This	   right	  
entitles me to use and enjoy the fruits of a thing of which I cannot dispose; the right of 
disposition of the thing belongs only to Danielle.301 In a case where you have taken a horse 
without my permission, applied it to the satisfaction of a personal need, fed it and left it 
unharmed in the same stable, you have unjustly enriched yourself at my expense. You 
have enriched yourself at my expense because I am the only one entitled to use and enjoy 
the fruits of that horse. The obligation to restitute would arise also in the event that the 
user was Danielle himself. So, to be entitled to claim unjust enrichment, you must have a 
right to a	  thing’s	  fruition.302 
How	  is	  it	  in	  contract?	  In	  a	  single	  act	  you	  give	  me	  the	  hardcover	  edition	  of	  Benson’s	  The 
Theory of Contract Law and I commit to give you a critical review of that book. In the 
imaginary	  of	  transfers	  I	  took	  a	  book	  from	  your	  hand	  and	  you	  heard	  “I	  commit	  to	  review 
this book,”	  spoken in my voice. We have two kinds of things here: a movable thing and a 
performance (or the image that I will do something for you in a given future). The first 
thing must appear to me as a belonging of yours, for why would I give you something of 
mine if I knew that the book I am receiving cannot be disposed except by another? If the 
latter situation is at stake, then I run the risk that the actual owner will come and take the 
book out of my hands through the argument that I took it knowing that its disposition 
belongs to him. The second thing must also belong to me with the exclusion of others! For 
why would you give me something of yours if you knew that the performance I am giving 
                                                        
300 Had Y agreed with X to play football, Y	  would	  not	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  indisposing	  X’s	  leg	  in	  some	  
way, for in such an agreement, X implicitly agreed to expose her leg to the possibility that Y indisposes 
it through injury etc. Conf. Sir Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts, Fourth Edition, Stevens and Sons, 
London, 1895, pp. 97-98: 
There are incidents, again, in every football match which an uninstructed observer might easily take for a 
confused fight of savages, and grave hurt sometimes ensues to one or more of the players. Yet, so long as the 
play is fairly conducted according to the rules agreed upon, there is no wrong and no cause of action. For the 
players have joined in the game of their own free will, and accepted its risks. Not that a man is bound to play 
football or any other rough game, but if he does he must abide its ordinary chances. Here the harm done, if not 
justified (for, though in a manner unavoidable, it was not in a legal sense necessary), is nevertheless excused. 
301  The very nice definition of usufruct provided by Dalmacio	   Vélez	   Sarsfield,	   the	   writer	   of	   the	   1871	  
Argentinian	  Civil	  Code:	  “El	  usufructo	  es	  el	  derecho	  real	  de	  usar	  y	  gozar	  de	  una	  cosa,	  cuya	  propiedad	  
pertenece	  a	  otro,	  con	  tal	  que	  no	  se	  altere	  su	  substancia.”	  (“The	  usufruct	  is	  the	  real	  right	  to	  use	  and	  fruit	  
of a thing	  which	  property	  belongs	  to	  another,	  provided	  that	  its	  substance	  is	  not	  altered.”) Art. 2807 in 
1871 Argentinian Civil Code. 
302 A	  similar	  solution	  in	  Kit	  Barer,	  “‘Damages	  Without	  Loss’:	  Can	  Hohfeld	  Help?,”	  in	  Oxford Journal of Legal 




you in exchange belongs to another, as if I came to our contract bound to work in 
exclusivity with your competitor?303 
Both parties to a contract own the things they exchange in the sense that they have the 
exclusive capacity to dispose of these things. But the nature of these things could be very 
dissimilar, from a certain thing like a book to a quantity.304 I will avoid the discussion of 
the legal nature of books to anticipate a notion that we will revisit in 4.1.4.3, 5.2.1.2 and 
5.2.2.1. 
(A) A RIGHT OVER MY DISPOSABLE FREEDOM 
Freedom,	  understood	  as	  an	  ability	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  hinder	  no	  one	  else’s	  freedom,	  is	  in	  
private law, something that I own to the exclusion of others. My freedom is mine in the 
sense that even if it has to do with my future conducts everyone must regard it as 
something of another and not hinder it, like for example making it possible that I do not 
study or work. Comprehended in this way freedom is what I will call a “right	  over	  my	  
disposable freedom.”	  This	  right contains the future I am able to dispose as a present asset 
in	  exchanges… 
Let me introduce the concept with the book review example. Before our contract, I was 
free from an obligation to conduct the book review for you. I could have chosen not to do 
it, or to do it for another editor. No one could dispose of this freedom for me, as if a third 
unauthorized party promised you that I will do the work or made it impossible that I 
dispose of that choice of mine by harming my reputation. Now, when I made a contract 
with you I parceled, as it were, a part of my disposable future. Of the universe of things I 
could do in the near future I specified, parceled, as it were, a choice, which you made yours 
by giving me your book. As your possibilities related to your book passed to be mine, my 
possibilities related to my choice to do the research passed to be yours. I am no longer 
able to do things that could hinder my conducing of that research. I must, in other words, 
do what is reasonable	  to	  “conserve”305 your choice.  
  
                                                        
303 If you were my employee and I wanted you to perform one of the tasks contemplated in our labor-
relation, I would not approach you as a contract party, as someone who has something I desire and is 
willing to exchange it for something I have. For why would I want to offer you something in exchange 
for something that you already owe me? 
304 The best essay on things in law I had the opportunity to read is Salvatore	   Pugliatti,	   “Cosa	   (Teoria	  
generale),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto, t. XI, Giuffrè,	  1962,	  Varese,	  pp.	  19-93. 




4.1.3.3. THE TWO PERSONS INTERACT 
If the causes of obligation presuppose two persons with rights, they consist of a legal act 
or interaction. The latest scholarship investigating the features or morphology of legal 
interactions proceeds in this way: They identify the facts that a norm makes the condition 
of an obligation, dissect them from the obligation and characterize them. In other words, 
they	   read	   positive	   law	   as	   a	   fact	   of	   nature	   and,	   even	   if	   they	   use	   “intention,”	   “act,”	  
“declaration”	  and	  related	  juridical concepts as analytical categories, they limit themselves 
to characterizing what they see in the positive law, sometimes modifying the analytical 
categories to make them house the facts described in the law. So it is that some obligation-
producing-facts	  would	   appear	  as	   “facts,”	   “unilateral	   acts,”	   “non-receptive	  declarations”	  
and other forms that, from the perspective of juridical private law, can never give rise to 
obligations.306 
The scholarship of just private law can be nothing like this. If the just private law says that 
the causes of the obligation presuppose two persons with rights over things, what can it 
say about the interactions that cause obligations? What juridical conditions make an 
interaction qualify as a cause of obligation? 
(A) ON PRIVATE LAW CONDUCT 
We understand conduct as “the	   outward	   expression	   of	   an	   inwardly	   determined	  
purpose.”307 There are various classifications of the acts of will in private law.308 The most 
                                                        
306 An example of this scholarship is Ludwig Enneccerus, who classifies the obligations in a paragraph that 
looks like an index to the provisions of the German Civil Code: 
The obligations arise: out of the legal transactions, of the acts akin to the legal transactions and of the real acts; 
of the illicit acts; of the un-faulty acts which nonetheless obligate to pay a remedy; of certain states of legal or 
factual nature, for example, of the real rights, of the family rights, of the hereditary law and of the unjust 
enrichment. The obligations that arise out of legal transactions are divided in obligations arisen out of a 
contract, of unilateral promises and of testamentary dispositions. The obligations that arise out of the 
contracts not only are sensibly the most frequent and important, but also the rules of the contractual 
obligations are applicable to the other obligations that arise out of legal transactions, whenever the 
unilaterality of these legal transactions or their special nature results no deviation. 
Tratado de Derecho Civil, t. V: Obligaciones,	   Blas	   Pérez	   González	   and	   José	   Alguer	   translation,	   Bosch,	  
Barcelona (?), 1934, p. 138. 
307 Ernest Weinrib, Corrective	  Justice…, op. cit., p. 23. 
308 The tradition consists in classifying intentionality according to its intensity. The famous or historical 
classification	   is	   that	   which	   divides	   culpa	   in	   “dolo”,	   “culpa	   grave”	   or	   lata,	   “culpa	   leve”	   and	   “culpa	  
levissima.”	  It	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  classification	  of	  intentionality	  must	  be	  contingent—changing 
within	  what	  it	  contains	  it.	  In	  this	  sense:	  “We	  can	  define	  will	  as	  the	  primary	  and	  irreducible	  principle	  of	  
subjective being which develops in the world of the senses. Its development varies in form, because will 
changes with the degree of perception from the blindest instinct to the most deliberate knowledge. And 
yet its differences and distinctions rest on a substantial unity. Will, like life itself, is one and continuous 




common today divides them into “intentional”	   and	   “negligent”	   acts.	   Contractual 
agreement offers an example of what legal intention is. 309 The parties exhibit to one 
another that they definitively want to endorse the planned exchange. Tort law provides a 
very good example of what negligence is. 310  The tortfeasor does something that a 
reasonable person could and would have chosen not to do. The absence of will makes 
behavior	  “unintentional.”	  If	  the	  act	  is	  unintentional	  then	  it	  cannot	  cause	  an	  obligation.	  A	  
person selling under illegal threat has no definite intention to exchange rights; an insane 
person driving over the speed limit is not committing a negligent act. This means that, if 
we want to argue that a behavior is a private law act, we must first prove that, in some 
sense, the agent chose it. 
It is crucial that the inner experience of choosing or being able to choose be otherwise 
discernible from the legal act or its circumstances. 311  The party to the contractual 
agreement must be able to tell from the agreement and its circumstances that the other 
party intended more or less the same idea of contract that she intended. The antecedent 
and posterior conducts of the tortfeasor and the tort circumstances must show the 
claimant, defendant and any other reasonable observer that the tortfeasor could have 
chosen to act diligently as opposed to negligently. One is able to tell that another is 
choosing something or is able to choose otherwise due to significant facts like words, body 
language, etc. These social facts mediate between the crude reality and the internal life of 
the other. Sometimes the observer must be specialized—I have to know of yoga to be able 
tell that your movements intend to manifest the figure you are representing in your mind. 
Other times the observer must solely be acquainted with the dictionary of everyday life; 
the culture mediating basic subjective experiences and signs, from want to aversion, to 
sadness and cheerfulness. 
                                                        
309 On the conception that I follow: Peter Benson, “The	  Unity	  of	  Contract	  Law,” op. cit., pp. 141-144. 
310 On the conception that I follow: Ernest Weinrib, The idea of Private Law, op. cit., pp. 147-153. 
311 The characteristic of the exteriority of law is not appropriate if with it one wants to delimit the field of 
application of the law, but it is if with it one wants to designate the direction of the juridical judgment: 
Morality is directed exclusively to the intention, while vice-versa, the law takes into consideration the 
intention,	  and	  identifies	   in	  it	  only	  the	  possible	  source	  of	  external	  action”	  So	  law	  cannot	  attend	  to	   the 
actions	  that	  demand	  consideration	  only	  as	  manifestations	  of	  an	  intention,	  “according	  to	  the	  measure	  of	  
not	   that	   what	   they	   operate	   but	   of	   what	   they	   signify,	   for	   example,	   as	   ‘demonstrations	   of	   love’	   or	  
‘manifestations	  of	   friendship’.	  Owing	  to	  this	   it	   is	   that the relationships whose essence lays not in the 
external behavior but in the intention from whom that behavior gushes out cannot be regulated 
juridically, thus the relations with God, the beloved, the friend. From this the abolishment of the 
punishments	  for	  heresy	  or	  apostasy,	  from	  this	  the	  juridical	  irrelevance	  of	  friendship.”	  Gustav Radbruch, 
Introduzione alla scienza del diritto, Dino Pasini and Carlo Agnesotti translation, Giappichelli, Torino, 




Let me clarify this: 
(B) NOT EVERY HUMAN CONDUCT CAN BE RELEVANT FOR JURIDICAL PRIVATE LAW 
Not all conduct demands the attention of private law. Think of this scenario. I uproot a 
spruce to use it as my Christmas tree. This is an intentional deed. But if the spruce is mine, 
as if it happed to be rooted in my garden, my uprooting of it has no significance in private 
law. In private law, everything separable from my land, like a tree, is mine and, as mine, 
can be used and abused as I wish. This means that no one can reproach me for my doings 
with my spruce.312 Conduct is relevant for private law only if it involves another, as if the 
spruce was not in my own, but in your garden. 
We now make an affirmation: 
(C) THE CONDUCTS THAT ARE RELEVANT FOR PRIVATE LAW ARE THOSE THAT CAN BE RELATED 
TO THE CONDUCT OF ANOTHER PERSON 
This affirmation obeys the principle of alterity,313 which in the field of the obligations says 
that whoever is to be a debtor or creditor must in some mode participate in the conduct 
from which the obligation arises.314 The reasoning is this: Private law has established a 
world where persons do what they want within their provinces. The establishment of this 
world presupposed reciprocal renunciations by physiologically free egoists; e.g. I 
renounced my physiologically free choice to eat the apples of the tree you planted so that 
you renounce your physiologically free choice of entering the house where I live. In this 
context, if you are going to be entitled to make a demand other than the ones that we have 
already established, like that I must let you pick apples from my tree, you must, to begin 
with, prove an act of mine in connection with your conduct or sphere of rights. 
We have already studied the most relevant modes in which private law works out the 
connection of conducts that ground obligations (See 3.2.1). I now want to classify them in 
two parts: bilateral interactions and unilateral interactions. 
                                                        
312 Kocourek	  calls	  this	  situation	  “freedom.”	  “Freedom	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  relation	  because	  it	  is	  one-sided. A relation 
always involves two elements or two sides. Freedom is protected by the law by various Claims and 
Powers, but in itself it is not within the law. It is rather the end of law. Where Freedom ends the law 
begins,	   and	   where	   the	   laws	   ends	   Freedom	   begins.”	   Albert	   Kocourek,	   Jural Relations, MacMillan, 
Indianapolis, 1927, p. 22. 
313 We spoke of the principle of alterity when we separated law from morality: Introductory Part.1. 
314  “Only	   where	   there	   were a plurality of individuals, whose respective actions meet or interfere in a 
common	  means,	  there	  can	  be	  place	  for	  the	  application	  of	  whatever	  juridical	  criteria.”	  Giorgio Del Vecchio, 




(D) BILATERAL INTERACTIONS 
Private law works out the bilateral interactions in several modes. The bilateral act par 
excellence is the contract. The contract is perfected and the obligations emerge when the 
offeree	  says	  to	  the	  offeror,	  “I	  accept	  your offer.”	  Although	  one	  first	  makes	  the	  offer	  and	  the	  
other afterwards accepts the offer, there is a moment where they do something together. 
We	  call	  this	  moment	  “agreement,”	  expressions	  like	  “meeting	  of	  the	  minds”	  and	  “the	  iter	  of	  
the	   contract”	   are	   also	   used. Other bilateral interactions appear outside of the law of 
obligations, like the act of conveyance (or tradition) of the law of in rem rights and 
marriage of family law. It would be productive if, in the field of the obligations, scholarship 
typified the conditions for the formation of the so-called	  “relational	  contracts.” 
(E) UNILATERAL INTERACTIONS 
A widespread opinion holds that acts in private law can be conducts of persons in 
solitude.315 Someone who stamps a reward announcement on a German public wall is 
someone who is performing a unilateral legal act, for §657	   of	   the	   German	   Civil	   Code	  
institutes such conduct as the antecedent of a legal effect and the conduct itself is about 
one person doing something alone. Scholars who talk about unilateral acts in this sense 
are scholars who think of private law in public law terms. Certainly, since the state 
meddles in the relations of its citizens, the state can say that from the unilateral conduct 
of one arises a right for another. Here then, my conduct could link us regardless of its 
interference with you. Whether this is unilateral conduct or not,316 for the reasons given 
in 3.2.1, it cannot be accepted as an act of private law. 
Having said that, private law does have room to talk about unilateral acts, or better: 
“unilateral	  interactions.”	  The	  case	  of	  intentional	  damage	  is	  a	  good	  example.	   
I, for some	  reason,	  smash	  my	  neighbor’s	  car.	  Did	  I	  establish a relation with him? He was 
absent at the time I was damaging his car. He came to know of the sad event when the tort 
had been committed. Are we to say that the tort occurred when he noticed it? No. The way 
                                                        
315 See the works discussed in 3.1. For a discussion on the many legal senses to which unilaterality can be 
applied: Martin Hogg, Promises and contract law: comparative perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge and New York, 2011, pp. 35-38. For an extensive treatise on the unilateral legal acts, see 
Carmine Donisi, Il problema dei negozi giuridici unilaterali, Jovene, Napoli, 1972. 
316 I pose doubts about the unilaterality of this conduct because its legal relevance is due only to its being 
established as the antecedent of a legal effect by the legal authority. Accordingly, X incurs in the 
obligation to act in accordance with the program of conduct prescribed in the paper that X posted on the 
public	  wall	  because	  X’s	  state	  said	  that	  anyone	  doing	  that	  act	  would	  incur in a voluntary obligation, the 




in which private law thinks is as follows: In destroying something that belongs to another, 
I destroyed another; for the things of others are like extensions of their personalities. So, 
even if this conduct may (from one perspective) look unilateral, it is (from the private law 
perspective) a legal interaction, an act between two persons. 317  We refer to this 
interaction as unilateral because there is only one agent taking action. In our case, it is the 
tortfeasor	  who	  intentionally	  smashed	  the	  other’s	  car. 
But torts are not the only cases of unilateral interactions. As we will see in 4.1.4.3 (b)-(c), 
there are licit unilateral interactions too.  
One could say that conduct on the part of the victim of a tort is unnecessary because tort 
is about the violation of an acquired right. A violation of a right can be a unilateral 
interaction but the acquisition of a right cannot. Licit causes of obligation cannot but be 
bilateral in the sense of bilaterally active acts.318 But then one must explain, why is it that 
the legatee acquires a right to the legated object without accepting it, why is it that the 
offeree acquires a power to accept the offer without expressing a will as to the unilaterally 
transferred power, why is it that the promisee of a promise to pay an unenforceable debt 
actualizes his claim with and only with the promise? What I am doing here is making space 
for a category that could explain these legal phenomena. I will	  work	  out	  the	  category’s	  
brightest type in 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 before justifying it in 6.1. 
4.1.3.4 THE INTERACTION IS NOT A SIMPLY LICIT INTERACTION 
A legal phenomenon (or interaction) is something that leaves traces in the world of senses 
and can be interpreted as implying two persons in relation. But not all legal phenomena 
are relevant to the law of obligations. We need to say something about the “simply	  licit	  
interactions.”	  319 
                                                        
317 The victim was interfered with by the tortfeasor—though passively, he participated in the tort. Another 
even more interesting form of unilateral interaction is depicted by the negotiorum gestio. See 3.2.1. 
318 For a version of the argument please see 6.1. 
319  For a very instructive discussion of simply licit activities in the common law see Peter Benson, 
“Misfeasance…,”	  op. cit., pp. 734-743, where professor Benson discusses the cases of rescues denial, pure 
economic loss and non-legal issues between neighbors. These cases are even more interesting than the 
illustrations of the text because they are about interactions where a person does something that she 
knows will result in a loss to another and yet the other has no action to claim recovery of the loss. With 
these examples professor Benson takes what I call simply licit activities to its limits. Let me quote 
Benson: 
Despite the differences between the rescue, pure economic loss, and nuisance scenarios—the first involves 
factual	  ‘omissions’	  and	  physical	  loss	  whereas	  the	  second	  and	  third	  involve	  factual	  ‘acts’	  and	  financial	  loss—
there seems to be a common thread: in these no liability situations, the defendant’s	  conduct	  does	  not	  affect	  an	  
interest rightfully belonging to the plaintiff to the exclusion of the defendant. The existence of such an interest 




I am having lunch in a restaurant with another person. You could interpret this situation 
in a manifold of legal ways. One interpretation could be that we are a contractual party 
and the owner of the restaurant (who is represented by the waitress) is the other 
contractual party. This legal interpretation would be relevant to the law of obligations. 
But the following interpretation would not be relevant: there are two persons; these two 
persons come to a meeting with a bundle of rights and interact, no one affecting the 
other’s	   rights.	  Private	   law	   identifies	  no	  obligation-creating act. Indeed, this interaction 
seems to have no legal effect at all. Yet private law names it. It calls it a licit interaction. 
Why? Well, one may make undue disclosures to	  the	  other	  and	  violate	  a	  third	  party’s	  right,	  
or as one goes to the toilet, the other profits’	   from	   a	   thing	   of	   hers. We need to see 
seemingly insignificant interactions as private law phenomena because they constitute 
the arena where a successive, relevant legal phenomenon may happen to occur. 
What is more, typical simply licit interactions could be instrumentalized as a defense to a 
wrong	   accusation.	   Take	   the	   simply	   licit	   interactions	   called	   “pourparlers”	   and	  
“Punkctuation.”320 The pourparlers are, in French private law, the conversations oriented 
towards the formation of a contract. This person and I meet in a coffee shop to comment 
on	  each	  one’s	  needs	  and	  brainstorm	  how	  we	  could	  cooperate.	  We	  agree	  that	  we	  could	  
exchange things. We talk about the possible terms and conditions of our contract. We 
made a pourparler. The German Punktuation refers to a further possible step in the pre-
contractual dealings. We take a piece of paper and outline the main points of the 
prospective contract. This written paper does not look like a contract. It misses our 
signatures. The significance of the pourparlers and the Punktuation is exactly that they do 
not create obligations. If private law characterizes and names them it is for giving them 
the prefabricated value of inoperative acts. Why would private law concern itself with 
determining an inoperative concept? I think the reason is efficiency. X introduces a first 
draft of a contract as conclusive evidence of a contract claim. Because private law cognizes 
that the Punktuation is not a contract, the defendant can say, without too much 
elaboration,	  “this	  is	  a	  Punktuation, it is not sufficient proof of a contractual agreement.” 
 
                                                        
toward the plaintiff with respect to any loss caused, whether it be physical or purely economic, and however 
foreseeable that loss may be [....] On this view, we may say provisionally that nonfeasance is conduct that does 
not affect or otherwise interfere with	  a	  substantive	  interest	  (one’s	  body	  or	  things)	  that	  belongs	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  
to the rightful exclusion of the defendant. 
Idem, p. 743 (italics in the text.) 
320 See	   the	  distinction	  in	  Fernando	  López	  de	  Zavalía,	  Teoría	  de	   los	  contratos, t. 1, 4th ed., Zavalia, Buenos 















The promise,  by  Henry  Tuke  (1888)  covers  Martin  Hogg’s  book  Promises  and  Contract  Law.  In  my  view,  the  picture  
perfectly casts the sort of situations from which private law should   abstain.   Look   at   the   boy’s   face:   Is   he  
transferring a right, contracting an obligation, creating a legal relationship, or whatever metaphor we choose to 
speak of private law? The boy may be making a promise, but not a legally intended one. This man is showing love 





4.1.3.5. THE INTERACTION AFFECTS THEIR RESPECTIVE SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS 
A person with a right; as long as every other person respects this picture, everything runs 
smoothly in private law. In other words, no one can reproach anyone else. One may place 
oneself at the limits of	  another’s	  right,	  as	  if	  I	  were to offer you something or run fast in the 
city center.321 In these interactions I am at the limit of affecting my own and your rights. 
The causes of the obligations are the interactions whose significance is to alter the rights 
of the interacting parties.322 
Taking	  a	  tree	  from	  another’s	  garden	  is	  an	  interaction	  whose	  significance	  is	  to	  affect	  the	  
interacting	  parties’	  rights. To me, my neighbor appears as someone with a right over his 
garden. Nobody can enter without his authorization, far less interfere with parts of his 
dominium. As I step into his garden I begin to affect his right. I am affecting his right in the 
sense that I am using his space, trespassing upon his dominium. But my act affects my 
right too. In getting into his space I used more space than I ought. This is an unrighteous 
conduct, a conduct beyond the limits of my own right. The subjective rights are so 
portrayed	  that	  for	  one	  to	  affect	  another’s	  right	  one	  had	  to	  affect	  one’s	  right	  too.	  The	  idea	  
becomes clearer when I am seen enjoying the new Christmas tree.323 
I	  will	  give	  you	  my	  watch	  and	  you	  will	  give	  me	  €100.	  Agreeing	  to	  those	  terms	  is	  to	  make a 
contract of sale, the significance of which is to alter the rights of the interacting parties. 
By this act, as it were, you become the owner of my choice to transfer to you dominium 
over my watch. I used to be able to do whatever I wanted with my watch. Now I cannot do 
anything that could impede its being transferred to you, my creditor. And the contract has 
                                                        
321 See the running case in 4.2.3.3. 
322 Maybe it is time to proffer an answer to this question: What do I mean by cause of obligation? A cause of 
obligation (or obligatory interaction or transaction) is the normative fact from which an obligation 
immediately emerges. It is a fact because it is observable, hearable, it can be perceived by our senses. It 
is normative, at the same time, because it is expressive of a juridical relation. It can be interpreted as the 
violation of a right or commutation of rights and therefore as the cause of the pertinent correction or 
enforcement. And the obligation emerges immediately from that normative fact, without further 
deliberation, because, ex hypothesis, the fact is another instance of a predetermined normative 
phenomenon or typical cause of obligation. It is another more battery or sale. A specific cause of 
obligation	  thus	  “is	  not	  like	  a	  far	  and	  generic	  thing	  but	  that	  which	  effectively	  gives	  place	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of the legal	  tie,	  that	  force	  which	  imposes	  the	  duty	  which	  forms	  the	  content	  of	  the	  obligation.”	  Antonio 
Scialoja,	  “Le	  fonti	  delle	  obbligazioni,”	  in	  Rivista di Diritto Commerciale, Vol II, (1904), parte prima, pp. 
520-530, at p. 527. I find it useful to translate the entire idea of the author:  
The precept neminem laedere can be employed as ground of the legal obligations [in my classification: the 
violations of rights] or of all the obligations […] But that precept is not the source of the obligation, it can only 
be the justification of the obligatory relations. Source of obligation in legal sense is not like a far and generic 
thing but that which effectively gives place to the emergence of the legal tie, that force which imposes the duty 
which forms the content of the obligation. 




implied an alteration of your sphere of rights too. You have a right to demand of me that I 
transfer you dominium over my watch. Before, you had no right as to that choice. Now, 
you can decide whether to demand performance or not. Your status quo has been altered 
for	  the	  “good,”	  which	  means	  that	  you	  now	  have	  more	  options. But for your right alteration 
to be perfect, a just private law not only requires agreement to the fact that I will give my 
watch. A just private law needs to see reciprocity. It demands that the one who has altered 
his rights for the good also alters his rights for the bad, or good of the other. This is why 
ours was a valid contract; because the prize you paid reciprocated the thing I sold you. 
It is worth noting that the emergence of an obligation adds nothing to the total sum of 
things belonging to persons in a private law society. For example, if the act by which a 
person invents something that had not existed before implicates both ownership for the 
inventor and a new certain thing for the world of private law, the act by which a person 
obligates herself to do something does not bring something new to the world but merely 
changes	  the	  obligated	  thing’s	  status	  quo.	  Before	  the	  contract	  it	  was	  purely	  mine;	  after	  the	  
contract I must give it to my creditor, however the thing has always been. So my 
enforceable promise to give you a house in March 2020 entails not that a new house will 
happen to exist in March 2020 but that the house that is now mine in fact or potency will 
become yours in March 2020.324 
4.1.3.6. THE RIGHTS ALTERATION IS A RIGHT VIOLATION OR A RIGHT COMMUTATION 
I elaborate this bi-member classification for the following reason. If the interaction at 
stake is not a simply licit interaction, the interaction is one that affects the rights of the 
interacting parties. And I cannot imagine modes of affecting rights that are not either 
(prohibited or) illicit or (permitted or) licit. The illicit causes of the obligation then consist 
of interactions where one party violates the rights of another. The licit causes of the 
obligation consist in interactions where two parties commute rights over things.325 
                                                        
324 Inspired	  by	  this	  statement:	  “Relative	  rights	  differ	  from	  absolute	  rights	  in	  this,	  that	  the	  former	  add	  nothing	  
to the sum or aggregate of humans rights; for what an obligation confers upon the oblige is precisely 
commensurate with what it takes from the obligor. Absolute rights, therefore, make up the entire sum 
of	  human	  rights.”	  C.	  C.	  Langdell,	  A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, 
1908, p. 3. 
325 I follow the bi-member division established by Gaius, Institutes, III, 88, probably inspired by Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit.,	  Book	  V,	  Chapter	  2,	  §13.	  The same division in Jean Domat, Les loix civiles dans 
leur ordre naturel, t. II, Paris, 1691, p.	  2,	  who	  probably	  influenced	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code’s	  meta-division 
of contractual and extra-contractual obligations (Title III of the Book 3 deals with the contracts and the 
obligations in general and the Title IV of Book 3 deals with the obligations that arise	   “without	  
agreement,”	  as	  we	  read	  in	  article	  Art.	  1370).	   
Of	   the	   modern	   writers,	   I	   am	   especially	   inspired	   by	   Marcel	   Planiol,	   “Clasification des sources des 




4.1.3.6.1. A CORRECTIVE OBLIGATION ARISES WHEN THE RIGHT’S ALTERATION IS A RIGHT 
VIOLATION 
(A) IN A RIGHT VIOLATION ONE PARTY LOSES WHAT THE OTHER GAINS, AND THE LOSER UN-WANTS 
OR DOES NOT WANT THE RIGHT ALTERATION 
In illicit interactions one party loses what the other party gains. Example: what the thief 
gains is what the victim loses. But there are interactions where the same thing occurs and 
there is no right violation, like donations. What makes them differ? The difference is 
obvious, the former are illicit interactions and the latter are licit interactions. But what 
makes an illicit interaction illicit? Or what qualifies an act that alters the party’s right as a 
right	   violation?	   The	   private	   law’s	   answer	   is this: whoever suffers the alteration for 
reduction	  “unwants”	  or “does	  not	  want”	  the	  reduction. 326 
                                                        
Planiol, all the obligations derive from two sources alone: Contract and the law. In the absence of a 
contract, the obligation would never arise out of the free will of the legislator. When the legislator 
establishes the cause of an obligation it is because it has identified a circumstance related to the person 
or patrimony of the creditor that makes it necessary. This circumstance is always an unjust injury, which 
the legislator seeks to prevent if it has not yet occurred, or to repair if it has already been done. The 
obligations grounded in future injuries are all the obligations that the classical classifications include in 
the category of legal, as well as the obligation to continue with the work of the gestor who benevolently 
intervened in another’s	  affairs.	  The	  obligations	  that	  arise	  from	  injuries	  already	  done	  to	  the	  person	  or	  
patrimony of the creditor include those where the damage has been intentionally caused (the delictual 
obligations), those where the damage was caused by negligence imputable to the tortfeasor (quasi 
delictual obligations) and the quasi-contractual obligations based on the enrichment for which the 
debtor can allege no cause. Such enrichment is also a form of injury, for when there is enrichment for 
only one there is an injury for the other.  
In	  a	  similar	  vein	  Michele	  Giorgianni,	  who	  says:	  “In	  our	  view,	  a	  worthwhile	  classification	  of	  the	  obligations	  
under the profile of the sources could probably be only that which distinguishes between the obligations 
so-called contractual and the obligations so-called extra-contractual, or rather in between those that 
derive from a fact or act which has the virtue of imposing an obligation in charge of a determinate subject 
and in favor of another determinate subject (according with the proper physiognomic characters of the 
obligation) and those that instead derive from the violation of a rule of conduct placed for the protection 
of the generality of the consociated. This distinction holds, as it is known, a preeminent importance on 
the field	  of	  the	  “responsibility”,	  where	  different	  rules	  are	  applied	  to	  one	  or	  the	  other	  category.”	   In his 
very	  rich	  essay:	  “Appunti	  sulle	  fonti	  dell’obbligazione,”	  in	  Rivista di Diritto Civile, I, (1965), pp. 70-75 at 
pp. 74-75. The same reduction is made in Peidró	  Pastor,	  “Pluralismo	  y	  dualismo	  en	  el	  problema	  de	  las	  
fuentes	   de	   la	   obligación,”	   in	   Revista	   General	   de	   Legislación	   y	   Jurisprudencia, Vol 197, (1954-Julio-
Diciembre), pp. 385-421, especially at pp. 404-411 and José Ferrandis	  Vilella,	  “Una	  revisión	  crítica de la 
clasificación	  de	  las	  fuentes	  de	  las	  obligaciones,”	  in	  Anuario de Derecho Civil, Vol 11, No 1, (1958), pp. 115-
146, especially pp. 140-1. 
 Scholars studying the prehistory of this classification have asked: Which obligation arose first, 
contractual or the delictual? This question, when asked in the present, could be of great utility to the 
private law theorist, for it raises the issue of whether we need consensus to have a legal regime or not. 
On the other hand, historical answers could be very informative in the sense that they offer images that 
the theorist can articulate in theory. For an interesting account of the prehistory of the obligation: Silvio 
Perozzi, Le obbligazioni romane, Ditta Nicola Zanichelli, Bologna, 1903. 
326 This is how I dare to solve the question without involving the state. My predecessors, whose contexts 




Even if the victim were not there to show opposition to the trespass, nobody would say 
that she wanted her neighbor to enter her land and uproot a spruce. Rather the opposite, 
we think that the victim, as the exclusive owner of something, un-wants—in the sense of 
dislikes, which is stronger than does not want—that other persons use and dispose her 
things. 
A	  strong	  rain	  ruins	  my	  house’s	  bench	  and	  I	  am	  on	  holidays. My neighbor cannot contact 
me and decides to fix it. The phone bill arrives home and, once again, I am on holidays. 
The cleaning lady finds it unnecessary to bother me and decides to pay these debts for 
me. In the negotiorum gestio scenarios, the gestor looses what the dominus negotii gains; 
namely, the cost of solving the issue. Nobody would say that people go around paying 
other’s	  bills	  or	  arranging	  other’s	  misfortunes	  out	  of	  charity.	  Nobody	  could	  say	  that	  the	  
gestor wanted the dominus negotti to receive a benefit without paying for it. We think that 
people generally do not want (now,	  yes…	  do	  not	  like)	  to	  help	  others	  gratuitously.327 
There is no illicit cause of obligation where who loses something consents that another 
should gain it. The person who watches her neighbor taking home a spruce on Christmas 
Eve is someone who wants the neighbor to gain what she loses. The neighbor who fixes 
my bench while I am at work is not someone who is taking charge of my businesses in an 
extraordinary event. We cannot say that he does not want to make me gain what she loses. 
                                                        
[illicit acts] to the precedent [the licit acts] is that they, instead of being consented, are prohibited by the 
legal order: thus, once performed, they produce legal consequences, not in accordance but in 
contradistinction to the interest of the actor.  The illicit acts hereby considered are those contrary to a 
norm of civil law, and therefore, as a general rule, detrimental to a subjective right of a person, from 
which	  it	  emerges	  a	  damage,	  that	  the	  actor	   is	  obligated	  to	  compensate.” Francesco Santoro-Passarelli, 
Dottrine generali del diritto civile, 9th ed., Jovene, Napoli, 1966, at p. 109, (notes omitted; italics are mine). 
327 The writers of Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27, 1, explain my point thus:  
The reason of this is the general convenience; otherwise people might be summoned away by some sudden 
event of pressing importance, and without commissioning any one to look after and manage their affairs, the 
result of which would be that during their absence those affairs would be entirely neglected: and of course no 
one would be likely to attend to them if he were to have no action for the recovery of any outlay he might have 
incurred in so doing. 
Intervening in another’s affairs could be a nice thing to do. But I characterize it as an illicit interaction. It 
is an illicit interaction because of the injustice that it produces. The dominus negotii ends up with a value 
that the gestor lost without wanting to confer. I am here inspired by Planiol, who said:  
On peut donc tenir pour certain que dans le quasi-contrat	   la	   cause	   réelle	   de	   l’obligation	   n’est	   ni	   un	   fait	  
volontaire, ni un	  fait	  licite;	  c’est	  un	  fait	  involontaire	  et	  illicite.	  Ceci	  revient	  á	  dire	  que	  l’expression	  quasi-contrat 
est	  tout	  à	  fait	  fausse;	  il	  n’y	  en	  a	  peut-étre	  pas,	  dans	  le	  droit	  tout	  entire,	  une	  seconde	  qui	  puisse	  rivaliser	  avec	  
elle	  en	  impropriété. 




She did want to facilitate my gain; she acted as a nice neighbor. These are all cases of 
donations,	  where	  a	  thing	  of	  one	  passes	  to	  be	  of	  another’s	  because	  one	  wills it. 328 
(B) THE OBLIGATION ARISES TO CORRECT THE RIGHT VIOLATION 
In rights violations one loses something by an illicit subtraction and another gains the 
same thing by illicit extension. The obligation emerges as the right that compensates the 
illicit loss and the duty that undoes the illicit gain. So the trespasser must do what is 
needed to place the victim back in the situation he would be in had the trespass never 
occurred, and the enriched has to restitute to the impoverished what she accrued without 
justification. Doing justice in illicit interactions is, accordingly, correcting the imbalance 
produced by the illicit interaction.  
We think of the obligation as another element of its cause—not as an external effect. We 
say that the obligation emerges with the other elements of the tort or the unjust 
enrichment because there is no moment separating the imbalance from the correction. 
With the wrong that causes damage the obligation to reverse the imbalance emerges. With 
the unjust enrichment arises the obligation to compensate for the impoverishment. The 
obligation is in relation with its cause not an effect in the sense of the image of colliding 
billiard balls. In the private law imaginary the effect is the object, one of the constituent 
objects of the cause. As the wrong, the causality and the harm manifest themselves in 
reality, the obligation immediately arises, closing the circle of the juridical transaction.  
4.1.3.6.2. A VOLUNTARY OBLIGATION ARISES WHEN THE RIGHT’S ALTERATION IS A RIGHT 
COMMUTATION 
(A) IN A RIGHT COMMUTATION BOTH PARTIES LOSE AND GAIN, AND THE TWO PARTIES WANT THE 
COMMUTATION, OR ONE WANTS IT AND THE OTHER DOES NOT UN-WANT IT.   
The licit interactions are right alterations where two parties commute their legal position 
in respect of things. What I owned before the interaction is what you own after the 
interaction and what you owned before the interaction is what I own after the interaction. 
What if someone replaces something of mine for something of his however? This would 
be a commutation too. True, but that commutation would not be licit. For someone to 
                                                        
328 Would a promise of a donation cause an obligation? As we will see in 4.1.3.4.2, a licit cause of obligation 
requires not only that someone commits to do something at the request of another but also that another 
reciprocates the voluntary obligation in some form. So, if a gratuitous promise causes an obligation, such 




acquire something of mine I must want it in some form.329 For the commutation to be licit, 
accordingly, the parties must want the commutation. 330 
How can we tell that the parties have wanted the commutation? Private law offers models 
for establishing those facts. Through these patterns observers can judge that licit 
commutations are at stake. In performing these patterns private actors assure themselves 
an effective commutation. The example is contract. The model of the offer and acceptance 
describes the conditions under which persons effectuate commutations. This model 
allows persons to implement their desire to effectuate purely executory commutations 
(an exchange of voluntary obligations), or partially executed commutations (one manual 
transfer or deed for a voluntary obligation). In contract both parties, offeror and acceptor, 
want the commutation. We will see voluntary causes of obligations where only one party 
explicitly	  wants	  the	  commutation;	  the	  other…	  does	  not	  un-want it (See 4.1.4.3). 
(B) A VOLUNTARY OBLIGATION ARISES WHEN THE RIGHT’S ALTERATION IS A RIGHT COMMUTATION 
Voluntary obligations are part of right commutations. Where the commutation is purely 
executory, the right exchange is of reciprocal obligations. (I obligate myself to do Y at your 
request so that you obligate yourself to do X at my request). Where the commutation is 
partially executed, the right exchange is of a voluntary obligation for a value of the same 
                                                        
329 I will argue that, if the unilateral substitution implies that I materially lose nothing, as when someone 
gets a chance from me by granting me a performance of her, I need not give my consent. 
The promisee of a unilateral promise did not explicitly want the transaction, but neither did he explicitly 
un-want it; nor it can be said that he did not want it. The law will say that the promisee did not un-
wanted the transaction. 
330 Pufendorf offers an explanation for why commutations must be wanted: 
Now it is plain that it was absolutely necessary for Men to enter into mutual Contracts. For though the Duties 
of	  Humanity	  diffuse	  themselves	  far	  and	  near	  thro’	  all	  the	  Instances	  of	  the	  Life	  of	  Man;	  yet	  that	  alone	  is	  not	  
Ground sufficient, whereon to fix all the Obligations which may be necessary to be made reciprocal between 
one and another. For all Men are not endowed with so much Good Nature as that they will do all good Offices 
to every Man out of meer Kindness, except they have some certain Expectation of receiving the like again: And 
very often it happens, that the Services we would have to be done to us by other Men are of that Sort, that we 
cannot with Modesty desire them. Frequently also, it may not become one of my Fortune, or in my Station, to 
be beholden to another for such a Thing. So that many times another cannot give, neither are we willing to 
accept, unless that other receive an Equivalent from us; and it happens not seldom, that my Neighbour knows 
not how he may be serviceable to my occasions. Therefore, that these mutual good Offices, which are the 
Product of Sociality, may be more freely and regularly exercised, it was necessary that Men should agree 
among themselves, concerning what was to be done on this side and on that, which no Man from the Law of 
Nature alone could have assured himself of. So that it was beforehand to be adjusted what, this Man doing so 
by his Neighbour, he was to expect in lieu of the same, and which he might lawfully demand. This is done by 
means of Promises and Contracts. 
Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, Andrew Tooke translation, 




kind—namely, another subjective right. (You convey me a ius in rem over X so that I 
obligate myself to do Y at your request.) 
Since the voluntary obligations are part of the right commutation, in principle, nothing 
should be said after of the interaction. The rights have been exchanged; justice has been 
done. 
Sometimes	  jurists	  talk	  about	  the	  “creation	  of	  voluntary	  obligations.”331 The metaphor is 
useful	   in	  private	   law	  only	   if	   “creation”	   is	  (firstly)	   taken	  as	  specification	  and	  (secondly)	  
related to its aim. One creates an obligation in the sense of specification when one 
determines, of the indeterminate but extant amount of disposable freedom, the 
performance that one is to obligate. When I decided to commit to do this or that research 
I created an obligation in the sense that I have posited a new constraint on my future. But 
the obligated object does not come out of the blue. It was there before in the sense that I 
could choose to do that thing as opposed to that thing which I could have never chosen, 
like promising to take you to the moon. On the other hand, an obligation is created in 
relation to an aim where the cause of the obligation responds to the	   question	   “in	  
commutation	  of	  what	  has	  she	  decided	  to	  obligate	  her	  performance?”	  A	  response	  to	  that 
question would not be ostensible in transactions whose only available information tells 
you that the debtor wanted the obligation. We will have time to develop these points 
further. Let me now proceed to illustrate the logic of commutation through the very useful 
metaphor of the transfer of a right. 
4.1.4. ILLUSTRATION: VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS IN THE IMAGE OF TRANSFERS OF RIGHTS 
The concept of transfer of right does not belong to the law of obligations.332 It comes from 
the law of property, where it works as a mode of acquisition. Jurists developed it based 
                                                        
331 “It	  is	  said	  that	  the	  contracts	  have	  as	  an	  object	  the	  transmission	  of	  a	  right	  (Aubry	  et	  Rau),	  but	  this	  is	  no	  
more than an appearance. The transmission of a right is the consequence of the creation of the obligation 
to	   give,	  which	   is	   executed	   once	   created,	   and	   the	   contracts	   are	  not	   traslative	  but	   obligatory.”	   Marcel 
Planiol, Traite	   élémentaire	   de	   droit	   civil,	   conforme	   au	   programme	   officiel	   des	   facultés	   de	   droit, t. 2, 
Librairie	  générale	  de	  droit	  &	  de	  jurisprudence,	  Paris,	  1921,	  n°	  944,	  p.	  317. 
332  “It is clear that incorporeal property is not susceptible of delivery.”	   These	   words	   belong	   to	   Gaius	  
(Institutes, 2, 28), who sets out the issues emerging from the use of the transfer metaphor in the field of 
obligations	  this	  way:	  “Obligations,	  no	  matter	  how	  they	  may	  have	  been	  contracted,	  cannot	  be	  transferred	  
[…]	  for	  if	  anything	  is	  due	  from	  someone	  to	  me,	  and	  I	  wish	  to	  transfer	  the	  claim	  to	  you,	  I	  cannot	  do	  this	  in	  
any of the ways by which corporeal property is transferred to a third party; but it will be necessary for 
you to stipulate with the debtor under my direction, with the result that he will be released by me and 
becomes liable to you, which is called the novation of an obligation.”	  	  (Idem, 2, 38) And he continues: 
“Without	  this	  novation,	  you	  cannot	  sue	  in	  your	  own	  name,	  but	  you	  must	  bring	  your	  action	  in	  my	  name,	  
as	  my	  agent	  or	  attorney.”	  (Idem, 2, 39) The proper metaphor for the law of obligations seems to be that 




on the consideration	  that	  “acquisition”	  alone	  gives	  too	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  subject	  who	  
acquires the right and insufficient attention to the subject who gives the right, whose role 
is essential in very important acquisitional modes, like the manual transfer of a thing. 333 
We use the concept of a transfer of right to explicate the logic of voluntary obligations for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is consonant with the idea that causes of obligation are interactions 
between two persons. Its invitation334—to imagine a right moving from one point to 
another—implicitly excludes third parties from the focus of attention. And secondly, it 
serves to build a very eloquent image of commutation. Imagining two rights moving in 
opposite directions gives a clear idea of justice in voluntary transactions. 
4.1.4.1 A TRANSFER OF RIGHT IS A DISPOSITION-ACQUISITION ACT 
According to a very useful analysis,335 there are four requisites for a valid transfer of a 
right:  
(A) 1: OWNERSHIP OVER SOMETHING 
(B) 2: AN ACT OF DISPOSITION OF THAT SOMETHING 
(C) 3: AN ACT OF ACQUISITION OF THE SAME THING 
(D) 4: THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY, BY WHICH THE ACQUIRER ACQUIRES FROM THE 
DISPOSER WITHOUT MEDIATION 
The last requisite is probably the most enigmatic. If the transfer consisted of two separate 
acts, one where one party disposes her ownership over a thing and another where the 
other party acquires ownership over the same thing, we would not be talking about 
transfer. The acquisition would be a non-transactional, original mode of acquisition. The 
first party had abandoned the thing (dereliction) and the second party occupied it as an 
ownerless object (res nullius). But if the act of disposition in transfer were something like 
dereliction then it is possible that anyone, and not only the addressed transferee acquire 
                                                        
cautiously use the metaphor. Conf.	  Michele	  Giorgianni,	  “Appunti	  sulle	  fonti	  dell’obbligazione,”	  op. cit., p. 
70. 
333 Salvatore	  Pugliatti,	  “Acquisto	  del	  diritto	  (teoria	  generale),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto,	  t.	  I,	  Giuffrè,	  Varese,	  
1958, p. 512. 
334 In a similar sense Bernhard Windscheid:	  “The	  expressions	  born,	  extinction,	  modification	  of	  the	  right	  are	  
figurative expressions, because the law is not something really existing.”	   Windscheid, Diritto delle 
pandette,	  Carlo	  Fadda	  and	  Paolo	  Emilio	  Bensa	  translation,	  Torino,	  UTET,	  1902,	  t.	  I,	  §63,	  note	  1. 
335 I	  follow	  Peter	  Benson,	  “The	  unity	  of	  Contract	  Law,”	  in	  Benson,	  Peter	  (ed.),	  The Theory of Contract Law, 




the abandoned object. Placing the possibility of transfers in the law, we say, paraphrasing 
Benson, that the person who acquires must acquire from the person who disposes. 336 
The paradigmatic example is the manual transfer of a right.337 Sarah hands her watch to 
Daniele, who takes it. We assume that Sarah comes to the transaction owning the watch 
(requirement 1 satisfied). Further, in compliance with requirement 2, Sarah hands the 
watch over to Daniele with the intention of transferring to him her property over it (in 
the	  act	  of	  manual	  transfer,	  disposition	  receives	  the	  name	  “alienation”)	  and,	  in	  compliance	  
with requirement 3, Daniele receives the thing from Sarah with the intention of taking the 
thing	  as	  his	  property	  (“appropriation”).	  Finally,	  receiving	  a	  thing from the hand of another 
figuratively complies with requirement 4: There is no instant in which the transferred 
thing is dispossessed. As a result, what belonged to Sarah before the alienation-
appropriation act becomes Daniele’s	  afterwards. 
Accordingly, by a transfer of right one party disposes of her right and the other party 
acquires the disposed right. Transfers can be also called disposition-acquisition acts in the 
sense that, in one act, one party disposes and another acquires. 
4.1.4.2. TWO MUTUALLY ENTAILED DISPOSITION-ACQUISITION ACTS MAKE UP A 
COMMUTATION 
Two	  reciprocally	   caused	  manual	   transfers	  make	  up	  what	  we	  call	   “manual	   contract.”	  A	  
contract is manual when its formation and compliance occurs almost indistinguishably. 
Sarah picks up a beer from the	  refrigerator	  of	  Daniele’s	  kiosk.	  While	  picking	  up	  the	  beer,	  
                                                        
336 “A	   transfer	  of	  ownership	   implies	   that	   the	  second	  party’s	  acquisition	   is	  not	  only	  with	   the	   first	  party’s	  
consent, but also through it: The acquisition of one is from the	  other.”	  Peter	  Benson,	  Idem, p. 129.	  	  “[T]he	  
loss (perdita) by the preceding owner (titolare) and the acquisition by the successive are inseparably 
linked: they are interdependent and contemporary effects and, above all, they are based on the same 
juridical cause, they constitute two inseparable	  moments	  of	  the	  same	  unitary	  act.	  The	  case	  [“fattispecie”]	  
that constitutes the antecedent must be such that it could produce both effects in their reciprocal 
relation: It must be, thus, about one and the same cause, by which it is untied the preceding link and tied 
the	  subsequent.”	  Salvatore	  Pugliatti,	  “Acquisto	  del	  diritto…,”	  op. cit., p. 512. 
337 It is probably with the image of the Roman traditio that jurists elaborated the concept of transfer. 
Similarly	  in	  the	  common	  law:	  “Much of the law governing transfers of property, for instance, was first 
conceptualized in terms used to designate the physical transfer of things.” Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
“Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,”	  in Yale L.J., 23, (1913), pp. 16-
59 at p. 24. “Thus, a successful legal transfer required delivery—for	  instance,	  “livery	  of	  seisin”—the sort 
of act that might be expected in the physical transfer of a thing. Over time, as the legal concept of property 
transfers came to be conceptualized in terms appropriate to the physical transfer of things, it became 
easy for the legal analyst to conflate the legal concept of transfer with the physical acts of transfer. This 
conflation, in turn, allowed the legal analyst, often unbeknownst to himself, to effectively elaborate the 
meaning of a legal concept by exploring the physical or mental objects or events with which it is 
associated.”	  Pierre Schlag, “How to Do Things with Hohfeld,” in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 78, 




Sarah is agreeing to pay the price, which will occur immediately. Here there are two 
manual transfers. The beer passing from Daniele’s	  ownership	  to	  Sarah’s	  and	  the	  money	  
from	  Sarah’s	  ownership	  to	  Daniele’s.	  The	  manual	  contract	  is	  a	  commutative	  transfer	  of	  
right in that two transfers (or acquisition-disposition acts) are reciprocally caused. 
Daniele alienates ownership over a beer to Sarah because Daniele appropriates 
ownership over a sum from Sarah and vice-versa. Paraphrasing Paul, 338 Sarah gives so 
that Daniele gives. 
The manual exchange of things is a commutation but not a cause of obligation. There is an 
exchange of rights but none of the rights exchanged is a credit right or obligation.  Here 
we are dealing with causes of obligation. This means that the commutation must have an 
obligation as an element.  
4.1.4.3 DISPOSITION-ACQUISITION ACTS THAT ENTAIL VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS 
We are accustomed to think that the only disposition-acquisition act of the law of 
obligations	  is	  the	  model	  called	  “offer	  and	  acceptance,”	  that	  one	  can	  dispose	  and	  acquire	  
an obligation only by means of an offer-acceptance act. The following section is dedicated 
to contradicting this instituted belief. It will first explain how commutation occurs in the 
obligational contract, before then drawing from various positive laws to show that 
contract is only one mode of commuting rights for obligations.339 One can dispose and 
acquire obligations through other acts. 
(A) THE OBLIGATIONAL CONTRACT: OFFER-ACCEPTANCE ACT 
Marta and David agree that Marta gives $X to David and David will give his house to Marta 
in a year. In the formation of the contract, there are two reciprocal transfers of rights: 
Marta transfers property over her money to David and David transfers ownership over 
his performance to Marta. Yet these transfers differ in nature. The right passing from 
Marta	  to	  David	  complies	  with	  the	  transfer	  requirements	   in	  the	  manual	  contract’s	  way:	  
                                                        
338 In Justinian, Digest, 19, 5, 5 pr. 
339 Showing us that contract is far from the only one type of legal transfer, Puggliatti classifies the various 
transfers into those that are voluntary, like the contract and the unilateral act, and those that are 
coercive, like the ab intestato mortis causa succession or the adjudication of a right to a third party by 
the state that expropriates it from another, among	  other	  examples.	  “Acquisto	  del	  diritto…,”	  op. cit., p. 
511.	  In	  “the	  coercive	  transfers”	  the	  attribution of the right to the new owner is made independently of 
the will of the preceding owner (and so also against his will). But the attribution is done with 
acknowledgement of the preceding subjective situation. Thus, when compensation is due, as in the case 
of the expropriation, the compensation is based on a consideration of the interest of the expropriated 
party—not on his will. Puggliatti notes that these transfers are however of an exceptional character. 




The	  money	  passed	  from	  Marta’s	  to	  David’s hands; Marta alienated her ownership over the 
money and David appropriated it. The transfer of right going from David to Marta is 
different however. It is not so clear how it is that the house, which was not yet delivered, 
passed to form part of the buyer’s	  assets	  (or	  “patrimony”). 
How can the law assert that something went from one patrimony to another if the only 
perceivable thing is a voice passing from the mouth of one to the ear of another? We need 
to be very clear about what Marta acquires from David and how, for injustice will occur if 
we are not convincing—only David would have made an acquisition. 
The law has regulated this social demand with two sophisticated concepts, that of 
“voluntary	  obligation”	  and	  that	  of	  “intelligible	  transfer.”	  Let	  us	  begin with the concept of 
voluntary obligation. By the obligation, one party (the creditor) has a right over a 
performance and another party (the debtor) has the correlative duty to perform. The 
strictly legal concept of performance is crucial to the understanding of the obligation. A 
performance	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  image	  of	  a	  choice	  that	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  juridical	  world.	  “I	  
will give you my house on December 1st”	  is	  something	  that	  you	  (even	  if	  you	  have	  never	  
seen my face) can somehow imagine. This image is a choice	  because	  the	  image	  of	  “I	  give	  
you my house on December 1st”	   is	  something	  that	   involves	  an	  agency	  of	  mine.	  And	  the	  
performance is a juridically possible choice because, assumedly, the house is mine and I 
have the capacity to give it to you. Classical examples of juridically impossible 
performances	   are	   the	   following	   images:	   “I	   will	   give	   Michel’s	   watch	   to	   you.”	   This	  
performance is legally impossible because, even if you could imagine me giving you 
someone	  else’s	  watch,	  I	  cannot	  have	  the	  power to give you something that is not mine. 
Another example: Monk August, a person who has renounced his capacity to own 
property by vow of poverty, promises to sell the monastery he lives in to Jenifer. This 
performance is legally impossible because, even if he is using and enjoying the fruits of 
“his”	   monastery,	   he	   has	   no	   capacity	   to	   sell	   it,	   for	   he	   is	   not	   an owner of things. The 
performance will also be juridically impossible—note carefully what I am saying—if the 
performance	  is	  factually	  impossible.	  For	  example,	  “I	  am transferring	  my	  watch	  to	  you”	  or	  
“I	   transferred	   you	   my	   watch.”	   Unless	   we	   have	   a	   means	   to	   travel	   into the past, it is 
impossible for me to obligate myself to do something in the past; nor can it have any legal 
significance that I obligate myself to do the thing that, by the time I am obligating myself, 
has been already done. Unreasonable performances are juridically impossible too. You 
cannot treat my promise to take you to the moon as an enforceable promise, unless, of 




to pay you high interests if I am an overwrought debtor looking for loans to cover debts. 
You know, or should have known, that I will not be able to perform.340 
Let us go back to the case of Marta and David. This was an obligational contract. The 
obligation related there comprised the performance that David gives his house to Sarah 
on December 1st. Yet this did	  not	  only	  stand	  on	  David’s	  obligation. Remember, David was 
obligated to deliver his house on December 1st because Marta transferred him the price 
agreed when the contract was made. I add this information to lead us to the point: It is 
because the law found justice in the practice of exchanging present things (the price of 
the house) for future things (the expectation that David will deliver his house on 
December 1st) that the law constructed the concept of obligation. In other words, the 
obligation is an object of exchange because of the thing it is an exchange of. This is why 
civilians	  used	  to	  say	  “every	  obligation	  has	  a	  cause”	  and	  tenacious	  common	  lawyers	  still	  
disdain the pact without consideration as “nudo.”	  We	  see	  that	  voluntary	  obligation	  is	  a	  
value of exchange. Its content consists in a deed within the realm of choice of the debtor 
and it has exchange value because it is exchangeable for rights.341 
Now we come to the notion of intelligible transfer. The performance is the thing that David 
is transferring to Marta. He owns this thing because it is part of his freedom (see above 
4.1.3.2(a)). By obligating a performance of his, he is, as it were, parceling part of his 
freedom and giving it to Marta. How is it that this transfer took place? It took place 
through the offering of the performance to Marta and Marta’s acceptance of it. We qualify 
this transfer as	   “intelligible”	   because,	   in	   contrast	   with	   physical	   transfers,	   the	   thing	  
transferred passes from one to another in an imaginary way. Contract is the intelligible 
transfer where one disposes with the act called offer and the other acquires with the act 
called acceptance. To briefly develop on this I first have to introduce the concept of 
“intelligible	  possession.” 
If the concept of obligation was drawn over the image of corporeal things,342 the concept 
of	   “intelligible	   possession”	   appeared	   to	   replace	   the	   concept	   of	   “empirical	   possession.”	  
                                                        
340 The consequence is the absolute nullity of the contract for lack of cause. For another solution, see Hans 
Kelsen, El	  contrato	  y	  el	  Tratado:	  Analizados	  desde	  el	  punto	  de	  vista	  de	  la	  teoría	  pura	  del	  derecho ,	  García	  
Máynez	  translation,	  Nacional,	  Mexico,	  1979,	  p.	  63,	  to	  whom	  it	  is	  a	  question of positive law. If the positive 
law	  does	  not	  establish	  a	  rule	  saying:	  “No	  one	  is	  obligated	  to	  the	  impossible,”	  the	  rules	  applicable	  to	  the	  
case of nonperformance of an impossible obligation are the general rules on nonperformance of 
obligations, which will (most likely!) demand the debtor to repair the damage caused to the creditor by 
the nonperformance of the obligation. 
341 We will come back to these ideas in 5.2.2.1. 
342 Tellingly, a Roman law classification of things holds that one type of things are the	  corporeal	  things,	  “such	  




Possession is empirical when someone is holding something with the intention of 
excluding others from holding the same thing. Someone with an apple in her hand is 
someone with a tenancy of an apple, but someone who is eating an apple is someone with 
empirical	  possession	  over	  it;	  there	  is	  no	  better	  sign	  of	  one’s	  intention	  to	  exclude	  others	  
from	   holding	   a	   thing	   than	   the	   thing’s	   consumption…	   Now,	   could	   someone	   possess	  
something without physically holding it? Do we have to hold everything we want to 
possess? Jurists find these questions very important, for any reasonable property regime 
would make it possible that owners could exclude others from the use of their things 
without physically excluding them. In response, jurists ideated the very useful concept of 
intelligible possession. Through it, a person is connected to a thing in a way that 
unauthorized contact with the thing counts as a wrong to the person. And a person 
acquires that connection whenever she rightfully acquires a thing.343  
What contract ensures is that one party acquires the performance, takes, as it were, its 
intelligible	  possession	  by	  accepting	  it.	  Marta	  took	  possession	  of	  David’s	  performance	  at	  
the time and place of contract formation, even if the performance is not something that 
she could grab empirically and its object (the house) is in another place and time (it will 
be finished in December 1st,	  far	  from	  the	  place	  of	  contract	  formation).	  Marta’s	  acceptance	  
of	  David’s	  offer	  gave	  her	   intelligible	  possession	  of	  David’s	  performance,	  which	   implies	  
Marta’s	  ownership	  over	  the	  David’s	  obligated	  performance—David would wrong Marta if 
for example he does not build the house.  
David’s	  disposition	  cannot	  be	  called	  alienation—he did not manually transfer his house 
to Marta. He disposed by an (accepted) offer of an obligation (reciprocated). So we see 
that	  “offer”	  is	  an	  act	  of	  disposition	  in	  that	  it	  implies	  the	  intention	  to	  dispose	  (or	  obligate)	  
a performance of one to another who, accepting it, acquires it.344 The	  “acceptance” of the 
                                                        
things, among which is included the obligation. See Justinian, Institutes, 2,2,1-2; also in Gaius, Institutes, 
2, 14. 
343 The	  question	  “Why	  is	  it	  that	  we	  have	  ius	  in	  rem	  in	  law?”	  ultimately	  becomes	  “Why	  is	  it	  that	  we	  are	  entitled	  
to	  acquire	  property?”	  Giving	  juridical	  form	  to	  the	  social	  demand	  of	  “How	  to	  have	  something	  external	  as	  
one’s	  own”:	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor translation, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996, 6:245-6:257. 
344  To	   be	   more	   precise,	   “offer”	   is	   the	   specification	   of	   the	   requirements	   of	   both	   “disposition”	   and	  
“acquisition.”	  In the offer, the offeror manifests her intention to transfer a performance of her own to 
the offeree and, at the same time, accepts in advance the transfer implicated in the acceptance of the 
offer. And “acceptance” is the specification	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  both	  “acquisition” and “disposition.” 
In the acceptance, the acceptor manifests her intention to acquire the performance transferred through 
the offer and manifests her intention to obligate the performance requested in the offer. The concept of 
the	  “meeting	  of	  the	  minds” (or offer and acceptance) is the contractual	  specification	  of	  the	  “continuity	  
requirement,”	  see	  the	  explanation	  in	  Peter	  Benson,	  “The	  unity	  of	  Contract	  Law,”	  op. cit., pp. 138-153 




offer is, in the obligational contract, the act of acquisition of a performance. And, as the 
parties are not physically giving and taking, the transfer is not empirical but intelligible. 
The obligational contract is the paradigm of a voluntary cause of obligation (or 
commutation that includes an obligation). However contract is not the only one voluntary 
cause of obligations. There are modes of commutation that include obligations and are 
not contractual. 
(B) THE PROMISE SOLVENDI CAUSA: PROMISE-RECEPTION ACT 
Daniele, who is an adult salesman, convinces Sarah, who is apparently a minor, to sign a 
contract by which she obligates herself to pay him $50 (the following month) in exchange 
for the doll he conveys her in the same act. Before the date of payment Sarah breaks the 
doll	  while	   playing	  with	   it.	   Daniele	   sues	   Sarah	   for	   the	   payment	   of	   the	   $50	   and	   Sarah’s	  
mother alleges that the contract is void, for Sarah is incapable of assuming obligations and 
Daniele could discern this. Judgment is held in favor of the defendant. Ten years later, 
Sarah	  plans	  to	  purge	  the	  recurrent	  angst,	  finds	  Daniele’s	  email	  and	  writes	  to	  him	  saying	  
that she will pay him the $50 she owes to him since that episode of her childhood. For a 
while, Daniele does not reply the email and Sarah, in a reckless rash, writes to Daniele 
again, asking him to forget about the previous email, that it was a stupid psychological 
issue of her own. Daniele replies immediately, telling Sarah that she must not over-think, 
that he is actually interested in the payment, adding also the number of his bank account. 
Fed up, Sarah replies saying that he should have done that immediately after that she 
wrote to him and that she is no longer interested in paying him the money. Now Daniele 
sues Sarah. He argues that Sarah promised him the payment of an unenforceable debt and 
that,	  although	  Sarah	  attempted	  to	  revoke	  the	  promise	  before	  he	  did	  something	  to	  “accept”	  
it, these promises do not need acceptance. Sarah alleges that the offer was revoked before 
the acceptance but, this time, the judgment is for Daniele. 
This story takes the case of a Roman law action to order it in accordance with the Italian 
law of recognition of debts.345 Promises made to recognize unenforceable debts obligate 
                                                        
345 See F. C. von Savigny, Le Obbligazioni,	  t.	  1,	  Giovanni	  Pacchionni	  translation,	  1912,	  UTET,	  Torino,	  §9	  and	  
ss. (discussing Roman law cases of natural obligations) and section 1988 of 1942 Italian Civil Code, 
which	  says:	  “Recognition	  of	  debts:	  The	  promise	  of	  payment or recognition of a debt dispenses the person 
to whom is made of the burden of proving the bases of the [recognized] relation. The existence of it is 
presumed	  unless	  contrary	  proof.”	   
Promises recognizing debts seem to be enforceable in the common law too:  
A subsequent promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, or to pay a debt discharged in 
bankruptcy, or to pay a debt that is uncollectable because the debtor was a minor at the time the debt was 




from the moment of their communication and are therefore irrevocable. The promise 
obligates because, by the time it reached the promisee, the promise, so to speak, matched 
a consideration. The commutation in the promise’s solvendi causa is about an obligation 
for (permit me the inappropriate usage) a past-consideration.346 I will briefly analyze 
promise as a disposition-acquisition act. 
In promise, a credit right moves from the promisor to the promisee. What are the 
constituents of this transfer? They cannot be offer and acceptance. If we think of Sarah’s	  
disposition as an offer then we will not be able to assert the transfer, for Sara revoked the 
offer before Danielle could be said to have accepted it. The act by which Sarah disposed is 
the	   legal	   act	   of	   “promise.”	   But	   if	   promise	   is	   the	   act	   of disposition, what is the act of 
acquisition?	  I	  call	  the	  acquisition	  act	  “reception	  of	  a	  promise.”	  Both	  promise	  and	  reception	  
operate on the basis of intelligible acquisition and disposition. In making a promise, Sarah 
intelligibly transfers an obligated performance to Danielle, who acquires it by receiving 
(or gaining knowledge of) the promise. Danielle would have not received the promise and 
therefore acquired the credit right if Sarah managed to let Danielle know of her intention 
to withdraw—not revoke—the promise before its reception. As can be seen, the 
continuity between disposition and acquisition through promise is in one sense more 
immediate than it is in offer and acceptance. All these points will be developed with due 
care in 5.2-3. 
                                                        
Richard	  Posner,	  “Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law,”	  in Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 6, (1977), pp. 
411-426 at 418. 
346 Let me be more precise. There are two transfers of rights here. On the one hand, there is an in personam 
right going from Sarah to Daniele, and on the other hand, there is an in rem right going from Daniele to 
Sarah. And these two transfers of rights are reciprocally caused. Let me briefly develop. 
In its proto-existence, the in rem right transfer was about a capable person giving a thing (not a right 
over a thing) to a child. This act alone, to the law, had a peculiar significance. Daniele interacted with a 
child as if the child were a capable person. Since Daniele knew or should have known that minors are 
not responsible in private law, everything that followed from his interaction with the child was at his 
own	  peril.	  He	  could	  have	  asked	  for	  recovery	  of	  the	  thing.	  But	  the	  thing	  perished	  in	  the	  minor’s	  hands.	  
And as the thing’s	  disposition	  brought	  no	  produce,	  no	  value	  remained	  for	  him	  to	  demand.	  In	  addition,	  
the	  parents	  were	  not	  responsible	   for	  the	  minor’s	  deeds.	  They	  did	  not	  ratify	  the	  contract,	  recognizing	  
Daniele’s	  right	  to	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  toy.	  There	  was	  nothing	  that	  Daniele could do. To the law, he has 
lost his right over the transferred thing. Still, Sarah grew up and wanted to recognize the reason that 
would	  allow	  her	   to	  dispose	  of	  Daniele’s	   thing	  as	  her	   thing.	  The	  promise	   solvendi causa had a double 
effect: It recognized the unpaid acquisition of an in rem right and it transferred a right in personam to 
pay for the acquisition. In other words, the transfer of a thing became a transfer of a right due to the 
effectivity of the in personam right transfer. And the opposite is also true. The transfer of a performance 
became a transfer of an enforceable right due to the effectivity of the in rem right transfer. We see that 
promise solvendi causa is about two reciprocally caused transfers of rights. So, by the promise solvedi 
causa, the promisee acquires a right to the payment of an unenforceable credit and the promisor 




(C) THE RETRIBUTORY BEQUEST: BEQUEST-IDEAL RECEPTION ACT 
Silvia	  writes	  a	  letter	  with	  the	  following	  words:	  “Hereby	  I	  manifest	  my	  deliberate	  and	  firm	  
last will that, in recognition of the time and efforts that Alberto spent taking care of me 
during these last years, my Fiat car must pass to belong to him after my death.”	   The	  
bequest or legatum347 may appear as a clause of a testament or as a separate act and, 
regardless of the solemnities that a jurisdiction may require for its validity, it is essentially 
an undertaking. The bequest is an undertaking in that its author (the legator) decides that 
something of hers must be regarded as something of another person—the legatee. The 
difference between the bequest and other unilateral undertakings like promise is that the 
bequest is a conditional undertaking. The bequest is conditioned in that it achieves its 
practical significance—it transfers a right to the legatee—only after of the occurrence of 
an event—the	  testator’s	  death.348 It follows from this that the legatee acquires the right 
immediately after the legator dies. It is important to emphasize that the legatee acquires 
the right granted by the bequest regardless of the fact that he (not only accepts the 
bequest but also) has knowledge of the bequest. For the legatee to acquire the right over 
the legated thing it suffices that the testator dies.  
The justice of our example is self-evident: Alberto performed some good agencies for 
Silvia and Silvia wanted to compensate these deeds. But to give Alberto the tools to argue 
acquisition of a right we need to specify the requirements of transfer in bequest. How are 
we to convince the audience of the presence of these requirements?  
The	   mode	   of	   disposition	   is	   the	   “bequest.”	   Like	   the	   promisor,	   the	   testator	   intends	   to	  
dispose a credit right in favor of a second party. Bequest is different to promise however. 
If the promisor addresses the promisee with a promise, the testator does not address the 
legatee with a bequest. She just makes the bequest. What about the mode of acquisition? 
Like promisees, legatees acquire without acceptance. However, unlike promisees, 
legatees acquire in ignorance of the disposition-act. Promisees do not accept promises but 
at least know that they acquire them, receive the promises of which they are the 
                                                        
347 For	  legate	  in	  general	  see	  Pasquale	  Voci,	  “Legato	  (dir.	  rom),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto,	  t.	  XXIII,	  Giuffrè,	  
1973, Varese, p. 707-719. 
348  I must emphasize that this condition conditions the bequest and not the obligation (or practical 
significance) of the bequest. If the obligation were conditional in such a manner, Silvia would have no 
power to change her will, for the bequest left an obligation by which Alberto has a (conditional) right to 
the Fiat. But this construction is not amenable to the social practice of making dispositions of last will—
individuals want to have disposability over their things until their last breath. Jurists sought to satisfy 
such societal exigency by construing the bequest as a conditional act. The condition conditions the 
bequest. In this legal form, the bequestor holds the ability to revoke the bequest until she dies (she may 
change it, e. g. designating another successor for her car, or simply revoke it) and the bequest becomes 




addressees. With the reception of the promise, I said, there is intelligible possession of the 
promised performance. Here we cannot say that there is intelligible acquisition of the 
bequest;	  at	  least,	  not	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “reception.”	  So,	  given	  all	  these	  differences,	  what is the 
act of acquisition in legate? How is it that legatees acquire credit rights without even 
noticing? The mode of acquisition at stake here is what, inspired by Kant’s insights, I call 
“ideal	  reception.”	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  legatee	  acquires	  a credit right without even 
knowing due to a systematic necessitation. What do I mean by this? I want to say that the 
alternatives surrounding my proposal are so powerfully unjust that my proposal emerges 
spontaneously as the right one.  
A person makes a disposition of last will according to which after she dies a certain person 
must have a right to a specific thing of hers. The condition of the bequest happens to occur 
and, if the will of one who is no longer with us is to be respected, the legatee must have a 
right to the thing. The legatee cannot be said to acquire the thing from the testator by 
means of reception of the legate. It would be too much to require that the legatee stood 
next to the deathbed to hear the legate immediately after the deceased passed. What is 
more, it is generally the case that legatees are the last to know of their condition. Hence 
the question arises of what should occur? Should the thing pass to the default heirs? This 
seems	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  testator’s	  will.	  Should	  the	  thing become res nullius? This also 
seems	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  testator’s	  will.	  The	  thing	  should	  pass,	  ex	  justice,	  to	  the	  legatee.	  
The legatee must have the right to acquire property over the legated thing. This is not a 
right to accept the bequest but straightforwardly a right to the legated object. How does 
the	   legatee	   acquire	   the	   credit	   right?	   Kant	   refers	   to	   this	   mode	   of	   acquisition	   as	   “ideal	  
acquisition	  of	  an	  external	  object	  of	  choice.” 349 He	  calls	  it	  “ideal”	  because	  “it	  involves	  no	  
causality in time and is therefore	  based	  on	  a	  mere	  idea	  of	  pure	  reason.”350 In other words, 
since it involves no deed by the legatee, the acquisition cannot be conditioned on an 
observable event, as if the legatee had to accept the bequest immediately after the 
testator’s	  dead.	   “It is	  nonetheless	   true,	   not	   imaginary	   acquisition,”351 in the sense that 
“every	  human	  would	  necessarily	  accept	  such	  a	  right	  (since	  he	  can	  always	  gain	  but	  never	  
lose	  by	  it).”352 If in knowing of his right to acquire a real right over the thing, the legatee 
thinks that he does not want it, (e.g.) because wanting it would cause him unpleasantness 
with others, he can reject it.353 “[T]he	  only	  reason	  I	  do	  not	  call	  it	  real	  [Kant	  continues]	  is	  
                                                        
349 See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., at 6:291. 
350 Idem, 6:291. 
351 Idem, 6:291. 
352 Idem, 6:294. 




that the act of acquiring is not empirical, since the subject acquires from another	  who…has	  
ceased to exist.”354 
4.1.5. THE IMPORTANCE OF CAUSE OF OBLIGATION: A HIGH-LEGAL CONCEPT 
4.1.5.1 LAW CASES, LEGAL CONCEPTS AND HIGH-PRIVATE-LAW CONCEPTS 
In a systematic organization of a just law of obligations we distinguish three levels of law: 
legal case, legal concept and cause of obligation.355 
Alberto	  says	  to	  Machteld	  that	  he	  will	  give	  her	  his	  watch	  if	  she	  pays	  him	  €250.	  Machteld	  
says,	   “Yes!”	   This	   is	   a	   very	   easy	   legal case. You can judge from the perspective of a 
particular legal concept that the facts at stake qualify as a legal concept—the concept 
called	  “contract.” 
The meeting of an offer of an obligation for a consideration with an acceptance forms the 
legal concept called	   “contract.”	   The	   contract	   is	   so	   articulated	   that	   we	   can	   apply	   it	   to	  
innumerable possible cases. The case described above is	  a	  typical	  one.	  We	  call	  it	  “sale.”356 
But there are atypical contracts too. I offer to paint your wall if you commit to take my 
child to school for a month and you accept. This is an atypical contract. It cannot, for 
example,	   be	   called	   “barter,”	   for	   even	   if we have exchanged non-monetary things, the 
things we exchanged are not tangible things but performances. This contract is atypical 
in that it has no name—you cannot mention it with a proper name that a jurist would 
recognize. Yet you can explain it as a contract.357 You can tell that there is an offeror and 
an acceptor and that the offeror contracts an obligation as against the acceptor that is 
reciprocated by a correlative obligation of the acceptor as against the offeror. In other 
words, you can explain the case from the perspective of the abstractions of offer, 
                                                        
354 Idem, 6:291.  
355 See	  “legal	  trialism”	  in	  Introductory	  Part. 
356 Or,	  to	  be	  more	  eloquent,	  “contract	  of	  buy	  and	  sale.” 
357 Classical Roman jurists could have never seen a contract in a case like this. They had a different way of 
regulating contracts. They organized contracts in a numerus clausus list. The enforceable contracts 
where the specific legal cases enumerated in the list. As the above-mentioned case was not enumerated 
in the list—it was an innominate contract—the case was not a contract, or there was no right of action 
for such case in the list. As Alvaro D’Ors, Derecho privado romano,	   2ª	   ed.,	   Ediciones	  Universidad de 
Navarra,	   Pamplona,	   1973,	   §125,	   p.	   364-365 puts	   it,	   “the	   correlation between the obligation and the 
action	  is	  such	  that	  where	  the	  in	  personam	  action	  is	  missing	  it	  is	  also	  missing	  the	  obligation”.	  Originally	  
in Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1951, n° 13, p. 11: “To	  a	  considerable	  
extent classical	   law	  might	  be	  called	   ‘actional	   law’	  or	   ‘law	  of	  actions’,	   since	   it	  appears in the shape of 
statements	  about	  judicial	  remedies.”. For a less radical but yet consonant and very informative account: 
Max Kaser, Derecho romano privado, 5th ed., José	  Santa	  Cruz Teijeiro translation, Reus, Madrid, 1968, 




obligation, acceptance, and consideration, convincing a reasonable listener that a contract 
is at stake, that two persons indeed assumed reciprocal obligations.358 
The	   legal	   concept	   called	   “contract”	   is a genus of various kinds (or better: types). But 
contract is itself a kind of a more fundamental concept. Together with the legal concepts 
of	  “tort”	  and	  “unjust	  enrichment,”	  the	  contract	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  “cause	  of	  obligation.”	  Cause	  of	  
obligation is a high legal concept in that it represents already abstract laws. No contractual 
debtor would demand the breach of an adequately caused obligation, having the more 
specific and familiar concept of contract on which to rely, in the same way  that no vendor 
would demand the breach of a contract due to having the more specified concept of sale. 
Yet, cause of obligation has a practical function. In the previous section I sought to 
explicate	  the	  concept	  of	  “cause	  of	  obligation,”	  to	  systematically	  expose	  it	  with	  a	  series of 
conditions. I now want to discuss the legal significance of this concept. What is the 
practical significance of the high-concept of cause of obligation? 
4.1.5.2 OUR HIGH-CONCEPTS SERVE TO CRITICIZE LEGAL DECISIONS, EXPLAIN THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS… 
Scholars who classify obligations in accordance with their causes often justify their 
classifications on their expositive or pedagogical function. 359 The classification offers a 
                                                        
358 There must be a practical significance in the distinction between typical and atypical contracts. The 
practical significance, I will suggest, is this: Whereas the atypical contract requires proof of its legal 
character, the typical contract does not require such proof. To say that there was a contract it suffices 
that the lawyer proves there was agreement about the exchange of money for a movable or immovable 
thing to say that there was a contract. The	  lawyer’s	  task	  consists	  in	  showing	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  sale’s	  
contract as instantiated in her case. That being argued, the easiest strategy for the defendant is to claim 
that this was not the case; that the plaintiff failed to adduce an account of the facts of the case in terms 
of a sale contract. It would be a titanic legal enterprise for the defendant to prove that the contract of 
sale is not a contract, or that the contract of sale, being a contract, is an unjust cause of obligation. Now, 
the lawyer who wants to prove that her case is an atypical contract must elaborate two orders of proof. 
First of all, she must prove that the type into which her case hypothetically falls is a contract. It must, 
following	  the	  example	  of	  the	  text,	  prove	  that	  “I	  agreeing with you that I will do something in exchange 
of	   a	   commitment	   of	   yours”	   is	   a	   contract.	   The	   lawyer	   will	   elaborate that proof with the systematic 
components of the contract. Having proven that the hypothesis at hand is a contract, or that she has a 
legal argument, the lawyer must now proceed to prove that, as a mater of fact, the parties made this 
atypical	  contract.	  That	  one	  said	  “Sure!”	  to	  the	  other’s	  question	  “Hey,	  what	  if	  I	  paint	  your	  wall	  and	  you	  
take my child to school for the month?” 
359 Luís	  Díez-Picazo explains that there are two questions involved in the traditional discussion concerning 
the	   “sources	   of	   the	  obligations.”	   The	   “fundamental	   or	   key	  question”	   for	   the	   scholar,	  maintains	   Díez-
Picazo,	  “[c]onsists	  in	  determining	  what	  juridical	  fact	  or	  facts	  are necessary so as to consider as born and 
contracted,	  with	  its	  sequel	  of	  rights	  and	  duties,	  an	  obligatory	  relationship.”	  “The	  second	  issue	  possesses	  
a didactic or scholastic character. Once that the sources have been enumerated the question is about 
establishing a classification or a systematic ordination of the sources of the obligations, gathering them 
by the similitude of their characteristics or by the similitude of the reasons that serve as their 




friendly way of learning the facts that give place to obligations in private law. I agree with 
this statement—the classification instructs the reader as to the	   law’s	  content.	  Yet,	  one	  
must elaborate further. 
As I said before, essaying a serious classification of the obligations requires an idea of 
what the classified items are. What are we going to include in our classification? This idea, 
in my view, is the high-concept of cause-of-obligation. We owe our taxonimisation of the 
phenomena we take for contracts, torts and unjust enrichments to its existence. Now, if 
we conceive of this high-concept as transactional justice, as justice in the interactions that 
affect the rights of the interacting parties, then we have a structural idea of what the law 
of obligations is. The pedagogical function of the classification turns out to be different, or 
more educative. By reading or elaborating a classification of the obligations we not only 
get to know the content of a law of obligations but also its form. We know that the law of 
obligations has to do with interactions between two persons, that what is relevant is that 
the	  interaction	  affects	  the	  persons’	  rights,	  that	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  only	  two	  modes	  in	  which	  
persons affect their respective rights in transactions and that one mode of private law 
justice corresponds to the licit character of a right alteration and another mode of the 
same justice corresponds  to the illicit character of a right alteration. This is a better or 
more extensive and reliable knowledge of the law of obligations. 
The point of knowing the law of obligations in such depth is manifestly worthwhile in and 
of itself. But you can utilize this knowledge too. Knowing the form of the law of obligations 
empowers you to criticize legal cases or ever-fluctuating arrangements of the law of 
obligations.360  
Suppose a legislator dictates the following norm: “The	  person	  who	  performs	  the	  activity	  
requested in a promise of a reward is entitled to the reward even if he ignored the 
promise.”	  A	  legalist	  could	  say	  that	  this	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  obligation.	  There	  is	  a	  situational	  case	  
(someone happens to perform the activity requested in a promise of a reward), and a legal 
effect (this someone is entitled to request the promised performance to the promisor). A 
legalist will proceed to enumerate this new case in one of the categories that she or he 
                                                        
360 In Weinrib, classification is the process through which one must understand and criticize the law: 
Juridical	  classification	  should	  therefore	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  what	  the	  law’s	  categories	  are	  but	  as	  a 
working	  out	  of	  what	  they	  must	  be	  if	  they	  are	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  common	  law’s	  own	  aspirations	  as	  a	  juridical	  
phenomenon. Juridical classification allows both a sympathetic and a critical attitude toward existing legal 
categories. Sympathy arises from the possibility	  of	  understanding	  the	  common	  law’s	  categories	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
its juridical aspirations. Criticism arises form the recognition that a given category may infelicitously fulfill 
those aspirations. 
Ernest	  Weinrib,	  “The	  Juridical	  Classification	  of	  The Obligations,”	  in	  Birks,	  Peter	  (ed.),	  The Classification 




thinks fit or, in the absence of one, develop it. The reasoning is the following: there is a 
law establishing X fact as an event that causes obligations; I am a legal commentator; 
therefore, I must classify X as a cause of obligation. The jurist would approach the new 
law differently. This law wants to grant a credit right to someone who returns lost 
property, ignoring that the owner promised a reward. The cause of such right could never 
be a voluntary obligation-interaction. The plaintiff related to the defendant as someone 
who	  wants	  to	  return	  someone	  else’s	  property—not as someone who expects a reward. In 
doing so he lost the possibility of addressing the defendant as his creditor, the manner of 
address he would invoke if, before returning the lost thing he received from her a promise 
of a reward and got a right to credere. I am a jurist, someone who talks about the justice 
or injustice of laws; I should be critical towards this law, for it fails to adequately establish 
a voluntary cause of obligations.361 
4.1.5.3. …AND (I SUBMIT) RECOGNIZE NEW CAUSES OF OBLIGATIO 
There is a third, somewhat unsung362 function of cause of obligation. Knowing the concept 
of cause of obligation permits us to identify new causes of obligations and to explain them 
us such. 
The concept of the right of bodily integrity is closely connected to the concept of battery. 
The former is an interaction that alters the rights of persons and the latter is what such 
specific cause of obligation presupposes. Both concepts make up the tort of battery, with 
which a lawyer can articulate a corrective justice claim. We can see and explain this tort 
in reality because we have knowledge of the notions of right and obligation, which make 
that reality a tort. We can say that the driver must compensate the harm caused to the 
pedestrian because we can think of their relationship as a violation of the right of one 
through the	  wrong	  of	  the	  other.	  We	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  make	  that	  judgment	  without	  the	  
notions of the right of bodily integrity, illicit, damage, actual contact, and malice. These 
                                                        
361 See more in 2.4.3.1. 
362 Though there are notable exceptions. Mayer-Maly complains of the uncritical attitude with which his 
contemporaries classify the obligations established by special statutes and maintains that: “…in our 
discussion of the system of the obligations we may learn quite important things. On the one hand we 
cannot avoid the continued recognition of other causes of obligation besides contract and delict. On the 
other hand there exists the need for a satisfactory legitimation of obligation which does not involve our 
eschewing a consequent divisio obligationum.”	  Theo Mayer-Maly,	   “Divisio	  Obligationum,”	   in	  The Irish 
Jurist, Dublin, (1966\1967), pp. 375-385, at p. 384. 
 More	  generally:	   “Oltre	   tutte	   le	   formule,	  quasi	   sempre	   imperfette,	   e	   quindi,	  per	   sè	   sole,	   fallaci,	   vi	   è	   la	  
ragione	  animatrice	  dell’intero	  organizmo	  logico;	  e	  a	  questa	  ragione	  il	  giurista	  deve	  sopra tutto avere 
riguardo, per ben comprendere e rettamente applicare, anche a casi nuovi,	  il	  diritto	  vigente.”	  Giorgio	  Del	  
Vecchio,	  “La	  Crisi	  della	  Scienza	  del	  Diritto,”	   in	  Studi sul Diritto, vol. I,	  Giuffrè,	  Milano,	  1958,	  at	  p.	  178,	  




concepts determine our reality as well as restrict it. The torts we see in streets are the 
torts we know of. These legal torts limit our vision of illicit reality.  
It could very well be that a cause of obligation other than a tort, contract and unjust 
enrichment exists, occurring in reality. Hence, the concept of cause of obligation has a role 
to play. It provides us with a viewpoint that is structurally identical to the existing causes 
of the obligations but that has been substantively emptied, cleansed of content. We are no 
longer limited to bodily integrity, contractual performance, in rem rights; we are no longer 
constrained into seeing offer and acceptance, wrong and harm, enrichment and 
impoverishment. Our perception is henceforth amplified. With terms like subjective right 
and legal interaction we can aim to identify exigencies and practices that, being unfamiliar 
to the law in existence are nonetheless explainable in legal terms. But legal concepts, 
however high, have clear limits. We must deal in interactions between persons, namely, 
separate free independent wills (4.1.3.1). These persons must come to the interaction 
with a subjective right, namely, a power over a thing of one as against the other that, as 
justice grounds them, one has it because the other has it (or could have it) too and none 
of them could dislike the fact that the other has it (4.1.3.2). Finally, the conduct of one 
must be relatable to the conduct of another (4.1.3.3.1), and such interaction must affect 
the party’s rights (4.1.3.3.2). Only then can we begin to specify the rights with which the 
parties come, the interaction that affects those rights and the kind of obligation that 
justice would demand. Evidently, the concepts, however high, limit our perception. We 
cannot make up causes of obligation whenever we are called to do so. 
On the whole, mine is a sensible point. Identifying new causes of obligation requires new 
legal concepts. This means that we have to make new law. This enterprise has long been 
regarded as undoable in private law. Most scholarship on the classification of obligations 
has discussed the point.363 The question is whether private law can recognize new causes 
of obligation. The next section is dedicated to responding to this question affirmatively. 
                                                        
363 One Spanish commentator famously said: 
May be the problem of the sources of the obligations responds to an obsession of the doctrine. In the practice, 
art. 1.089, which enumerates them, has almost only served in Spain as the basis to discuss whether the 
unilateral will can be a cause of obligations. We will deal separately with this question. 
José Puig Brutau, Fundamentos de Derecho Civil, t. I, 2 ed., vol. II, Derecho General de las Obligaciones, 
Bosch, Barcelona, 1976, p. 37. Almost every early twentieth century Italian author who dealt with the 
question of the causes of obligation dealt also with the question of the unilateral promises. For example, 
Emilio	  Albertario,	  who	  wrote	   “Le	   fonti	   delle	   obbligazioni	   e	   la	   genesi	   dell’art.	   1097	  Codice	  Civile,”	   in	  
Rivista diritto Commerciale,	  (1923),	  I,	  p.	  493	  and	  ss.,	  occupied	  himself	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  promises	  in	  “La	  
pollicitatio,”	  in	  Publigazioni	  della	  Università	  Cattolica	  del	  Sacro	  Cuore,	  Serie	  Seconda:	  Scienze	  Giuridiche, 
Vol XX, Milano, (1929) (elaborating various reasons for not bringing promises to private law). Antonio 
Scialoja	  writes	  “Le	  fonti	  delle	  obbligazioni,”	  in	  Rivista di Diritto Commerciale, Vol. II, (1904), pp. 520-530 




4.2. CAN WE CONSTRUE NEW CAUSES OF OBLIGATION? (A QUESTION AMONG 
FORMALISTS) 
4.2.1. “NO WE CAN’T”, THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS ARGUMENT 
Previous generations of jurists believed that the norms classifying the obligations in 
accordance with their causes could enumerate all possible causes of obligation. If Art. 
1097 of (1865) the Italian	  Civil	  Code	  says,	   “Obligations	  arise	   from	  the	   law,	  contract	  or	  
quasi-contract, delict and quasi-delict,” it is because the obligations arise only from the 
facts fitting the enumerated causes. The cases for which the statute provides no obligation 
are outside of the law of obligations. This numerus clausus interpretation was possible 
only due to a series of assumptions about private law, which I will now explicate. 
4.2.1.1. THE CLASSIFICATION HAS EXHAUSTED ALL THE POSSIBLE CAUSES OF OBLIGATION 
By means of introspective reflection and through a methodical process of doubtful 
questioning, the modern genius could discover the a priori principle of law, a proposition 
that was so evident that to doubt it would entail a contradiction. Modernity could thus 
work downwards towards conclusions about law, deriving legal concepts through logical 
deduction, as one would proceed in geometrics. 364  “Every	   legal	   concept	   has	   its	   own	  
distinct and bounded place, and every place is occupied by a distinct and bounded legal 
concept.”365 And since the modern genius could foresee, describe and classify (in one 
                                                        
Diritto Commerciale, Vol. I, (1904), p. 370 and ss, forcefully arguing that promise cannot create 
obligations but rather justifying the obligations of almost every relevant promissory case on the basis of 
acceptances implied by law.) Finally, Nicola Stolfi, a scholar writing some years before the 1942 Italian 
Civil Code, deals with the issue of the promesse unilaterale immediately after of the classification of the 
obligations, a section which he closes saying:  
In any case, the controversy on the sources of the obligations is important from the scientific viewpoint; 
namely, the attempt to give a better systematization to the matter, or because it serves to clarify the diverse 
importance among the various causes of the obligations. And to be convinced about this it suffices to revisit 
some grave disputes, which are waving in the modern doctrine, and this is on the unilateral promise 
Diritto Civile, v. III: Le Obbligazioni in Generale, Torino, UTET, 1932, Capitolo III, n. 237, p. 116. Prominent 
French authors who included the unilateral promise as another cause of obligation—distinct to the 
contract and without legislative bases—are	  René	  Demogue,	  Traitè	  des	  obligations	  en	  général,	  tome	  1: 
Sources des Obligations, Rousseau, Paris, 1923, p. 44 and ss (who divides the obligations into five: the 
contract, the unilateral will of the debtor, the illicit act, the will of the creditor (quasi-contracts) and the 
simple fact (better known as legal obligations)) and Louis Josserand, Cours de Droit civil français, t. II, 
Sirey, Paris, 1930, num. 11, p. 6 (who divides the obligations in three: Firstly, the juridical acts, which 
are subdivided in contracts and unilateral undertakings, secondly, the illicit acts, which include the 
delicts and quasi-delicts, and finally, the enrichment without a cause.) 
364 See James Gordley, “The State's Private Law and Legal Academia,”	  in	  Jansen, Nils and Ralf Michaels (eds.), 
Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law, Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen, 2008, p. 646 and ss. 
365  The	   “grid	   aesthetic”	   is	   in	   place.	   “In	   the	   grid	   aesthetic,	   law	   is	   framed	   as	   a	   field,	   a	   territory,	   a	   two-




word: exhaust) all the practical implications of the principle, nothing would remain 
outstanding;366 hence the Prussian Civil Code of 1794, with its aspiration to complete 
casuistry	   and	   approximately	   20.000	   paragraphs…	   In	   Savigny’s	   critical	   appraisal,	   an	  
attempt	  to	  “contain	  in	  advance	  a	  decision	  for	  every	  possible	  case.”367 
The last generation of formalists thought that their written law, the civil code or the 
mature common law arrangements were complete. Completeness meant the norms so 
laid-down were the unique sources of law, that the only relevant cases for the law were 
those cases for which the law provided a specific solution or that the lawyer who wanted 
to back a claim with an argument had no other basis on which to appeal than to show that 
the claim was written in a legal text. Completeness therefore implied the irrelevance of 
considerations of principle.	  “The law imparted in a thorough and thoroughly learned legal 
education was sufficient to answer legal questions, and sufficiently good to answer them 
in a way that guaranteed just results. Thus, the lightness of justice, from a formalist 
perspective. There was no	  “internal”	  reason	  to	  teach	  or	  study	  the	  meaning	  of	  justice:	  law	  
was	  complete	  and	  autonomous.”368 
What then could our predecessors say about a norm classifying obligations? The 
significance of such norm is to clearly state that only the enlisted categories can ground 
obligations, that an obligation claim that fails to dress its case in one of the enlisted 
categories must be rejected without consideration, as illegitimate or without grounds.369 
                                                        
subdivision of the territorial space of law into various parts: contracts/torts. Each part is subdivided 
into subparts: negligence/intentional torts. These are then subdivided into even smaller subparts. This 
process continues until a mysterious point is reached where law gives out and all that remains are 
questions of fact.”	  Pierre	  Schlag,	   “The Aesthetics of American Law,”	   in Harv. L. Rev., 115, (2002), pp. 
1047-1118, p. 1055. 
366 Gordley,	  “The State's Private Law…,” ob. cit.,	  647.	  See	  also	  Wikipedia’s	  entry	  “legal	  formalism”: 
The "formalist fiction" is that the process that produced the legal norms has exhausted normative and policy 
considerations; accordingly, law can be seen as a more or less "closed" normative system. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_formalism (March 12, 2015). 
367 Quoted in Joachim	  Rückert,	  “Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the Legal Method, and the Modernity of Law,”	  
in Juridica International, XI/2006, p. 63. 
368 Robin L. West, Teaching Law, Justice, Politics and the demands of Professionalism, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2014, p. 79.  
369 Spanish private law instantiates this reasoning in Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 25 de abril de 1924, 
which, in its third consideration, says: 
the obligations cannot have another cause or origin from which they born or to which they owe their existence 
than those determined by the legislator; this is to say: the law, the contracts, the quasi contracts and the illicit 
acts or omissions or those in which there is any kind of fault or negligence, according with the disposition of 
article 1.809 (sic) of the Civil Code. 
Conf. the Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 25 de abril de 1928. This view was revised by Sentencia de 




4.2.1.2. PRIVATE LAW IS INDEFEASIBLE 
Private law is not only gapless but also indefeasible. Its norms not only establish an 
answer to every possible case but the answers so established are unquestionable or a 
posteriori irrefutable. Once again, huge faith was placed in the modern genius. The law 
was deduced from justice and this work was completed without mistake. As deduced 
inferences bear the value of their premise, one cannot contradict a law without 
contradicting justice. And contradicting the principle is wrong a priori, for the principle is 
right or freed of contradiction a priori. To the moderns, law provisions were immovable, 
as	  “written	  in	  stone.” 370 
The closure of the list of the causes of obligation was now definite. If the code had divided 
the obligations into five, it was because there are five causes of obligation, full stop. The 
lawyer endeavouring to argue for the obligation of an unsung case better avoid the 
argument of legal change. He is not expected to revise the classification, to say for 
example, that the classification is outdated, that his case is unjustly missing in the list. 
What is at work is “Mechanical	   jurisprudence.”371 His	  best	  choice	   is	   to	  make	  the	  case’s	  
facts look like one of the enlisted categories, to attempt for example, to find an acceptance 
for his interested promise. Facts can be articulated in different ways, the text of the law 
cannot. 
4.2.1.3. PRIVATE LAW IS AUTONOMOUS, UNCONNECTED WITH SOCIAL LIFE 
Not only the judges and lawyers, but also the scholarly jurists blinded their eyes to 
whatever happened outside of the realities that their positive categories permitted them 
to see. If the persons of the private law were making transactions by means others than 
                                                        
1975, to be definitively overturned by Sentencia de 17 octubre de 1975, which, in its seventh 
consideration, says:  
That the classical principle of the sources of the obligations, recognized by article 1.089 of our Civil Code, has 
been modernly substituted by the principle which reduces the sources into two:  the will—admitting also in 
this, the unilateral will—and the law. 
For	  a	  critical	  review	  see	  Federico	  de	  Castro	  y	  Bravo,	  “Declaración	  unilateral	  de	  voluntad	  (Sentencia	  del	  
Tribunal	  Supremo	  de	  17	  de	  octubre	  de	  1975),”	  in	  Anuario de Derecho Civil, 30, (1977), pp. 194-207 and 
Manuel Albaladejo	  Garcia,	  “La	  jurisprudencia	  del	  tribunal	  supremo	  sobre	  la	  voluntad	  unilateral	  como	  
fuente	  de	  obligaciones,”	  in	  Revista de Derecho Privado, Enero, (1977), pp. 3-13. 
370 “Si	  pretendeva	  di	  poterlo	  scrivere	  sulla	  pietra	  nella	  presunzione	  che	  un	  Codice	  fosse	  valevole per quanto 
è	  eterno	  il	  mondo.”	  Paolo	  Grossi,	  “Sulla	  odierna	  “incertezza”	  del	  diritto,”	  in	  Giustizia Civile, No 4, (2014), 
p. 230. 
371 “Si	  concepisce	  il	  giurista,	  e	  la	  leggge	  stessa,	  quasi	  come	  un	  apparecchio	  automatico,	  che,	  messo	  in	  moto	  
con un impulse meccanico, dovrebbe dar fuori in ogni caso, egualmente in modo meccanico, una 
sentenza	   precisa.”	   Giorgio	   Del	   Vecchio,	   “La	   Crisi	   della	   Scienza	   del	  Diritto,”	   in	   Studi sul Diritto, vol. I, 




contract, they were not making private law transactions. Offeror and offeree restricted 
their views to the persons who make transactions, obligation and property their views on 
the factors commuted in voluntary transactions, and agreement limited their views on the 
interactions	  that	  licitly	  affect	  the	  parties’	  rights.	  Legal	  science	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  social	  
reality. The object of legal science consists of learning the positive legal provisions, 
abstracting the categories that give these legal provisions an intelligible form and 
exposing the same positive legal provisions in a systematic order. Whatever is inside the 
text that the scholar takes as authoritative is a matter of law, and whatever is outside of 
such text is anything but law. In focusing only on the rules laid down in authoritative texts, 
the lawyer is thought to be insulating law from religion, morality, politics and economics. 
The reduction of law to written law gives warrant to the substantive, operative and 
academic autonomy to private law.372 
The stage was set for satire. Jurists more aware of the reality beyond the positive law 
would caricature formalists as creatures living	  in	  a	  “heaven	  of	  concepts.”	  Jhering’s	  famous	  
joke	  addressed	  the	  Pandectists’	  indifference	  towards	  life	  in	  social	  reality.373 
                                                        
372 This conception of autonomy presupposes a strong dichotomization of facts and norms, of life in civil 
society and of justice and its norms. See	  the	  elocuent	  words	  by	  Paolo	  Grossi,	  “Sulla	  odierna	  “incertezza”	  
del	  diritto,”	  op. cit., p. 230: “Legalism	  and	  formalism	  were	  the	  only	  channels	  through which the law could 
stream. Society and history, magmatic reality, thanks to artificial but efficacious institutional 
mechanisms streamed at the outside without possibly contaminating with their contact the purity of the 
official law willed from above and	  from	  the	  above	  proposed	  to	  the	  obedience	  of	  passive	  addressees	  […]	  
the jurists, specially the civilists, inebriate themselves with abstractions and purities; proud of having a 
pure science, meta-historical and, as such, freed from every carnal weigh. All this construction, both 
artificial	  and	  ingenious,	  encountered	  itself	  with	  the	  turbulence	  of	  which	  the	  new	  century	  was	  bearer.” 
373 Interestingly	  enough,	  the	  issue	  of	  promises	  appears	  in	  Jhering’s	  Ridendo dicere vero. The scene portrays 
Jhering and the spirit who guides him in the heaven of concepts walking around the cabinet of 
pathological concepts, the place of the legal concepts that practical lawyers have deformed, by practical 
or utility reasons. The spirit exclaims: 
A unilateral promise, not accepted by the other party, namely, that hangs in the air, without having yet fallen 
in a determinate person, has now the power to obligate the promisor! Is something like that thinkable? No, 
certainly not, as one cannot imagine a horse runned by the reins hanging from its neck; it is necessary that the 
horseman take them in his hands. The unilateral promise is a rein that no one has in his hands yet. Can that 
promise	  obligate	  […]? 
Jhering, Rudolf von, Bromas	   y	   veras	   en	   la	   ciencia	   jurídica.	   Ridendo	   dicere	   verum, Tomás	   A.	   Banzhaf	  
(exquisite Spanish) translation, Civitas, Madrid, 1987, p. 259. A more contemporary trip into the 
psychology of the caricatured formalist:  
Grid thinking can thus spin out of control. In the name of greater precision, clarity, and rigor, grids can 
sometimes develop into extraordinarily intricate constructions with no obvious use-value to anyone other 
than those who are involved in refining the grid. Disagreement can occur at levels of excruciating detail. In one 
sense, this is a disciplinary defense mechanism: so long as grid thinkers are preoccupied with tiny disputes, 
the big picture remains incontestable — indeed beyond view. At the same time, however, this is a pathology: 
the grid and its custodians become increasingly insular and divorced from other enterprises, so that when a 
reality principle is finally en- countered, it is in the form of a crisis. 













A landmark  of  private  law  theory,  the  classification  of  the  obligations.  Gaius  says  “Let  us  now  proceed  to  
obligations. These are divided into two main species: for every obligation arises either from contract or 
from  delict.”  (Francis  de  Zuleta,  ed,  The  institutes  of  Gaius, Part 1, Text with critical notes and translation 
by Martin de Zuleta, at 179.) 
 
Picture taken from Francis de Zuleta, ed, The institutes of Gaius, Part 1, Text with critical notes and 








4.2.2. YES, WE MUST! THE TRUE LEGAL FORMALISM 
There is a better understanding of legal formalism. This formalism does not neglect the 
changes in social life, or it tries to resolve the tension between the inexorability of change 
that has proved a truism of contemporary society, and the vocation of stability that is 
characteristic of law. For formalism, norms like Art. 1097 of (1865) Italian Civil Code do 
not serve to deny atypical legal demands. On the contrary, these norms remind us that the 
causes of obligations are instances of a practical idea of reason, an idea that is there 
precisely for advancing new legal demands. We hold that formalism could not be a school 
of thought that neglects change	  in	  law.	  Donatello’s	  David	  could	  have	  been	  molded	  in	  mud	  
rather than bronze. Today artists manifest their visions in music and light, a thoroughly 
new experience. So new social practices and exigencies may be a matter for new law. Legal 
formalism indeed expects its matter to vary. Allow me to develop these theses. 
4.2.2.1. JUSTICE CAN BE NEVER EXHAUSTED 
There is one thing that law cannot but accept. This is that human relations such as 
harming another person, exchanging goods, intervening benevolently in the affairs of 
another, paying money by mistake, are as exhaustible as the freedom law assumes 
humans host, use and unfold in their impossibly innumerable contexts. Think of the 
interactions that life in modern society brought into existence. Making interested 
promises is one example; the case of damages by dangerous machines or harmful 
products is another. Lawyers had no words with which to say things about the issues 
arising in such new contexts and yet, the obvious juridical relevance of these issues urged 
them to speak. Today we are struck by the phenomenon called the “network.”	  The	  fact	  is	  
that when you have fixed your attention on a type of interaction, innovation brings a new 
one, which reproduces this interaction (inter-absent agreement is a reproduction of the 
harm-length agreement), or imposes itself as an alternative (agreement and interested 
promise are different modes of exchanging things). 374 Human relations are inexhaustible 
and therefore they cannot be enumerated once and for all. 
                                                        
374 See 1.1.3. Let me clarify. In this paragraph I am arguing that private law cannot deny what I will call the 
“innumerability	   of	   cases.”	   Private	   law	   cannot	   deny	   the	   ever-growing diversity of cases due to two 
reasons, one is theoretical and the other is historical. 
The theoretical point is the most powerful: The idea of free will is one of the core private law 
assumptions. It is what private law thinks inhere in humans and makes them capable of deciding by 
themselves and taking responsibility for their deeds. But the idea of free will comes with the idea of 
creativity or, to be more precise, the possibility of invention. If humans are not the sum total of their past 
experiences, it is because they can bring new things to life, in Kantian terminology they can be the cause 
of their mental representations. In relation to our theme, we can say that the reality of agreed exchanges, 




Yet law needs determinate ideas about human relations. The causes of obligation, like all 
legal relations, are exactly that. They are more or less defined ideas about how certain 
human relations must unfold. Contract, for example, is about the practice of agreeing to a 
present or future exchange. Aware of its juridical relevance, (it is my interpretation), the 
law moulded it with one of its high-forms. Namely, it determined agreed exchanges as a 
cause of obligation and labeled the emerging systematic concept with private law 
names—hence	  our	  just,	  precise,	  intelligent	  and	  venerable	  “contract.”	  Law did the same 
with the realities of harming another person, intervening benevolently in the affairs of 
another, giving money without reason and many others. Contract, tort and unjust 
enrichment are the stable and more or less exact terms with which private law tries to 
ensure that human relations receive equal treatment. 
We see the issue here. On the one hand we have that possible legal reality is inexhaustible, 
or as we can also put it, innumerable, and on the other hand we see that law needs to 
determine its reality, or as we can also put it, enumerate the facts that constitute it. We 
see a tension between the innumerability	  of	  the	  relevant	  legal	  reality	  and	  the	  law’s	  need	  
to determine in numerable categories all relevant reality. How do we resolve it?  
Formalism	  says:	  “Justice”. 
Justice permits private law to update	   itself	   to	   “the	   constantly	   growing	   diversity	   of 
cases.”375 Of the universe of human relations it indicates the relations that are relevant for 
law. The everyday practice of making interested promises is one such relevant reality—it 
is about a half-willed exchange of values between private actors. Since it manifests a mode 
of transactional justice (commutative as differentiated from corrective justice)376 I dare 
to determine it as a cause of obligation.377 Justice thus adopts an operative role in private 
law. It is no longer relegated to the place of death mother of immortal laws. Justice, as 
equal freedom for each purposive being, or as explicated with the high private-law 
concepts of personality, thing, subjective right, right violation and right commutation, 
                                                        
from processes where obviously not one but many individuals collaborated through their own 
creativity—some making these transactions, others defining them. For this reason, private law cannot 
but accept the innumerability of human relations. It may not be able to categorically affirm that life will 
bring unprecedented social interactions. But it cannot deny it. 
The historical proof has become prosaic. See	  an	  interesting	  account	  in	  Giorgio	  Del	  Vecchio,	  “La	  crisi	  della	  
scienza	  del	  diritto,”	  op. cit., p. 179. 
375 F. C. von Savigny, quoted in Joachim	  Rückert, op. cit., p. 63. 
376 See, 1., 4.3, and 6.2. 




indicates to us which of the universe of social interactions are relevant for law, that law 
could and ought itself order. 
So formalism would never say that a classification enumerated all the causes of 
obligation.378 Formalism offers a better interpretation for dictums like Art. 1097 of the 
(1865) Italian Civil Code. They must be taken to be the	  law’s	  explicit	  invocation	  of	  justice. 
379  In opening its book on obligations with Art. 1097, the (1865) Italian Civil Code 
announces that justice in transactions is the governing principle of its law of obligations. 
It is the idea with which contract, tort and the other causes of the obligation have been 
determined. And because this statement is there for purposes beyond the rendering 
explicit what is latent in the text, the classification must have an additional significance. 
Its fundamental practical significance is to permit lawyers and judges to detect unseen 
injustices and establish the right precedents to correct them. The point of articles like 
1097 of the (1865) Italian Civil Code is to tell the reader that even if the code has not 
written about this or that claim in the following pages, the book lies open for it to be 
entered. A dictum classifying the obligations in accordance with their causes represents 
the gate through which the jurist can lead new causes to the law of obligations. 
4.2.2.2. PRIVATE LAW NORMS ARE HUMAN PRODUCTS AND THEREFORE FALLIBLE AND 
DEFEASIBLE 
In the legal formalism justice is indefeasible, rather than the norms and concepts that 
realize it in a given social stage. Freedom of the will, the usability of objects, the idea of 
right and common space 380  are authoritative postulates in the sense that we cannot 
disregard them when solving cases without doing other than private law. But the fact that 
we put our efforts into bringing justice to the case at hand does not warrant the success 
of our enterprise. We could have gotten it wrong, or the reality for which we developed 
our dictum changed without someone showing us our mistake, rendering our previously 
valid dictum evidently inadequate. If women fell outside of the category of person some 
decades ago, it was not because the category of person was unjust. It was because no one 
could convincingly show that the proviso excluding women got it wrong, that what is right 
is to treat women as equally free as men. One could have made the argument that it is 
                                                        
378 “The logical form of law is found in every juridical proposition, but is not exhausted in every one of them 
nor in their sum.”	  Giorgio	  Del	  Vecchio,	  The Formal Bases of Law, op. cit., n. 61, p. 82. 
379 It is not by chance that Gaius, the first one to classify the obligations in accordance with their causes, 
divided the causes of the obligations as Aristotle divided the modes of corrective justice. Compare 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit.,	  Book	  V,	  Chapter	  2,	  §13	  with Gaius, Institutes, III, 88. 




right that the woman remain outside the legal scene and that they should be incapable of 
response for contract and tort claims. This	  argument’s	  validity	  would	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  
recognition of women as capable persons came with a transformation of the justice of 
private	  law.	  It	  might	  have	  been	  that	  women	  couldn’t	  show	  themselves	  in	  competition with 
men, as comparably free individuals.381 We discovered that they are so, or simply that 
what some took as a protection was more of a paternalistic bound. Gladly, the legal 
character of an adult woman is a very easy case today, and justice as equality remains 
unchanged	  since	  Aristotle’s	  formulation. 
A dictum classifying obligations in accordance with their causes cannot be taken as the 
final enumeration of the causes of the obligation. Such an interpretation would not only 
render the classificatory dictum otiose,382 but also deny value to dictums other than the 
one that is accepted. If we think that the only valid classification of obligations is the one 
that was established by the nineteenth-century legislator, then we must be ready to 
maintain that the preexisting classifications, those on which the nineteenth century 
legislator drew, were either non-juridical classifications or juridically mistaken 
classifications.	  This	  conclusion	  does	  injustice	  to	  the	  private	  law’s	  past	  determinations.	  My	  
interpretation of the classificatory dictums is comfortable with the fact that the causes of 
obligation changed.383 We have seen how, since their invention in classical Rome, the 
causes of obligation have on the one hand changed their content, and on the other hand 
split themselves from two to four to five, to now fuse themselves into three, all within the 
same structure. Formalism believes that each stage of the development was the adequate 
to its time. It interprets Gaius as classifying the obligations into two because the cases 
where the call for obligations pertained were classifiable into two groups. And it 
                                                        
381  Curiously: "Our ancestors saw fit that "females, by reason of levity of disposition, shall remain in 
guardianship, even when they have attained their majority." Table V, 1 of the Law of the XII Tables (451-
450 B.C.) http://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/12tables.html (27-07-2015) 
382 I	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  this	  passage	  of	  professor	  Weinrib’s	  The idea of private law, op. cit., p. 223:  
Legal formalism arrays the particulars of external interaction under a coherent set of juridical categories, and 
therefore ultimately under the forms of justice. Formalism thereby illuminates the particular through the 
general: the particulars are the inexhaustible ways in which persons can externally affect one another, 
whereas the forms are the general patterns that order these particulars in a juridically coherent way. The 
difference between the generality of the forms and the particularity of specific interactions is precisely what 
allows the former to be	  principles	  of	  ordering	   for	   the	   latter.	   It	  also	  prevents	  the	   law’s	   treatment	  of	  all	   the	  
possible particulars from being exhaustively specifiable by theory. Such exhaustiveness would mean that the 
particulars are theoretically as intelligible as the forms through which they are understood, and would render 
otiose	  the	  formalist’s	  invocation	  of	  form. 
383 “The	  idea	  of	  the	  variety	  of	  historical	  legal	  manifestations	  actually	  proves the assumption of a common 
form, for we could not speak of juridical evolution if we did not first accept a certain abstract unity as 
common to all its phases, in whose regard a continuity of process was apparent.” Giorgio Del Vecchio, 




interprets the French as reformulating the classification not because they found a better 
one, but because they found it insufficient to their reality. 
This amounts to say that a legal classification, as logically tight as it may appear, can 
always be revised or updated. One possible question is how well the classification 
achieves its purpose of enumerating the juridically relevant relations. If it fails, the 
interested party can revise it. Lawyers, judges and scholars can defy a classification with 
juridical argumentation. 
4.2.2.3. THE PRACTICAL MISSION OF PRIVATE LAW IS TO SERVE REALITY WITHOUT LOSING ITS 
CHARACTER 
Autonomy is no longer simply the	  law’s	  status after its divorce from religion, morality, 
political power and economy. The formalist has a different conception of autonomy. 
Autonomy is the status, or if you wish, the dignity of the law that molds itself to a reality 
without losing its own character. Autonomy thus no longer offers solace to the jurist by 
warranting her to do her job correctly by solely fitting cases into written laws. In its new 
conception autonomy does not comfort. On the contrary, autonomy shakes, awakes, 
demands an active attitude to the jurist, a confrontation with the messy and the 
unexplored, the socially sensible. It expects that the jurist assume the	  law’s	  spirit	  to	  make	  
it say of a social need something that both gives reasonable satisfaction to the pressing 
social demand and is coherent with	  the	  law’s	  most	  characteristic	  precedents.	  To	  order	  the	  
emerging social reality without losing its own character	  is,	  put	  differently,	  “the	  practical	  
mission of law in life.”384 I want to dedicate some lines of argumentation to identifying the 
locus of this call. I will suggest that it comes from the very essence of private law. We listen 
to	  the	  law’s	  vocation	  in	  the	  gathering	  of	  the	  law’s	  most	  juridical of concepts. 
Private law observes human relations and understands them through the logic of justice. 
Where the layperson sees a handshake at a marketplace, private law sees two persons 
that give and receive on the basis of an enforceable agreement. Where the layperson sees 
a car accident, private law sees that a person used the freedom of another, caused damage 
and contracted the obligation to repair it. To understand these relations through the logic 
of justice, private law necessitates juridical concepts, images of reality that were ordered 
through the logic of justice and that can be seen in reality again. To illustrate: I, a 
                                                        
384 I take this expression from Emil Lask, “Legal	  Philosophy,”	   in Patterson, Edwin Wilhite (ed.), The legal 
Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, Kurt Wilk translation, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge 




16th/17th century jurist,385 sought to determine contractual behavior through the logic 
of commutative justice. I first had to develop the concept of “person,” or of an equally free 
individual able to decide for himself. Then I had to develop the concept of “ownership,” or 
the power of someone to exclude others from the disposition of a thing. Only after having 
developed these two concepts could I develop my idea of “contract,” or exchange of 
accepted promises. Now I have a set of concepts for understanding contractual behavior 
through the logic of justice. As I saw a handshake at a marketplace I could recognize a just 
exchange, for I saw two persons with ownership over things exchanging them through 
reciprocal (accepted) promises. 
At some point in time, through the work of many jurists, the just private law achieved a 
high degree of systematicity. Characteristic of this system is the fact that there are relations 
among its constituents. The concept of contract is paradigmatic: The latest version of the 
just contract is composed by an offer, an obligation, an acceptance and an object-cause (or 
consideration).	   These	   are	   components	   or	   “sub-concepts”	   that	  make	   up	   the	   concept	   of	  
contract. Each one of these sub-concepts has sense insofar as you relate it to its parallel 
concepts. Without their parallel concepts, they make no sense—they are unintelligible. 
Put differently, you will not know what contractual offer is if you do not know the 
concepts of obligation, acceptance and consideration. Such is the relation of these sub-
concepts that, once you have learned how to use them, thinking of one demands thinking 
of the others. Someone who thinks of a contractual offer is someone who, by necessitation, 
is thinking of obligation, acceptance and consideration. If someone attends to a reality 
implicated in the concept of offer—Alexis	  says:	  “Dear	  Bosko,	  I	  will	  give you X if you give 
me	  Y”—and aims to understand it juridically, this someone is not only thinking of offer, 
but also of obligation, acceptance and consideration.  
The concept of contractual offer demands the concept of obligation, acceptance and 
consideration. A contractual offer demands the presence of the concepts that help it give a 
juridical account to a specific reality. 
Now, the concept of contract is one of the causes of obligation. You could build the other 
causes of obligation in the same systematic fashion. Tort, for example, could be 
determined with the elements of illicit act or wrong, causality, damage, responsibility and 
obligation. Let me elaborate how these elements make up a tort with an example:  
                                                        
385 I am inspired by Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an introduction by Richard 
Tuck, Liberty Found, Indianapolis, 2005, especially Book II, Chapters XI-XII. I think that the account I 
elaborate in the text is correct. If it is partially correct then take it as a piece of Foucauldian history in 




Someone running in the city center is, in my opinion,	   committing	  an	   “illicit	   act.”	  True,	  
persons	   have	   the	   freedom	   to	   go	   around	   common	   places.	   Call	   this	   freedom	   “right	   of	  
locomotion.”	   But	   such	   right	   is	   not	   being	   well	   exercised.	   Why?	   The	   city	   center	   was	  
established for walking, doing shopping, meeting friends; you would hardly include the 
image of someone running among the activities that persons do in city centers. In other 
words, the runner could harm a pedestrian. So, in running in the city center, our agent is 
acting outside of what is her right—she	  is	  endangering	  another’s	  use	  of	  the	  same	  right. 
Now let us bring another person to the scene. He is walking in a way that, to any 
reasonable observer, will not be changed—he is likely to continue in the same direction 
and at the same speed. But he suddenly changes his course. He abruptly stops walking 
and begins veering from the center of the footpath to the extreme left, as someone who 
suddenly realized he is going in the wrong direction and wants to come back. In this 
sudden movement our runner crashes him. She was mindful of him and calculated that he 
was not going to change his course. Yet, because he made this sudden movement, she 
crashed into him	   and	  made	   him	   fall.	   The	   harm	   to	   the	   walker’s	   body	   is	   what	   we	   call	  
“damage.” 
The damage would have not been caused by the illicit act if, for example, a third party 
pushed the runner towards the walker. Another factor interrupting the link between 
harm and illicit act refers	   to	   the	  victim’s	  deeds,	  as	   in a case where the victim was not 
walking but also running. “Causation”	  means	  that	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  the	  damage	  is	  
the	  illicit	  act.	  The	  last	  element	  of	  tort	  is	  “responsibility.”	  Ours	  is	  a	  case	  of	  negligence.	  The	  
runner did not plan to harm the pedestrian—she just acted imprudently. She knew, or 
should have known that running in the city center creates undue risk. As her illicit act 
resulted in damage, she must correct the harm. She has the obligation to rectify the 
damage caused by her illicit action. Thus is how the sub-concepts of illicit act, damage, 
causality, responsibility and obligation permit us to represent sad social facts through the 
logic of justice.  
Now that we have elucidated these notions, we can make the point:  
In each one of the causes of obligation there is a sub-concept that, being only intelligible 
in concert with its parallel sub-concepts is, at the same time, relative to or intelligible with 
sub-concepts of other causes of the obligations. In the case of the contract, this sub-concept 
is the so-called	  “object-cause”	  (or	  “consideration”), namely, the right in return for which 
I gave you a contractual obligation. In the case of the tort, this sub-concept	  is	  “causation,”	  
namely, the fact that my violating your sphere of right is at the same time my acting 
outside of my sphere of right. In the case of the uncaused enrichment, this sub-concept is 




impoverishment has no reason or is unjustified. The relation between these sub-concepts 
is obvious. They are related in that they all exhibit the injustice that an interaction 
necessitates in order to be a cause of obligation.  
We can notice moreover, that the relation displayed by the above-mentioned sub-
concepts is somehow different to the relation that each of these sub-concepts exhibits 
with its parallel sub-concepts. Aligned, the sub-concepts of a cause of obligation make up 
a totality. They form the basis for imputing an obligation and the obligation itself. They 
provide, on the one hand, the image of the interaction that produces an imbalance, and on 
the other hand, the image of the measure that undoes the imbalance produced. You feel 
that nothing can be added, the work is perfect, complete. But nothing like this happens 
when you align the injustice concepts. Rather the contrary, they give you the impression 
of being incomplete, of a sort of to-be perfected thing, in need of more expansion. The 
relation of the injustice concepts reveals that private law is internally compelled to 
continue its trend of identifying injustice in realities for the sake of saying what must be 
done in order to undo them.386 
I conclude, two main features characterize private law: its will to regulate life in 
accordance with justice, and the systematic fashion in which it does its work. Justice and 
system give a distinct character to private law, and at the same time demand private law 
live	  up	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  such	  character.	  We	  listened	  to	  private	  law’s	  systematicity in 
making such a demand. We could say that justice demands it too: 
Even truer is the Aristotelian concept according to which the judge is the living justice: 
namely, an organ that assumes in it the spirit of the law, and expresses it in always new 
formulations, coherent with the vital system, but yet such so as to take it to new 
developments.387  
                                                        
386 Article	  4	  of	   the	  French	  Civil	  Code	  says	  “The	   judge	  who	  refuses	   to	   judge	  under	  pretext	  of	   the	  silence,	  
obscurity or insufficiency of law can	  be	  prosecuted,	  as	  guilty	  for	  the	  denial	  of	  justice.”	  The	  Swiss	  Civil	  
Code of 1912 famously states that in the absence of a statutory or customary norm, the judge must 
decide	  “in	  accordance	  with	  the	  rule	  he	  would	  lay	  down	  if	  he	  were	  the	  legislator[!]”	  In	  Perelman,	  “The	  
obligation	  to	  judge	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  judge’s	  power	  to	  make	  decisions,	  to	  fill	  the	  law’s	  lacunae,	  
to	  resolve	  antinomies	  and	  to	  choose	  one	  or	  another	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text.”	  Chaïm Perelman, Justice, 
law, and argument: Essays on moral and legal reasoning, D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht, 1980, p. 123. 
Perelman probably sees the obligation and power as facts established by the legislator. I have tried to 
explain them differently. 
387 Del	  Vecchio,	  Giorgio,	  “La	  Crisi	  della	  Scienza	  del	  Diritto,”	  in	  Studi sul Diritto,	  vol.	  I,	  Giuffrè,	  Milano,	  1958,	  p.	  
174. Similarly in idem, p. 180: 
Lo sviluppo del sistema giuridico si compie in tal modo, quasi parallelamente, o meglio mediante un influsso 
reciproco,	   sotto	   l’aspetto	   pratico	   e	   giudiziale,	   e sotto	   l’aspetto	   scientifico.	   È	   ovvio	   che	   l’incremento	   e	   la	  
modificazioni	  degli	  istituti	  esistenti,	  e	  l’aggiunta	  di	  nuovi,	  quasi	  per	  innesto	  di	  nuovi	  rami	  sopra	  l’antico	  tronco,	  
debbono	  per	  necessità	  accompagnarsi	  a	  un	  corrispondente	  rinnovamento	  dell’elaborazione scientifica. Non si 




Herein lies the significance of autonomy: True, autonomy is merely procedural. It 
demands	  that	  one	  be	  the	  author	  of	  one’s	  own	  rules.	  	  But,	  for	  one’s	  rules	  to	  be	  one’s own, 
they must be expressive of oneself. Hence this qualification: Only intelligences with 
character	   can	   be	   autonomous.	   But	   the	   expressiveness	   of	   one’s	   own	   character	   will	   be	  
limited if it is limited so as to always remain the same. Gentlemen no longer wear tailcoats. 
“Cool”	  can	  be	  cool	  only	  in	  German.	  Hence	  my	  proposition:	  Autonomy requires intelligent 
characters to mould themselves to the contexts where they happen to be placed. 
Autonomous characters order their dresses in accordance with the party’s style. This is 
the beauty of autonomy: Opportunity. If private law has to govern in a place where 
contracts are no longer inter presents, where a long chain of causes and effects separate 
the illicit from the harm, where persons work in networks and make interested promises, 
where things without corpus abound in spaces without land and wills without bodies are 
about	   to	  come,	   then	  private	   law’s	  orderings	  must	  be	  expressive	  of	   these	  realities, they 
must govern them in their way. The previous generation of formalists paid little attention 
to life in civil society. The new formalism takes it as a demand. 
A recurrent concern in the work of Tullio Ascarelli is creation in continuity. Someone 
illustrated his thought with a naturalistic metaphor. Private law appears as an always-
growing river. A new legal reality is a tributary of the growing mass of water. Once that 
confluence was achieved the tributary is indistinguishable from the current.388 I like this 
                                                        
gnoseologia	  e	  della	  logica	  non	  mutano	  per	  l’accrescersi	  delle	  nostre	  cognizioni	  in	  qualsiasi	  parte	  dello	  scibile.	  
Si tratta	  bensì	  di	  quelle	  nozioni	  concettuali,	  che	  hanno	  un	  carattere	  almeno	  parzialmente	  empirico,	  poichè	  
comprendono un contenuto di esperienze giuridiche storicamente determinate, in guisa da renderne possibile 
la costruzione in un ordine sistematico. Si tratta,	  in	  una	  parola,	  della	  così	  detta	  dogmatica	  giuridica;	  la	  quale	  
non	  deve	  essere	  scambiata	  con	  la	  Filosofia,	  ma	  rappresenta	  nondimeno	  un’attività	  scientificamente	  legittima	  
e perfettamente valida nella sua sfera. 
388 This	  is	  Norberto	  Bobbio’s	  illustration of the thought of Tullio Ascarelli: "L'ordinamento giuridico in altre 
parole	   è	  un	   processo,	   un	   sistema	   in	  divenire,	   un	   tutto	  mobile	   e	  moventesi	   nel	   tempo,	   una	   specie	  di	  
corrente	   di	   fiume	   che	   s'ingrossa	   per	   via	   ma	   è	   sempre	   lo	   stesso	   fiume. In questo processo 
l'interpretazione	   è	   come	   l'affluente	   che	   contribuisce	   alla	   crescita	   della	  massa	   d'acqua;	  ma	   una	   volta	  
confluito	  nella	  corrente,	  non	  se	  ne	  distingue	  più."	  Dalla struttura alla funzione: Nuovi studi di teoria del 
diritto, Edizioni di Comunita, Milano, 1977, p. 259. 
Later, these extremely interesting reflections: 
Il	  discorso	  di	  Ascarelli	  sull'interpretazione	  si	  muove	  sempre	  tra	  i	  due	  poli	  della	  creatività	  e	  della	  continuità.	  
Purtroppo,	  questo	  concetto	  di	  continuità,	  nonostante	  la	  parte	  importante	  che	  assume nella	  teoria,	  non	  è	  mai	  
stato svolto analiticamente. Si capisce a che cosa serve (a evitare il facile abbandono alle correnti del diritto 
libero,	  cioè	  della	  creazione	  continua);	  ma	  non	  si	  capisce	  bene	  come	  debba	  essere	  inteso.	  Continuità	  rispetto	  a	  
che cosa?	  Ai	   princìpi	   generali	   del	   sistema?	  Ai	   princìpi	   dei	   singoli	   istituti?	   Ai	   precedenti	   giurisprudenziali?	  
Questa	  continuità	  è	  un'esigenza,	  cui	  il	  giurista	  deve	  restar	  fedele	  sino	  ai	  limiti	  del	  possibile?	  O	  è	  un	  fatto	  che	  lo	  
storico constata studiando l'opera	  dei	  giuristi	   in	  differenti	  sistemi?	  Ma	  se	  è	  un	  fatto,	  come	  si	  inseriscono	  in	  
questo fatto le cosiddette innovazioni giurisprudenziali, di cui lo stesso Ascarelli porta spesso esempi assai 
noti?	  Quale	  rapporto	  si	  può	  stabilire	  tra	  innovazione	  e	  continuità? Che le tecniche interpretative siano tecniche 
miranti	  a	  ricondurre	   i	  casi	  nuovi	  all'unità	  dell	  sistema,	  della	   finzioni	  all'analogia,	  è	  certo:	  ma	  accettando	   le	  
tecniche per quel che presumono di essere non si rischia di confondere ancora una volta quel che i giuristi 
dicono di fare con quel che fanno realmente? Ora l'interesse delle riflessioni di Ascarelli sta nella demolizione 




idea. Private law is an ongoing normative reality, a system in development, a whole 
moving in time. Though I would choose another image. Private law is like a group of well-
rounded constructs, resembling cultural units which, paraphrasing Plato, roll around 
what is not law and what it purely is.389 In their incessant rolling, private law pieces gain 
and loose in content, split themselves in more, change in outlook, disappear, get reformed 
and reappear. 
4.3. HOW SHOULD WE EFFECTUATE OUR CONSTRUCTION? 
We have an idea of what cause of obligation is and we know that we can construe new 
causes of obligation. We thus come to the final stage of this part. The question is how do 
we effectuate the construction? How are we to make a cause of obligation out of the 
interested promise? 
4.3.1. THE NATURE OF LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
4.3.1.1. IT IS NOT A LEGAL JUDGMENT 
We must, first of all, differentiate adjudication from construction. Adjudicating, as I take 
it to mean now, consists of explaining a social reality in terms of an existing legal concept. 
For example, a handshake at a marketplace could signify many things, from an image 
symbolizing the zeitgeist of an age, to	  “a	  mechanism	  for	  sampling	  social	  chemosignals.”390 
Yet if you predispose yourself to interpreting it juridically,391 you will easily conclude that 
the handshake is a contract. Here you are adjudicating rather than creating a legal 
concept, because you are putting in place concepts that you know. You have learned how 
                                                        
mentre	  di	   fatto	  non	  è mai	   tale.	  Ma	   la	   continuità	  non	  è	  anch'essa	  un	  pregiudizio?	   Siamo	  proprio	   sicuri	   che	  
l'interpretazione si presenti come continuazione, ma di fatto non sia talora innovazione e rottura? Il mancato 
approfondimento	   di	   questo	  punto,	   si	   può	   spiegare,	   a	  mio	   giudizio, col fatto che su questo punto Ascarelli 
abbandona	  senza	  parere	  il	  terreno	  della	  constatazione	  storica	  sul	  quale	  dichiara	  a	  più	  riprese	  di	  essersi	  posto,	  
e	  lascia	  apparire	  le	  proprie	  preferenze	  ortiche:	  la	  continuità	  non	  è	  un	  fatto	  constatato,	  ma	  un	  valore chi il buon 
giurista	  dovrebbe	  attenersi.	  È	  un'esigenza	  cui	  non	  può	  rinunciare	  chi	  si	  muove,	  come	  l'Ascarelli,	   tra	   le	  due	  
ideologie opposte del concettualismo radicale e del radicale realismo in una posizione che ho chiamata 
poc'anzi di antiformalismo moderato. 
389 Plato describes sensible things and properties as "rolling around as intermediates between what is not 
and what purely is" Republic, G. M. A. Grube translation and C. D. C. Reeve revision, Hackett, Indianapolis, 
1992, 478a-479d. 
390 See: http://elifesciences.org/content/4/e05154#sthash.fC5RnuSx.dpuf (21-07-2005) 
391 Juridical predisposition also precedes adjudication. Two adults signing a formulary in the office of a 
notary	  is	  an	  image	  that	  demands,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  description:	  “Contract.”	  Yet	  the	  observer	  will	  always	  be	  
able to peel off this interpretation and predispose herself to see otherwise. Even if the reality comes as 
dressed with a legal category, the interpreter can always make the effort to see ethics, society, economy, 
etc. Artists have the strength to resist the force of triviality. Easy cases predispose us to understand them 
in their legal sense, but, as we can predispose ourselves to see them differently, I consider them objects 




to use the concepts of offer, acceptance, consideration and obligation and it was easy for 
you to apply them to the case. 
An interested promise is not an easy case for adjudication. The best choice is to see it as a 
contract. Explaining an interested promise with the language of contract places you in a 
difficult position (See 1.2.3) however.	   This	   is	   so	   because	   the	   concepts	   that	   “offer,”	  
“acceptance,”	   “obligation”	   and	   “consideration”	   connote	   were determined to give 
(juridical) order (and existence) to a reality that is different to the reality called 
“interested	  promise.”	  Namely,	  the	  fact	  of	  agreeing	  that	  I	  will	  give	  you	  something	  and	  you	  
will give me another thing in exchange is significantly different to the fact of giving you 
something so that you create the chance that you will do something I want. In this context, 
and insofar as we want to legally regulate the atypical reality, we must construe a legal 
concept. 
4.3.1.2. IT IS, IF YOU WANT, A JURIDICAL JUDGMENT 
When the practice you are confronted with is very atypical, you can dare to build a new 
legal concept.392 This requires from you a very ingenious judgment. You are no longer 
involved in the task of applying one of the readily applicable legal concepts. You have to 
elaborate a legal explanation for the atypical reality—see and state law without using 
applicable categories. If you are lucky enough, you will see the explanation as a reflection 
of a high-legal concept, like the idea of authorization, subjective right or cause of 
obligation. 
Yet the process of making sense of a reality with an applicable legal concept is very 
different to the process of making sense of a reality with a high legal concept. In the latter 
case, you have to convince your audience that the reality that you are confronted with 
manifests the reality contemplated by the readily applicable legal concept. You have to 
say; “Look,	  there	  is	  an	  offer,	  an	  acceptance	  and	  a	  consideration,”	  “look, there is a human 
body under the control of a free will.”	  When	  your	  task	  is	  about	  explaining	  a	  reality	  in	  terms	  
of a high legal concept you have to elaborate the contents that would render those 
abstractions	  applicable.	  You	  have	  to	  develop	  appealing	  answers	  to	  questions	  like	  “What	  
is the thing that is the object	  of	  the	  right?”	  “What	  are	  the	  exclusive	  powers	  that	  a	  will	  has	  
                                                        
392  Terminology and meaning are not uniform in the scholarship. Rudolf Stammler, for example, calls 
“juridical	   construction”	   to	   the	   act	   of	   elaborating	   concepts	   from	   the	   material	   given	   by	   the	   law.	   “La 
elaboracion cientifica de las normas de un derecho historicamente dado se llama desde antiguo 
construccion	   juridica.”	   Tratado	   de	   Filosofía	   del	   Derecho, Wenceslao Roces translated, Reus, 2007, 
Madrid, p. 391. Aleksander Peczenik goes further to say that legal construction or, as he calls it, juridical 
science	  consists	  also	  in	  creating	  “new	  concepts	  by	  generalizing	  logically	  possible	  cases.”	  Scientia Juris: 




over such a thing?”	   “What	  are	   the	  components	  of	   the	   interaction	   from	  which	   the	  right	  
emerges?”	  The	  judge	  sees	  a	  reality, imagines an idea of how to explain the reality in terms 
of a high-legal concept, and effectuates the explanation. This explanation (which, as we 
will see, must be constructed with	  one	  of	  the	  “legal	  techniques”	  and	  presented	  in “legal	  
language”)	   is	   a	   legal	   construction.	   So,	   if	   I	   had	   to	   define	   it,	   I	   would	   say that a legal 
construction is a synthesis of an inapplicable legal concept and the image of a new 
operative concept. If adjudication applies operative concepts, legal construction created 
them. So construction, in contrast to adjudication, brings about new legal realities. One 
can think of construction as a juridical (as opposed to a legal) judgment because, to come 
about,	  to	  produce	  a	  new	  legal	  reality,	  construction	  utilizes	  one	  of	  justice’s	  most	  abstract	  
representations. 
4.3.1.3. THE THIN DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE JUDGMENT 
The line separating the two judgments is thin however. Construction could be said to be 
a legal judgment for various reasons. First of all, as happens in the majority of cases, the 
new legal entity has precedents in the existing law. For example, the unilateral promise 
that I will construe in part 5 can claim precedents in the various arrangements that I have 
criticized	  in	  Part	  2.	  So,	  one	  could	  say,	  “Yes	  Javier,	  this	  legal	  concept	  of	  yours	  is	  very	  nice	  
and, as you put it, it has been never seen before, but the construction brings no legal 
innovation. To start with, it is the reconstruction of something that, although in different 
forms,	  already	  existed	  in	  the	  law.” 
This criticism cannot be correct. True, my unilateral promise is not the first legal idea 
recognizing the promise of a reward, promise of a contract and fake gratuitous promises. 
It is also true that my unilateral promise is not the first attempt to justifying the 
irrevocability of these promises on the grounds that the reception of the promise causes 
a benefit to the promisor. However, my unilateral promise would change the law that 
integrates it into its system. Owing to its semi-abstract outlook, the unilateral promise 
brings with it a range of indeterminate cases.393 The legal system that recognizes the 
unilateral promise is a legal system that would not only recognize the various typical 
                                                        
393 In this sense: 
[…]	   the	   action	   of	   the	   jurists,	   appears	   at	   first	   sight	   a	   dependent	   one,	   receiving	   its	  materials	   from	  without.	  
However, by their giving to the materials so presented a scientific form which strives to disclose and perfect 
the unity dwelling in them, there arises a new organic life which shapes and reacts upon the materials 
themselves, so that from science as such, a new sort of generation of law incessantly proceeds. 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, William Holloway translation, t. 1, 




interested promises that it already recognizes but also all promises cognizable as 
unilateral promises (see 5.1.2.) 
But there	  is	  a	  stronger	  criticism.	  It	  says:	  “Your	  unilateral	  promise	  cannot	  be	  new	  in	  any	  
sense. For, if the reality that you are construing is to be recognized as a legal reality, the 
reality must, before your construction, have been legal. The fact that you are saying	  ‘there	  
is	  a	  juridical	  reality	  that	  is	  not	  recognized	  by	  the	  law’	  indicates	  that	  you	  believe	  that	  law	  
unfolds from a principle. And the fact that you believe that law unfolds from a principle is 
due to the fact that you read X or Y principle in the positive legal material. If the principle 
with	  which	  you	  recognize	  the	  ‘new’	  reality	  exceeds	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  explains	  more	  than)	  
the available legal material, then your principle is not the principle of law. You must 
recognize	   the	   ‘new’	   reality	   with	   a	   principle that covers the material available in the 
documents that you consider to be law and does not exceed them. And if that is what you 
do, then what you call the ‘new	  legal	  reality’	  was	  law	  before	  your	  calling	  it	  thus.” 
This is a fair point, and it gives me room to elaborate further the relation between justice 
and (positive) law. When the jurist uses legal techniques to explain a reality in the logic of 
justice, the jurist is, paraphrasing Weinrib, showing the possibilities that were implicit in 
the legal materials.394 But then the question arises: Can there be any new law? I would say 
that no juridical law is new if you consider that someone else could have done exactly 
what the legislator did. Look at the practice of promise-making	  and	  think:	  “Some	  cases	  
show	  a	  commutation	  of	  a	  voluntary	  obligation	  for	  the	  value	  of	  a	  chance.”	  Wonder,	  “How	  
could we explain this section of reality in a way that it appears as another cause of 
obligation?”	  Articulate the interested promise in concepts that are, with different content, 
present in the contract, tort and unjust enrichment, and culminate by communicating the 
developments in words that sound like traditional private law words. Certainly, someone 
could have done that before I did it and sound as convincing. If we reason in this way, then 
my creation is not new in any sense. It was there before I, ready for anyone to talk about 
it. Having said that, I beg of you the following compromise: Agree with me in that the first 
who talks about a legal idea is its author. Legal ideas are new even if they were there to 
be appropriated. Constructions are new in the sense that they are the result of a first 
judgment. The judgment was first in determining something that has always been 
determinable.	  So,	  to	  save	  my	  position,	  I	  say,	  “Well,	  when	  I	  talk	  about	  ‘legal	  construction’	  I	  
am	  saying	  ‘first	  determination.’” 
  
                                                        




4.3.2. THE PROCEDURE 
4.3.2.1. PREDISPOSE YOURSELF TO INTERPRET JURIDICALLY 
The jurist will be confronted with a thoroughly atypical reality. The first thing she must 
do is to get rid of legal preconceptions. What do I mean? The atypical reality could appear 
to her as a complicated case, one lying in between one or another legal category. She will 
consider: Should I pay attention to the promise and imply an acceptance so as to talk of 
this reality as of a contract? Or should I	  better	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  plaintiff’s	  loses,	  find	  
some guilt on the part of the promisor and make it look like the tort of deceit? The 
constructive judgment does not construe facts to make them fit with law; the constructive 
judgment directly and strictly creates law.  
The first advice hence is that the jurist must resist all temptation to explain the case in the 
language of the positive law to see in it its possible juridical implications. She must, in 
other words, find law without the legal forms. 
4.3.2.2. MIND THE SOCIAL REALITY 
Generally jurists do not make up social practices. What we do is to elaborate on the basis 
of what we hear from others. We draw on many sources, including sociologists, 
economists,	   moralists,	   merchants,	   politicians,	   one’s	   own	   culture	   and	   weird	   legal	  
decisions.  
In my opinion sociological research is the best inspirational source. 395 As the sociologist 
is not constrained by legal concepts, she can see beyond or even without the categories 
established by law. Sociologists see beyond what our legal categories would enable them 
to see when they look at reality that positive law straightforwardly ignores. For example, 
the sociologist could inform us that a contractual party engages herself not only with her 
counterpart	  but	  also	  with	  her	  counterpart’s	  clients	  and	  providers, or that business people 
solve their issues outside courts, with non-adversarial modes of solving conflicts. On the 
other hand sociologists see without legal categories when they approach realities for 
which law does have a category. It could be the case that the law has long (ad)dressed an 
atypical reality with a typical legal concept, disguising its genuine morphology. Indeed, 
this has been the case for my interested promises. My understanding of the authentic 
morphology of the interested promise is very much due to the developments of the 
sociological	   observations	   of	  Melvin	  Eisenberg.	   If	   it	  weren’t	   for	   the	   sociological	   part	   of	  
                                                        
395 The example of the sociological approach I have in mind is I.R. MacNeil, The New Social Contract, An 




Probability and Chance in Contract Law, I would have still thought of interested promises 
as implied contracts (the English law approach in 2.2), atypical delicts (the French law 
approach in 2.3), obligationes ex lege (German law in 2.4) or as (moral) promises (the 
unilateral promise tradition, See 3). 
The jurist must read sociology, but with scrupulous care. We are here not to use legal 
words to describe what society does, wants or is assumed to want. What we do is 
predispose ourselves to finding possible juridical explanations for legally unprecedented 
practices. 
4.3.2.3. CHARACTERIZE IT WITH A LEGAL TERM… 
The first question we ask is what kind of legal reality this reality resembles. What is the 
juridical nature of the phenomenon under examination? The jurist must think of a higher 
concept than the concept she or he intuits that the thing is. We call this process technical 
characterization. 
Take my PhD as an example. Its target is not that difficult. As Eisenberg would say, 396 the 
point of the interested promise is to induce confidence in the promisee so he creates a 
chance for the promisor. The promisor makes the promise in order to obtain value from 
the promise: the so-called	  “value	  of	  the	  chance.” It is obvious that if the interested promise 
qualifies as a legal concept, it qualifies as a voluntary cause of obligation, a commutation 
of	   an	   obligation	   for	   “the	   value	   of	   a	   chance.”397 So we have to approach the interested 
promise from the perspective of the high-concept of voluntary cause of obligation. 
4.3.2.4. …AND STATE WHAT YOU HAVE CHARACTERIZED. 
Having overlapped the two concepts in our thought, we must write about one in a way 
that a reader might understand the other concept. In other words, we must describe the 
interested promise in a way that a jurist could find the conditions that make up every 
cause of obligation. What is the thing that the promisor owns and wants to transfer to the 
promisee? What is the interaction whereby the promisor disposes and the promisee 
acquires? And how is it that, in the interaction, the promisor not only disposes of what the 
promisee acquires but also acquires what the promisee disposes? What is what the 
                                                        
396 Melvin	  A.	  Eisenberg,	  “Probability and Chance in Contract Law,”	  UCLA L. Rev., 45, (1997-1998), pp. 1005-
1076. See 1.1.3. 




promisee owns and disposes? In answering these questions we will be determining legal 
concepts.  
(A) LEGAL STATEMENTS 
Private law offers at least five techniques or means with which we can determine legal 
concepts.398 My	  favorite	  one	  is	  what	  I	  call	  “legal	  statement.”	  I	  would	  use this technique if, 
for example, I talked about the right that the promisor has and wants to transfer to the 
promisee with categorical propositions	  like	  “the	  promisor	  must own a certain amount of 
disposable freedom,”	  “the	  promisor	  determines	  part	  of	  his	  freedom	  by	  ideating	  a	  credit	  
right,”	  and	  “received	  promises	  transfer	  credit	  rights.” Legal statements are useful when 
the jurist wants to map out legal ideas, describe the constituents of a legal relation with 
very indicative, maybe figurative words - French Civil Code style.399 
                                                        
398 For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	   “legal	   technique” see:	  Gény,	  Françoise,	   “The Legislative 
Technique of Modern Civil Codes,”	  (Ernest	  Bruncken	  translation),	   in	  Vv.	  Aa.,	  Science of Legal Method, 
MacMillan, New York, 1921, pp. 498-557. 
399 Let us take a brief look on how the writers of the French Civil Code synthetized justice and social reality 
in gentle, even literary legal statements. 
Art.	  544	  of	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code	  defines	  property	  in	  the	  following	  way;	  “Ownership	  is	  the	  right	  to	  enjoy	  
and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided that use is not made of them which is 
prohibited	  by	  laws	  or	  regulations.”	  Art	  545	  follows	  to	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  owner’s	  free	  will	  
to	  decide	  if	  his	  thing	  will	  be	  disposed:	  “No	  one	  can	  be	  forced	  to	  yield	  his	  ownership,	  unless	  for	  public	  
purposes and with	  just	  and	  antecedent	  compensations.” 
Having made these definitions, the Code now moves to govern an issue that could take place, occur as a 
matter	  of	  fact	  in	  the	  life	  of	  (mainly	  land)	  owners.	  “Ownership	  of	  a	  thing,	  either	  movable	  or	  immovable,	  
gives a right on all which it produces and on that which unites with it accessorily, either naturally or 
artificially.	  Such	  right	  is	  called	  right	  of	  accession.”	  This	  statement	  is	  not	  about	  your	  entitlements	  as	  an	  
owner. Article 546 gets into the fact that things may multiply themselves, produce new things, receive 
annexations and generate emoluments. What is to be the status of the new things? All manner of produce 
borne of your thing, and all that happens to attach to it inseparably, are accessories of yours; belonging 
to the owner of the principal thing by right of accession. Why is this so? Well, given your authorization 
to acquire ownership, that all persons must tolerate that you exclude them from the acquisition of things 
and bear a duty to respect you as the exclusive master of what you acquired, it becomes axiomatic that 
everything occurring within the boundaries of your territory, nay, without externally affecting the lives 
of others, is a matter for the owner to be concerned with and of which he owes no explanation to others. 
Then, if a thing of yours happens to produce another thing, you, for the law, are equally owner of the two 
things. (In reality it is as if nothing really happened, see 4.1.3.3(b)). 
Art. 547 further develops the right of accession and Art. 548 addresses the very sensitive issue for which 
the	  546	  determination	  was	  actually	  made.	  Art	  548	  solves	  a	  transactional	  issue;	  “Fruits	  produced	  by	  a	  
thing belong to the owner only with the obligation of reimbursing the costs of labor, works and seedings 
done	  by	  third	  parties.”	  If	  the	  accession	  or	  production	  occurred	  because	  of	  the	  work,	  seeding	  or	  labor	  of	  
another	  (I’ve	  always	  wondered	  why	  the	  Code	  talks	  about	  third	  parties)	  the	  just	  solution	  is	  that	  the	  owner	  
keeps the produce or thing and compensates the work, seeding or labor of the producer. 
Some	  150	  years	  after	  of	  the	  code’s	  enactment	  the	  law	  number	  60-464, 17 May 1960, Art. 1 regulated an 
issue arising in the application of Art. 548. The price for the work, seed or labor sensibly increases since 
the claimant performed the work and the defendant has not yet paid for it. Inflation might have been 





Other techniques will be more suitable for answering other questions. So if I wanted to 
talk about the legal significance of the new cause of obligation, I would choose the 
language	   of	   “norms.” 400  “The	   promisor	   incurs	   a	   promissory	   obligation	   where	   the	  
promisee	  receives	  the	  interested	  promise	  and	  creates	  the	  value	  sought	  by	  the	  promisor.” 
A now classic understanding of norms has it that norms are conditionals. Norms are 
propositions	  composed	  by	  a	  “situational	  case”	  and	  a	  “legal	  effect,”	  where	  the	  situational	  
case is the factual condition for the legal consequence. Norms accordingly would generally 
adopt the grammatical form	  “If	  X	  then	  Y.”401 But it seems that sentences could make norms 
without using conditional“if,”	   as	  when	   they	   say	   “Every	   doer	   of	   X	   is	   liable	   to	   do	  Y,”	   or	  
“Where	  someone	  does	  X	  there	  is	  an	  obligation	  to	  do	  Y.”	  The	  indicia	  of	  a	  norm	  seems	  to	  be	  
that a sentence contains an applicable piece of law; that it describes the factual conditions 
under which a legal consequence is in place, from a complete legal relation—like a cause 
                                                        
jurists had to regulate it. The producer has deprived herself of a value when she did the work and, as she 
could	   not	   value	   it	   before	   its	   price	   escalated,	   justice	   states	   the	   “value	   is	   estimated	   at	   the	   date	   of	  
reimbursement.” 
400 This	   legislative	   technique	   appears	  masterly	  developed	   firstly	   in	  Ernest	   Zitelmann’s	  book Irrtum und 
Rechtsgeschäft (1879)	   and	   later	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Hans	   Kelsen.	   Natalino	   Irti	   explains	   it	   as	   the	   jurist’s	  
response to the need of rational calculus demanded by the emerging modern capitalism in the late 
nineteenth century Germany. In legal norms, the contract, like all relations, appears as a situation of fact; 
the legal relations are legal effects. Natalino	  Irti,	  “Un	  contratto	  <<incalcolabile>>,”	  in	  Rivista Trimestrale 
di Diritto e Procedura Civile, (Marzo), 2015, No 1, p. 19. 
401 “In	  its	  logical	  form, the rule of law is an hypothetical judgment that binds a certain case (the illicit act) to 
a determinate consequence: the coactive sanction. This conception is the only one that permits 
understand clearly and precisely the fact of the illicit. The illicit is a specific condition of the fact-
consequence,	  of	  the	  act	  of	  coaction	  established	  as	  sanction	  by	  the	  legal	  rule.”	  Hans Kelsen, El contrato y 
el	  Tratado,	  Analizados	  desde	  el	  punto	  de	  vista	  de	  la	  teoría	  pura	  del	  derecho,	  García	  Máynez	  translation,	  
Nacional, Mexico, 1979, p. 94. 
To an account of norms from a private law perspective see Mario Allara, Le Nozioni Fondamentali del 
Diritto Privato, t. 1, Giappichelli, Torino, 1939, pp. 1-57, who adds, to the conditional or hypothetical 
character of norms, the characters of generality, abstraction and bipolarity. Bipolarity in Allara is not a 
link between the subject of the law and the lawgiver, but a link in between a holder of a right and bearer 
of a correlative duty: 
the legal order, as a complex of norms that regulate social behavior, comes to attribute to subjects diverse 
positions or diverse treatments. On the one hand, there is the subject who, in the regulation of the relationship, 
is advantaged; this is the subject on the interest of whom the regulation is established. On the other hand, 
there is the subject who in the relationship has a disadvantageous position. It is said that the first subject is 
the holder of a right (right in the subjective sense) and the second subject is the holder of a juridical duty. To 
the first subject corresponds the faculty to behave in a certain mode and the pretension that the other behaves 
in a certain way as against him. The second subject is hold to a determined behavior (positive or negative). 
The social relation thus regulated becomes a juridical relationship.  




of obligation—to a presupposition of a legal relation—like the conditions under which 
someone qualifies as a capable person. 
Norms can be very effective for conveying legal messages. However, one should not 
overuse them. Too many norms in a text make an overly technical reading.402  
(C) LEGAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
If I were enumerating legal relations, I would be implementing the classificatory 
technique. 403  For	   example,	   “Enforceable	   promises	   are	   the	   promise	   of	   a	   reward,	   the	  
promise	   of	   a	   contract	   and	   the	   fake	   gratuitous	   promise.”	   In	   its	   strong	   version,	   a	  
classification is geared to give an exact and exhaustive enumeration of the different kinds 
within a particular genus.	  They	  are	  known	  as	  “numerus clausus”	  classifications	  because	  
they are not open to the inclusion of new units.404 Weak classifications, on the other hand, 
make it clear that the kinds enumerated in the classification are mere examples of the 
genus.	  For	  example,	  “Wrong	  discriminations	  are	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	  age,	  race	  or	  
some other unjustifiable basis.”	  The	  statement	  “or	  some	  other	  unjustifiable	  basis”	  opens	  
the classification to the inclusion of new kinds of discrimination. 
                                                        
402 “[T]he	  dry	  language	  of	  the	  BGB	  contrasts	  rather	  unfavourably	  with	  the	  elegant	  declarations	  of	  general	  
principles	  in	  the	  French	  Code	  civil.”	  Basil	  Markesinis	  et al., The German Law of Contract: A comparative 
treatise, 2d ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2006, p. 21. 
403 Private law is rich in classifications. There are traditional debates about classifications. The classification 
of the obligations can properly be called a traditional issue of private law. See 4.1.1.1. and the discussion 
in 4.2. Another similar issue is the classification of the subjective rights. A recent example in Shalev 
Ginossar,	  “Rights	  in	  rem:	  A	  new	  approach,”	  in	  Israel Law Review, vol. 14, N. 3, (1979), pp. 286-336. 
404 I agree with Werner Goldschmidt in that “The point of divisions is to give an exact and exhaustive vision 
of	  a	  concept’s	  extension.”	  Introducción	  filosófica	  al	  Derecho:	  La	  teoría	  trialista	  del	  mundo	  jurídico	  y	  sus	  
horizontes, 6th ed., Buenos Aires, Depalma, 1987, p. 351. But I must add two notes. First of all, 
exhaustiveness is the point of strong or perfect classifications. There are merely enumerative 
classifications, which could be very useful.  
In second place, the fact that a classification intends to exhaust its subject matter does not entail that the 
classification has indeed exhausted the subject matter. Classifications are human products, the best of 
the aspirations of a human intellect but no more than aspirations realized in facts. This means that it 
should be possible to contest numerus clausus classifications. Obviously, the argument that one must 
elaborate to prove that a case must be contemplated amongst the cases contemplated in a non-
exhaustive classification must be (qualitatively) different to the argument that one must elaborate to 
prove that a case must be contemplated among the cases contemplated in an exhaustive classification. 
An example of the former kind of argument appears in 4.3.2.4 (d) and 4.1.5.1 note 115, where one applies 
a concept	  like	  “contract”	  to	  a	  case,	  showing	  that	  something	  unknown	  to	  the	  law	  (an	  atypical	  contract)	  is	  
in fact like the (typical) contracts regulated in the Code or precedents. This PhD is an example of the 
latter kind of argument,, where I firstly had to build the model common to all the types and then rather 
than apply the model to the case, determine the case in accordance with the model. I did not have to tell 
the	  reader	  “Look,	  that	  is	  an	  offer,”	  I	  had	  to	  tell	  the	  reader,	  “Look,	  those	  statements	  of	  X	  can	  be	  represented 
as	  a	  legal	  interaction,	  which	  we	  will	  call	  promise.”	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  did	  not	  apply	  a	  concept	  but	  construed	  




(D) LEGAL CONCEPTS 
I will now turn to legal concepts in strict sense.405 To make a legal concept you must have 
first defined	  a	  legal	  phenomenon	  (see	  4.3.2.4(a)).	  “A	  contract	  is	  an	  agreement	  whereby	  
two persons exchange	  rights.”	  This	  is	  a	  definition	  of	  contract.	  The	  concept	  will	  be	  made	  
out of the partition of the definition. The task is to parcel the definition into systematically 
related elements, or parts. 406 For example, the concept of contract, based on the definition 
given above, could be divided into four parts: offer, obligation, acceptance and 
consideration.407 
Both classification and conceptualization work with already juridified phenomena, and 
are concerned with division. However, they differ in this: partition divides a definition 
into parts (parallel verticals) and classification divides a definition into species (parallel 
horizontals). It is clear what we can do with the species of a legal relation (see 4.3.2.4.(c) 
and 4.1.5.1). What do we do with a legal relation’s	  parts?	  Parceling	  a	  legal	  relation	  offers	  
a set of elements through which the jurist can perceive, explain and govern every possible 
instance	  (or	  species)	  of	  the	  legal	  relation.	  Compare,	  for	  example,	  Gaius’s	  classification	  of	  
the Roman law consensual contracts	  with	  Benson’s	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  common	  law	  
contract.408 Both Gaius and Benson are talking about more or less the same thing: the 
                                                        
405 See	  La	  Pira’s	  work	  in	  the	  bibliography	  (private	  law	  theory).	   
For a defense of conceptual analysis in law see Dietmar	  von	  der	  Pfordte,	  “About	  concepts	  in	  law,” in Jaap 
C. Hage, von der Pfordte, Dietmar (eds.), Concepts in law, Springer, Dordrecht and New York, 2009, pp. 
17-33,	  where	  what	   I	  call	   “legal	  concept”	   is	  one	   type	  of	   concept,	  which Pfordte calls	   “determinatio ex 
partitio”.	  Idem,	  at	  24. 
406 These parts are systematically related because the intelligibility of one demands the intelligibility of the 
others (see 4.2.3.3.)  
You can find a legal concept in in Gaius, Institutes, IV, 44, where Gaius explains that certain parts of the 
legal	  action	  make	  no	  sense	  without	  others.	  The	  “Condemnatio”	  must	  be	  preceded	  by	  the	  “Intentio”	  and	  
this	  by	  the	  “Demonstratio”,	  “for the Demonstratio without the Intentio and the Condemnatio, is of no 
effect.”	  There	  are	  some	  parts	  that have sense alone, or that do not require other parts to be intelligible: 
“and in fact, sometimes the Intentio exists alone, as in prejudicial formulas, in which the question is 
whether a man is a freedman, or what the amount of a dowry may be, and numerous others.” 
407 Another excellent partition of the contract appears in the French Civil Code, whose Book III, Title III, 
Chapter	  II:	  “Of	  Conditions	  essential	  to	  the	  Validity	  of	  Agreements”,	  says,	  in	  its	  only	  article	  (1108): 
Four conditions are essential to the validity of an agreement: 
The consent of the party who binds himself; 
His capacity to contract; 
A certain object forming the matter of the contract; 
A lawful cause in the bond. 
408 See Gaius, Institutes,	  III,	  93	  and	  ss.	  and	  Peter	  Benson,	  “The	  unity	  of	  Contract	  Law,”	  in	  (ed)	  Benson,	  Peter,	  




social practices of buying and selling, letting and hiring and mandating someone to 
represent us in an affair. Both jurists are also saying that one party incurs an obligation 
as against another because he received a reciprocal obligation from the other. 409 
However,	  Benson’s	  juridical	  determination	  is	  superior	  in	  justice	  to	  Gaius’ determination. 
In	   Gaius’	   legal	   piece, only the classified consensual contracts are enforceable. 410  If a 
plaintiff comes to the praetor with a case where he and the defendant agreed that he will 
look	  after	  the	  other’s	  children	  and	  the	  other	  will	  paint	  his	  wall,	  the	  praetor	  will	  have	  no	  
definition of contract with which to characterize the case (This atypical consensual 
contract,	   it	   goes	   without	   saying,	   does	   not	   appear	   in	   Gaius’	   list). Had the praetor had 
Benson’s	  conceptualization,	  he	  would	  have	  had	  such an instrument.	  With	  the	  contract’s	  
parts at hand, the praetor can easily grant a contract action to the plaintiff. For, as the 
plaintiff reported it, the case is about an accepted offer of two reciprocal obligations. We 
see that in the Gaian list, two consensual contracts can receive unequal treatment. In 
Benson’s	  determination,	  in	  contrast,	  all	  consensual	  contracts	  receive	  equal	  treatment.411 
The difference is due solely to the fact that Professor Benson used the conceptualization 
technique. 
Concluding, legal concepts are optimal for practices like contract, tort, unjust enrichment, 
unilateral promise, testaments, practices that can take place in so many different ways 
that a case-by-case approach would never cover all the possible instances (see 2.4.3.2 and 
3.3.4). For, once again, parceling a legal relation offers a set of elements through which 
the jurist can perceive, explain and govern every possible instance (or species) of the legal 
relation.	  With	  the	  contract’s	  parts	  at	  hand	  you	  can	  look	  at	  every	  seemingly	  contractual	  
behavior and ask, is that an offer? If yes, then ask again, was it accepted? If yes, then: does 
the acceptance contain a valid consideration? If yes, then you can conclude that there is a 
contractual obligation. 
 
                                                        
409 Benson’s	  commitment	  to	  justice	  is	  well	  known.	  On	  Gaius’	  see	  Aldo Schiavone, Ius. L’invenzione	  del	  diritto	  
in Occidente, Einadi, Torino, 2005, p. 126. 
410 Conf. Arrigo Dernburg, Diritto delle obbligazioni, 6°,	  Francesco	  Bernardino	  Cicala	  translation	  (?),	  Bocca,	  
Torino,	  1903,	  §7,	  4,	  p.	  24.	  Also Paul Jörs and Kunkel, Wolfgang, Derecho privado romano, 2d. ed., L. Prieto 
Castro translation, Labor, Barcelona, 1965, §117,	  3,	  p.	  271. 
411 Moreover,	  Benson’s	  contract	  is	  a	  more	  efficient	  private	  law	  piece.	  Where the Roman lawyer must learn 








Can we have a just, peaceful law, that which comes about from justice without sword? The question seems to 
me interesting in two senses: direction one, do we need a sword to make the commandments of justice a fact? 
There are others, perhaps more effective modes of coercion. I am thinking of the coercion modes of morality, 
which are imposed by the very lawbreaker. Or, think of the external but non-physically violent modes of 
enforcing norms—reputation. The second direction of the question concerning the possibility of peaceful law is 
even more interesting. First, assume that there is a system of just laws, general statements about what to do in 
different scenarios that find justification in the rule of equal freedom (justice). Second, assume that people 
without exception comply with the norms of the peaceful law: they live  in  “the  golden  age”: 
 
Esiodo, ne Le Opere e i Giorni, racconta che all'inizio, nel periodo in cui regnava Crono, c'era una "razza 
d'oro". Gli uomini vivevano ancora come gli Dei: non invecchiavano e godevano la vita tra banchetti e 
feste. Giunto il tempo di morire si addormentavano dolcemente. Non dovevano lavorare ed i beni 
appartenevano a tutti. Vivevano dell'abbondante raccolto offerto dalla terra e non facevano guerre. Era 
il regno dell Giustizia e della Buona Fede, e gli Dei vivevano accanto ai mortalii. Giovenale affermava che 
un tempo "nessuno temeva ancora i ladri" e la gente viveva "senza chiudere l'orto". Ci si nutriva di 
legumi e di frutti, senza uccidere animali. 
 
Do we need such thing as justice where its commandments shine in all of our actions? May be the role of justice 
in the golden age is figurative—sign of the reign of peace. Or may be she is there to be consulted of what to do 
in cases for which the law has not yet spoken. Whatever the case may be, 
 
…   i  misfatti   dell'umanità  misero   in   fuga Iustitia e la costrinsero a lasciare la terra, in cui viveva con 
familiarità  coi  Mortali,  rifugiandosi  in  cielo  dove  divenne  la  costellazione  della  Vergine. 
 






(E) LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
We must begin differentiating the principles of law from the principles of justice.412  The 
principles of justice are analytical implications of the rule of equal freedom, like 
“independence	  from	  being	  bound	  by	  others	  to	  more	  than	  one	  can in turn bind them[,]”413 
which expresses in different words much the same as the pure rule of equal freedom. 
From this it follows that the principles of justice have no content; they talk about all legal 
relations, and at the same time address no specific legal relation (see Introductory Speech 
1). In contrast, principles of law are about specific legal relations. They establish 
fundamental truths for specific legal relations. Pacta sunt servanda is one such principle. 
It orders the parties of a contract to do what they have promised to each other. Pacta sunt 
servanda is	  a	  fundamental	  truth	  of	  contract	  law	  in	  that	  there	  couldn’t	  be	  contract	  law	  if	  
pacta sunt servanda were false. Yet, there could be private law without pacta sunt 
servanda. One can certainly imagine a private law society where exchanges are made only 
manually. As the transaction emerged and died without leaving obligations, there is no 
need to order the parties to commit to their agreement. Principles of law are to their legal 
relations what the Pythagorean theorem is to a right-angled triangle; they are true to the 
figure with which they are concerned.  
(F) ARE THERE RULES FOR DETERMINING LAW? 
Of course there are. For example, every legal determination must have a practical 
implication. So, if I spend time talking about the right that the promisor has and wants to 
transfer to the promisee it is not because I find it useful to inform the reader about the 
constituents of the unilateral promise. It is because such determination would have 
practical implications. The most relevant one is that it is the mentioned right that a 
promisee would receive with the promise and claim in case of breach of promise.414 The 
jurist is prone to indulge in the sweet bias of conceptual jurisprudence. She must 
remember, determining legal pieces is not about demonstrating one’s	  ability to split hairs. 
Another order of rules includes those that determine the appropriate use of a technique. 
For example, if one decides to elaborate a principle, a decision that should be rather 
                                                        
412 Italians	  distinguish	  “the	  principles	  of	  single	  institutions”	  from	  “the	  general	  principles	  of	  the	  system”	  See	  
Norberto Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla funzione: Nuovi studi di teoria del diritto, Edizioni di Comunita, 
Milano, 1977, p. 259. 
413 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor translation, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996, 6:237-6:238, pp. 393-394. 
414  Another practical implication that emerges from the same determination is the possibility of right 




extraordinary, one must be abstract enough so as to allow judicial discretion without 
giving room to plain arbitrariness. Or, if one decides to classify legal entities, one must 
classify them in accordance with the different ways in which the various entities manifest 
their common character or gender. For example, it would be a mistake to classify the 
contracts as real and consensual if one has defined contract as agreement with 
patrimonial content.415 For saying that a contract is not concluded unless the plaintiff 
transfers the thing she agreed to transfer to the defendant amounts to saying that contract 
is	  more	  than	  agreement	  with	  patrimonial	  content	  or	  that	  the	  “real	  contract”	  is	  not	  actually	  
a contract. The jurist may still want to give legal reality to the practices known as real 
contracts. But then she must either change the definition of contract (she still wants to 
classify those practices as a contract!) or rather classify them as something other than 
contractual transactions. This must be considered if the idea of classification is taken 
seriously.  
The typical definitional mistake occurs where definitions contain the definiendum. For 
example,	   “A	  promise	   is	  a	  promise	  made	  by…”	  You	  are	  not	   really	  defining!	  A	  definition	  
would also be biased where the definition is excessively ample or excessively narrow. We 
saw in Part 3 that from the perspective of justice, the definition of promise is biased due 
to excess. A common mistake in conceptualizations is to treat accidental elements as 
essentials. I would commit this mistake for example, if I said that the obligation of 
unilateral promises is conditional. True, the obligation of the promise of a reward and the 
promise of a prize is conditional. Yet, the obligations of other unilateral promises are not 
conditional but potestative (i.e. promise of a contract) or pure and simple (i.e. fake 
gratuitous promises), see 5.2.2.2 (c). Saying that the obligations of unilateral promises are 
conditional would exclude the promise of a contract and fake gratuitous promise from the 
law of unilateral promises.  
(G) THE PRIVATE LAW LANGUAGE 
Three points on the use of language: First of all, new ideas must be presented with new 
words. Why? Well, important legal concepts are generally tied to a word; if we want to 
talk about contract	  we	  do	  not	  say	  other	  than	  “contract.”	  If	  we	  use	  an	  occupied	  word	  for	  
                                                        
415 Real	  contracts	  are	  defined	  in	  opposition	  to	  consensual	  contracts.	  “The	  contracts	  are	  consensual	  or	  real.	  
The consensual contracts, notwithstanding what it will be established in relation to their form, are 
concluded for producing their proper effects from the moment that the parties have reciprocally 
manifested	  their	  consent.”	  1871	  Argentinian	  Civil	  Code,	  art	  1140.	  “The	  real	  contracts,	  for	  producing	  their	  
proper effects, are concluded from the moment that one of the parties	  have	  made	  conveyance	  [tradición]	  
of	  the	  thing	  which	  the	  contract	  is	  about.”	  Idem,	  art	  1141	  “Form	  the	  class	  of	  the	  real	  contracts	  the	  loan	  for	  
consumption, the loan for use, the contract of deposit and the constitution of surety and of anticresis.”	  




talking about a new concept, we create the possibility that the reader, in a moment of 
distraction, will think of a concept other than the one we intend to invoke. We want to 
prevent such confusion. 
Secondly, in labeling a new concept we must choose private law words. What? Yes, private 
law words.416 Ask yourself this question: What most immediately tells you that what you 
are facing is a piece of private law? Take this legal monstrosity:	  “The	  person	  who	  makes	  
a contract with a thing will be free to perform it unless a third party requires it.”	  This	  legal	  
statement makes no sense, juridically speaking. However, it predisposed you to interpret 
it	   as	   a	   juridical	   piece.	   Didn’t	   it?	   Why?!	   Because it used words that are traditionally 
associated with private law discourse.  
You should present your construction with legal words because you wish for your concept 
to be quickly interpreted in the manner intended.417 Another reason for using legal words 
is that you do not want to clutter your discourse with awkward sounds. What do I mean? 
Let	  me	  illustrate:	  “An	  obligation	  is	  a	  legal	  relation	  by	  which	  a	  private	  agent	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  
give	   or	   do	   something	   at	   the	   request	   of	   another.”	   There	   is	   one	   thing	   awkward in this 
statement.	  The	  awkward	  thing	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  words	  “private	  agent”.	  Even	  if	  “private	  
agent”	  will	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  more	  or	  less	  what	  I	  want	  to	  say,	  “private	  agent”	  are	  not	  legal	  
words.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  “goods”/“thing”	  and	  “bargain”/“contract,”	  the	  examples	  
could be multiplied. 
Now, we must present concepts with legal words but we must avoid using extant legal 
words. What legal word do we use then? Two possibilities. The first one is to recycle. You 
utilize a legal word whose latest concept is no longer vital in your law. For example, the 
word	   “pollicitatio,” originally from Roman law, absent in the common law, and 
translatable	  into	  “policitation”	  could	  be	  linked	  to	  a	  type	  of	  public	  solicitation.	  The	  law	  of	  
property is full of words attached to obsolete concepts. The other possibility is to invent. 
How can we invent a word that sounds legal? This is something that I cannot really tell. 
But	  I	  will	  give	  you	  an	  example:	  Have	  you	  ever	  heard	  of	  the	  “right	  of	  disposable	  freedom?”	  
Most probably you haven’t.	  Yet,	  these	  words	  sound	  legal,	  don’t	  they?	  The key is probably 
to use Latin rooted words. You will see many examples in Part 5.418 
                                                        
416 I	  take	  the	  term	  “law	  words”	  from	  Albert	  Kocourek,	  Jural Relations, MacMillan, Indianapolis, 1927, p. 25. 
417 See Introductory Part.4.3. 
418 Here you have an example of a nice choice of words: 
While there are numerous other instances of the apt use of	  the	  term	  “liberty,”	  both	  in	  juridical	  opinions	  and	  in	  
coveyancing	  documents,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  so	  common	  or	  definite	  a	  word	  as	  “privilege.”	  The	  former	  term	  is	  far	  
more likely to be used in the sense of physical or personal freedom (i.e., absence of physical restraint), as 




4.3.2.5. BE AN ARTIST WHEN IT IS DUE 
We generally do not have to determine every single part of the construction. We will see 
that some juridical aspects of the interested promise appear to us in the form of existing 
legal concepts. For example, that one person states to want to commit herself to do 
something at the request of another is explainable and governable with the concept of 
voluntary obligation. I am now tempted to say that something of the new reality must 
show the form of an existing legal concept; for otherwise the reality would have never 
caught our attention! 
Still, the time for determining legal concepts will come. It is evident that the seeming cause 
or reciprocation of the voluntary obligation—the chance that the promisee does what the 
promisor wants—hardly fits an existing legal form. We may recall the contracts that are 
about an obligation for a chance.419 But we must resist closing circles with fictions! The 
chance that could be involved in a contract is actually wrapped up in the obligation that a 
party either offered or accepted. Closing the circle with a fiction would be implying an 
acceptance of the promise, which we do not want to do (2.2). We must give legal reality 
to the chance with creatively! We try to explain the chance-creation fact in a manner that 
makes it clear that, with the reception of the promise, a new subjective right goes from 
the promisee to the promisor. 
4.3.3. THE INTERESTED PROMISE APPEARS TO BE A PREFABRICATED CAUSE OF OBLIGATION 
I now begin my construction. These lines of argument will be dedicated to preparing the 
reality called interested promise, so that I can determine it in its best possible legal 
representation. We are not determining a private-law concept yet. I am beginning to 
mould, as it were, what will be determined in part 5. 
4.3.3.1. CHARACTERIZATION: A VOLUNTARY CAUSE OF OBLIGATION 
What is the juridical nature of the interested promise? As we are told, the point of a 
promise of a reward, prize or contract is to induce confidence on the part of the promisees 
so that they will consider looking for the lost thing, engage in the challenge or ponder the 
                                                        
distinguished	  form	  a	  particular	  relation	  between	  two	  definite	  individuals.	  Besides	  all	  this,	  the	  term	  “privilege”	  
has the	  advantage	  of	  giving	  us,	  as	  a	  variable,	  the	  adjective	  “privileged”.	  Thus,	   it	   is	  frequently	  convenient	  to	  
speak of a privileged act, a privileged transaction, a privileged conveyance, etc.  
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” in 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol 23, No 1, (1913), pp. 16-59, at PP. 42-43 (quotes omitted and italics in the text.) 
The final justification is hilarious. 




contract proposal. Interested promisors make these promises because the promisees who 
receive them enhance the chance that they will get something they want—a lost thing, a 
nice challenge, a sale, etc. (see 1.1.3.) It is obvious that, if the interested promise qualifies 
as a legal concept, it qualifies as a voluntary cause of obligation, a commutation of an 
obligation for the so-called	  “value	  of	  a	  chance”	  (see	  1.3).  
So we have to approach the interested promise from the perspective of the high-concept 
of voluntary cause of obligation. The interested promise must be explained as a 
commutative transfer of rights (see 4.1.3-4). A series of questions then emerge: What is 
the thing that the promisor owns and then transfers to the promisee? How does she 
transfer that thing to the promisee? Does the promisee acquire that thing? How? How is 
it that the promisee creates a chance for the promisor? Does the appointed promisee 
always create the sought-for chance? And, finally, how does the promisor acquire the 
created chance? 
(A) THERE IS ONE PERSON: THE PROMISOR 
If	  the	  persons	  of	  the	  contract	  inter	  absents	  are	  the	  “offeror”	  and	  “acceptor”	  (see	  4.1.3.1),	  
who are the persons of the interested promise? Even if we visualise the entire 
relationship, we focus firstly on one person. The person who initiates something, who 
with the participation of a second person will culminate an interested promise, is the 
“interested	  promisor.”	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  her	  simply	  as	  the	  promisor. 
(B) SHE, WITH A SUBJECTIVE RIGHT OVER A THING: A PERFORMANCE TO OBLIGATE  
The promisor wants to make a promise. She, in the words of a high private-law concept, 
wants to dispose of a right. What is the thing that the promisor owns and wants to transfer 
to the promisee? We can say that the promisor appears as owner of an amount of 
disposable freedom, which she will specify in a performance and transfer as an obligation 
to the promisee. (See 4.1.3.2 and 5.2.1). 
The classical theory of the obligation is perfectly suited to explaining what promisors 
want to give in the case of the typical interested promises. For example, the interest of the 
person who makes a promise of a contract is that the promisee acquires an irrevocable 
option	   to	   make	   a	   contract.	   We	   can	   say	   that	   the	   promisor	   transfers	   a	   “potestative	  
obligation”	  to	  the	  promisee.	  An obligation is potestative when its exigibility depends on a 
dispositional act of the creditor. The creditor cannot claim performance unless he has 
previously declared to the debtor his will to accrue the owed performance. Meanwhile, 




promisor cannot act as if she had never promised to make (do) a contract to the promisee. 
We will see more examples in 5.2.2. 
(C) HER ACT AFFECTS ANOTHER’S SPHERE OF RIGHT: THE PROMISEE DISPOSES WHAT THE 
PROMISEE ACQUIRES? 
The promisor specifies the obligation as she wishes and gives it to the promisee by means 
of	   a	   promise.	   The	   act	   of	   “promise”	   is	   the	  means	   by	   which	   the	   promisor	   ex hypothesi 
transfers the obligation to the promisee. But is it? 
 (C.1) A SENSIBLE ISSUE: CAN A PROMISEE ACQUIRE WITHOUT ACCEPTING? 
Jurists developing theories of contract have long maintained that transfers of rights need 
acceptance to be perfect. This, despite the fact that, since the times of the jurist Paulus, 
private laws have been enforcing promises that were revoked before the acceptance.420 
However, these jurists are authorities (I am talking about Grotius, Pufendorf and most 
recently Pothier) and proffer reasonable arguments. So the question must be asked: Is 
promise apt to transfer rights? Is it just to say that someone can acquire a right without 
either requesting it or accepting it? In answering these questions we must forget about 
contract. We look at promise from the perspective of high-private law concepts. Promise 
must appear as an interaction between two persons and it must be clear that the 
interaction	  is	  affecting	  the	  two	  parties’	  spheres	  of	  rights	  (see	  4.1.3.3). More specifically, 
the promisor must appear as someone who disposes part of her freedom and the 
promisee as someone who acquires the disposed freedom as a credit right (see 4.1.4). I 
will build promise as a private law interaction in 5.2-3, and justify my construction in 6.1. 
(D) THERE IS ANOTHER PERSON: THE PROMISEE 
Let us assume that the promise transfers the obligation to the promisee or that the 
promisee has a legal basis to think that he has acquired a right directly from the promisor. 
We	  get	  to	  the	  other	  person	  of	  the	  relation.	  We	  call	  him	  the	  “interested	  promisee,”	  or	  if	  no	  
contrary specification	  is	  made,	  simply	  “promisee”. 
 (D.1.) THE SOLID BUT RARE POSITION OF THE PROMISEE 
But	  what	  can	  the	  promisee	  do	  with	  his	  “promissory	  right?”	  Suppose	  the	  promisor	  neglects	  
the promise. The promisee will go to a court, supporting her claim to her promissory right 
not only with the promise. The promisor did not transfer a right charitably. She 
                                                        




transferred a right because she knew that the	  promisee’s reception of the right would 
induce him to produce a benefit for her. The promisee will bring socioeconomic studies 
in support of his	  claim:	  Promisors	  make	  interested	  promises	  to	  obtain	  the	  “value	  of	  the	  
chance.” 421  What is more, the promisee will be able to support his case with legal 
decisions:	  Private	  law	  dictums	  that	  have	  recognized	  such	  chances	  as	  “ample	  consideration 
for the promise.”422 It is as if private law had seen these chances as advantages passing 
from the promisee to the promisor and, in a fashion comparable with other cases (see 
4.1.4.3 (b)), it utilizes these advantages to render the promissory rights enforceable. 
These arguments, especially the last one, sound convincing. But as scientists we cannot 
content ourselves with rare decisions. We want to give conceptual form to the so-called 
“value	  of	  the	  chance.”	  If	  the	  transfer	  going	  from	  the	  promisor to the promisee is a difficult 
one, the reciprocal is even more so. But we must try. 
(D.2.) CHANCE AS THE OBJECT OF OBLIGATIONS, BUT NO OBLIGATION-CREATING ACT BY THE 
PROMISEE 
It would be easy to characterize the chance if, for example, the promisee promised the 
chance to the promisor. Private law knows of commutations where one party assures a 
certain result to another while the other only assures a chance. This occurs where A 
assures a payment to B and B assures a prize to A in the event that A wins a competition. 
B has received money and A has received a chance. Gambling contracts follow the same 
                                                        
421 Melvin	  A.	  Eisenberg,	  “Probability	  and	  Chance	  in	  Contract	  Law,”	  UCLA	  L.	  Rev.,	  45,	  (1997-1998), pp. 1005-
1076, at p. 1007. 
422 The statement belongs to A. L. Smith, L. J. in Carlil vs. Carballic Smoke Ball. The task for the judge was to 
show that the defendant gave valid consideration for the public promise of a reward to the user of a 
medicine (smoke balls)	  who	  couldn’t	  benefit	  from	  its	  curative	  effects.	  One	  consideration	  was	  found	  in	  
the fact that the plaintiff used the smoke balls without benefitting from its curative effects but “the	  other	  
more important consideration is the money gain likely to accrue to the defendants by the enhanced sale 
of	  the	  smoke	  balls,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  user	  of	  them.” True, the judge pinned the consideration to 
“the	   plaintiff’s	   user	   of”	   the	  medicine.	   In	  my	   view	   he	   did	   that	   because	   the	   doctrine	   of	   consideration	  
requires some deed on behalf of the party who gives the consideration. But it is obvious that what caused 
sales to increase was not the usage of	   the	   Smoke	  Balls	  but	   the	  chance	   (or	   “the	  money	  gain	   likely to 
accrue”)	  that	  promisees	  created	  when	  they	  received	  the	  promissory	  advertisement.	  The	  same	  argument	  
can be read in Lindley, L. J. opinion:  
It has been argued that this is nudum pactum—that there is no consideration. We must apply to that argument 
the usual legal tests. Let us see whether there is no advantage to the defendants. It is said that the use of the 
ball is no advantage to them, and that what benefits them is the sale; and the case is put that a lot of these balls 
might be stolen, and that it would be no advantage to the defendants if the thief or other people used them. 
The answer to that, I think, is as follows. It is quite obvious that in the view of the advertisers a sue by the 
public of their remedy, if they can only get the public to have confidence enough to use it, will react and 
produce a sale which is directly beneficial to them. Therefore, the advertisers get out of the use an advantage 
which is enough to constitute a consideration. 




pattern. But nothing like this occurs in interested promises. Had the promisee promised 
the promisor to search for the dog, there would be no issue with the characterization of 
the chance. The truth is that the promisee does not even talk to the promisor when he ex 
hypothesi creates the chance. 
(D.3.) CHANCE AS OBJECT OF AN IN REM RIGHT? 
We can approach our research with another question. What is the value that the debtor 
receives in a unilateral contract? In some cases the answer is easy. I offer you money so 
that you build a wall in my garden. You build the wall; I have an in rem right over the wall. 
But what about these cases: X offers to give $Y to anyone who provides information 
leading	   to	   the	  discovery	  Y’s	  murderer,	  or	   to	  anyone	  who	  crosses	   the	  Brooklyn	  Bridge.	  
What sort of right does the offeror acquire when the offeree performs the condition? The 
offeree must appear as someone who providing a value for the obligation he is acquiring 
because he otherwise cannot claim commutation. Recall, justice ensures the enforcement 
of voluntary obligations only where the creditor has acquired a subjective right in the 
obligation-creating act. Our best option is to say that the acceptor gave an in rem right 
over her time and efforts to the offeror. The offeror acquired such a right when the offeree 
produced the requested information or crossed the Brooklyn Bridge. 
Could we build an analogy here? 
If the offeree of a unilateral	   contract	   gives	   “property”	   over	  his	   time	  and	  efforts	   to	   the	  
offeror,	  we	  could	  say,	  the	  promisee	  gives	  “property”	  over	  the	  chance	  she	  produces	  to	  the	  
promisor. The analogy, however, has its limits. When the offeree crosses the Brooklyn 
Bridge, the offeree gives	  “property”	  over	  something	  that	  gets	  consumed	  with	  its	  coming	  
into	  being.	  As	  the	  offeree’s	  efforts	  pass	  into the belonging of the offeror, they disappear. 
In the case of the interested promise, by contrast, the chance remains alive after the 
promisee creates it. The life of the chance lasts from the moment that the promisee 
receives the promise to the moment that the promisee either claims or rejects the 
promissory right. The issue with characterizing the benefit of the chance as a sort of in 
rem right of the promisor would not be the fact that the chance is an intellectual thing. 
The problem is another, rarer issue. It has to do with the fact that the promisee can 
liberate the promisor. By letting the promisor know that he is no longer interested in the 
promise the promisee is at the same time dousing the chance that he may do the thing 
that the promisor wants. Thinking of the chance acquisition as a ius in rem acquisition is 
impossible for this reason—the promisor cannot be represented as owning something 




Yet dominium over things is not the only right in rem. We could own the same thing 
without being co-owners. How? By owning different powers over the same thing. One 
could think of the chance as something that the promisee creates, and is able to destroy, 
but that in fact serves the interest of another. 
(E) HE, WITH A SUBJECTIVE RIGHT OVER A THING: A MODE OF REASONING IN HIS MIND? 
Think of the interested promise this way: Promisors do not make promises to random 
persons. They address persons who could be interested in their promises, persons who 
will take the promissory right and evaluate it as a possible claim. Now let me ask this 
question, is there anything that the promisee could be said to be affecting or using when 
he receives the promise? We certainly cannot say that the promisee affects his own 
possibilities for future performance. Yet we can say that he is using something of his own. 
The reception of the promise by the promisee makes him think, evaluate the promised 
proposal as a possible thing he might do. What the promisee owns, the thing that will be 
affected with the reception of the promise, is his thinking. He is, let us put it this way, 
owner of the thinking that produces the chance. (Please see 5.4.1). 
(F) THE INTERACTION IS NOT A SIMPLE INTERACTION: THE PROMISEE CREATES A CHANCE FOR 
THE PROMISOR 
The promisee receives the promise and realises that he has a new legal possibility of 
action. He may be uninterested in this option at the moment of the acquisition. But he 
knows he has it. The fact that he may have the occasion to remember the option is the 
possibility that the promisor wanted cause with her promise. In precisely what is this 
phenomenon relevant for private law? There are two critical facts to consider.  
Firstly, the chance affects the life of the promisee. The promisee has choices other than 
the one he acquired with the reception of the promise. These choices are surely 
incompatible and possibly contradictory. His right to gain a reward by finding a lost thing 
is surely incompatible with his right to rest at home; choosing the promised option and 
choosing	  Silvia’s	  offer	  of	  the	  same	  service	  are	  alternative	  choices.	  The	  promissory	  right	  
competes with other choices of the promisee. If the promissorily created choice is 
effective enough to convince the promisee to reject other choices by choosing it, then the 
promisee will in some sense have chosen what the promisor wanted (see 5.4.2). This is 
relevant enough so as to regulate the relation legally. The best possible regulation is the 
one envisioned in this work (see 6.2). 
Equally important, the creation of the chance benefits the promisor. The promisor wants 




possible to buy the choice of potential partners or clients. The best she can do is seduce 
them with irresistable proposals. Hence, she tailors proposals to selected candidates. 
Candidates take the proposal and evaluate it as a choice for action, creating the chance 
that they will happen to choose it. The creation of this chance is what the promisor wanted 
to have caused with her promise. We see that the promisee is using her thinking to 
produce,	  as	  it	  were,	  “a	  fruit”	  for	  the	  promisor. 
(G) THE INTERACTION AFFECTS HIS AND HER SPHERE OF RIGHT: THE PROMISOR PERCEIVES 
THE CHANCE?? 
The idea I had in mind since the beginning of 4.3.3.2 (e) is the concept of ius in re aliena.423 
The promisee posseses what	  I	  will	  call	  “a	  bargaining	  mode	  of	  reasoning.”	  This	  is	  the	  know-
how with which the promisee evaluates the promise. The re aliena is the chance, an 
externality that the promisee produces when he uses his bargaining mode of reasoning. 
It is the possibility that he may happen to choose the choice promised instead of other 
choices of his own. The promisor enjoys the chance as someone who enjoys the 
externalities of the thing of another. And so, I dare to say, the promisor owns the chance 
as someone who owns the fruit of the thing of another. 
But why is it that the promisor is owner, in the sense of having title over the chance? The 
answer to this question is strictly linked to what made the promisee cause a benefit for 
the promisor: the fact that the promisee received a promise, or acquired a credit right. In 
other words, it is the chance that the promisee will present as the counter-cause of her 
promissory right. It is this chance that the promisee will oppose to the promisor if the 
promisor wants to revoke the promise.424 The	  promisee	  will	  say,	  “When	  you	  made	  me	  the	  
promise, you made me use my bargaining mode of reasoning. I used it because of your 
proposal and applied it to the right of your proposal. I could have not used it or have 
                                                        
423 Briefly defined, a ius in re aliena is a power to do something with the thing of another. For example, Peter 
has a power to take a reasonable monthly amount of oranges from a tree that belongs to Dennis. 
Of all the real rights, it is probably in the in re aliena rights that	  the	  axiom	  “ius	  et	  obligatio	  correlata sunt”	  
manifests itself more starkly. In our example, Dennis cannot prevent Peter from taking fruit from his 
tree. The difference with personal rights is that the right is not over the performance of the duty bearer. 
The right of Peter is not that Dennis does something so that Peter can take the fruits. The right is that 
Dennis does not oppose Peter taking the fruits and, moreover, if Dennis sells the land where the tree is 
to Hans, Hans also bears the duty to Peter. 
Professor	   Gretton	   thinks	   that	   “limited	   real	   rights”	   “is	   perhaps	   the	   commonest	   expression	  
internationally.”	  But	  he	  also	  teaches	  that	  “Ius	  in	  re	  aliena”	  is	  an	  alternative,	  especially	  in	  the	  Francophone 
world,	   where	   its	   French	   equivalent,	   “droit	   reel	   sur	   la	   chose	   d’autrui”,	   is	   also	   used.	   George	   Gretton,	  
“Ownership and its Objects,” in RabelsZ Bd., 71, (2007), pp. 802-851, at p. 811, note 45. 




applied it to another cause. The fact is that my use of my bargaining mode of reasoning 
produced a chance. This chance was a benefit for you, for it is this chance that you sought 
with your promise. You have perceived this chance as a fruit of yours, for you are the 
direct	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  possibility	  I	  have	  created”	  (Please	  see	  5.4.2	  and	  5.5.2). 
Therefore: 
(H) A VOLUNTARY OBLIGATION (CREDIT RIGHT) ARISES FOR THE PROMISEE 
The promisor is obligated to do what she promised from the moment that the promisee 
receives the interested promise. The promisee has the correlative right to demand that 
the promisor act in accordance with the promise. This amounts to saying that the 
promisor cannot neglect the promise by, for example, intending to revoke it and that the 
promisee can count on the assurance that what the promise said will be the case (See 
5.6.2). 
At the same time, the promisee can say to the promisor: 
Of course I cannot deprive you of your right to the chance. But I can restart, as it were, the 
thinking from which the chance emerges. I can end a cycle of my bargaining mode of 
reasoning, which is mine, not yours. So, when I liberate you from your obligation I dispose 
of nothing of yours; if at all, I am just ending a cycle of my bargaining mode of reasoning 
(Please see 5.6.4). 





5. A PROPOSAL: THE UNILATERAL PROMISE AS A NEW CAUSE OF 
OBLIGATION 
5.1. THE (JURIDICAL) UNILATERAL PROMISE 
In this part I will elaborate the interested promise as a new cause of obligation. I want to 
use the first section to give an overview of the concept of unilateral promise. In the 
following section I will outline the presuppositions, elements, object and outcome of the 
unilateral promise. I conclude by showing that the concept of unilateral promise fits with 
the contract, tort and unjust enrichment. 
5.1.1. PRESENTATION 
The unilateral promise involves two persons, the promisor and the promisee. The promisor 
is a person who owns an amount of disposable freedom and promises a part of it to the 
promisee. The promisee is the person who receives the promised performance, and as he 
posseses a bargaining mode of reasoning, compares the right with his preexisting 
alternative choices, creating a chance for the promisor. A unilateral promise is formed 
when the promisor makes a promise, the promisee receives the promise, the reception of 
the promise induces the promisee to cause a chance and the promisor perceives the benefit 
of the chance. The object of a unilateral promise is a legal exchange or commutation. On 
the one hand, the promisor disposes of a performance of her so that the promisee acquires 
it, and on the other hand, the promisee uses his bargaining mode of reasoning to produce 
the chance that the promisor enjoys. 
The unilateral promise establishes a promissory relationship, by which the promisor 
enjoys the chance produced by the promisee and the promisee counts on the performance 
the promisor promised. The promisee hence appears as the owner of a promised 
performance. Nonperformance of a promissory right occurs, for example, where the 
promisor neglects the promise or initiates actions that will hinder the performance. The 
promisee can demand that the promisor recognize his entitlement and act as if the 
promisor never neglected the promise or, if it makes no sense to consider the 
performance performable, he can demand compensation for his frustrated expectations. 
The promisor, on the other hand, is the owner of the benefit of the chance. Violation of the 
right over the benefit of the chance occurs where someone takes the chance without the 
promisor’s	  authorization. The promisor can demand compensation for the value of the 
frustrated chance. The form of a right to enjoy a chance also serves as a shield for 




occur where the promisor made a bare promise or an offer with typically promissory 
content. 
The promissory relationship can be extinguished in various ways, the most significant of 
which is the liberation of the promisor. The liberation of the promisor by the promisee 
does not imply a violation of the right of the promisor. If the chance and its benefit 
disappear with the liberation it is not because the promisee seized the benefit of the 
promisor but because the promisee completed a cycle of her bargaining mode of 
reasoning.  
5.1.2. A GUIDE TO THE READER 
The next four sections determine the requirements for the formation of a unilateral 
promise. Section 2 determines the first requirement, namely, the making of a promise. 
What does being a promisor require? (2.1.1) What is the process of ideating a promissory 
right? (2.1.2) What must the promisor do to effectively dispose of the promissory right? 
(2.1.3) Section 3 determines the second requirement, namely, the reception of the 
promise. What does being a promisee require? (3.1.1) How is it that the promisee receives 
the right? (3.1.2) Answering the latter question will structure the discussion in 3.1.3. The 
question is whether promise needs acceptance to transfer rights. 
In the first two sections the first transfer of the commutation will have been explicated. 
We know now that the promisee acquires a credit or promissory right from the promisor. 
Section 4 and 5 will explain that the reception of the right by the promisee induces the 
promisee to cause a benefit that the promisor rightfully perceives. These sections, in other 
words, determine the other part of the commutation. 
Section 4 determines the third step in the formation of a unilateral promise, namely, the 
creation of the chance. What is the thing with which the promisee produces the chance? 
(5.4.1) How is it that the promisee produces the chance? (5.4.2) What kind of thing is the 
chance? Of particular interest, is the chance an in commercium thing? (5.4.3) Section 5 
determines the last requirement, namely, the perception of the benefit. How does the 
promisor perceive the benefit of the chance? (5.5.1) In what sense does the promisor own 
the benefit of the chance? (5.5.2) And finally, why is it that the promisor owns the benefit 
of the chance? (5.5.2) 
Section 6 develops the practical implications of the promissory relation. What can the 
promisee claim of the promisor? (5.6.2.1) What can cause the extinction of his right? 




benefit of the chance? (5.6.3) Finally, does the liberation of the promisor imply a violation 
of the	  promisor’s	  right?	  (5.6.4)	   
Section 7 perfects the construction of the new cause of obligation. Firstly, it places the 
unilateral promise in a classification of causes of obligation (5.7.1), and secondly it sheds 
light on the differences between unilateral promise and contract (5.7.2) 
5.2. REQUIREMENT ONE: THE PROMISOR MUST MAKE A PROMISE 
5.2.1. THE PROMISOR MUST OWN THE PERFORMANCE SHE WANTS TO OBLIGATE 
5.2.1.1. THE PROMISOR MUST BE A CAPABLE PERSON 
I lost my dog and feel the strong desire to have it back. My desire is to have my lost dog 
back. I imagine that doing something may help satisfy my desire. I could do many things, 
from crying and complaining to making a public promise of a reward. The last choice 
supposes a more mature attitude. I repressed my most immediate inclinations, thought of 
the various ways that, according to my experience, may aid in the satisfaction of my desire, 
chose one of those means and planned and carried out my chosen action. That I made a 
unilateral promise supposes that I have legal capacity.425 
Legal capacity on the part of the promisor is a requirement for the formation of the 
promise. The person who makes the promise must appear to the promisee as someone 
who can be the author of such act, someone who could tell what the implications of 
promise in private law are. A minor, a mentally ill or a capable person who temporally 
lost awareness of her capacities, like a very drunk capable person, cannot be taken as a 
promisor.	  These	  are	  persons	  who	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	   to	  respond	   for	   the	   things	   they	  did.	  
They	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  intend	  what	  comes	  with	  promise	  before	  making	  “one”	  and	  so	  they	  
cannot be held to do what they said. 
(A) TRUSTING THE PROMISE OF AN OBVIOUSLY INCAPABLE PERSON 
Someone	  who	  can	  tell	  that	  the	  “promise”	  is	  coming	  from	  an	  incapable	  person	  cannot	  take	  
the	  “promise”	  as	  a	  promise.	  For	  what	  he	  is	  receiving	  is	  not	  a	  promise;	  or,	  in	  private	  law	  
vocabulary, it is a null promise. So the plaintiff who found and returned the lost thing 
cannot claim expectation on the basis of a null promise of a reward. His expectations were 
illegitimate. He had no legitimate basis to create expectations because he knew, or should 
have known that everything he heard from the apparent promisor was, as it were, not 
                                                        




coming from her mouth. Something else, like an unmanageable inclination, or background 
voice,	   was	   promising	   for	   her.	   So,	   such	   “promises”	   do	   not	   count	   as	   promises. Yet the 
plaintiff can claim restitution. He will have to prove that the costs he incurred in returning 
the lost thing where somehow useful for the incapable person. 
5.2.1.2. THE PROMISOR MUST OWN THE PERFORMANCE SHE WANTS TO OBLIGATE 
But self-determination is not enough. The autonomous being must have endorsed the 
private law regime and addressed the promisee as a participant of the same private 
law.426 So on the basis of the determinations I have made in Part 4, what sort of right 
should the promisor have to be able to make a unilateral promise? The promisor must 
own the performance she wants to transfer to the promisee. Put differently, she must 
come to the transaction with a right over an amount of disposable freedom. 
Imagine a carpenter making a promise. Every reasonable promisee could think of her as 
able to craft shelves, chairs, desks, and in general whatever qualifies as an act of carpentry. 
These	  assumptions	  are	  not	  about	  present	  facts,	  but	  about	  a	  carpenter’s	  future	  agencies.	  
Now	  imagine	  that	  our	  carpenter	  promises	  to	  furnish	  Jose’s	  new	  office.	  Of	  the universe of 
things that Jose could have reasonably expected the carpenter to do, the carpenter 
determined, parceled, as it were, a particular choice and transferred it to him. When I say 
that the promisor has a right over her disposable freedom I mean to say that, before the 
act where she parceled and gave a piece of her freedom to the promisee, she was free of 
an obligation to fulfill the given performance. She could have decided to spend the time 
that	  furnishing	  Jose’s	  office	  would	  consume	  doing	  something else, like furnishing her own 
office, or selling the service to a third person. This performance was optional to her (she 
was free to do it) because it belonged to her—it was part of her freedom. It could have 
been the case that the agency no longer belonged to her—it was no longer part of her 
disposable freedom. This is the case addressed in 5.2.1.2 (a) and (b). Or it could have been 
that the promised agency has never belonged to her. These are cases of illicit or 
impossible promises, where someone promises something she cannot legally do 
(something that has never been within her disposable freedom) or someone promises 
something that no reasonable person could expect her to do (something that could have 
never been within her disposable freedom). We will deal with these cases in 5.2.2.2(c4) 
  
                                                        
426 It is important to mention that I am not dealing with the case where the parties have previously agreed 
that one will obligate herself unilaterally whenever she makes a promise to the other. We are dealing 




(A) PROMISING SOMETHING ALREADY PROMISED 
The promisor must have owned the freedom she determined and transferred as an 
obligated performance. The performance would not have belonged to the promisor if, 
excuse the triviality, the promisor had already transferred it to the promisee. For example, 
a subcontractor forgot that she has already submitted a promise of a service in response 
to	  the	  general	  contractor’s	  solicitation	  and	  submits	  a	  second	  one.	  As	  the	  second	  promise	  
is about a service that could not be reasonably done in tandem with the service promised 
the first time, the second proposal is void for lack of object. The promisor was no longer 
the owner of the performance she is promising and the promisee had grounds to know it. 
(B) PROMISING SOMETHING PROMISED TO ANOTHER 
Another, probably more sensitive case is where the promisor promises a performance 
that she has already promised to a third party. The effects of the unilateral promise will 
depend on whether the promisee knew that the promisor had already obligated the 
performance or not. If he knew it, then he cannot claim the performance as his. The 
promise in this case is absolutely void for lack of object. If the promisor cannot prove that 
the promisee could tell that the performance had been given to another, then the 
promisee has a promissory claim. As we are talking about a case where the promisor 
cannot actually do what she has promised—for otherwise the performance would not 
belong to a third party—the promisee is entitled only to the frustrated expectations. 
(C) HAVING ONE’S CREDIT HARMED 
Our right over our disposable freedom could be violated by the deeds of another. For 
example, a consumer association launches a defamatory campaign whereby it is stated 
that Company X makes promises that it does not perform. If the campaign is unfounded, 
then	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  consumer	  association	  is	  harming	  Company’s	  X	  credit.	  Company	  X	  
can go to court and say that the freedom it carefully conserved so as to make promises 
has been damaged and that it wants compensation for the harms that the defendant 





5.2.2. THE PROMISOR IDEATES AN OBLIGATION WITH A VIEW TO ACQUIRING A CHANCE 
5.2.2.1. THE PROMISOR’S IDEA: OBLIGATE A PERFORMANCE FOR ACQUIRING A CHANCE 
The preliminary stage in the making of a unilateral promise is the intention, or, as I like to 
call it, ideation of a promissory obligation. To ideate an obligation, the promisor must 
obviously know what a voluntary obligation is.427 Private law conceptualizes obligation 
as a duty of one person to another. The obligation is voluntary when the debtor of the 
obligation has determined the content of the duty. It is as if private law gave private actors 
the possibility of determining its content. But not all interests are served. Private law 
recognizes voluntary obligations only insofar as they have been determined to have been 
exchanged. This is true to the extent that juridical private law requires that persons be 
clear about the thing they seek to obtain with the obligations they create. 428 For the sake 
of safeguarding such clarity, just private law offers a classification of the voluntary 
obligations that divides them in accordance with the interest that a debtor could seek to 
obtain.  
There are four voluntary obligations, in the same way that there are four interests. Firstly, 
a person may be interested in honoring a past favor or an unenforceable debt and have 
no means to do so in the present. With an obligation solvendi causa, a person can obligate 
a future performance of hers with a view to compensating something she long ago 
received. Secondly, a person may be interested in acquiring a thing or service in the 
                                                        
427 Ideas of transactions that are typically recognized by the law would be written in the language and forms 
in which they typically appear. This formality is often followed so as to ensure that the court recognizes 
the transaction. When the parties have atypical ideas, they will try to find a key typical term, relation or 
formulary that they could add or make their transaction conform to. They would try to make it so that 
the court validates the whole transaction by consideration of the typical term, relation or formulary. See 
Max Weber, Economy and Society, Guether Roth and Claus Wittich editors, vol. 2, University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978, pp. 743-756. 
428 This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code	  wrote,	  	  “An	  obligation	  without	  causa,	  or	  with	  a	  false	  causa,	  
or	   with	   an	   illicit	   causa,	   cannot	   have	   any	   effect.”	   (Art.	   1131.)	   Other	   private	   laws,	   like	   the	   German,	  
recognize the exchange function of voluntary obligations only implicitly. The BGB does not state that 
obligations obligate only when they were created in the context of an exchange, but its structure (see 
the argument in 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.1.1(e)), its law of unjust enrichment and the fact that the Code does not 
enforce gratuitous informal agreements suggests so. The BGB does not talk about causa or consideration 
because	   its	   law	   of	   contract	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   pandectists’	   theory	   of	   contract,	   and	   these	   authors	  
neglected the concept of causa and consideration. They derived the contractual obligation from the 
creative	   force	   of	   individual	   wills	   (See	   Paolo	   Recano,	   “Profili	   storici	   della	   promessa	   unilaterale,”	   in	  
Rassegna di Diritto Civile, (2006), fasc. 1, pp. 168-223, at p. 201 note 101). Recent American theorists 
have elaborated similar theories, like Charles Fried, who grounds the obligation of contract on a 
promissory principle, according to which it is wrong to make a promise and break it, and dismisses the 
doctrine of consideration owing to its uselessness. He argues however, with great ingenuity, that 
promises do not bind without acceptance. Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, 




present and have no means of paying for it. With an obligation credendi causa, a person 
can obligate a future performance of hers with a view to changing it for the thing or service 
she wants. Thirdly, a person may be interested in acquiring something in the future and 
have no means or will to pay for it now. With a synalagmatic obligation, a person can 
obligate a future performance of hers with a view to changing it for a credendi causa 
obligation.429 Finally, a person may be interested in acquiring a future service or thing, 
the existence of which is uncertain, and so try to obtain a chance that she acquire it. 
Romans	  called	   these	  obligations	   “contracts	  of	   spes”	   (spes,	   in	  Latin,	  hope), for what the 
debtor receives in exchange of her obligation is neither a thing, service nor a credit, but a 
mere hope. 430 
So with a voluntary obligation we can parcel a part of our future and render it valuable by 
exchanging it for something else—past, present, future, and probable. The interested 
promisor, who knows of the concept of voluntary obligation, will utilize the voluntary 
obligation to pursue her special interest. But what is her interest? What kind of thing does 
she want in exchange for her obligation? The answer is obvious, but let me analyze the 
reasoning through which the interested promisor reaches the decision to change an 
obligation for the value of a chance. 
  
                                                        
429  The synalagmatic obligation is a credendi causa obligation	   whose	   cause	   or	   raison	   d’être	   is	   another	  
obligation of the same type. It is used to ideate purely executory contracts, where one party obligates 
reciprocally to the other. 
430 “The	  sale	  of a non-existent thing which may come into existence is however, as we have seen, perfectly 
valid.  Such a sale is known as the sale of a “spes” or “res	  sperata”.  The distinction between the two is of 
little practical importance.  A spes is a mere hope that something will be available for delivery by the 
seller, depending purely upon chance.  A res sperata on the other hand, is something which, although not 
yet in existence, can confidently be expected to come into existence in the normal course of things.”	  J.T.R. 
Gibson, South African Mercantile and Company Law, 7th Edition, Kenwyn, Juta, 1997, at p. 119. 
One	  may	  be	  suspicious	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  promissor’s	  benefit,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  differently,	  of	  the	  difuse	  
character	  of	  the	  promissory	  right’s	  counter-cause. Yet one can find counter-causes with the same sort of 
uncertainty in the positive law too, not to mention the fact that we overvalue certainty in law:  
Ciò	  che	  noi	  siamo	  soliti	  chiamare	  "certezza	  del	  diritto"	  è	  una	  "verità"	  che	  ci	  proviene	  dal	  seno profondo della 
modernità	  giuridica,	  una	  "verità"	  [o	  mito]	  in	  cui	  parecchie	  generazioni	  di	  giuristi	  - dagli adepti settecenteschi 
del credo illuministico ai sacerdoti otto/novecenteschi del culto della legge - hanno convintamente creduto, 
tanto da proporla come	  una	  acme	  di	  civiltà	  giuridica,	  ineguagliabile	  e,	  pertanto,	  insopprimibile.	  […Per	  quello]	  
se	   c’é	   una	   forca	   caudina	   di	   carattere	   culturale	   e	   tecnico	   di	   cui	   dobbiamo	   sbarazzarci,	   è	   la	   netta	   antìtesi	  
certo/incerto,	   certezza/incertezza,	   inculcàtaci	   pressantemente e restata nel cuore - più	   che	   nell'intelletto	  
razionale - di noi giuristi italiani. 





(A) HOW DO PROMISORS ARRIVE AT THIS IDEA? 
Someone loses something and wants that thing back. Her interest is to have the lost thing 
back. She knows that it is possible that someone will find the lost thing, learn that it 
belongs to her and return it without expecting more	   than	   a	   “thank	   you	   very	   much.”	  
Though this possibility exists, she believes it is highly improbable. She thinks that she can 
do something to make it more likely she will get her thing back. The best possible world 
for her would be one where there is a place where she can buy the thing she lost, but there 
is no such market. Still, she could ideate a synalagmatic obligation. She could offer a 
monthly payment to a private detective for the correlative obligation that the detective 
looks for the lost thing, but she finds this idea inconvenient. She is obligating herself to 
pay money to someone who is obligating himself only to try to find the thing, not to return 
it. Other means could give her the same thing, like offering a unilateral contract to the 
public, an offer by which anyone of the public who returns the lost dog is entitled to claim 
a sum. True, no one from the public will commit to look for the lost thing. But she is not 
obligating herself to pay a monthly wage neither. What is more, the fact that no one will 
commit to look for the lost thing may be compensated by the fact that many—not only the 
private detective—will know of the offer. Maybe someone found the lost thing by chance 
and has ignored the person to whom it belongs, or wants to return it only in exchange for 
a reasonable sum, or has not yet found it but has free time and the incentive to search for 
the thing. The former idea tempts her. Yet she discovers an inconvenience. Many people 
will find the offer interesting but not be fully convinced to embark on the search. The offer 
of a unilateral contract is, by definition, a revocable proposal. The offeror is entitled to 
lose her interest in the proposal and revoke it at any time before someone returns the lost 
thing. This, in the mind of the average offeree, signifies that one may have already 
discarded other plans, spent time, efforts and resources, have the illusion of finding the 
lost thing and getting the reward and, when some progress has been achieved, have to 
accept that the proposal was revoked. This, in the mind of the average offeree, signifies a 
high degree of risk…	  How	  could	  our	  agent	  avoid that risk? Our agent thinks, by eliminating 
it.431 She decides to ideate a promissory obligation.  
                                                        
431 Here there are similar considerations but in the context of other unilateral promises:  
What the offeror thinks he will get is an increase in the probability of exchange with the offeree. In some cases, 
an offeree is highly unlikely to consider an offer at all unless it is firm. For example, if an offeree solicits an 
offer for the purpose of determining her costs in providing goods or services to third parties with whom she 
proposes to contract, she is unlikely to consider an offer that is not firm, because she could not reliably 
determine her costs on the basis of such an offer. In other cases, an offeree is likely to give more consideration 
to an offer if it is firm than if it is not. In deciding whether to accept an offer, an offeree must make an 
investment in deliberation. The offeree is more likely to make such an investment, or is likely to make a greater 




This is a simplified version of how promisors arrive at the idea of ideating a promissory 
obligation. The point is not to exchange a performance for the thing one ultimately wants, 
nor it is to exchange a performance for a reciprocal performance of doing or giving. The 
point of an interested promise is to induce confidence in the creditor so that he creates 
the chance that we will gain something that we want. We exchange a performance for the 
enjoyment of a chance. 
5.2.2.2.  BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROMISSORY OBLIGATION 
Let us now investigate the composition of the promissory obligation. As a voluntary 
obligation, the promissory obligation comprises a debtor, a creditor and a duty or right 
over a performance. 
(A) THE DEBTOR 
The debtor is the person of the obligation who owes some giving, doing or not doing to 
another. The debtor of the obligation caused by the unilateral promise cannot be other 
than the promisor. A rule by which a person could, by her own choice, choose that another 
becomes her debtor would contravene the principle of freedom.432 (This does not mean 
that the promisor gets nothing from the transaction, that the unilateral promise is 
gratuitous. It means only that the promisee cannot assume the role of debtor). 
(B) THE CREDITOR 
The creditor of an obligation is the person who owns the giving, doing or not doing that 
the debtor owes. This right entitles him to use, enjoy the fruits of, and dispose of the owed 
performance. He can show off his right, use it as a warranty and most relevantly, he can 
claim what is owed to him when due and liberate the debtor with a unilateral choice. 
Every obligation has a creditor and the creditor of the promissory obligation is the 
promisee, the addressee of a promise to make a contract, a promise of a reward, a fake 
gratuitous promise and all imaginable unilateral promises. We will study the diverse 
                                                        
made. The purpose of a firm offer in this context is to induce the offeree to make such an investment so as to 
increase the probability of exchange. 
Melvin	  A.	  Eisenberg,	  “The	  Revocation	  of	  Offers,”	  2004,	  Wis.	  L.	  Rev.,	  (2004),	  pp.	  271-308, at p. 282. 
432 To put it differently, one could never ideate a promissory obligation whereby one appears as the creditor. 
This idea would be more like the offer of a synalagmatic obligation. To illustrate, someone who offers a 
synalagmatic obligation to another is someone who is offering to be both a debtor and to be a creditor. 
The acceptor of this obligation is not only accepting the offered performance but also the duty ideated 
as its correlate. By the executory contract of sale, for example, the offeree is not only accepting the right 




types of promissory creditors in 5.3.1, where I examine the possible promisees of a 
unilateral promise. I must first advance two points however. 
First, the promisor will not satisfy her interest—acquire the chance—if she does not 
select the right creditor. I would not be satisfying my interest in having the chance to 
engage consumers of my new Motorbikes Magazine if I send the promise of a free year’s 
subscription to the inhabitants of a monastery. I am misplacing the creditor. For, even if I 
grant the monks a year’s	  free subscription, none of them will ever order the issues; far 
less become consumers after a year of consumption. The interested promisor must select 
an adequate creditor. As we will see in 5.1.3, the formation of a unilateral promise 
demands a special kind of promisee, one that uses a specific mode of reasoning. 
Secondly, the mindset of the creditor that the promisor selects influences the choice of the 
design of the performance that she is to obligate. If I want the chance to have my dog back, 
I have to ideate my obligation in a way that may appeal to the average person likely to 
search for the dog. It is obvious that the promise cannot be addressed to a businessperson, 
professional football player or actor. This promise must be addressed to a young person 
or, in general, someone who is looking for odd jobs. Moreover, it is probable that this 
person will not be interested in acquiring a performance of doing, e.g. I promise a public 
congratulations in the event that... This potential creditor is interested in a performance 
of giving, e.g. I promise to give money in case that... The potential creditor will influence 
my choice of not only the modality of the performance, but also of its quality or 
quantity. 433  Thinking as he would think, I will have to calculate how much I should 
promise so as to encourage a person like him. 
(C) THE OBLIGATION’S OBJECT: THE PERFORMANCE 
(C.1) GIVING, DOING OR NOT DOING 
The object of an obligation is a duty and the content of this duty is what we call 
“performance.”	   The	   performance	   can	   be	   a	   giving,	   doing	   or	   not	   doing.	   This	   traditional	  
classification serves quite well for the determination of the various promissory 
                                                        
433 Three	  quotations:	  “Typically,	  the	  recompense	  promised	  is	  vastly	  greater	  than	  the	  worth	  of	  the	  offeree’s	  
time and skill measured on a pure per diem and	  out	  of	  pocket	  basis.”	  Llewellyn,	  “Our	  case	  of	  contract,”	  
in The Yale Law Journal, Vol 48, No 5, (Mar., 1939), pp. 779-818,	  at	  p.	  806.	  “To induce him to make that 
bet, the reward must be high enough so that the reward, multiplied by the probability of gaining the 
reward, exceeds the offeree's investment.”	  Eisenberg,	  Melvin	  A.,	   “Probability and Chance in Contract 
Law,”	  UCLA L. Rev., 45, (1997-1998), pp. 1005-1076,	  at	  p.	  1049.	  “[…I]n the case of prizes, the recompense 
is often vastly greater than the market value of the benefit the offeree confers upon the promoter, as 
evidenced by cases where a golf-hole-in would entitle someone to a Chevrolet Beretta [Cobaugh v. Klick-




obligations. For example, the performance in a fake gratuitous promise cannot be other 
than a giving: I will give you X. The performance in a promise to make a contract cannot 
be other than a doing: I will make (do) X contract with you. The performance in a promise 
of a reward can be about a giving, doing or not doing. An example of the last possibility: 
Big Industry A says to Environmental NGO B	   “I	   will	   no	   longer	   use	   X	   chemical in my 
products if you promote this good deed of mine in your advertisements.”	   The	  
classification of the performances is not exhaustive. In the letters of patronage the 
promisor	  “warrants”	  the	  promisee	  that	  a	  third	  party	  will	  pay	  her	  a	  debt	  (see	  1.1.3.4). 
(C.2) PURE AND SIMPLE PERFORMANCES 
Furthermore, the giving, doing and not doing could be pure and simple or qualified with 
a period or condition. It is only in the fake gratuitous promises that the performance can 
appear as purely and simply obligated. The promisee acquires the claim to the gift from 
the very moment that he receives the promise, without having for example to inform the 
promisor that he will go to her market and take the gift. The promisor appears as purely 
and simply obligated in the sense that she has to give a gift solely on foot of the claim of 
the consumer.434 
(C.3) PERFORMANCES WITH MODALITY: CONDITIONS AND PERIODS 
The rest of the promissory obligations appear with some type of “accident.” In the promise 
of a contract, for example, the accident is what I call a “potestative	   condition.”	   The	  
situation is one where someone obligates herself to make a contract with another. This 
means that the promisor cannot do something that could hinder the realization of the 
promised service. But this does not mean that the promisor must do the service described 
in the promised contract. For her to be obligated to perform that service, the promisee 
must make a choice. He must communicate to the promisor that he wants to exercise the 
choice he earned with the promise. The performance of the promisee is potestatively 
conditioned in the sense that its exercise depends on his choice (potesta). 
                                                        
434 Jonathan Garton, “Charitable Purposes and Activities,” in Current Legal Problems, Vol 67, Issue 1, (2014), 
pp. 373-407, argues that to find out whether an organization has a charitable character we better look 
at the activities that the organization carries out and not to the name or structure of the organization. 
My argument, mutatis mutandi, is that some promises are charitable only in legal structure or name. If 
one focuses on the interest leading retailers to make gratuitous promises, then one can tell that the 
promise is not charitable at all. Rather than looking at the terms of the promise, whether the 
performance is done in exchange of a real or personal right, I enquire into the purposes leading persons 





Time periods are quite useful for interested promisors. The promisor could utilize a 
period	  to	  leverage	  the	  promisee’s	  consideration.	  She	  says	  to	  him:	  “I	  am	  ready	  to	  provide	  
you with this service. Think about it, it is at your deposal... Only one thing! You must have 
a decision by the end of March.”	  Putting	   a	   time limit on the proposal may induce the 
promisee to consider choosing it more intently, for then the finitude of his time to choose 
is put explicitly. 
(C.4) THE QUALITY: LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE PERFORMANCES 
I need to repeat what I said in relation to the quality of performances.435 The giving, doing 
or not doing must be licit, this is to say, legally and factually possible. A legally impossible 
performance could	  look	  like	  this	  “A	  will	  kill	  B.”	  This	  is	  not	  a	  licit	  performance	  not	  because	  
A thinks or knows that B does not want to be killed but because A must know that B, akin 
to A herself, is a private law persona, and as an equally free individual, B cannot want 
others to kill him. To be licit, the performance must be something that could exist in 
harmony with the freedom of all in private law. We will see more of this in 6.1.  
A performance, on the other hand, would be factually impossible where its quality is 
highly improbable in its context. For example, a consumer cannot take as a unilateral 
promise an advertisement in which a company promises a trip to the Middle Ages to the 
first collector of a thousand coupons. To be sure, it is not impossible that we invent a 
means to travel to the past. But at the moment of the promise that machine is known to 
be fictional and no reasonable person would think that something like it will come to exist 
in	   the	   near	   future.	   The	   addressee	   must	   therefore	   take	   this	   “promise”	   as of a highly 
improbable performance and therefore not take it as a promise. The promise of an illicit 
or impossible performance is absolutely null due to a lack of object. 
5.2.3. THE PROMISOR MUST DISPOSE OF HER IDEATED OBLIGATION BY MAKING A PROMISE 
The promisor has already ideated the promissory obligation. In other words, she has 
imagined who would be the best possible creditor for the obligation of her unilateral 
promise, what performance she should make obligatatory for herself in order to induce 
him to create the chance she wants, and under which conditions she should obligate the 
performance to make the promise most effective. The next step is to choose the tool that 
renders a promissory obligation valuable. 
                                                        
435 For more on this go to 4.1.4.3 (a). 
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5.2.3.1. The ideated obligation and the unilateral promise 
Before getting into the act of promise, we need to distinguish promise from voluntary 
obligation. Assume that a promisor perfectly ideated the obligation of a promise of a 
reward. She selected the right creditor and determined the performance effectively. The 
idea is brilliant. However, rather than dressing the idea with a promise, she happens to 
present it with the vocabulary of	  offer.	  She	  says	  to	  the	  public:	  “I	  offer	  100	  EUR	  reward to 
the person who returns to me my lost dog.”	   She	   had	   the	   intention	   of obligating a 
performance of hers so that a chance would be created through the actions of the 
addressees. But she failed to induce the public to effect these actions. The addressees 
thought that the proponent was interested in an exchange of an obligation for an act and 
from this they inferred that the proponent feels entitled to revoke the offer. For this is 
what the language of offers entails! Since the addressees did not have the assurance that 
promises give, they were not confident enough to create the chance that the proponent 
sought. As a result, the value of the ideated obligation could not come to fruition.436  
Something like a declaration of promise is needed to render the promissory obligation 
valuable.	  Another	  sign	  of	  this	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  communication	  of	  a	  person’s	  intention	  to	  
be	  obligated	  seems	  to	  be	  insufficient	  to	  constitute	  an	  obligation.	  “Look,	  I	  want	  you	  to know 
that I have the intention to obligate myself to you. It is a very interested intention. You 
will be sure that I will not revoke my proposal of a contract, and this assurance of yours 
will serve me. For if you are sure that I will not revoke, you will probably be prone to 
invest thought and resources in evaluating my proposal. Once again, this intention of 
mine, that I am communicating to you, is very strong and firm.”	  These	  words	  are	  quite	  
informative of my intentions. Informative as they may be, these words effect no legal 
change. At most, I would be preparing you for the final shot. I would be advancing 
information to facilitate a later legal declaration. A declaration that may integrate the 
given information, to be sure, but a declaration without which there is no legal bond. In 
themselves, words communicating intentions to be obligated are one of those 
communications that persons make to each other without incurring obligations. If I want 
                                                        
436 By the same token, someone could end up bound to a promissory obligation without having actually 
intended it. The case is of someone who seeks to invite another to accept a contract and, instead of using 




to jump the barrier of the simply licit interactions (see 4.1.3.3.1), I need to make a 
promise.437 
5.2.3.2. THE DECLARATION OF PROMISE 
A declaration of promise is essential for the formation of the promissory relationship. This 
act of the promisor is intentional. This means first that the promisor must have willed the 
promise and not promised by mistake, under the influence of violence or an 
insurmountable need. Secondly, the promise is other-directed, an act whereby the 
promisor addressees the promisee to bring about an effect—the obligatory relationship. 
Thirdly, promise is by definition irrevocable. This is to say, the significance of promise—
to bring about an obligation—is achieved with its reception; no requisite act other than 
reception intervenes between the promise and its reception. Fourth, the promise is 
juridically intended. This means that the language the promisor uses to address the 
promisee connotes law—its authority, arguments, logic, and if there are any, institutions. 
Finally, the obligation involved in the promise is oriented to be reciprocated by a further 
act—the act whereby the promisee creates a chance for the promisor. 
Let us examine in detail the essential requirements for the adequate formation of a 
unilateral promise and study the practical reasons behind these legal requirements. 
(A) THE PROMISE MUST HAVE BEEN (FREELY) DECLARED 
The significance of promise is that it operates a specific change in the status of the 
parties—it obligates the promisor to the promisee. For this to occur both the promisor 
and promisee must know that promises obligate. So, if I happen to want to relate to you 
via a promise in a state of nature scenario, I must, with the promise itself, make you 
                                                        
437 Even in a society of perfect communication, where there is no need to speak to communicate to others 
what one thinks, there must be an act ulterior to the ideation of the obligation, an act by which the 
promisor	  says	  to	  the	  promisee:	  “from	  now	  on	  it	  is	  that	  this	  idea	  that	  you	  know	  binds	  us.” 
To be clear, a perfectly made promise is more than the outward expression of the inwardly ideated 
obligation. Promise is not the external manifestation of an internal experience. I could be convinced of 
having the internal experience of intending to obligate myself to another and, on the bases of my 
conviction, inform the intended creditor of this intention of mine. As if I said to you; “In	  what	   I	   am	  
intending now I am obligated as against you to do X in the time T whenever V condition obtains.”	  By	  
assuring you of my intention, I am not merely relating myself to you, but also addressing you in a way 
similar to that of promises: I turn to you and evoke your turning to me (See 5.3, especially 5.3.2.1). What 
is more, my communication consists in what by definition goes in a promise: a voluntary obligation (See 
5.2. especially 5.2.2). This information, in other words, could itself be the substantial object of a promise. 




understand that that which you are receiving is to be taken as productive of the obligation 
that you can also identify in the act.438 
We have said that the promisor must be able to want (have legal capacity) and have 
something to want (be owner of the thing she is promising). We also said that the 
promisor must have wanted or ideated the promissory obligation. Now I want to say that 
the promisor must want, spontaneously want to make the promise. Let me illustrate what 
I intend to say with an example: Suppose that someone chooses to make a promise whose 
customary body is a certain kind of formulary. She ideates the promissory obligation, 
writes it down in the requisite document and signs the document. Did she make a 
promise? I would say that she did not. From these deeds must follow the declaration of a 
promise—the spontaneous decision made by the check issuer to transfer the check to the 
receiver.439 Even when I sign the check on a table in front of the person who will happen 
to be the bearer, the promise is not actualized unless and until I pass the check, hand to 
hand, to the bearer, most likely looking deep into his eyes—at least, in juridical private 
law. 
Promise is a sudden act, something that begins, produces all its effects and passes away 
in an instant. Accordingly, the examination of the formation of the promissory relation, 
whether the promisor was a minor, mentally ill, or excessively drunk, whether the 
promisor acted under an irresponsible mistake or the promisee took her promise under 
threat of violence have answers in reference to the spatio-temporal moment of the 
promise—not to the development of the promissory relation. It follows from this that 
promises must be made in the present tense.	  “I	  promise	  you	  this	  and	  that”	  or	  “I	  hereby	  
commit myself to do this or that at your request.”	  If	  you	  say, “I	  promised	  you	  X,”	  you	  are	  
not making a promise, but perhaps offering proof of a promise that you made in the past. 
Finally, promise could take the form of a voice or written word. What is paramount is that 
the promisee could tell, through the message conveyed by the promise itself, that the 
promisor is making him a promise. 
                                                        
438 Yet I think that the question of whether the declaration of promise must be expressive of the rule that 
what the promise is intending to do generally obtains is not an issue for discussion in the context of 
private law. With its rules, concepts and principles private law sets out what persons do and can do. If 
the significance of promise is recognized by private law, then it matters little if this or that promisee 
could tell that the stranger who addressed him made a promise. If he never got it he will never demand. 
If he is surprised, he will seek counsel. And if the lawyer is informed, as she is supposed to be, then no 
doubts will remain about the significance of the received message. 
439 Indeed, signing a check is not making a promise to the prospective bearer; no one becomes a debtor by 
signing a check. One is just exacting the tailoring of a voluntary obligation whose customary substratum 
is a certain type of scripture. For reasons of safety, signing the document is ordinarily the last moment 




(A.1) THE CASE OF PROMISE BORNE OF VIOLENCE 
A promise would be invalid for lack of intention if the promisee extracts the promise from 
the promisor with violence. For example, we are in a bar talking about the possibility that 
I issue a promise of a contract for you. You are trying to convince me that this would give 
you the right incentive to seriously consider my services. So far there is no violence. You 
have actually made some progress in convincing me. I take a piece of paper, write a 
promise and even sign it. Yet, I do not give it to you. I repent and you go wild. You start 
shouting at me; that you spent a long time convincing me, that I made you think that I was 
going to make the promise, that this cannot be happening, and so on. I say I am sorry but 
you snatch the paper from my hands and leave the bar. You took my promise by means of 
violence. 
Obviously, nothing in the promise itself indicates that you took it out of violence. I will 
have to prove that this was the case. In other words, you will be able to claim my contract 
without any more proof than the written promise, and	   if	   I	   don’t	  want	   to	   accept	   your	  
claims, I will have to prove that you took my promise through violence. A difficult proof, 
but yet it is just to accept its possibility.  
(B) THE PROMISE MUST ADDRESS AND… REACH THE PROMISEE 
The way in which the promisor addresses the promisee is idiosyncratic—the promisor 
turns	   to	   the	   promisee,	   evoking	   the	   promisee’s	   attention.	   When	   someone	   declares	   a	  
promise to another, one is turning into the other, conveying a right to him. In this 
interaction the promisee is not indifferent. He hears the promise and takes cognizance of 
the promissory right. He grasps by means of the promise that which is expressed in it.440 
The promisee is however passive in a sense. His enthusiasm (or lack thereof) towards the 
promissory right is irrelevant to the sudden formation of promise. By the time he desires 
to reject the right he has already acquired it.441 
Once again, promises are in need of reception. If the promisee played no part in the 
declaration of a promise, as some scholars have maintained,442 the promisee would be as 
                                                        
440  “He	  must	  grasp through them that which is expressed in them, he must take cognizance of the act of 
promising itself, he must, as we would put it somewhat more exactly, consciously take in the promise 
(des	  Verprechens	  innewerden).”	  Adolf	  Reinach,	  “The	  A	  Priori	  Foundations	  of	  Civil	  Law,”	  (John	  Crosby	  
translation), Aletheia, issue 3, (1983), pp. 1-142, at p. 28. 
441 We will see that the promisee can respond in different ways to that which he takes in, claiming it, 
rejecting it and even forgetting it. See 5.6.2.2. and 6.1.4.2.1. 
442 Here is where the unilaterality of unilateral promise rests. The promisor takes preponderance in the 




any other; the promise would never have given him a right, connected him with another 
person. We, on the other hand, would never make a promise if we knew for sure that the 
other is incapable of becoming aware of it. Promises form nothing if they have never been 
received.	  As	  Adolf	  Reinach	  puts	  it,	  “They	  are	  like	  thrown	  spears	  which	  fall	  to	  the	  ground	  
without	  hitting	  their	  target.”443 
(B.1) THE CASE OF ONE WHO HAS NEVER BEEN THE PROMISEE 
Ignoring your promise of a reward, I find your lost property. I am aware of the fact that 
the thing I found belongs to you and I decide to return it to you. I performed the requested 
act, not induced by the promise, but by my good will. Then I come to know that you 
promised a reward for the act I performed. My lawyer advises me to claim the reward and 
I do so. You neglect the promise and I demand it of you you in court. According to the 
(juridical) law of unilateral promises, I have no right of action here. To be entitled to the 
reward I had to receive the promise. If you manage to prove that I retuned your property 
ignoring the reward, you will have debunked my claim (For a different solution and my 
criticism see 2.4.3.1). 
(C) THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT ABOUT ITS IRREVOCABILITY 
In principle, it should be	  clear	  to	  any	  addressee	  of	  the	  words	  “I	  promise”	  that	  the	  declarant	  
is no longer able to decide whether to do or not to do what she promised, for promises 
obligate. It would denaturalize the sense of promise if one had to think that after receiving 
a promise	  the	  promisor	  could	  free	  herself	  from	  the	  obligation	  by	  just	  saying:	  “No,	  no,	  I	  
regret, do not accept my promise.”	  In	  this	  promises	  are	  like	  gifts.	  When	  one	  receives	  a	  gift,	  
even before one calls the giver to express thanks or to reject the present, one feels oneself 
                                                        
promise. But this does not mean that the promisee assumes no role on the promise making process, as 
other unilateral promise scholars maintain. 
Martin	  Hogg,	  for	  example,	  has	  talked	  about	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  promisees	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “Things which are not 
components of the definition”	   of	   promise.	   “It is further asserted, as a general point, that the effect 
produced	  by	  a	  promise	  in	  the	  promisee’s	  mind	  and	  in	  any	  actions	  of	  the	  promisee	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  
definition of a promise. The focus is properly on the promisor, as it is his intention and actions which 
may constitute the normative act of promising and may give rise to a binding obligation.”	  Martin	  Hogg,	  
Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New 
York, 2011, p. 25. 
I have repeatedly argued that a definition of promise that does not require an act on behalf of the 
promisee cannot be a private law relation. It may sound within a specific moral theory, or within a public 
law conception of private law but not in the context of an autonomous private law. (See 3.2.1. and 
Introductory Part.1.1.) Here we determine promise as a declaration and it is in the nature of declarations 
that another hears of declared thing and takes awareness of it. Otherwise the declaration is a noise, not 
a declaration, something impacting or falling over a totally passive subject. 




in possession of the gift. One does not expect the giver to ask for the gift back without a 
serious reason. As with gifts, in promise there is no place for revocation. Revocation can 
take place only where the thing given is conditional on a further act, like a ratification of 
the giver or the acceptance of the receiver. A revocable promise is like a contradiction in 
terms. 
However, there are missuses of language. We often say things like; “I	  promise	  you	  that	  I	  
was not there,”	  “I	  promise	  you	  that I am telling you	  the	  truth”	  and	  other	  statements, which 
properly speaking are not promises. Moreover people	  use	  the	  word	  promise,	  “promessa,”	  
“Versprechen”	   and	   other	   translations	   in	   the	   context	   of	   contractual	   transactions. More 
specifically, they intend	  to	  say	  “I	  offer”	  but	  say	  “I	  promise.”	  The	  question	  hence	  arises,	  
whether the illocution produces the intended or right effect. In my opinion, the issue is a 
question of fact. If the proper meaning of promise has been settled in the community to 
which promisor and promisee belong, the promisor cannot say to a promisee that she 
intended	  to	  say	  “offer”	  when	  she	  said	  “promise.”	  It	  would	  be	  immaterial	  if the promisor 
were to prove revocation of the promise before acceptance, for promises are irrevocable. 
On the contrary, if it is not at all clear that promise means irrevocable commitment, and 
the declarant said the word promise in a text and context that cast doubts on the character 
of her commitment, then such declaration, if it can be thought of as such, constitutes an 
offer.444 
(C.1) WHEN THE PROMISE IS TAKEN AS AN OFFER 
In case of doubt, and if the declaration can be thought of as an offer, then the declaration 
must be taken as an offer. Why as an offer and not as, for example, an invitation to make 
an offer? Briefly explained, the issue here is whether the proposal was irrevocably 
intended or not. If it was, then it constitutes a promise. If it was not, then it does not 
constitute a promise. If it is settled that the proposal was not a promise, but nevertheless 
it is viewed as an offer, then the defendant cannot argue that as it does not constitute a 
promise, the proposal does constitute an offer either. The reason for this is that the 
defendant declared operative words to the claimant. If what she made was almost a 
promise and also an offer then what she made was not a promise but an offer. In these 
                                                        
444 Di Giovanni notes this problem in the Italian jurisprudence on public advertisements. The fact is that 
judges	  lack	  a	  criterion	  to	  distinguish	  “offerta	  al	  pubblico”	  and	  “promessa	  al	  pubblico”.	  Following	  Di	  Majo,	  
he offers the criterion of the	  “negotiability of the wanted fact”: “the	  most	  efficacious	  example	  is	  given	  
from	  the	  difference	  that	  runs	  in	  between	  promising	  a	  compensation	  to	  ‘whom	  will	  treat	  my	  wife’	  (the	  
promisor	  solicits	  a	   ‘negotiable’	  fact)	  and	  promising	  a	  compensation	  to	  ‘whom	  will	  cure	  my	  wife’	  (the	  
promisor	  promises	  a	  remuneration	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  non	  ‘negotiable’	  fact).”	  Francesco Di Giovanni, 




types of cases, the claimant can demand firstly a promise, and in substitution, an 
(accepted!) offer. 
 (D) THE PROMISE MUST SUGGEST LEGAL INTENTION 
One could become obligated to another by a consistently repeated conduct, as where I 
have been letting you draw water from my fountain every Monday for the last four years, 
making you think that I benefit you with the intention to continue benefitting you. This 
circumstance, call it what you want, creates the obligation that this Monday I will let you 
draw some water from my fountain. 445  The obligation of promise arises with the 
declaration of a promise, and declaring a promise is a speech act—namely the illocution 
of terms synonymous	   to	   “I	   promise,”	   “prometo,”	   “ich	   verspreche.”446 But here arises a 
question, do all declarations of promise obligate promisors in legal terms? No, must be 
the	  answer.	  “Sofia,	  I	  promise	  you	  I	  will	  not	  cheat	  on	  you,”	  “Diego,	  tomorrow	  I	  will go with 
you	  to	  the	  Cinema,”	  “Mama,	  don’t	  be	  sad,	  I	  will	  quit	  smoking	  after	  New	  Year’s	  eve,”	  are	  
examples of promises and nobody will prima facie interpret them as legal promises. So 
what is it that makes a promise a legal promise? 
The first indicator is the language used by the promisor. What is the language suitable for 
invocation of the law? Arguably, there are words, the first or most conventional meanings 
of	  which	  are	   legal.	  The	  words	  “obligation”	  “duty”	  “irretrievably,”	  the	  phrases	  “I	  hereby	  
promise,”	  “I	  bind	  myself	  to…”	  are	  eminently	  legal.447 So when someone uses these words 
to make a promise she is prima facie making a legal promise. But this is more a question 
of fact than of law. Suppose that A and B have developed a language of their own. In this 
language, some words indicate things that they generally are not. Among those words, 
some indicate legal concepts. Though these words would not indicate legal concepts in 
the	  public	  speaking	  sphere,	   they	  would	   indicate	   legal	  concepts	   in	   the	  parties’	   intimate	  
language. So these words are legal words, though only between A and B. The important 
                                                        
445 You can call it obligation by typical conduct and ground it on the principle that nobody can change her 
own design to the prejudice of the other. If I want to interrupt this obligatory relationship I must tell you 
in advance, probably a considerable amount of time in advance, that I no longer want you to draw water 
from my fountain. 
446 “And	  the	  act	  of	  promise,	  like	  any	  other	  social	  act,	  can	  only	  be	  grasped	  through	  some	  physical	  medium;	  
they need an external side if they are to be perceived. Experiences which need not turn without, can 
unfold without being in any way externally expressed. But the social acts have an inner and an outer 
side, as it were a soul and a body. The body of social acts can widely vary while the soul remains the 
same.”	  Adolf Reinach, op. cit., p. 20. 
447 With my PhD, I aim to introduce new	  vocabulary	   to	   the	   law,	   the	  vocabulary	  of	   “unilateral	   promise,”	  
“promissory	  relation,”	  “promissory	  obligation,”	  “right	  over	  the	  benefit of the chance,”	  I	  introduce	  this	  





thing is that the promisor uses words that the promisee could take as words connoting a 
promissory obligation. 
The promise must use legal language; ok, but does this mean that all promises using legal 
words are really invoking the law? A friend says	   to	   the	   other:	   “Diego,	   I	   will	   show	   up	  
tomorrow at nine.	   If	  I	  don’t	  you	  can	  take	  me	  to	  court.”	  Or	  an	  actor	  uses	  legal words to 
promise something to another in a play. Are these examples of promises? No, they cannot 
be so. Why? The use of the law words is not honest but ironical or fictional. Take this case: 
“I	  hereby	  irrevocably	  promise	  you	  that	  I	  will	  not	  on	  cheat	  you.	  I	  am	  invoking	  justice	  and	  
its language to give you the assurance that if I ever cheat on you, you will be entitled to 
yield	   against	  me	   the	  most	   burdensome	   blames…	  No,	   Sofia,	   be	   sure	   I	  will	   not	   be	  with	  
another	  while	  we	  are	  together.”	  The	  promise	  comes	  when	  the	  listener	  can	  tell	  that	  the	  
language is being used honestly. And the language of the example is used honestly when 
the lover makes a moral, not a legal promise to her beloved. Family, friends, lovers and 
acquaintances are generally not the social contexts where one will honestly invoke legal 
concepts. 448 
Still, it could be that persons use common or even friendly language to make legally 
intended promises. So, for example, a merchant who has been doing business with 
another	  for	  some	  months	  says	  to	  the	  other,	  “Hey	  Mike,	  take	  it	  easy,	  Steven	  [her	  employee]	  
will show up next Friday with the boxes. Trust me.”	   The	   promisor	   is	   not	   using	   legal	  
language here, but it is evident that the promise is serious. Then how are we to tell 
whether a promise is legally intended if it does not use law words? Well, there are many 
indicators. Once again, probably the most effective indicator is the context. The 
marketplace, newspaper, publicity boards and interactions between relative strangers 
are social contexts where one will generally speak seriously to each other. Another 
important indicator has	   to	  do	  with	   the	  quality	   and	  quantity	   of	   the	  promised	   thing.	   “A	  
thousand	  euros”	   sounds	  different	   to	   “fifty	   cents,”	   “a	   brand	  new	  Porsche”	   is	   somewhat 
                                                        
448 “A	   considerable	   number	   of	   cases	   concern	   this	   animus contrahendi.	   Beginning	  with	   sham	   “contracts”	  
which fail because, by hypothesis, the parties, in drawing up the instrument, had some other object than 
the	   creation	   of	   contractual	   rights;	   and	   continuing	   through	   the	   line	   of	   “contracts”	   made	   in	   jest,	   and	  
“contracts”	  made	  in	  excitement,	  we	  arrive	  at	  cases	  which	  definitely	  hold	  that	  an	  affirmative	  intention	  to	  
assume a legal obligation is the essence of a contract. Such are the cases in which, from the fact that 
another and more formal contract was later to be executed, the courts have inferred a lack of intention 
to enter into legal relations, notwithstanding the former agreement answered all the requirements of 
form and content necessary for a contract. Such also are the cases in which, from the situation of the 
parties, courts infer a lack of the requisite intent: social and domestic relations have given rise to judicial 
inferences that	  the	  parties	  did	  not	  intend	  legal	  consequences	  to	  flow	  from	  their	  promises.”	  Jerome	  W.	  
Thompson, “Covenants not to sue,” in Association of American Law Schools, (ed. and compiler), Selected 





different	  to	  “a	  gelato.”	  Yet	  a	  reseller	  could	  promise	  a	  free	  gelato	  to	  every	  visitor	  of	  her	  
opening store with a view to making the shop known. 
Whatever words the promisor uses the essential requisite is that the promisee grasps that 
he received a legal promise. Only a legal promise will give the assurance that promisees 
need to create the chance. On the other hand, only a legal promise will bring promisee and 
promisor to the game of private law, a space of rules, concepts and principles for 
advancing, backing and contradicting, juridical claims. 
(D.1) THE JOCULAR PROMISE 
It is probably in the realm of promissory advertisements that the issue of whether the 
promisor really intended to obligate herself or not emerges most frequently. We have 
settled some criteria to resolve this issue in the previous section and in 5.2.2.2(c4). A 
particularly illustrative case is the American decision Leonard v. Pepsico. 449  An 
advertisement said that PepsiCo would give an AV-8 Harrier II jump jet to whoever 
redeemed 7,000,000 Pepsi Points. The plaintiff claimed to have performed the task 
conditioninal to the reward that PepsiCo promised. PepsiCo argued that the 
advertisement was intended to be humorous. And there is no better way to appreciate 
that it was a jocular promise than watching it.450 The court found for the defendant on the 
grounds that no reasonable person could ever believe that such advertisement was 
seriously intended, that PepsiCo could have not promised a jet priced at more or less $23 
million in return for the cost of redeeming the 7,000,000 Pepsi Points. This was not a 
promise but mere puffery. 
(E) THE PROMISE MUST BE MADE TO INDUCE THE PROMISEE TO CREATE THE CHANCE 
A sub-contractor	  says	  to	  a	  general	  contractor:	  “I	  promise	  I	  will	  do	  N	  for	  you	  at	  the	  price	  Y,	  
under	  Z	  and	  U	  conditions.	  You	  don’t	  have	  to	  request	  this	  service	  now;	  you	  count	  on it for 
when you need it. I will	  not	  change	  the	  terms.	  I	  really	  want	  to	  work	  with	  you.”	  What	  is	  the	  
object of this promise? A lawyer who ignores the concept of unilateral promise must say: 
“The	  object	   is	  an	  obligation	   to	  do,	  by	  which	   the	  subcontractor	  has	   the	  duty	   to	  make	  X	  
contract when the general	  contractor	  requests	  it.”	  This	  answer	  is	  correct but incomplete. 
As we will see in 5.4-5, there is a way in which we can think of the reception of a firm 
promise of a contract as the creation of a right for the promisor. The lawyer who is 
acquainted with the concept of unilateral promise can tell that the object of the promise 
                                                        
449 http://www.classcaster.org/449/10564-Leonard%20v.%20Pepsico.pdf (13-08-2015) 




in the example is not only the obligation to make a contract but also the right to enjoy a 
chance.	  The	  right	  answer	  to	  our	  question	  is,	  “the	  object	  of	  this	  promise	  is	  a promissory 
relationship, where the creditor has a right to a contract and the debtor (rightfully) enjoys 
a	  chance	  to	  make	  a	  contract.” 
What about this other example? A little old	  lady	  sends	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  neighborhood’s	  high	  
school saying that, as she is aware of the fact that the school is collecting money to renew 
the football pitch, she is willing to contribute the sum of $1000. Here there is a promise. 
According to the words and the context, moreover, the promise is firm and seriously 
intended. What is	   the	  object	   of	   such	  promise?	  A	   lawyer	   could	   say:	   “The	   object	   of	   this	  
promise is an obligation to do something, by which lady X has the duty to give $1000 to 
school Y.”	  Is	  this	  answer	  right?	  If	  the	  text	  of	  the	  promise	  is	  all	  the	  relevant	  information	  
that we	  have,	  then	  “Yes,	  the	  answer	  is	  right”	  and	  full	  stop.	  The	  object	  of	  this	  obligation	  is	  
an obligation to do, which the promisor ideated to benefit the promisee. There is nothing 
that the promisor could be said to receive from the promisee in exchange for her promise. 
If the promisor is better off in some way, this relates to her emotional state. Unless the 
promisee is able to link the promise to a relatable cause, say the school were able to prove 
that the promisor made the promise in order to pay an unenforceable debt,451 or that she 
made	   the	   promise	   to	   support	   her	   son’s	   ongoing Dean of Studies campaign, 452  the 
promisee cannot claim the right to the promisor (See thought 5.2.3.2e.2). Unreciprocated 
obligations are not enforceable in private law.  
(E.1) THE TYPICAL UNILATERAL PROMISES 
How do we know that the promise is oriented towards, and in fact induces the promisee 
to cause a chance for the promisor? As I advanced in 5.2.2.2(b) and will develop in 5.4, the 
promise must be addressed to a specific kind of person, someone with a bargaining mode 
of reasoning. Only such individuals are in possession of the tools that produce the chance 
that an interested promisor seeks. Only with the possession of such tools can a promisee 
say:	  “Look,	  you	  made	  me	  this	  promise	  because you knew that I am in the construction 
business and, like any member of this society, I am accustomed to considering service 
proposals, giving special value to firm ones. It is obvious that your firm and legally 
intended promise was made so that I might give	  it	  special	  consideration.”	   
Still, a promisee need not always elaborate that much in court. The easiest way of saying 
“your	  promise	  was	  oriented	  to	  make	  me	  produce	  a	  chance	  for	  you”	  is	  by	  saying	  “you	  made	  
                                                        
451 This claim would qualify the promise as a retributory promise, see 4.1.4.3(b). 




me X or Y unilateral promise.”	   The	   typical	   unilateral promises are the promises that 
everyone knows that promisors make in their own interest (see 1.1.3.4). The task for 
positive law is to determine them from the perspective of the concept of unilateral 
promise. That is to say, to specify the outlook of the promissory obligation and the kind of 
promise through which promisors dispose of the obligation, the sort of promisee this 
promise is addressed to and moment from which it is reasonable to say that the promisee 
receives the promise, the mode of reasoning that leads these promisees to produce the 
chance, the content of the emerging chance and finally the mode in which such chances 
benefit	  the	  promisor.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  “promise	  of	  a	  contract”	  is	  a	  typical	  unilateral	  
promise. The promissory obligation is about the duty to make a certain contract. A 
promise of a contract must be made in written form. The reception of the promise occurs 
when	   the	   promise	   reaches	   the	   promisee’s	   firm	   or	   residence.	   The	   promisee	   must	   be	  
someone involved in the construction business. The chance emerges from the comparison 
of the promise to other contradictory promises and offers of the same service. The chance 
consists	  in	  that	  the	  promisee	  may	  choose	  the	  promisor’s	  service.	  The	  chance	  may	  consist	  
in a benefit for the promisor because she may be willing to sell an important service, 
engage in a prestigious construction project or show her qualities as partner to the 
promisee. 
Note however that no legal statement can be conclusive. So the promisee could prove that 
the promise was duly declared, albeit not written, or that the promisor benefited from a 
different fact, e.g. she made the promise to obtain the chance of undermining her 
competitor. What is even more important is that the elements of the concept of unilateral 
promise allow the promisee to elaborate a case for an atypical unilateral promise, a 
promise that only very specialized observers, or even no one previously, noticed 
promisors make in order to obtain the benefit of a chance. The promise must, in the eyes 
of the promisee, suggest a promissory relationship. If it does so, then the promise is a 
unilateral promise and therefore it obligates the promisor to do what was promised. If it 
does not, then the promise is not a unilateral promise and notwithstanding the other legal 
effects that it may provoke, it falls short of giving an enforceable credit right to the 
promisee.  
(E.2) GRATUITOUS PROMISES CAUSE NATURAL OBLIGATIONS 
A promise could very clearly indicate that it is honestly intended to produce legal effects, 
but be unenforceable due to a lack of cause. The interest motivating the promisor was 
neither to compensate an unenforceable debt nor to make the promisee produce a chance 
that he does something she wants. Her interest was purely a charitable one. Yet does this 




consideration do have a legal effect. Technically speaking, simple promises cause what we 
call	  “natural	  obligation.”	  The	  operative consequence of this old concept is that the natural 
creditor cannot claim her performance from the debtor but, if the debtor voluntarily 
performs her natural duty and then claims recovery for lack of title, the creditor can 
oppose the promise as granting title over the acquisition.453  
So, to make it clearer, suppose that a promisor performs her gratuitous promise. If such 
promise had no legal significance at all, the promisor will have a claim on restitution. She 
will be able to say, “Hey,	  I	  gave	  you	  this	  money	  without	  reason	  or	  cause,	  so	  you	  should 
give me that sum back.”	  But	  no	  private	  law	  would	  adjudicate	  like	  that.	  The	  payment	  of	  
gratuitous promises is irrecoverable because gratuitous promises are causes of natural 
obligations; the greatest significance of which is to serve as title for the purpose of 
banning actions of restitution.454 
                                                        
453 “Natural obligations are not estimated solely by the fact that some action can be brought on account of 
them, but also where the money, once paid, cannot be recovered. For although natural debtors cannot 
strictly be said to be indebted, still they may be considered such, and those who receive money from 
them to have obtained that to which they were entitled.”	  Justinian,	  Digest,	  46,	  1,	  16,	  4.	  I	  am	  utilizing	  this	  
version: http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Anglica/digest_Scott.htm 
454 There are some other legal implications of natural obligations. First of all, the natural creditor who is, by 
an independent cause, civil debtor of the natural debtor can use her natural credit to compensate her 
civil debt, provided that the object of natural credit and debt is of the same quantity and to the extent of 
the difference. So if Daniela has a natural credit of $10 as against Fernando, Fernando has an enforceable 
credit of $20 as against Daniela and Fernando claims payment of the $20 to Daniela, Daniela can argue 
that she only owes $10 to Fernando, given the title of her natural credit right (Dig. 16, 2, 6). Secondly, a 
natural obligation could become a civil obligation through novation. Fernando and Daniela agree that 
Fernando gives $10 to Daniela so that Daniela pays her natural debt in December 12th.	   Fernando’s	  
natural credit of $100 as against Daniela becomes an enforceable credit (Dig. 46, 2, 1, 1). Last but not 
least, if a third interested party gives warrant to the natural creditor that she will pay the natural debt, 
if the warrant is valid, the natural creditor has an action as against the warrantor in case of breach of 
warranty (for example in Art. 518 of 1871 Argentinian Civil Code). 
Now let us perform this thought experiment. Assume that, from a purely doctrinal point of view, promise 
itself performs the function of causing, grounding or being the title of a natural obligation. Now ask this 
question: Given that every firm and legally intended promise effects the legal outcome of causing a 
natural obligation, how are we to explain the enforceable promises, those that operate civil obligations? 
I will suggest that enforceable promises also cause natural obligations. Their difference from the 
gratuitous promises is not a difference of nature; both are legally intended promises in the same sense, 
just that one kind of promise is relatable to an independent counter-cause and the other kind is not. 
Here things demand rigorous analysis. The point is that the transfer that any enforceable promise 
reciprocates performs the role of payment of the natural obligation that the enforceable promise causes. 
To illustrate, when the promisor makes a promise of payment to the promisee (see 4.1.4.3(b)), the 
promisor is naturally obligating herself to the promisee. But because the promisee (natural creditor) 
had an independent credit against the promisor (natural debtor), he can deem himself paid with the 
promise	  (natural	  credit),	  and	  therefore	  claim	  the	  promise’s	  (natural)	  obligation.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  promise	  
(thought of as assured future payment) constitutes a payment. If paying a natural debt with a manual 
transfer makes the transferred thing irrecoverable, mutatis mutandi, paying a natural debt with an 




5.3. REQUIREMENT TWO: THE PROMISEE RECEIVES THE PROMISE 
5.3.1. THE OTHER PARTY TO THE UNILATERAL PROMISE IS THE APPOINTED PROMISEE 
The promisee, the person who receives the promise and acquires the right, must be the 
person who the promisor thought of when ideating the obligation and effectively 
addressed when making the promise. Suppose that the promisor thinks of one person and 
addresses another. This is an easy case. I ideated the promise of X to Mario Leal and, 
despite wanting to address it to him, I address it to Victor Jara. As this could only happen 
via mail delivery, I should have said something like, “To	  Mario	   Leal”	   or	   simply	   “Dear	  
Mario.”	  Victor	  can	  easily	  tell	  that	  he	  is	  not	  Mario. 
A more difficult case occurs where I think I am addressing the right person but am not. As 
where I think that you are someone else, however you are in fact someone who is planning 
to make a large-scale construction contract and so I promise you my services. What 
should the law be? These promises are generally written. If it is obvious to any reasonable 
reader that the promisor was mistaken, then the promise should not bind. However if a 
reasonable reader could feel himself entitled to the credit right, then the promise should 
bind. The question remains whether the promise is enforceable or causes a natural 
obligation. This is discerned by examining the question of whether the promisee caused 
the chance. If the promisee is also a contractor, then the burden of proof lies on the 
promisor. She will have to prove that the promisee did not cause the chance. 
Scholars classify unilateral promises according to the type of promisee a unilateral 
promise can address.455 There are three major types of promisees. 
                                                        
What I am suggesting is that, in very abstract juridical logic, banning an action of unjust enrichment on 
the grounds that the enrichment was just is like enforcing a promise on the grounds that the promise 
had reciprocation—non-recoverability being equivalent to enforceability.   
Concluding, the correct thesis on promises and private law is this: Serious and legally intended promises 
obligate the promisor to the promisee, although the promisee can not always claim performance of the 
promise to the promisor. The promise perfectly obligates the promisor—the promisee can claim 
performance of his right to the promisor—whenever the promise can be correlated with an autarkic 
counter-cause or reciprocation. In the absence of cause, the promise also obligates the promisor to the 
promisee, though it does it imperfectly—the promisee has a right as against the promisor but cannot 
claim	  it	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  justice.	  Still,	  the	  imperfect	  promise	  or	  cause	  of	  “natural	  credit”	  has	  at	  least	  four	  
legal implications. Frist, if the promisor pays the debt she cannot recuperate it on the grounds of unjust 
enrichment. Second, the promisee can use the promise to compensate a duty of his as against the 
promisor-natural debtor. Thirdly, the natural debtor and creditor can novate the natural obligation into 
a civil obligation. Last but possibly not least, third parties can warrant the payment of the natural 
obligation. 
455 Probably the first making this classification is Worms, who introduces it in his treatment of the binding 




5.3.1.1. THE DETERMINATE AND DETERMINABLE PROMISEE 
First,	  a	  unilateral	  promise	  could	  address	  a	  determinate	  person,	  as	  if	  I	  say	  to	  you,	  “Wanja	  
Postel, I promise you that if you ever decide to give a job to my son Robin, I will hire your 
daughter-in-law.”	  The	  determinate	  person	  could	  obviously be less determinate, as when 
I	  address	  a	  promise	  to	  “The	  Head	  of	  X	  Company.” 
A unilateral promise could also be addressed to an indeterminate but determinable 
person.456 As	  when	  persons	   say	   “I	  promise	   to	  pay	  X	  money	   to	  whoever solves Y math 
problem.”	  Who	  is the addressee of my promise? There is no person in particular. However, 
one can deduce from the content of the promise the kind of promisee the promise is 
addressed to. In our case, it is obvious that the promise is addressed to a mathematician, 
be this mathematician affiliated to a university or a free agent.  
5.3.1.2. THERE IS NO PROMISE IF THE PROMISEE IS INDETERMINABLE 
Some writers say that a unilateral promise can be made to an indeterminable person. The 
example is of a promise addressed to an unborn	  person.	  E.g.	  “I	  promise	  to	  give	  my	  library	  
to your next child.” The question is whether these promises bind the promisor. 
The private law obligation includes not only a debtor and a performance, but also a 
creditor; it is a duty of one to another. If there is no determinable creditor, then: To whom 
could the obligation engage the debtor with? The unilateral promise scholars 
conceptualize the unilateral promise to include the borderline cases of promises without 
existing creditors. They succeed, for as we saw in section 3, they ground the obligation of 
promises in a general norm saying: do what you say. Hence promise can be defined as a 
unilateral statement by which one person is obligated to do something. Despite the 
attention that cases like the promise to the unborn garner, and probably deserve, I cannot 
comprehend them in the juridical conception of the unilateral promise. In just private law 
regimes it is essential that the act aiming to cause a voluntary obligation reaches the 
promisee, i.e. be communicated (and reciprocated). Cases like the promise to the unborn 
put the theorist in the difficult position of choosing to conceptualize the unilateral 
promise so as to include the borderline cases, or conceptualizing the unilateral promise 
                                                        
en	  droit	   français,	   (thèse	  pour	   le	  doctorat	  présentée	  et	  soutenue	   le	  mardi	  23	   juin	  1891,	  Université	  de	  
France,	  Faculté	  de	  droit	  de	  Paris,	  by	  René	  Worms),	  A.	  Giard,	  Paris,	  1891,	  p.	  166. 
456 Carlos Martinez de Aguirre maintains that the national private laws and doctrines agree in that the 
indeterminacy	   of	   the	   promise’s	   addressee	   is	   a	   characteristic	   feature	   of	   the	   promise	   of	   reward.	   “La	  
promesa	   pública	   de	   recompense	   en	   el	   Derecho	   comparado,”	   in	   Revista General	   de	   Legislacón	   y	  
Jurisprudencia, Vol LXXXIX, No 6, December 1984, pp. 789-812, at p. 795-796. I	  don’t	  see	  the	  reason	  why,	  




so that it can cohere with the other institutions of a just private law. I have thus to decide: 
the unilateral promise must be communicated to a determinable person—the creditor.457 
5.3.2. THE PROMISEE ACQUIRES THE OBLIGATED PERFORMANCE BY RECEIVING THE PROMISE  
5.3.2.1. THE PROMISEE ACQUIRES BY RECEPTION 
Now we move to a sensitive issue. The formation of a transfer of a right requires that a 
person disposes of a right and another person acquires the disposed right (see 4.1.4). We 
said that what the promisor disposes is a credit right or obligation and that the means 
through which the promisor disposes of that obligation is the promise. So far there could 
be little, if any, disagreement. The sensitive question is this: How does the promisee 
acquire the right?  
My answer is as follows. True, for a transfer to exist, there must be an act of disposition 
and an act of acquisition, but acceptance, which is a mode of acquiring a personal right, is 
not the only mode of acquiring personal rights. There are other modes of acquiring 
personal rights from another person,	   like	   “reception,”	   which	   is	   the	   mode	   in	   which,	   I	  
submit, the promisee takes the personal or credit right from the promisor. 
Let me elucidate this mode of acquisition with an example: 
The promisee finds a letter at her doorstep. The promisee gets interested in the letter, 
grasps it, opens it, reads it, and apprehends or receives the message. I want to suggest that 
the acquisition of the right takes place at the reception stage. In the process of intending 
to know what the piece of paper is, the promisee related the words, spacing, paragraphs, 
the margins, colors, drawings, the terminology used by the writer in the text, the time, 
space and circumstances in which the promise came to her, the promisee related all the 
signs with her educational background to identify or pick up the idea that the promisor 
invoked to her in his letter. This idea is a voluntary obligation. I want to suggest that, in 
intellectually grasping what the promisor expressed, the promisee takes on the credit of 
the obligation. The promisor lassoed her performance and tossed the rope to the 
promisee; when the promisee caught the rope, understanding what lay at the other end, 
the promisee took command over the performance—the rope linked the parties as in a 
private law obligation. 
                                                        
457 It obviously remains possible to argue that the promise receiver (the mother) acted as a representative 




In short, the promisee takes the right when he happens to receive the promise. I will 
defend this technical development in 5.3.3. In 6.1.4 I justify it. 
5.3.2.2. THE PROMISEE ALWAYS RECEIVES THE PROMISE  
The time of reception varies with the mode of communication of the promise. For 
example, if the promise is made verbally to the promisee, the promisee may be reasonably 
treated as having received the promise from the moment that he could be deemed as 
having understood the promise. If the promise is made through a letter to the promisee, 
the promisee may be reasonably treated as having received the promise from the moment 
that the promise enters to his area of control, namely his house, office or wherever it is 
known that he receives his post.458  
These are all questions of fact. Good faith in unilateral promising, which is an aggregation 
of the norms of dealings between reasonable promisors and promisees in typical 
unilateral promise scenarios, plays a central role in determining this moment. The 
relevant fact from a juridical viewpoint is that the promisee perceives the content of the 
promise from the promise itself. We do not need to discuss whether this indeed happens 
in the promises inter presents. The relevant discussion is whether reception in fact occurs 
in the cases of promises inter absents. Regardless of the fact that some people do not 
collect their mail, it has long been assumed that individuals cultivate awareness of their 
promises, offers and the other declarations that private law persons make to each other. 
The	  adage	  is	  “Idem est scire aut scire debet aut potuisse.” If this is not a legal fiction, on 
what basiss can we uphold it? I develop an answer in 5.4.2.1. 
5.3.2.3. THE PERFORMANCE DISPOSED BY THE PROMISOR IS, WITHOUT MEDIATION, THE 
PERFORMANCE ACQUIRED BY THE PROMISEE 
When the promisee receives the promise, the promisee acquires the right that the 
promisor disposed of by promising. Before the promise reaches the promisee, the 
promised thing belongs to the promisor. After the promise reaches the promisee, the 
promised thing belongs to the promisee. Through the promise, the thing passes from the 
                                                        
458 The same mode of reception applies to promises to the public—the addressed public is deemed as 
acquainted with the promise from the moment that the promise is made available to it. If the public is 
composed by a community of computer scientists, the promise is considered available from the moment 
that it appears (say) in a computer science magazine, if the public comprises all interested persons, from 




promisor to the promisee. As happens in contract (see 4.1.4.), the thing passes from one 
party to another directly, without becoming a res nullius and without a state mediating.459 
However, the continuity between disposition and acquisition in promise is, in one respect, 
even more acute than it is in contract. In contract there is a fraction of time between the 
reception of the offer and the acceptance or formation of the contract. This fraction of time 
begs questions like, what is the status of the offeree? Can he effectuate actions other than 
accepting the offer? In what sense is the offeror bound to her offer? Can she licitly dispose 
of what she has offered before revoking the offer? What justifies her liability? There is no 
such lapse in promise. The analogous moment would be the lapse between the statement 
of the promise and its reception by the promise, but this moment will hardly be relevant 
from a practical perspective.  
(A) IN PROMISE THERE IS NO PLACE FOR REVOCATION 
If follows from the previous section that in promises there is no place for revocation. 
Revocation has a place where the transferee bears something that he has not yet fully 
acquired.	   Hence	   the	   transferor	   can	   say:	   “Give me the thing back please.”	   When	   one	  
receives a promise one acquires a credit right, a definite power over a performance. The 
promisor	   hence	   cannot	   say:	   “Give me the performance back please.”	   If	   before	   the	  
delivered promise arrives, the promisor manages to inform the promisee that the arriving 
promise is not intended, she will surely not be bound, but not because she revoked. She is 
not	  revoking	  the	  promise’s	  effects, because the promise never was. The promisor aborted 
the formation of the promise after having initiated it.  
With these developments I believe I have determined inter vivos promises as a means of 
transferring rights. 
5.3.3. THERE IS NO NEED FOR ACCEPTANCE TO ACQUIRE THE RIGHT GIVEN BY PROMISE  
Some scholars affirm that a promise that is not accepted does not transfer a right, that the 
promisee must accept the promise to acquire the right that promise aims at 
                                                        
459 It is clear that the thing that the promisee acquires is the same thing that the promisor disposes. For 
example, if the promisor promises the performance	  “I	  will do	  X”	  the	  promisee	  acquires the performance 
“You	  will	  do	  X.”	  The	  identity	  consisting	  in	  that,	  for	  both	  parties,	  the	  same	  person	  will	  do	  X.	  Obviously	  the 
performance is not for the promisor what it is for the promisee. The fact that the promisor sees the 
performance in the manner; “I	  will do X,”	  and	  the	  promisee	  sees	  it	  as; “You	  will	  do	  X,”	  tells	  us about the 
fact that one is obligated to do X and the other has the right to X. But the fact that the performance is a 
right for one and a duty for the other does not contravene the requirement that the thing that the 





transferring.460 In the previous section I said that what promise needs to transfer a right 
is reception, not an acceptance; that the promisee must receive and get to know the 
promise to acquire the right disposed by promise. Here I will demonstrate that acceptance 
has nothing to do with the act of making promises, and what is more, that promises are 
by definition unacceptable. So if promise is to be determined as a right transfer 
interaction, the act with which the acquirer acquires what the disposer disposed must be 
one other than acceptance. 
We	  must	  first	  examine	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “acceptance.”	  In general acceptance represents 
an affirmative response to a yes or no proposal. There is as much acceptance in the case 
where A responds, “Sure,”	  to	  the	  request	  of	  B	  to	  promise	  him something, as there is in the 
case where A responds, “Great!”	  to	  the	  promise of B to do something for him. However, 
one can see a substantial difference between the two acceptances.461 The	  “Sure”	  contains	  
an	  act	  by	  which	  the	  speaker	  obligates	  herself	   to	  the	  hearer	  and	  the	  “Great!”	  contains	  a	  
piece of information that tells the hearer that the speaker is pleased. I shall name the 
former acceptance operative acceptance and the latter acceptance mere acceptance.  
Is operative acceptance necessary for the formation of a promise? It is obvious, in my 
view, that operative acceptance has nothing to do with the social act of promising. The 
proper place for such acceptance is amongst the constituents of a command. Operative 
acceptance also makes sense alongside offer and contractual obligation.462 Of course, 
amongst the constituents of a contract operative acceptance will imply, in addition to the 
assumption of an obligation, the reception of a right. Yet in both command and contract, 
acceptance implies the conferral of a right from the acceptor to the acceptee, a conferral 
that, if it were present in promise, would convert promise into a purely executory 
contract. 463  Operative acceptance is to promise what damnum is to the systematic 
composition of offer and contractual obligation. The vacuum left by offer and contractual 
obligation cannot be filled by damnum. These concepts make sense with the concept of 
                                                        
460 The classical statement of this view is in Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an 
introduction by Richard Tuck, Liberty Found, Indianapolis, 2005, Book II, Chapter XI, n. XIV: 
XIV. But that a Promise may transfer a Right, the Acceptance of the Person to whom it is made is no less 
required here, than in the Case of transferring a Property[…] 
461 Adolf Reinach, op. cit., pp. 29 and ss. 
462 Confirming, in their own argumentative contexts, strategies and languages, J.	   E.	   Penner,	   “Voluntary	  
obligations and the scope of the law of contract,”	  in	  Legal Theory, Issue 2, (1996), pp. 325-357, at pp. 
228-230 and Enrico	  Dell’Acquila,	  “La	  promesa	  unilateral	  como	  fuente	  general	  de	  obligaciones,”	  in	  Revista 
de Derecho Privado, Tomo LXIII, (1979), Madrid, pp. 796-806, at p. 797. 
463 Let me insist on this, both the offeree of an obligation for consideration and the addressee of a stipulation 
are,	  by	  saying	  the	  magic	  word	  “I	  accept,”	  assuming	  obligations—the offeree to give the consideration to 




(operative) acceptance, not with something like damnum. In the same sense, operative 
acceptance is incoherent in the context of promise, chance creation and chance 
perception—if something else is needed, it cannot be operative acceptance. 
So operative acceptance has nothing to do with the act of promise. What about mere 
acceptance?	  To	  repeat,	  mere	  acceptance	  informs	  the	  acceptee	  of	  the	  acceptor’s	  present	  
accord	  with	  the	  acceptee’s	  proposal.	  Can	  such acceptance be a requisite for the formation 
of	  a	  promise?	  “I	  hereby	  accept	  your	  promise”	  amounts	  to	  saying	  “I	  do	  want	  the	  promissory	  
right.”	   The	   question	   to	   be	   asked	   is	   this:	   Do	   people	   condition	   their	   promises	   upon	  
agreement of the counterpart? And the answer to be given is a categorical no. One does 
not ask if the other wants a promise, rather, one makes the promise. Whether the other 
wants the promise is not a consideration for the efficacy of the promise. It is a matter of 
consideration for the continuance of the normative change operated because of the 
promise. If one likes (or simply does not like it, as opposed to dislikes) the promise, one 
never rejects it, which is like keeping it, not like accepting it. 
The denial of a promise is the act of rejection. And it is implicit in rejection that the rejecter 
has something. One cannot reject or refuse something that one does not have. My refusing 
the right given by this promise implies that I have, at any time, made that right mine. The 
possibility of rejecting the right analytically implies ownership over the right. And 
ownership over the right is in obligations the correlative of bearing the obligation. We 
henceforth reaffirm that promise causes obligation without the need for acceptance. And 
having affirmed that promise causes obligation, we reaffirm that irrevocability is essential 
to promise, for	   the	   idea	   that	   one	   can	   by	   one’s	   own	  will	   decide	   not	   to	   be	   obligated	   is	  
contrary to the idea of being obligated. It is the irrevocability of promises that makes mere 
acceptance insignificant in promise. 
In 5.3.2.1 I dealt with the question of how it is that someone acquires a right disposed of 
by promise. The answer was reception. This answer was a technical determination, the 
best possible answer to the question: If promise were to be considered a transfer of right, 
what would be the act of acquisition? (See 4.3.2, especially 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.4 and 4.3.2.3) This 
section reinforced such technical determination. We said that acceptance, in any of its two 
forms, is inessential to the efficacy of (an unconditional, default) promise. Since 
acceptance is inapposite to promise, and the promisee must do something to acquire the 
right disposed through promise, reception must be the act of acquisition. The question of 
whether someone has the right to impose on another the reception of a right presents 
another quandary. It remains, in other words, to see whether the legal concept of 
reception resists a normative examination, if for example, it does not contradict the free 




form of acquiring rights, promise must be neglected by private law, for the promisee must 
somehow acquire the right transfer through promise, and acceptance is inapposite to 
promise. I discuss the normative issue in 6.1, specifically 6.1.4. 
5.4. REQUIREMENT THREE: THE PROMISEE MUST PRODUCE A CHANCE 
5.4.1. THE PROMISEE MUST POSSESS A “BARGAINING MODE OF REASONING” 
5.4.1.1. THE ‘BARGAINING MODE OF REASONING’ 
The merit of the	  Kantian	  Willkür	  is	  to	  have	  represented	  the	  ancient	  idea	  of	  self-control, 
voluntas or free will in its minimalist expression.464 Understood in this minimalistic sense, 
will—namely	  Willkür—signifies	   the	   faculty	   to	   choose	   by	   means	   of	   one’s	   own	  mental	  
representations. Capacity of choice implies that a human can refrain from doing what she 
has been taught or accustomed herself to do in similar situations, and even to resist the 
urgings of natural impulses—like her sensual desires. It is as if she could stand outside of 
the chain of causes and effects that determine her as one more object of the natural world. 
By having capacity of choice, by being able to think for herself, the human is hence able to 
formulate her original choices for actions, conceive her own projects. It is because of their 
presupposition of Willkür	  on the part of humans, I would say, that law and other cultural 
domains like the creative disciplines can impute ultimate authorship of deeds to humans 
and not to social contexts or natures. This is what	  Willkür	  imports. 
The question of how to think in order to choose an action, and of what can be chosen 
through the mode of thinking that we chose to think with, does not come of pure freedom. 
The mode of reasoning is not one but as many as one could clearly distinguish and these 
modes	  of	  reasoning	  are	  not	  features	  of	  the	  human’s	  mind	  but	  constituents	  of	  a	  culture.	  
This means that humans can learn how to reason in various ways. One could learn how to 
think as a virtue or Kantian moralist, as a carpenter or skateboarder. These modes of 
thought, however reducible to categories like practical reasoning or technical reasoning, 
can be said to be distinct. Although the mental representation of both the carpenter and 
skateboarder is of the same conditional nature, both carpenters and skateboarders can 
think of themselves as doing something of their own—for the numerous and 
sophisticated rules of one has little of the numerous and sophisticated rules of the other. 
                                                        
464 I take the notion from Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor translation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 6:211-6:221, pp. 373-376, Peter Benson, “External	   Freedom	  
According to Kant,”	   in Columbia Law Review, 87, (1987), pp. 559-579 and Ernest Weinrib "Law as a 
Kantian Idea of Reason," in Columbia Law Review, 87, (1987), pp. 472-508. I might have departed from 




It is in this context that I propose that you think that the promisee, prior to and after the 
acquisition of the promissory right, possesses what I call the “bargaining	   mode	   of	  
reasoning.”	  This	   intellectual	   thing	   serves	   to	   choose	   transactions	   and	   it	   can	  be	  used	   as	  
many times as its owner desires for the purpose of assessing choices for bargains. I will 
refer to it indistinctly, but there are as many bargaining modes of reasoning as the 
researcher could distinguish. For example, one could argue that some people are well 
trained in choosing promises of goods for shopping. They consider factors like 
price/quality,	  satisfaction,	  social	  responsibility,	  status,	  etc.	  They	  have	  a	  “consumer’s	  mode	  
of thinking.”	  The	  interested	  promisor	  will	  implement	  it	  (reason	  like	  a	  consumer)	  at	  the	  
time of ideating the promissory obligation (see 5.2.2.2 (b)), and the promisee-consumer 
at	  the	  time	  of	  receiving	  the	  promise.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  “constructor’s	  mindset.”	  His	  
reasoning also assesses contract options, but for doing business, and so other factors will 
be considered, like the transference of risks, margin of gain, professional credit and 
prestige, etc. The addressees of a reward and of prize promises may have their own modes 
of reasoning. 
5.4.1.2. THE BARGAINING MODE OF REASONING BELONGS TO THE PROMISEE 
It would take too long to discuss the reasons I have for thinking that promisees can be 
thought of as owners of a bargaining mode of reasoning. Let us just accept some 
propositions. First, the bargaining mode of reasoning consists of an intellectual thing, a 
concept that serves a distinct function in an ascertainable community of sense. Second, it 
is susceptible of being acquired by persons—humans can apprehend it, make it theirs 
through education, or not.465 Finally, humans use their bargaining mode of reasoning to 
the exclusion of others. Even if everyone can easily access this good, each person has their 
own	  and	  each	  one’s	  usage	  of	  it	  brings	  results	  that	  differ	  from	  the	  results	  or	  uses	  of	  others.	  
So, the promisees that the interested promisors appoint with their promises are persons 
who have acquired a bargaining mode of reasoning. 
Now let me examine some features of the bargaining mode of reasoning. First, the 
bargaining mode of reasoning is a productive thing. It is a productive thing in the sense 
                                                        
465 You could not have this mode of reasoning and be a perfect legal person. Think of the Arab bargaining 
culture. Arabs do compare choices for transactional action, however the comparison does not take place 
in solitude. Their bargaining process requires of a co-present will, which is modifying and re-modifying 
the terms of the choices. No choice is truly deemed definitive to an extent that, from the Western 
perspective, the bargaining process turns to be everlasting, uncertain and unbearable. In this scenario, 
a promisee cannot say that he has been induced by the promisor to create a chance for the promisor. 
The promisor could obviously say that the promisee could have never taken the promise as a definitive 




that the function that distinguishes it from other ideas produces objects of their own.466 
As the tree produces fruit, or the letting of a house rent, the bargaining mode of reasoning 
produces deliberations (which can be thought of as chances, see 5.4.3.1). These objects 
are distinguishable from the thing that produces them. Second, the bargaining mode of 
reasoning is an incomplete thing. To show the character that distinguishes it from other 
things or concepts, this or that bargaining mode of reasoning needs to be complemented 
by something else. Even if the promisee possesses the bargaining mode of reasoning as a 
thing standing on its own, this thing is not realized—it does not come into being—unless 
and until it is set into motion, unless and until it bargains between choices. As a math 
formula needs quantities to be itself, the bargaining mode of reasoning needs qualities, 
choices that excite it into deliberatation. Finally, the bargaining mode of reasoning is an 
inconsumable thing. Since it is like a skill, the bargaining mode of reasoning can be put to 
use as many times as its bearer can and wants. 
5.4.2. THE PROMISEE AS INDUCED TO PUT HER BARGAINING MODE OF REASONING INTO ACTION, 
CREATING A CHANCE 
Let us go back to the transaction. It is time to explain how the promisee produces the 
chance. 
5.4.2.1. THE EFFICACY OF THE INDUCEMENT 
An interested promisor contemplates three orders of fact about the promisee that she 
appoints with her promise.  
First of all, she knows that the promisee is committed to being a private law person; he 
will gain awareness and appraise the notifications, offers, promises and other 
communications he may receive. 
                                                        
466 German Civil Code says in relation to fruits: 
§99 [Fruits] (1) Fruits of a thing are the products of the thing, and other yield derived from the thing consistent 
with its purpose.  
(2) Fruits of a right are the proceeds which the right affords, consistent with its purpose, in particular, in the 
case of a right to extract component parts of the earth, the component parts so extracted.  
(3) Fruits also include the proceeds which a thing or a right affords by virtue of a legal relationship.  
§100 [Emoluments] Emoluments are the fruits of a thing or a right as well as the advantages which the use of 
the thing or right affords. 
I utilize The German Civil Code, Revised ed. as amended to January 1, 1992, Simon L. Goren translation, 




Second, she knows that the promisee has a bargaining mode of reasoning that he shaped, 
disciplining his capacity for choice in a specific mode.  
Third, she knows that the promisee possesses an infinite number legal choices for action, 
like the right to rest in the public space, the privilege to make offers to others, and so on 
and so forth. 
On these bases, the promisor can be sure of the following three facts: 
First of all, the promisee receives the promise. As the promisee is a private law persona, 
someone who not only has rights as against others but also responsibilities, the promisee 
is someone who cares about the communications, invitations, promises, offers, etc. that 
others make to him. So when the promisor declares a promise to the promisee the 
promisee must listen to the promisor and take her seriously. If the promisor promises in 
a letter, she can be sure that the promisor will check the mailbox, read the letter and 
understand the right conferred in it. So when the promisor makes him the promise, the 
promisee acquires or gains awareness of the promissory right.467  
Second, the promisee applies his bargaining mode of reasoning. The promisee is not a 
random person. He is someone with a bargaining mode of reasoning. No one who 
understands that what he is reading is a promise will not consider, at least for a second, 
whether he is interested in the right or not. The promisee applies the bargaining mode of 
reasoning—he evaluates the desirability of the promissory right or compares it with the 
other comparable choices he has. 
Third, the usage of the bargaining mode of reasoning indicates to him that the choice of 
the newly acquired right comes with the rejection of preexistent choices. Let me explain 
this point with an example. The promisor makes a promise of a reward and the promisee 
receives it, acquiring a conditional right to a reward (see 5.2.2.2(c)). If he decides to 
perform the act conditioning his entitlement to the reward, the promisee will have to (let 
us assume) spend the whole evening looking for the lost cat (choice A). But he could 
choose to exercise another entitlement of his. He could, for example go to the park and 
rest, which will also take him the whole evening (choice B). Since all possible promisees 
possess choice B and it is impossible to perform choice A and B simultaneously, we could 
                                                        
467 From a different angle:  
How do we know that an offeree has given the offeror the chance that the offeror was bargaining for? Usually 
in firm-offer cases, the issue of enforceability only arises when the offeree wants to accept the offer. Therefore, 
it can fairly be presumed that by making the firm offer, the offeror has induced just the consideration of his 
offer that he sought. 




be sure that the promissorily placed choice conflicts with at least one of the choices that 
the promisee possesses.  
Now, if we agree that a chance is a possibility that a hypothesis of a fact occurs in the place 
of a contrary hypothesis, and that the usage of the bargaining mode of reasoning puts the 
possibility forward that the promisee may choose the promissory right instead of a 
contrary right that he cannot but possess, then we must conclude, without uncertainty, 
that the usage of the bargaining mode of reasoning creates as it were, a legal chance. Once 
again, as the promisee will always receive the promise, apply his bargaining mode of 
reasoning and consider choosing the promissory right instead of an incompatible choice 
that he certainly has, the promisee will, without uncertainty, always produce the legal 
chance (See more in 5.4.3.1). 
We can refer to the	  fact	  of	  the	  chance	  production	  as	  “chance	  causation.” 
5.4.2.2. IT IS THE PROMISEE WHO PRODUCES THE CHANCE 
True, the promisee would have not evaluated the promissory choice had the promisor 
never submitted it. But the chance determination act is performed by the promisee alone. 
He is who takes the right in, compares it with his other rights and produces the chance. 
So the actor in relation to the chance-causation act is the promisee. 
5.4.2.3. THE IRRELEVANCE OF RELIANCE 
Reliance on the promise is not a prerequisite for the causation of the chance. Reliance 
considers the relationship from the moment that the promisee commences to perform the 
act requested in the promise, like beginning to look for the lost thing, preparing himself 
for the contract, and so on. What I am suggesting here is that the relationship deserves 
consideration from the moment that the promisee receives the promise. The reason for 
this is that the benefit that the promisor sought when she made the promise became a fact 
with the reception of the promise. If the interest of the proponent were not the chance of 
having her lost dog back but the fact of having the dog back, then the moment from which 
the relationship causes an obligation is the moment in which the addressee brings the dog 
back, when the offeree accepts the offer. So if the reliance requisite is one step ahead of 
the requisite causation of the chance, the reliance requisite is one step behind the 
requisite acceptance of an offer of a unilateral contract. To be sure, I cannot imagine a case 








In this drawing we see the four stages of the formation of a unilateral promise. In 
number one we see the promisor planning and making the unilateral promise to pay a 
reward to the finder of his lost dog. We see in his message that the promise is not a 
simple promise but one of those made to induce promisees to create a chance for 
promisors: on the one hand, the promisor and his promised money; on the other hand, 
the act that conditions the promise; below, the intended addressees of the promise. In 
number two we see a promisee receiving the promise. He is not accepting it; he is just 
learning (apprehending) it. We can see that the promise caught his attention. In the 
third moment we see the same promisee considering the promise. Do I put myself to 
look for the lost dog, or perhaps to play basketball, or just ride my bike? These choices 
compete against each other generating possible world scenarios. One of these is the 
chance that he chooses to do what the promisor wants, in exchange for the reward. 







Now suppose that the promisor sends a revocation letter to the promisee and the 
promisee reacts by alleging violation of the promise. The promisor cannot say that the 
first act on behalf of the promisee occurred after of the revocation. No, the first deed of 
the promisee did not consist in demanding performance of the promisor. The first deed 
of the promisee, what caused the chance that the promisor perceived, was the reception 
of the promise. 
5.4.3. THE CHANCE AS A THING IN COMMERCIUM 
We saw that when the promisee receives the promissory right and evaluates it in relation 
to incompatible or alternative legal choices, the promisee creates something that had not 
existed	  before.	  This	  something,	  again,	   is	  what	  we	  have	  called	   “the	  chance”—the actual 
possibility that the promisee choses to act as the promisor wishes. I want to give special 
attention to the chance. The following topography is aimed at making it clear that the 
chance, the thing that the promisee produces and the promisor perceives, is something 
with a significance and a reality of its own, distinct to both the promissory right and the 
bargaining mode of reasoning. Eventually, I will argue that this thing of its own has a 
pecuniary value. 
5.4.3.1. THE THING I CALL “CHANCE” 
We could define chance as the hypothesis of a fact that is more than possible in a given 
world. Let me develop briefly. That we talk while we swallow can be said to be impossible 
in this world. That we swallow what we eat can be said to be certain in the same world. 
Whatever is neither certain nor impossible in a world is said to be possible. That we 
discover the way to eat and not get fat could be considered possible today. That I will eat 
tomorrow is however more than possible. This is more than possible because the 
considerations that made us reach that conclusion are more convincing than the 
considerations that made us reach the former conclusion. Humans have invented the 
wheel, the internet,	  innumerable	  obscenities,	  why	  wouldn’t	  they	  invent	  food	  that	  never	  
fattens? This seems to be convincing. But what about this: I have been eating every day of 
my life, I am 29 years old and people with my lifestyle die in their 70’s. Furthermore, I 
have the money to eat tomorrow and live in a country with plentiful goods and a stable 
economy. It is more possible that I eat tomorrow than that we ever find a way to eat 
without getting fat. 
Now, chance can have a double existence. One is in the form of a psychological reality and 
the other is in the form of a reality outside of the mind. Let us firstly examine what 
happens in the mind of someone receiving a unilateral promise. When the promisee opens 




right. Hence, in	  the	  promisee’s	  mind there is a new choice for action, a new project on 
which the promisee can embark (decide to make the contract, look for the lost dog, claim 
the gift) and benefit therefrom (acquire the service, possibly get the reward, take the gift). 
However, this is not his only choice for action. He has other choices, some of which are 
realizable through plans that are in conflict with the plan involved in the realization of the 
promissory choice. (The promisee cannot rest at home and look for the lost dog, deliver 
the same service to two subcontractors and so on and so forth). Now, the reception of the 
promise entailed the evaluation of its desirability. No one who understands that what he 
is reading is a promise will not consider, at least for a second, whether he is interested in 
the right or not. The placing of the new choice in the bargaining mode of reasoning calls 
to mind the most obviously incompatible choices, for no one can evaluate a choice without 
alternative choices. So a conflict of choices is produced. The promisee will compare the 
promissory choice with those choices beholden to contradictory projects, once and again. 
Here is where the chance appears. In making its own place, the newly placed right 
displaces, pushes outward as it were the contradictory choices, and from their prior 
position the contradicting choices resist, bouncing against the newcomer. 468 The tension 
produced where each choice exercises its rhetorical force against the others resembles a 
chance scenario, one where there is the possibility that one hypothesis of a fact defeats 
the contradicting others in its coming into being. This is what I call the chance in the 
psychological sense. I make reference to a process happening in	  the	  promisee’s	  mind. 
Now	  let	  me	  talk	  about	  the	  chance	  as	  it	  exists	  outside	  of	  the	  promisee’s	  mind.	  Someone,	  
most probably a merchant, must have realized that a specific type of promise has the 
power of inducing persons to want to do things with a remarkable degree of effectiveness. 
I imagine that in business schools teachers teach techniques for making very attractive 
proposals, proposals whose rhetorical power excludes competing proposals or create the 
need for its offer where previously no need existed. The result of those proposals is what 
I have called the chance. And I would add that the chance is a cultural reality because 
people can pick it up from a community of sense and apply it to specific purposes.469 Its 
                                                        
468 Interestingly, scholars in the field of marketing	  studies	  talk	  about	  the	  “public	  and	  mental	  space”	  taken 
by advertisements. Noemi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Picador USA, New York, 1999, 
p. 340. 
469 Obviously the concept of legal chance can also serve a third impartial party who wants to analyze the 
promisor-promisee relation. Before the promisee received the promise, it was almost impossible that 
he would begin to search for something he most likely ignored was lost. With the reception of the 
promise, he began to know that an object of X and Z qualities is lost, that the object belongs to Y and, 
more importantly, that he will be rewarded with $N if he happens to return it. That he may decide to 
embark himself in the search is a new hypothesis of fact in the promisor-promisee world, and any well-




original and also most conventional application is the satisfaction of a civil and 
commercial need. The chance satisfies my need to increase the possibilities of having 
something that I cannot obtain in a market place. I cannot go to a market and buy my lost 
dog, I cannot buy consumers nor can I buy good partners with whom to work. Yet I do can 
promise things that may induce others to look for my lost dog, consume and become 
consumers of my products or test me as a working partner. 
What I do hence is endeavour to increase the possibility of a thing I cannot buy becoming 
mine. In this, the chance is something that serves the promisor, but as I am trying to 
elaborate here, the chance can serve to the promisee as well. Clearly, the promisee does 
not apply his bargaining mode of reasoning to create the chance. He applies his bargaining 
mode of reasoning to make the most convenient choice. He is indifferent towards the 
chance, it has value only for the promisor. And it will serve only the promisor if the 
promisor behaves as she promised. However if the promisor violates the promise—this 
is my argument—then the chance can serve the promisee as well. The promisee can utilize 
the chance to oppose it as the object of a conferred right. Thereby another signification 
for the chance: It is the object of a specific subjective right. I will come back to this in 
4.3.3.2 (d.1). 
5.4.3.3. IT IS DIFFERENT TO THE RIGHT AND AN EXTERNALITY OF THE MODE OF REASONING 
The chance distinguishes itself from everything around it. It is neither reducible to the 
bargaining mode of reasoning nor is it reducible to the promissory choice—the 
promisor’s	  fruit	  is	  neither	  its	  source	  nor	  the	  personal	  right	  that	  excites	  it.	   
Firstly, the chance cannot be confused with the bargaining mode of reasoning. Whereas 
the chance refers to the interplay between the promissory choice and a preexisting group 
of contradictory choices, the bargaining mode of reasoning refers to the platform where 
this interplay takes place. Each concept has a function of its own (compare 5.4.3.1. with 
5.4.1), and the bargaining mode of reasoning preexists and subsists on the chance created 
with the reception of a promissory right (see X). Like the let of an apartment, the chance 
is attributable to, but yet detachable and distinguishable from its source. Indeed, the main 
function of the bargaining mode of reasoning is not to produce chances but right choices. 
The chance is an externality of the choice making process. 
                                                        
contradictory hypothesis of the same world. Yet the possibility that the promisee happens to do it is 




The chance should also not be confused with the promissory right. True, the promissory 
right partakes in the creation of the chance. It is one of the many choices the evaluation of 
which produces the chance, but it cannot be confused with it. The difference could be 
better viewed in consideration of their legal functions: Whereas the promissory right is 
to juridically impoverish the promisor, the right over the chance is to juridically enrich 
her; the same thing cannot enrich and impoverish you in the same sense. The chance is 
not the promissory right but	  the	  product	  of	  the	  promissory	  right’s	  interplay with other 
practical choices. 
5.4.3.2. THE CHANCE IS IN COMMERCIUM 
For a thing to be the object of a transaction in private law requires, firstly that it not be 
excluded from commerce and secondly, that it be susceptible of pecuniary appreciation. 
Should private law prohibit transactions whereby persons induce others to give them the 
value of a chance? This is the question addressed in 6.2. Here I address the second 
requirement.470 So, is the chance susceptible of pecuniary appreciation? This question can 
be answered both empirically and theoretically. The risk of answering the question only 
empirically is that if we find no chances in commerce we will have to conclude that 
chances are insusceptible to pecuniary appreciation without having considered if they 
could be susceptible to pecuniary appreciation. I want to eliminate that risk. 
Theoretically, a thing can be analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively.471 The qualitative 
consideration goes to the needs that the thing that is the object of analysis is regarded as 
serviceable for. As Professor Weinrib illustratres: “I	  can	  make	  use	  of	  my	  shoe,	  for	  example,	  
because my shoe has certain qualities: a concave shape into which my foot fits, a flexible 
material that will bend as I lift and lower my foot, a slightly curved sole that facilitates 
locomotion, and so on. Only with such qualities can the shoe satisfy the needs of 
movement and protection that the shoe serves.”472 The need, or better, the interest that 
the chance serves is, in general, our will to develop our civil or professional personality, 
and in particular, our will to have the possibilities of having something we cannot buy 
increased. 
                                                        
470  The requirement can be inferred from the rule according to which private law remedies must be 
translatable into monetary terms. 
471 In	  this	  I	  am	  inspired	  by	  Weinrib’s	  interpretation	  of	  Hegel	  in,	  Corrective Justice, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012, Chapter 6, number 2, p. 190 and ss. 




The quantitative consideration makes two movements. Negatively, it abstracts from the 
needs that things conventionally serve, and positively, it relates one such “denaturalized”	  
thing	  to	  another	  through	  an	  equalizer.	  This	  equalizer	  looks	  like	  a	  norm	  saying	  “X	  units	  of	  
shoes equals Y units of loaves of bread.”	  We	  effectuate	   the	  quantitative consideration 
because we want a means to compare qualitatively incomparable things. Indeed, the need 
that	  shoes	  serves	  (call	  it	  “ambulatory	  comfort”)	  cannot	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  need	  served	  
by	  loaves	  of	  bread	  (call	  it	  “nutrition”).473 And we want to render these two incomparable 
things comparable because, for example, the baker may want to know how many loaves 
of bread she should give in exchange for a pair of shoes. The quantitative consideration, 
to make it short, is one of the representational systems that make up markets.474 
The time has come to answer the question: Can the chance have a pecuniary value? This 
question has nothing to do with the intrinsic qualities of the chance, nor has it to do with 
the function that people give it. It has to do with whether the chance is comparable with 
a qualitatively incomparable thing through monetary quantities. The question that 
matters is whether someone could ever exchange the chance for a thing with pecuniary 
value. So the answer is yes, theoretically, the chance can have a pecuniary value.475 
Now let us formulate the empirical question: Does the chance have a pecuniary value? 
Once again the answer is yes, it does. The chance does have a monetary value. This value 
is given whenever persons say things like “I	  promise	  €9000	  to	  the	  person	  who	  finds	  my	  
dog,	  and	  I	  firmly	  promise	  that	  I	  will	  not	  revoke	  the	  promise.”	  In	  doing	  this,	  the	  promisor	  
is giving monetary value to the chance.476 In this case, the pecuniary value of the chance 
                                                        
473 Idem, p. 192 
474 We find quantitative consideration in many other situations, like the competition for the best dog. How 
can we say that X is the best dog if the competitors are dogs of a different kind? If the dogs in competition 
were of the same kind, it would be possible to use the quantitative analysis. We assume that all dogs 
manifest a set of qualities and then we evaluate which one dog manifests the set of qualities better. But 
the competition does not assume that all dogs manifest	  the	  same	  abstraction	  “dog.”	  They	  assume	  that	  
dogs manifest different kinds of dogs, and this assumption excludes the possibility of qualitatively 
considering that a dog of one kind is better than a dog of a different kind—for each one dog manifests a 
different set of qualities. The problem is nevertheless solved. In a first round the dogs of the same kind 
are evaluated under a qualitative consideration. In a second round the winners of the first round are 
evaluated under a quantitative consideration. The judge must estimate in a scale of 1 to 10 how much a 
dog manifests the perfect representation of the kind of dog she is. So if Camila is better than Zinia it is 
because Camila is a 9 as Cocker spaniel and Zinia an 8 as an Irish Setter. (Here I draw from a paper on 
legal	  decision	  making	  by	  Bruce	  Chapman	  called	  “Incommensurability,	  proportionality	  and	  defeasibility”	  
presented to the EUI Legal and Political Theory Working Group on Wednesday 21th of November 2012 
in Sala Triaria, European University Institute, Florence.) 
475 So literally everything could have pecuniary value. It suffices for someone to be interested in acquiring 
it for money or for something with monetary value. The chance is given pecuniary value whenever 
someone acquires a chance in exchange for something with a monetized value. 




is the difference between the money	  value	  of	  the	  €9000	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  claim	  and	  the	  
market value of the dog (we must assume that the promisor has lost ownership!), plus the 
work it could take to find it. The next, intuitive question is this: Is there a market for 
chances? Studies on the role of chance and probability in contract law inform us of many 
markets for chances and report cases where courts use such markets to assess damages 
for the breach of contracts.477 These markets are not quantifying the chances we are 
dealing with in this work, but then this is not a theoretical impossibility... So we conclude 
with two answers. First: Yes, chances can and do have a pecuniary value. Second: The 
empirical non-affirmative	  to	  the	  question	  “is	  there	  a	  market	  for chances?”	  does	  not	  imply	  
the theoretical negative. 
5.5. REQUIREMENT FOUR: THE PROMISOR PERCEIVES THE BENEFIT OF THE CHANCE 
5.5.1 THE FACT OF THE CHANCE’S BENEFIT PERCEPTION 
As the promissory choice reaches the promisee and makes him use his bargaining mode 
of reasoning, a choice competition begins, where the promissory choice is compared with 
incompatible or contrary choices. Thereby a chance arises; the possibility that the 
promisee happens to choose the promissory choice and not the other conflicting choices. 
This chance is not something that the promisee produces for his interest. He may prima 
facie be uninterested and even unaware of the chance-causation fact. The promisee 
produces the chance for the benefit of the promisor. It is the promisor who benefits from 
the existence of the chance. I want to suggest that as the promisee produces the chance, 
the	  promisor	  perceives,	  takes	  possession,	  as	  it	  were,	  of	  the	  chance’s	  benefit. 
The best way of saying that the promisor is in control of the value of the chance is to say 
that the promisor is the immediate beneficiary of the chance produced by the promisee. 
                                                        
477 Melvin	  A.	  Eisenberg,	  “Probability and Chance in Contract Law,”	   in	  UCLA L. Rev., 45, (1997-1998), pp. 
1005-1076,	  at	  p.	  1048	  and	  ss.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  Eisenberg’s	  notes	  on	  the	  question	  of	  measuring	  the	  
damage for breach of promise: 
The best approach is to use market value. In cases like lottery tickets, in which there is an established market 
for the chance, market value should be measured by the market price. When there is no established market, 
market value should be based on the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller. This approach 
was implied in the opinion of Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, concurring in Chaplin v. Hicks: 
It is true that no market can be said to exist. None of the fifty competitors could have gone into the 
market and sold her right; her right was a personal right and incapable of transfer. But a jury might 
well take the view that such a right, if it could have been transferred, would have been of such a value 
that every one would recognize that a good price could be obtained for it. 
Typically, in the absence of a market price, what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller will be based on the 
expected value of the chance. 




We have explained this point from different angles in 1.1.3, 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.2(d.1.), 5.2.2.1, 
5.4.2.1 and 5.4.3. Certainly, a third party could benefit himself from the created chance as 
well, but we will see in 5.6.3.2(a) that third parties have a duty to regard promissorily 
created chances as a value for the exclusive enjoyment of the promisor. 
One must also notice that if the promissorily placed choice is effective enough to convince 
the promisee to reject other choices by choosing it, then the promisee will in some sense 
have chosen what the promisor wanted. It would be far-fetched to argue that the promisor 
gets into the	   promisee’s	  mind	   to	   exercise	   control	   over	   the	   choices	   that	   involve	   plans 
contrary to the plans demanded by the promissory choice. Yet, the choice she made the 
promisee	  receive	  is	  in	  the	  latter’s	  mind,	  competing	  with	  his	  preexistent	  choices… 
I must connect this section with 5.4.2.3: the moment the promisor perceives the chance is 
the moment where the promisee receives the promise and creates the chance, there is no 
need of reliance on the part of the promisee. The reason for this is precisely that the 
benefit that the promisor sought when making the promise became a fact with the 
reception of the promise—the benefit arose as soon as the promisee engendered the 
expectations. Reliance theorists pay no attention to the interests of promisors, and thus 
they miss the opportunity to make a good argument. They just focus on the losses of the 
promisee. No one, let alone reliance theorists, seems to have noticed that some promisors 
give credits to others because credit-giving benefits them. The unilateral promise does 
identify the interests of interested promisors. 
5.5.2. THE CHANCE PERCEPTION AS THE ACQUISITION OF A RIGHT (THE IUS IN RE ALIENA) 
So the promisor in fact perceives the benefit of the chance. The question is: Has she a right 
over it? The answer is yes; the promisor owns the benefit of the chance as someone who 
owns the fruits of the thing of another.478 The chance is in the mind of the promisee and, 
if someone can dispose of it, that must be him. However, the chance does not serve him. 
Indeed, insofar as he does not want to claim the promissory right he will never think of 
talking about the chance. But the chance does serve the promisor, and so she has a right 
to its fruits. He has a right to its fruits because and exactly because, if she ever wants to 
neglect the promise, the promisee will be able to point the chance as the thing he gave in 
exchange for the right he acquired. The promisor owns the benefit created by the 
promisee so that the promisee owns the performance disposed by the promisor.  
                                                        




Am I saying that the right of the promisor exists so that the promisee has title to oppose 
to her attempt to revoke the promise? No, I am not saying that. What I am saying is that 
the value she perceives when the promisee receives the promise obtains the nature of a 
right because of her decision to commute it for a promissory right. I am saying that the 
quality of the value she gave to the promisee is transmitted to the value that the reception 
of the promise made the promisee produce for her. Another question relates to the 
implications of the ius in re aliena. As we will see, the implication of the right over the 
benefit of the chance is two-fold. As against any possible person, the promisor is the only 
one entitled to benefit from the chance. If another enjoys the chance without his 
authorization, the promisor accrues an action for the recovery of the lost profit. In 
addition, the form of a right to enjoy a chance serves as a shield for defendants who were 
falsely accused of making a unilateral promise. 
(A) THE CHANCE IS ONLY A POSSIBILITY: IT DOESN’T MATTER IF IT NEVER WAS 
Barry v. Davis is a case of a promissory advertisement. The defendant had promised to sell 
a lot without reserve and, in view of the fact that the best bid was derisory, he tried to 
revoke the promise. The court held that the revocation was ineffective, for there was 
already an obligation. The consideration for the obligation was in the form of a chance for 
the promisor, for	   he	   promised	   with	   the	   clause	   “without	   reserve,”	   knowing	   that	  
“attendance	  at	  the	  sale	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  increased	  if	  it	  is	  known	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reserve,”479 
(See the discussion and critical review in 2.2).  
The fact to be highlighted now is that only one person attended the auction—the highest 
bidder. In other words, of all the persons that the auctioneer entitled with a right to bid 
for the lot, no other promisee, besides the plaintiff, attended the auction. This case shows 
that it is immaterial whether the ultimate goal of the promisor—e.g. to sell the lot at a 
good price—happens to take place, it suffices that she acquired the chance. The chance is 
a valid consideration even if it was miscalculated, even if the thing the promisor ultimately 
wanted never happened to occur.  
5.6. THE PROMISSORY RELATION 
5.6.1. THE PROMISSORY RIGHT AND THE IUS IN RE ALIENA 
The unilateral promise implies two correlative transfers of rights. On the one hand, the 
promisor disposes of a performance of her own so that the promisee acquires it, and on 
                                                        




the other hand, the promisee uses his mode of reasoning to produce a benefit that the 
promisor perceives. There is, in other words, a perfect commutation. But the 
commutation of the unilateral promise is not like a manual contract, where the two 
parties take possession of the thing-objects of the commutation. The unilateral promise 
causes an obligatory relationship, where not only the promisee owns something that the 
promisor has not yet given. The benefit to the promisor is also in suspense. The chance 
lives in the mind of the promisee and, as we will see, others can exclude the promisor from 
its advantage. This section will study the implications of the promissory relationship. 
5.6.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROMISSORY RIGHT 
The	  promise	  has	  given	  a	  credit	  right	  to	  the	  promisee,	  which	  I	  have	  named	  “promissory	  
right.”	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  promissory	  right? 
5.6.2.1. AN ACTION FOR THE PROMISEE 
The promissory right entitles the promisee to the performance obligated of the promisor, 
which means that the promisee can count on the performance for planning his civil or 
professional life. So, for example, the promisee can look for the lost thing with the 
assurance that the reward will not be revoked, that the only risk he runs is that he never 
finds the thing or another finds it before him. Or the contractor can count on the service 
and prize promised when constructing a general offer. He is assured that after the 
acceptance of the offer the promisor will not change the price of the promised service.480 
Typically, the promisor may attempt to revoke the promise. The legal position of the 
promisee permits him to demand the promisor recognize his right and continue acting as 
if the promisor had never neglected her obligation. In other words, the promisee can 
demand that the promisor act in accordance with the promise. Another case may occur 
where the promisor begins to act in ways that indicate that she will not be able to perform 
the obligation. For example, she promised a contract to be effectuated in July 2016 and, 
before the end of 2015, a rumour that she is closing the company begins to circulate. This 
                                                        
480 We could add what López	  de	  Zavalía said of credit	  rights	  in	  general;	  “It	  seems	  exaggerated	  to	  limit	  the	  
protected interest in a mode such that it be conceived as if it could only be satisfied by the complied 
performance	  by	  the	  debtor…	  during	  the	  time	  of	  expectation	  there	  certainly	  fit	  conducts	  of	  enjoyment of 
the credit before the payment and before of all type of violation. The creditor can do more than wait, and 
in particular, he can enjoy of his right making it value as an active of his assets, with all the consequences 
that that has as against third parties, included also the debtor. Think that, to whom not being a creditor 
calls himself thus there are declarative actions, from which we conclude that in the claim of creditor by 
who he is not there is an attitude of enjoyment of the active position—we would mutilate the credit if 
we	   reduced	   it	   to	   pure	   expectations,	   denying	   the	   aspect	   of	   wealth	   that	   it	   provides	   to	   the	   creditor.”	  




would	  be	  a	  case	  of	  “breach	  of	  promise”	  or	  non-performance of the promissory obligation. 
If it is clear that there will be no way to make the promisor come to terms with the 
promise, the promisee can claim compensatation for his frustrated expectations (See 
below (B)). 
5.6.2.2. SOME WORDS ON THE MODES OF EXTINCTION OF THE RIGHT 
Let me develop some thoughts on the modes of extinction of the promissory right. The 
right of the promisee is typically extinguished by performance, non-performance, 
expiration and rejection. Other modes of extinction may be applicable. 
(A) PERFORMANCE 
Performing a promissory obligation can be understood in two senses. In one sense, it 
implies that the promisor does not neglect the promise nor performs acts that would 
hinder its due performance, like disposing of the promised service, prize, etc. In a second, 
and I would say stricter sense, performance means that the promisor gives, does or does 
not do what she has promised. If the promisee returns the lost thing and claims the 
reward, the promisor pays the reward; if the promisee claims the promised contract, the 
promisor gets ready to effectuate the contract, and so on and so forth. 
Is the duty to perform compensatory? Eisenberg asks this question in the context of 
promises	  of	  prizes,	  noticing	  that	  “Although	  the	  benefit	  a promoter gets from the contest 
winner is typically only an infinitesimal fraction of the contestant's prize, the promoter 
will set the amount of the prize at no more than the benefit he expects to derive by running 
the contest. Accordingly, while the overwhelming proportion of that benefit will flow from 
persons other than the contest winner, requiring payment of the prize will not result in a 
net	  loss	  to	  the	  promoter,	  at	  least	  as	  he	  calculated	  costs	  and	  benefits	  ex	  ante.”481 From this 
it	   follows	   that	   “the	   best explanation for the expectation measure is not that it is 
compensatory, but rather that it provides the right kind of incentives to contracting 
parties and, therefore, is the measure that contracting parties probably would have 
adopted if they had addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  damages.”482 
I hold a different view. The pertinent consideration is not whether the promisor pays 
more or less what the promisee expended in participating and winning the competition, 
what determines if the prize is compensatory or not is whether the promisee gave 
                                                        
481 “Probability and Chance in Contract Law,”	  in	  UCLA L. Rev., 45, (1997-1998), pp. 1005-1076, at p. 1047. 




something for acquiring the prize as a right. In the promise of a prize the candidate 
acquired a right to participate in a game and win a prize and the promoter a right to enjoy 
the chance that the candidate may participate in the challenge. There would be an 
imbalance if the candidate wanted to participate in the game and the promisor did 
something to prevent it, or the candidate won the challenge and the promisor refused to 
pay him the prize. The promisee would have given a right to enjoy a thing created by him, 
and not received the thing in return for which he gave such right. The prize would be 
compensatory in the sense that he would have the thing that has belonged (as a 
conditional credit right) to him since the promise of a prize.  
(B) NON-PERFORMANCE 
If it is clear that it makes no sense to keep promisor and promisee in a promissory 
relationship, then the promissory obligation has been unperformed. For example, the sub-
contractor promised a contract to be effectuated in July 2016, and before the end of 2015, 
a rumour begins to circulate that she is closing the company—firing workers, selling 
working tools and so on. Here it makes little sense to pretend to hold the promisor to her 
promise. The obligation is extinguished by non-performance and the promisee 
perpetuates his right in an action of compensation for his frustrated expectations. 
(C) EXPIRATION 
Expiration also extinguishes the obligation. The expiration date could be established by 
the promise itself or, in the event of defect, be given by the circumstances. Positive laws 
fix terms like 2, 5, 10 years, depending on the case. I am talking about the so-called 
prescription or set off. These norms are fair. It would not be reasonable to keep someone 
obligated for more than, for example, 2 years after that she made the promise. 
(D) REJECTION 
Rejection occurs where the promisee communicates to the promisor that he is no longer 
interested in the promissory right. Rejection plays an important role in the justification of 
the unilateral	  promise.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  6.1.4.2.1,	  the	  possibility	  to	  say	  “No,	  I	  don’t	  want	  
this	  right”	  is	  what	  counterbalances	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  promisee	  never	  actually	  chooses	  to	  
have the unilaterally transferred right. But rejection poses a technical problem. The 
rejection of the personal right by the promisee does not only imply that he is no longer 
owner of the personal right but also that the promisor no longer owns the benefit of the 
chance. For saying; “I	  don’t	  want	  this	  right”	  amounts	  to	  saying; “I	  am	  no longer considering 




emerges: How can the promisee dispose of something of the promisor? We revisit this 
question in in 5.6.3. 
(E) IMPOSSIBLE PERFORMANCE 
Complying with the promise is no longer possible, and the promisor has incurred no fault. 
For example, someone promises a prize to the person who discovers the formula to do Y. 
After some months, it becomes public knowledge that Z University discovered how to do 
Y. Many independent researchers were looking for the formula with a view to obtaining 
the promised prize. Z University, instead, discovered the formula independently; it never 
knew of the promise. The promisor is no longer liable as against the community of 
researchers to which she made the promise because the condition that they were 
expected to perform has become impossible to perform. This extinguishes their 
conditional right and, as a consequence, the correlative duty of the promisor. 
(F) UNILATERAL CANCELATION OF THE DUTY 
Some situations would permit promisors to unilaterally cancel their duty. For example, I 
offer	  to	  sale	  1kg	  of	  beef	  for	  the	  price	  of	  €10	  and	  I	  say	  not	  that	  I	  will	  keep	  the	  promise	  until 
stocks are exhausted, but that I will keep the promise open for a year. Two months later 
an unpredictable event makes the price of the meat rise three times more than the price 
it had been making at the time I made the promise. It is fair that I have the power to 
unilaterally cancel my duty. This would be a typical case of just cancelation of a 
promissory obligation, and one could imagine other situations.483  
The just cancelation—what one may improperly call just revocation—must be made in 
the same way as the promise.484 If I made the promise appear in X newspaper, three times 
a week, for a month, I have to employ the same means and intensity to communicate the 
just cancelation. 
(G) OTHER MODES 
The above-noted modes of extinction are the ones that will most typically apply to 
unilateral promises, however other modes of extinction of obligations could also 
extinguish the promissory obligations. For example, promisee and promisor could novate 
the right to make a contract. But novation does not seem to be relevant to all cases. It is 
                                                        
483 See	  Mariano	  D’Amelio,	  “Delle	  promesse	  unilaterale	  (Art.	  1987-1991),”	  in	  D’Amelio,	  Mariano	  and	  Enrico	  
Finzi, Codice Civile, Libro delle Obligazioni, Commentario,	  vol.	  III,	  Barbèra,	  Firenze,	  1949,	  pp. 11-12. 




difficult to imagine promisor and promisee novating the obligation arising from a promise 
of a reward. 
5.6.3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE IUS IN RE ALIENA 
Receiving the promissory right has induced the promisee to produce a benefit for the 
promisor. The promisor owns the benefit of the chance as someone who owns the 
emoluments of the thing of another. He has a right over the benefit of the chance. What 
are the implications of this ius in re aliena? 
5.6.3.1. A DEFENSE AGAINST FALSE ACCUSATIONS 
To start with, the form of a right to enjoy a chance serves as a shield for defendants who 
are falsely accused of having made a unilateral promise. This defense can be invoked in 
two scenarios, firstly the case of a bare promise, and secondly, the case of an offer with 
promissory content. So assume first that the claimant received a promise that, according 
to the dominant commercial practices, the promisor could have not made with a view to 
acquiring a chance. These are cases of promises among relatives or friends, or every case 
in which it is clear that the interest of the promisor is to do charity to the promisee. To the 
claim	  of	   the	  promisee,	   the	  promisor	  can	  say,	   “True I made you a promise, but as I got 
nothing in exchange for the promise, the promise is not enforceable in private law. You 
may say that I am a bad guy, or that with this I ruined my credit, but you cannot say that I 
acted unjustly, for I never received a right from	  you.” 485 
Suppose now that one receives an offer and claims to have received a unilateral promise. 
The case becomes more interesting where the offer that one received is one whose 
content is typically proposed by means of unilateral promises. To illustrate, promises of 
reward are typically made via unilateral promises, but nothing prevents someone who 
wants to recover lost property from simply offering a reward for the found item. To the 
offeree then it must be clear that the proposal is revocable at will, that the only way in 
which he can accrue a right against the offeror is by returning the lost property. And if the 
offeror revokes and the offeree opposes argument against such revocation, the offeror can 
                                                        
485  Richard	   Posner	   analyses	   this	   case	   in	   the	   terms	   of	   “costs	   of	   legal	   error.”	   It	   is	   about	   a	   “mistaken	   or	  
dishonest "promisee" who imposes on his "promisor" the costs of defending a groundless suit, at the 
same	  time	  incurring	  litigation	  costs	  of	  his	  own	  which	  have	  no	  social	  value	  either.”	  Interestingly,	  the	  judge	  
should	   decide	   to	   not	   enforce	   the	   promise	   if	   she	   finds	   that	   the	   “costs	   of	   legal	   error”	   and	   the	   other	  
“enforcement	  costs”	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  social utility of enforcing the promise, “Gratuitous Promises in 




say:	  “As	  I	  never	  stated	  my	  proposal	  in	  words	  that	  suggested to you that I am making you 
a	  promise,	  you	  cannot	  deem	  me	  bound	  by	  my	  proposal.”486 
5.6.3.2. IS THERE ANY ACTION FOR THE PROMISOR? 
One may argue that the promisor can have no right, for rights allow their holders to claim 
positive conducts from others and the promisor can claim no giving or doing of anyone. 
If, by claiming something from someone we mean the possibility that the promisor 
demands that the promisee does what she wants, we are right in making the point. Indeed, 
such a claim would be wrong and misrepresent reality. The promisee never commits to 
do what the promisor wants nor does the promisor ever expect that this should occur. 
What the promisor wants and the promisee does is produce a chance, an act that involves 
no commitment, no duty to perform an act for another in the future.  
Not every claim however, is about a doing or giving. Claims could be about a not doing 
too. The owner of a thing is not someone who has claims on the basis of which X or Y must 
give F thing to her. She cannot use her right to claim something because she is in peaceful 
possession of its object. Something similar occurs with the promisor. She has already 
perceived the object of her right and is in actual enjoyment of the fruits of the chance. 
There is nothing for her to claim. Yet this does not mean that she could never be in a 
situation where she could claim something from someone. Her right could produce active 
claims for her too. This claim arises when the object of her right is infringed. How could 
that be?  
(A) AS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES 
Assume that I run a shoe factory and, in my aim to expand my business, I write a letter to 
a well-known international	   investor,	  saying	  something	  like	  “If	  you	  invest	   in	  my	  factory	  
you	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  have	  X	  share	  and	  Y	  and	  Z.”	  The	  investor	  happens	  to	  meet	  my	  
promise with enthusiasm and decides to travel to my country to meet me in person. He 
visits the industrial complex where my factory is located, and after having found exactly 
what I presented with my promise, the shoe factory adjacent to mine catches his eye. The 
international investor visits my neighbor’s factory, likes his establishment better than 
mine and offers Jose, its owner, to invest in his industry. He puts his money in my 
                                                        
486 “The	  existence	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  objectively	  perceive	  (we	  could	  say:	  the	  evidence	  of)	  such	  advantage 
of	  the	  promisor	  helps	  to	  resolve	  two	  problems…	  that	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  promise	  in	  the	  juridical	  realm	  
(and	  not	  just	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  “courtesy”	  relations)	  and	  that	  of	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  the	  simple	  promise	  
(which has not be refuted) to generate binding	  effects.”	  Francesco Di Giovanni, Le promesse unilaterali, 




neighbor’s	  industry	  rather	  than	  in	  mine.	  He	  has	  a	  right	  to	  do	  that;	  he	  can	  dispose	  of	  his	  
things through contracts freely, and he had no duty to invest in my project. My unilateral 
promise attracted him, did not obligate him to invest. I would however argue that I should 
have a claim against the third party beneficiary of the investment.  
The investor had the possibility of visiting our industrial complex before I gave him the 
idea. He could, by himself, have thought about putting his money somewhere, realized 
that a shoe factory is the ideal place, thought of Argentina, and well, yes, find out that in 
the north of Argentina, close to Bolivia, lies a wonderful industrial complex which he could 
visit from Tokyo and invest in. There the investor used his bargaining mode of reasoning 
by himself. If he decided to invest in your factory rather than mine, I would say, Jose, let 
us celebrate. But this was not the case. When I declared to him the promise, I gave him an 
idea that he would otherwise never have considered: To put money in a shoe factory that 
is far away from home. I had to do some work to induce him to have such a thought. First 
I had to study the market of the universe of people with money, who could be interested 
in putting money in an industry like mine. I then had to elaborate the terms of the 
proposal. This guy lives on another continent, speaks a different language, thinks in 
different terms... I needed advice to address him in a way that could attract him and give 
him confidence so as to put himself on a plane and travel many miles. I had to calculate if 
the possibilities created by my proposal compensated for the cost of binding myself 
during its validity. All this demanded my time and the money I spent in professional 
consultancy, paperwork, carrier and telephone calls. Finally, and most importantly, I had 
to bind myself to the terms of the promise, never consider inviting other investors or do 
anything that could signify breach of promise. In short, the acquisition of the chance—
that happily or not came to be materialized—cost me money. It was I who induced the 
investor to produce the chance. I was the person whose promise brought about what 
previously there was not, and hence the materialization of the chance, if at all, must be 
mine. All the work done to induce the promisee to cause the chance is there, benefitting 
you. You seized, as it were, the fruit that I had the right to enjoy. You took my chance, 
impoverishing me thereby. If rights in rem imply duties of non-intervention, and I owned 
the benefit of the chance, other people must recognize and respect my right. Certainly, 
people will continue taking advantage of the chances of others, but if my argument is 
sound, and private laws would make it law, then a party who profits from the chance of 
another would be obligated to compensate the owner for the expenses incurred in 





(A) AS AGAINST THE PROMISEE? 
An action against the promisee would be thinkable in cases where the promisee infringes 
on the benefit of the promisor. For example, he communicates to the promisor that he has 
no interest in the promise, that there is no chance that she will look for the lost dog, make 
the contract or consume the thing she wants to gift him. Here the promisee extinguishes 
the chance and the benefit of the promisor, for the chance is the source from whence the 
benefit to the promisor flows. Is the promisee violating the right of the promisor? 
5.6.4. THE LIBERATION OF THE PROMISOR BY THE PROMISEE AND THE CONSEQUENT EXTINCTION OF 
THE CHANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PROMISOR’S RIGHT OVER THE BENEFIT OF THE CHANCE 
The liberation of the promisor by the promisee may look like a violation of the right of the 
promisor. The promisee liberates the promisor, provoking the extinction of the chance 
from which the promisor rightfully enjoys. But even if the causal relation is in fact tight, 
in law the act of the promisee cannot be thought of as a wrong. When the promisee 
liberates the promisor from her obligation he is damaging nothing of the promisor. He is 
exercising one of the faculties that come with his promissory right. If the chance perishes 
with the act of liberation it does it not as the effect of an illicit act of the promisee but as a 
collateral, legally irrelevant effect of another act. The promisee concluded a cycle of her 
bargaining mode of reasoning, deciding that she will definitely not choose the promissory 
right. So the promisor	  is	  not	  seizing	  the	  fruits	  from	  the	  promisor’s	  hand	  but	  concluding a 
cycle of his bargaining mode of reasoning. He must be entitled to do that, because the 
bargaining mode of reasoning is entirely and exclusively his own. If the chance emanates 
from a cycle of the bargaining mode of reasoning then, bad luck for the owner of the 
chance if the owner of the bargaining mode of reasoning decides to turn off the source of 
the benefit. 
Will the promisee be able to use his bargaining mode of reasoning again? The fact that the 
promisee extinguishes a cycle of the bargaining mode of reasoning does not signify that 
the promisee will no longer be able to evaluate choices for an efficient bargain. As was 
explained in 5.4.1.2, the bargaining mode of reasoning is an inconsumable thing. 
5.7. THE UNILATERAL PROMISE AMONG THE CAUSES OF OBLIGATION 
5.7.1. THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS REVISED 
In 4.1.3.4 I divided the obligations into two main branches, the illicits and the licits. I have 
said that the illicit causes of obligations occur where a party loses something that another 




those cases where the person who loses may be thought of as someone who un-wants, in 
the sense of strongly dislikes the loss. Assault, trespass and slander are all good examples 
of tort.487 Unjust enrichment is about cases where the loser does not want to lose. The 
most illustrative case is the mistaken payment, where I did not really want to give you the 
sum. In the case where you enriched yourself by using my thing without damaging it I lost, 
but not in the sense that I un-wanted it. The state of mind of the owner is not like that of 
one whose thing has been destroyed; it is slightly different. The borderline case is the 
negotiorum gestio, where at first glance it appears that I rather wanted to confer you the 
benefit. Thinking clearly however, we realize that no one goes around taking care of the 
affairs of others. If I conferred you a benefit willingly it was because I thought that you 
would restitute me the expenditures that you benefitted from. People generally do not 
want to help others gratuitously.488 
The licit causes of the obligation are the rights commutations. We have said that in perfect, 
irreversible commutations the two parties want the commutation, or one wants it and the 
other does not un-want it.  Contract represents all the cases where two parties want a 
                                                        
487 You may ask, in what sense is it that the slanderer or assaulter wins? Pollock will answer, wrongdoing is 
“something like the self-seeking indulgence of passion”.	   Sir Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts: A 
Treatise on the Principles of Obligations arising from Civil Wrongs in the Common Law, 4th ed., Stevens and 
Sons, London, 1895, p. 9. In a similar sense the interesting opinion of Pufendorf: 
in case a Man be hurt or injur’d	  by	  another,	  in	  any	  respect,	  the	  Person	  who	  stands	  justly	  charg’d	  as	  Author	  of	  
the Wrong, ought, as far as it lies in his Power, to make Reparation. For otherwise it would have been a vain 
Command not to harm another, if the Party who actually suffers such a Harm, must be content to put it up 
without farther Notice, and leave the Offender to enjoy in Peace the Fruit of his Injury, never obliging him to 
refund, or to restore.  
Samuel Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, Basil Kennett translation, printed for J. Walthoe, R. 
Wilkin, J. and J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, T. Ward, and T. Osborne, London, 1729, Book 3, Ch 1, num. 2, p. 214 
(emphasis omitted). See more in 3.2.3. and 4.1.3.3.2. 
488 The	  writers	  of	  Justinian’s	  Institutes	  explain	  my	  point	  thus:	   
The reason of this is the general convenience; otherwise people might be summoned away by some sudden 
event of pressing importance, and without commissioning any one to look after and manage their affairs, the 
result of which would be that during their absence those affairs would be entirely neglected: and of course no 
one would be likely to attend to them if he were to have no action for the recovery of any outlay he might have 
incurred in so doing.  
Justinian, Institutes, 3, 27, 1. 
Intervening in the affairs of another may be a nice thing to do. But I characterize it as an illicit interaction 
because of the injustice that it produces. The dominus negotii ends up with a value that the gestor lost 
without wanting to confer. I am here inspired by Planiol, who said:  
On peut donc tenir pour certain que dans le quasi-contrat	   la	   cause	   réelle	   de	   l’obligation	   n’est	   ni	   un	   fait	  
volontaire,	  ni	  un	  fait	  licite;	  c’est	  un	  fait	  involontaire	  et	  illicite.	  Ceci	  revient	  á	  dire	  que	  l’expression	  quasi-contrat 
est	  tout	  à	  fait	  fausse;	  il	  n’y	  en	  a	  peut-étre	  pas,	  dans	  le	  droit	  tout	  entire,	  une	  seconde	  qui	  puisse	  rivaliser	  avec	  
elle	  en	  impropriété. 
Marcel	   Planiol,	   “Clasification des sources des obligations,”	   in	   Revue critique de legislation et de 




commutation. The agreements that fail to fit with the offer and acceptance model, like the 
so-called relational contracts could, if craftily determined, be included in this box. The 
unilateral promises are cases where one party wants a commutation and the other does 
not un-want it. Let me dedicate four paragraphs to this. 
The promisee of a unilateral promise did not explicitly want the transaction. He did not 
ask the promisor to make him a promise. Had he in fact asked for the promise, his request 
would, rigoroso analisi, not count. If this were the case the request of a promise would 
amount to an advanced mere acceptance, and mere acceptances are immaterial to the 
formation of promises (see 5.3.3). But let me go back to the case where someone meets 
another for the first time through a promise. Could we say that the promisee un-wants the 
promise?  By un-want I mean what a reasonable person may feel with respect to a battery, 
slander or any such tort. I want to suggest that a promisor does not un-want the promise. 
He would un-want the unilateral promise if, for example, the unilateral promise were 
empirically impoverishing him. Imagine that the making of a promise results in a situation 
where the promisee loses one of his properties. This would be the object of an un-want, 
similar to a trespass with damage. 489  But this is not the case. If the promisee is 
impoverished, he is only normatively and merely impoverished. He is only normatively 
impoverished in the sense that what he loses is his ability to neglect that the promisor got 
the benefit of a chance from him. He, as any other person in his private law society, has to 
recognize that the promisor has acquired a right to the fruit of the chance that he 
produced. Yet such impoverishment is automatically counterbalanced with a right to a 
performance or thing, in exchange for which he did not un-want to give the right over the 
chance to the promisor. The	  promisee’s	  normative	  impoverishment	  is mere, as it were, in 
that the promisee has the choice to put himself in the situation he was before the chance 
was granted (see5.6.3). 
Not un-wanting the promise is the reasonable promisee’s	  state	  of	  mind	  and	  logically	   it	  
couldn’t	  be	  another.	  For	  could	  he	  be	  said	  to	  be	  one	  who	  does	  not	  want	  the	  promise?	  If	  he	  
were one who does not want unilateral promises, his doors would be a priori closed to 
such interventions. 
True, unilateral promises are partly pacific acts. On the one hand they give you a right but 
on the other hand they take from you a chance. They place you in a choice scenario that 
you may not have wanted had you appraised it. This is the risk of freedom. We will see in 
                                                        
489 If the unilateral substitution implied that I materially lose nothing, as when someone gets a chance from 




6.2 that the other possible options, if desirable, have nothing to do with private law. 
Regulating the unilateral promise as a cause of voluntary obligations is the best possible 
choice. Here I have tried to place them within a classification. 
So I imagine the classification of the causes of the obligation as a gradation. At one extreme 
there is the tort and in the other the contract. Tort is about conflict and contract about 
peace.490 Nearer the tort and before the center there is unjust enrichment, which is not 
really conflictive and yet is partly so. Near the center but towards the contracts rests the 
category I call unilateral promise. The unilateral promise is not totally pacific because 
there is no agreement; there is a unilateral attribution. But since attribution is of a right 
and not a duty it cannot be conflictive. One could very well want to be closed to receive 
benefits, but this is something that private law cannot presume (see my proposal in 
6.2.3.2). So, if the principle of contracts is pacta sunt servanda, the principle of tort is 
neminem laedere and the principle of unjust enrichments is nemo cum detriment alterius 
locupletari potest,	   the	   principle	   of	   unilateral	   promises	   is	   “It	   may	   be	   assumed	   that	  
everybody wants that which appears to be of advantage to him.”491 
5.7.2. COMPARING THE UNILATERAL PROMISE WITH THE CONTRACT 
There are two main differences between contract and unilateral promise. The interaction 
from which the contractual relationship emerges is bilateral at its best: both offeror and 
acceptor contribute with their assent to the formation of the contract. The interaction 
from which the promissory relationship emerges is unilateral: the promisor makes the 
promise, inducing the promisee to cause the benefit of a chance for her. From this 
difference various practical implications emerge, the most important of which is probably 
that whereas contractual relationships need rules for the interval between the reception 
of the offer and the reception of the acceptance (the law of acceptance and revocation), 
the promissory relations do not need those rules, as there is no interval between proposal 
and formation of the legal relation. 
On the other hand, the cause of the promissory obligation is different to the cause of the 
contractual obligation. The reciprocation of a contractual obligation is an intentional 
transfer of right, through which may pass another obligation or a right in rem. The 
reciprocation of a promissory obligation is an unintentional transfer, the spontaneous licit 
                                                        
490 The Latin word pactum comes	  from	  “pacisci,” to make peace. We find it in the Edict of the praetor (‘pacta	  
conventa	   [...]	   servabo’). Interestingly enough, the German word for contract was coined to keep the 
semantics	   of	   pactum.	   “Vertrag,”	   Zimmermann	   tells	   us,	   comes	   from “sich vertragen,”	   to get along, be 
trustworthy, reconcile. Reinhard Zimmermann, “Derecho	  Romano	  y	  Cultura	  Europea,”	   (translated	  by	  
Salgado	  Ramírez),	  in	  Revista de Derecho Privado, No 18, (2010), pp. 5-34, at p. 12. 
491 Taken from Theo Mayer-Maly,	  “Divisio	  Obligationum,”	  in	  The Irish Jurist, Dublin, (1966\1967), pp. 375-




act of the creation of a right to enjoy the chance. I have not yet studied the implications of 
this difference. Perhaps the rules on the (non-voluntary) legal servitudes provide useful 
material for the perception and regulaton of such implications. 
5.7.3. THE UTILITY OF THE UNILATERAL PROMISE 
5.7.3.1. IT HELPS STATE PRIVATE LAW PURGE MANY OF ITS CORRUPTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
The national private laws have been trying to satisfy the necessity for a solution to cases 
of interested promise with very odd arrangements. Part 2 showed how the form of the 
collateral contract, the reliance theory and the doctrine of the obligationes ex lege have 
corrupted juridical interpretations of the English contract law, the French law of 
obligations and the German private law. As I will elaborate in the Conclusion and Final 
Remarks, the unilateral promise acts as a purge of corruptive arrangements. This is to say, 
if the state private laws incorporate the concept of unilateral promise, they will have the 
means to deal with interested promises without having to use the double contract 
analysis, the reliance theory and the obligationes ex lege. As the problem-causing 
arrangements will lose their practical sense, they will become automatically abrogated. 
Hence the relevant promises will be attended to as they ought, and the classical private 
law concepts and divisions will recover their healthy shape. 
5.7.3.2. THE UNILATERAL PROMISE WORKS WITH ALL POSSIBLE RELEVANT PROMISES 
The unilateral promise was constructed not only to govern the cases that private laws 
enforce to their own determinant, but also the atypical cases. This is due to the fact that 
the unilateral promise is built within a set of relatively general sub-concepts—promise, 
reception, chance-causation and chance-perception. Having learned these concepts, a 
legal operator can capture, explain and regulate all legally interesting promises—not only 
the typical (promise of a reward, the promise of a contract and the fake gratuitous 
promise), but also the atypical interested promises (only in potency, see 1.2). This is the 
unilateral	  promise’s	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  obligatio ex lege solution. (See 2.4.3.) 
5.7.3.3. IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE GRATUITOUS PROMISES 
The traditional concept of unilateral promise (see Part 3) bears undesirable implications. 
Its integration in a private law makes private law have to enforce gratuitous promises. 
Private laws now have the means to enforce juridically interesting promises without 
having to enforce gratuitous promises. Honest gratuitous promises fail to exhibit the 
unilateral	  promise’s	  third	  and	  fourth	  requirements,	  that	  the	  promisee	  produces	  a	  chance	  




6. WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS OF THE UNILATERAL PROMISE? 
Part 5 construed the unilateral promise as an interaction whereby two parties exchange 
“rights.”	  A	  promisor	  gives	  a	   right	   to	  a	  performance	   to	   the	  promisee,	  and	   the	  promisee	  
produces the chance from which the promisor benefits. The promisor perceives the value 
of this chance, I maintained, as one who acquires a right to the benefits of a thing 
belonging to another. In other words, Part 5 created a way of understanding interested 
promises as an exchange of rights. You see two reciprocal transfers, an exchange of a 
“promissory	  right”	  for	   the	  “right	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  chance.”	  However,	  Part	  5	  did not 
evaluate the legal concept. The question we must answer to test this formal structure is 
whether	  these	  two	  “transfers	  of	  rights”	  qualify	  as	  just	  transfers	  of	  rights.	   
This part will test each transfer separately. Section 1 enquires into the basis of promises 
in private law. Why is it that the promisor can grant a right to the promisee without the 
promisee’s	   request	   or	   acceptance?	   This	   question	   is	   relevant	   because	   acquisitions	   of	  
personal rights in private law are generally taken to be voluntary acts. Section 2 addresses 
the legality of unilateral promises. If we grant that one could transfer a right to a non-
accepting promisee, should we also accept that one could benefit from these unilateral 
interventions? Does something change when your promise not only grants a right to me, 
but also induces me to do something you want? Let us get straight to the first question. 
6.1. THE BASIS OF PROMISE IS FREEDOM TO CONTRACT (OBLIGATIONS) 
6.1.1. ANSWERING AN OLD QUESTION 
There has been at least 500 years of debate on the subject of whether promises can 
transfer rights. The question is whether someone who neither requests nor accepts the 
promise can be deemed to have acquired the promissory right. The pragmatic jurist may 
miss the nerve of such a question: How could someone dislike the opportunity for benefit? 
However	  the	  question	  has	  a	  raison	  d’être.	  Rights	  are	  like	  extensions	  of	  our	  personalities.	  
When someone finds our things, they find our very selves. So, a long line of jurists—which 
begins with Hugo Grotius, and includes authorities like Robert Joseph Pothier—would 
argue that a credit right must be willed to be acquired, either by request or acceptance. 
Otherwise the promisee finds his personality altered by the unilateral choice of the 
promisor, which undermines his freedom.492 
                                                        
492 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an introduction by Richard Tuck, Liberty 




I will argue that the promisor can confer a right to a non-accepting promisee because she 
has the “freedom	   to	   contract	   obligations.”	   Since in my view the basis of promise is 
“freedom	   to	   contract,”	   I will have to develop an understanding and justification of 
“freedom	  to	  contract.”	  6.1.2.	  denounces	  the	  errors	  of	  the	  usual	  scholarship	  on	  freedom	  of	  
contract. I will point out these mistakes so that we can clearly see what a private law 
conception of freedom of contract must not look like. 6.1.3. sets adequate meanings for 
both	  “freedom”	  and	  “contract.” 6.1.4 conceptualizes freedom of contract as a private law 
relationship. I determine freedom of contract as a privilege-no right relationship. By 
means of this relation, every person has the ability to peacefully interfere in another 
person’s	  sphere	  of	  rights—i.e. by granting him a power or a right—and the other person 
                                                        
But that a Promise may transfer a Right, the Acceptance of the Person to whom it is made is no less required 
here, than in the Case of transferring a Property[…] 
Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, Andrew Tooke translation, 
Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2003 Chapter IX, number XVI, puts the argument like so: 
Moreover not only in Contracts, but in Promises the Consent ought to be reciprocal; that is, both the Promiser 
and he to whom the Promise is made must agree in the Thing. For if the latter shall not consent, or refuse to 
accept of what is offered, the thing promised remains still in the Power of the Promiser. For he that makes an 
offer of any thing, cannot be supposed to intend to force it upon one that is unwilling to receive it, nor yet to 
quit his own Title to it; therefore when the other denies Acceptance, he who proffered it loses nothing of his 
Claim thereto…. 
In his treatise on the law of obligations,	  Pothier	  deals	  with	  the	  question	  “Wherein	  a	  Contract	  differs	  from	  
a	  Pollicitation”.	  He	   first	  quotes the ordinances that have prohibited pollicitations in France and then 
distinguishes	   pollicitation	   from	   contract.	   Contract	   involves	   “the	   concurrence	   of	   intention	   in	   the	   two	  
parties”	  and	  “pollicitation	  is	  a	  promise	  not	  yet	  accepted	  by	  the	  person	  to	  whom	  it	  is	  made.”	  Then	  comes	  
the famous paragraph 4:  
A pollicitation, according to the rules of mere natural law, does not produce what can be properly called an 
Obligation; and the person who has made the promise may retract it at any time before it is accepted; for there 
cannot be any obligation without a right being acquired by the person in whose favour it is contracted against 
the person bound. Now as I cannot, by the mere act of my own mind, transfer to another a right in my goods, 
without a concurrent intention on his part to accept them, neither can I by my promise confer a right against 
my person, until the person to whom the promise is made has, by his acceptance of it, concurred in the 
intention of acquiring such right. 
Pothier quotes Grotius, and finishes	  his	  dissertation	  on	  pollicitation	  by	  saying	  that	  “the	  civil	  law,	  which	  
comes	  in	  aid	  of	  the	  natural	  law,”	  rendered	  pollicitations	  obligatory	  in	  Roman	  law.	  Robert	  Joseph	  Pothier,	  
A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or Contracts, David Evans translation, Strahan, London, 1806, n. 4, 
pp. 4-5.  
Pothier’s	  views	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  statements	  of	  recent	  Italian	  authors.	  Franco	  Carresi,	  “Il	  contratto,”	  in	  
Cicu, Antonio and Francesco Messineo, (eds.), Trattato di Diritto Civile e Commerciale,	  Giuffrè,	  Milano,	  
vol. XXI, t. 2., 1987, p. 104, for example, states that positive law could make a promise without acceptance 
obligatory but that these norms constitute very specific exceptions to general principles of the law: 
To establish that someone could put into being a unilateral act which is alien to the types disciplined by the 
statutory law is hence unconceivable, for such act would boil down to an arbitrary intromission into the 
juridical sphere of another. 
Then it makes sense that legal historian Wieacker talks about Grotius’	  idea as	  a	  “principle”	  and	  bases	  
thereon	  “the	  Grotian	  theory	  of	  the	  contract	  conclusion	  which	  continues	  influencing	  the	  theory	  of	  law	  till	  
the present day.”	  Franz Wiacker, Historia del derecho privado de la edad moderna,	  Francisco	  Fernández	  




has the no-right to oppose against such peaceful interventions. At the end of the section I 
reproduce the question that brought us to the present lucubration, but rather than asking 
why it is that the promisor can unilaterally confer a right to the promisee, I ask why is it 
that persons have freedom to contract obligations? 
6.1.2. THE PUBLIC LAW CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
Willingly or not, the vast bulk of the literature presents freedom of contract as a 
relationship between the state and its citizens.493 The sovereign state attributes to each 
individual citizen a power to make contracts. This power enables citizens to make as many 
contracts as they want. The only limit they have is a negative one—their contracts cannot 
infringe the public order. Otherwise they are free to choose with whom to make contracts, 
what to include in their contracts and what corpus—or	  as	  one	  would	  call	  it	  “form”—will 
they give to the contract. A valid contract is one made in accordance with the attributed 
creative power. The valid contract binds the parties like a general state law. 
It would be easy to solve our problem using the standard conception of freedom of 
contract. True, the norm by which offers must be accepted is an impediment to the valid 
formation of promises. Still, since states are progressively enforcing promises, the 
argument would go, states seem to be repealing the acceptance norm from the public 
order. States are recognizing the right of persons to promise things to others without 
previous request or posterior acceptance. 
However, in adopting this solution we would perpetrate a fallacy. The parties of the right 
to contract are not two equally free individuals but an individual and an unequal, almighty 
entity capable of deciding what individuals can and cannot do. The state is over the citizen 
in that the state is what caused the right to make contracts, ideating it, delimiting its scope 
at will, and then attributing it to its citizens. We would be presenting freedom to contract 
as a private law right but elaborating it in the form of a public law right. 
But	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  that?	  The	  first	  corollary	  of the public law conception of freedom of 
contract is that contract must be seen not as a relation between two persons but as a 
relation between each contractual party and the state. If a citizen entered into a 
contractual relationship it is because the state provides a norm by which all citizens can 
enter into contracts. This norm looks like a conditional, where the conditional (or, as it is 
called,	  “situational	  fact”)	  says:	  “whenever	  A	  agrees	  with	  A2	  that	  A	  will	  do	  X	  for	  A2	  and	  A2	  
                                                        
493 For a master example of the public-law version of freedom to contract see Luigi Ferri, L'autonomia 




will do Z for A,”	  and	  the	  consequence	  (or	  “legal	  effect”)	  says:	  “A	  must	  do	  X	  and	  A2	  must	  do	  
Z.”	  In	  actualising the situational fact of the state norm, the two citizens are triggering the 
provided-for legal effect—that each will do what each said to the other. Although they are 
interacting in reality, the obligation does not come from the reality of the interaction. It 
comes from the reality of the performance of the conditional fact of the state law. The 
obligation does not link one person to the other but each to the state. One has a duty to do 
X because the state says so and the other has a right to X because the state says so. So 
when we talk about the obligation between persons we do so, as López	  de	  Zavalía	  puts	  it,	  
in an elliptic language, for what is meant is a double relation connected by the state.494  
But why so much effort spent insulating private law from the State? Mine is not an 
argument from liberty. I am not maintaining that the State is an evil consumer of freedoms 
and therefore it should be tamed to participate in private life merely as an enforcer of 
classical private law rights. I will repeat a reason I explicated in the introduction, and 
suggest a second one. Firstly, private law cannot explain its central notions with the facile 
recourse to the will of the state. If it does so then private law loses its autonomy, and it 
makes no sense to theorize about private law. Secondly, we want to hold that law stands 
without central authority and I believe that private law offers the platform for the 
elaboration of such stateless law. 
6.1.3. ON WHAT A PRIVATE LAW CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT MUST LOOK LIKE 
Freedom of contract is composed of two terms, freedom and contract. A worthwhile 
conception of freedom of contract must first of all clarify what it means by these two 
terms. 
6.1.3.1. WHAT MUST “FREEDOM” MEAN IN “FREEDOM TO CONTRACT?” 
We can think of at least two conceptions of freedom.495 We have, on the one hand, what 
we	  can	  call	  “physiological”	  or	  “factual	  freedom.”	  Factual	  freedom	  consists	  of an	  entity’s	  
ability to put purposes to itself, to think of the best ways to perform a self-conceived 
                                                        
494 To Domenico Barbero, for example, there is no relation between debtor and creditor but two functionally 
connected relations, one between creditor and legal order and another between debtor and legal order. 
Quoted in Fernando	  López	  de	  Zavalía,	  Derechos Reales,	  Zavalia,	  Buenos	  Aires,	  1989,	  t.	  1,	  §2,	  p.	  19,	  note	  
12, who comments, “thus	  it	  is	  that	  when	  it is talked about legal relation between two subjects what it is 
meant, in an elliptic language, would be that double relation connected by the [same] legal order.” Idem. 
495 If we assimilate freedom to rightness and contrast rightness with physical strength, as I do in the text, I 
suggest	  we	  can	  trace	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  freedoms	  back	  to	  Plato’s	  Republic,	  where	  Socrates	  
sets	  himself	  to	  combatting	  Thrasimachus’s	  claim	  that	  “justice	  is	  nothing	  else	  than	  what	  is	  pleasing	  to	  the 
strongest.”	  Conf.	  C.	  D.	  C.	  Reeve,	  “Introductory analysis of the work,”	   in	  Plato,	  Republic, G. M. A. Grube 




purpose and achieve it or translate that project into a fact. Factual freedom is normatively 
limitless. It is only limited by the amount of goals and means to achieve goals that a 
purposive being may be able to imagine and remember. As long as this entity imagines a 
new goal and finds the means to achieve it, he she or it expands her freedom.496  
The other freedom is juridical, or the freedom of the private law. Juridical freedom is 
factual freedom determined by the idea of equality in an original transaction. It is as if two 
factually free beings faced each other in the context of an original transaction and, 
ignoring who is more powerful than the other but acknowledging that factual weakness 
could be inconvenient for the realization of their respective purposes, settled the standard 
of a median personality and endorsed it. This middle person, the private law persona, is 
able to do whatever she desires insofar as the realization of her desire does not infringe 
the (equivalent) freedom of the other. So, as the person comes with juridical freedom it 
also comes with a correlative no-freedom. Whenever she happens to have a purpose in 
mind, she must consider, in addition to the means with which she makes the purpose 
realizable, whether the realization of her purpose would interfere with the freedom of 
another. If it would, then she must forbear action. If it would not, then she is free to do it. 
This is a very abstract principle. We will see later how private law specifies it. 
It is obvious that, if freedom to contract is to be conceptualized in the terms of a private 
law relationship, we must develop an understanding of freedom to contract that reflects 
juridical freedom. 
6.1.3.2. WHAT MUST “CONTRACT” MEAN IN “FREEDOM TO CONTRACT?” 
We now want to know what the “contract”	  of	  “freedom	  to	  contract”	  should	  mean.	  I	  want	  
to suggest that, for our purposes, we must adopt an ample understanding of contract. We 
                                                        
496 A version of the purely arbitrary free will appears in the manifesto of the Renaissance,	  “The	  Oration	  on	  
the	  Dignity	  of	  Man”	  (1486),	  by	  Pico	  della	  Mirandola: 
We have given you, O Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor endowment properly your own, in order that 
whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with premeditation, select, these same you may have 
and possess through your own judgement and decision. The nature of all other creatures is defined and 
restricted within laws which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by 
your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own 
nature. I have placed you at the very center of the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater 
ease glance round about you on all that the world contains. We have made you a creature neither of heaven 
nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own 
being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. It will be in your power to descend to the lower, brutish 
forms of life; you will be able, through your own decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose life is 
divine. 




must	   take	   “contract”	   in	   its	   verbal	   sense,	   in the active sense of undertaking liability in 
general.497 
We need something like a freedom or capacity to contract liabilities in general because 
we want to explain contract as a relation between the parties—without a mediating state 
or other overarching moral order. Let me develop. If we look closely at the formation of a 
contractual obligation, we will find a stage where one of the parties transfers a power to 
accept the offer to another who acquires it without accepting it. This unilateral 
empowerment does not obligate the offeror in the sense that the contract does, for she 
can always revoke the offer. Yet this unilateral empowerment must render the offeror 
liable in some sense. If the offeror were not liable in any sense, then the acceptance of the 
offer would effect no legal change between the parties. In other words, the offeree can 
accept the offer and legally obligate the offeror because the offeror gave him a legal power 
to conclude a contract. If the liability-power emerging from an offer were of a moral 
nature for example, the relationship maturing from the acceptance would also be moral, 
not legal. So the question arises: If not the will of the state or morality, what says offerors 
are bound to their offers? What is it that justifies the relation that determines that 
acceptance concludes a contract? My response is freedom to contract. 
Another	  reason	  for	  making	  the	  term	  “contract”, in the context of “freedom to contract,” 
mean the ability to contract liability in general is that there are various ways in which 
persons can obligate each other. 4.1.4.3 has shown various non-contractual voluntary 
transfers of rights, including the promise solvendi causa and the bequest. Moreover, Part 
5 determined the concept of unilateral promise so as to give adequate treatment to the 
many promises that private laws enforce, to their own detriment. These are acts whereby 
one person transfers a credit right to another who neither requested the right nor 
accepted it. Promise is not the only peaceful non-contractual interaction obligating parties 
in	  private	  law.	  Lawyers	  talk	  about	  “contracts	  of	  adhesion,”	  “relational	  contracts”	  and	  other	  
                                                        
497 As a matter of fact, the substantive term contractus developed from the term obligatio contracta, which 
meant the action of having contracted an obligation. Conf. Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1951,	   n°	   799,	   p.	   465:	   “The verb contrahere is old and was used both literally and 
metaphorically (Thes. L.L. iv. 757 ff., 764). If used metaphorically contrahere means as a rule (Voc. Iur. 
Rom.	   i.	   1001)	   ‘to	   effect’,	   ‘to	   perpetrate’,	   ‘to	   bring	   on	   oneself	   (admittere,	   commitere,	   constituere):	  
contrahere invidiam, offensionem, amicitiam, inimicitias, culpam, crimen, stuprum, incestum, aes 
alienum, societatem, nuptias, etc. Students must beware of believing that in common Latin usage 
contrahere	  meant	  primarily	  ‘to	  make	  a	  contract’.	  Even	  the	  classical	  lawyers	  used	  contrahere in the wide 
sense we have indicated. Some of the relevant texts are spurious, but when Gaius (Inst. 2. 14) said: 
‘Incorporales	  res	  sunt	  quae	  tangi	  non	  possunt	  qualia	  sunt...	  obligationes	  quoquo	  modo	  contractae’,	  he	  
certainly had in mind the obligations ex delicto as well as obligations	  arising	  ex	  contractu.”	  So	  contrahere 
obligatio referred to the action of contracting an obligation and one could contract an obligation either 




voluntary sources of liability that are contracts only by analogy. All these acts deserve 
further study and description. Yet they all seem to be reducible to a commutation of rights. 
Firstly, because one or two intelligences plan or ideate a future relationship, and secondly 
because the ideated relationship is about one party giving something to the other because 
the other has given, is giving or will give something else in return. And so we arrive at my 
point. The conditions under which a commutation could occur are, and cannot but be, 
established by an initiative act of confidence/tolerance. 498  Any kind of transfer 
presupposes that a party undertakes a commitment or discloses information for the 
purpose of making of a transaction and this initial act of trust is made in ignorance of 
whether the addressee in fact wants (or is interested in) the transaction. The most 
familiar example is probably the contractual offer. We must ground the first 
attribution/reception as the basis on which all private law transactions unfold. I think of 
freedom of contract as the worthwhile candidate. 
6.1.3.3. WE MUST CONCEIVE FREEDOM TO CONTRACT AS A PRIVATE LAW RELATION 
We must present freedom to contract liability in general as something like a relation of 
juridical freedom. It must be about the freedom of one to give something of her own to 
another, and this freedom must be correlated by something giving legal status to the fact 
that the receiver of the thing cannot but take it as his own, or acquire the unilaterally 
transferred entitlement. 
I now proceed to determine freedom of contract in what I suggest is the proper technical 
form. 
6.1.4. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AS A PRIVILEGE/NO-RIGHT RELATION 
Freedom of contract must appear as a privilege/no-right relation.499 This relationship 
means a	  person	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  peacefully	  alter	  another’s	  sphere	  of	  rights—i.e. by giving 
                                                        
498 Naturally, if contract is taken to mean the capacity to undertake liability, and every liability comes with 
a	  correlative	  “power,”	  contracting	  liability	  implies,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  imposing	  a	  power	  over	  another,	  or	  
choosing that another contracts a power. 
499 See the discussion of privilege and no-right relations in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,”	  in The Yale Law Journal, Vol 23, No 1, (1913), pp. 
16-59 at pp. 31-44, especially p. 36, where the author supports my determination. Now consider Pierre 
Schlag’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  power-liability relation:  
[The power–liability relation] pertain[s] to “control”	  over the alteration of legal relations. If A has a power vis-
à-vis B, then A upon satisfying certain specified conditions (“super-added facts”)	  can bring about a specified 
change	   (X)	   in	   their	   relations.	   In	   such	  a	   case,	  B	  has	   a	   liability	   in	   that	  B’s	   relations	  are	   susceptible	   to	  being	  
changed by A. 
Pierre Schlag, “How to Do Things with Hohfeld,” in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 78, No 185, 




him powers and personal rights—and no claim can be made against such peaceful 
alteration—like, for example, opposing injunctions. 500 
To illustrate, a person has the privilege to grant a promissory right to another and the 
promisee cannot neglect the transfer, and for example, ask the promisor for compensation 
for the disturbances caused by her unrequested promise. (Notice that the choice that are 
the objects	   of	   the	   privilege	   at	   stake	   have	   the	   efficacy	   of	   altering	   another’s	   sphere	   of	  
                                                        
in power-liability terms: persons have the power to alter the legal status of others by transferring them 
powers and rights and the others whose legal statuses have been altered have the liability to take the 
transferred powers and rights as things of their own. This might be why Kocourek claimed: 
Theoretically there is no difference between a power and a Privilege. 
Albert Kocourek, Jural Relations, MacMillan, Indianapolis, 1927, p. 24.  
500 Private laws institutionalize this capacity in diverse declarations. Freedom to contract can for example 
be	  read	  in	  Art.	  1124	  of	  the	  French	  Civil	  Code,	  which	  says:	  “Any	  person	  may	  contract,	  if	  he	  has	  not	  been	  
declared incapable	  before	  law.”  
Jurists give voice to freedom to contract when they talk	  about	  “capacity	  to	  contract”,	  “freedom	  to	  make	  
contracts”	  and	  “autonomy	  of	  the	  will.” 
Kant himself identifies this freedom in what he calls “innate	   freedom”	   or	   “the	   only	   original right 
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.”	  Kant	  suggests	  that	  “the	  principle	  of	  innate	  freedom	  
already	  involves”	  the	  authorization	  to	  do	  to	  others	  “such	  things	  as	  merely	  communicating	  his	  thoughts	  
to them, telling or promising them something”.	  Let	  me	  quote	  the	  entire	  paragraph: 
There is only one innate right 
Freedom (independence	   from	   being	   constrained	   by	   another’s	   choice),	   insofar	   as	   it	   can	   coexist	   with	   the	  
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man 
by virtue of his humanity.—This principle of innate freedom already involves the following authorizations, 
which are not really distinct from it (as if they were members of the division of some higher concept of a right): 
innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them: 
hence	  	  a	  human	  being’s	  quality	  of	  being	  his own master  (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond 
reproach (iusti), since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone; and finally, 
his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do 
not want to accept it—such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them 
something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere (veriloquium aut falsiloquium); 
for it is entirely up to them whether they want to believe him or not. 
The aim in introducing such a division within the system of natural right (insofar as it is concerned with innate 
right) is that when a dispute arises about an acquired right and the question comes up, on who does the burden 
of proof (onus probandi) fall, either about a controversial fact or, if this is settled, about a controversial right, 
someone who refuses to accept this obligation can appeal methodically to his innate right to freedom (which 
is now specified in its various relations), as if he were appealing to various bases for rights.  
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor translation, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996, 6:237-6:238, pp. 393-394. So, in Kant, the ability to alter others’ freedoms by 
communicating thoughts, promises and similar operative acts extends over the most foundational of all 
rights, that right to which we must recur whenever we have doubts about more concrete norms and 
doctrines. Kant is very conscious of the normative fact that the making of a promise to another alters the 
personality of the promisee without	  the	  promisee’s	  acquiescence. He is conscious that, in promise, the 
promisor chooses that the promisee acquire an un-chosen right. Kant nevertheless believes that such 
interference does not hinder the	  promisee’s	  freedom,	  even	  if	  the	  promisee	  does	  not assent. He defends 
this point by saying that the	  promisor	  does	  something	  “that	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  diminish	  what	  is”	  of	  the	  
promisee (Idem,	  6:238,	  p.	  394),	  that	  the	  promisee,	  like	  “every	  human	  being	  would	  necessarily	  accept	  
such a right (since he can always	  gain	  but	  never	  lose	  by	  it)”	  (Idem, 6:294, p. 441). We will come back to 




personal rights—I choose that, from now on, you have a credit right against me; a credit 
right which, as an extension of your personality, makes you responsible for its gains and 
possible contingencies).501 
Having established the legal basis for promise, it is now time to reproduce the question 
that gave place to the present investigation: If, as I am arguing, the basis on which 
someone can choose that another acquires a promissory right is freedom to contract 
obligations, why then is it that persons have the freedom or privilege to grant rights to 
others by their (unilateral) choice? Or, from the point of view of the entitled party, why is 
it that, in a world where every entitlement must be chosen, a person happens to acquire 
a right without having chosen it? 502 
6.1.4.1. THE ARGUMENT FROM EQUALITY: WE ALL HAVE THE SAME PRIVILEGE 
I begin with an argument from equality. My privilege of being able to put others in the 
condition of being my creditors is not a faculty that only I (Javier Habib) lay claim to. No. 
I can address others with acts that put them in the condition of owners of a performance 
of mine inasmuch as others can address me with such acts. Accordingly, freedom to 
                                                        
501 On the possible contingencies of personal rights—which are never inconvenient—see the case of the 
third party who uses the right of his debtor to satisfy his expectations in 6.1.4.2.1 in fine. 
502 The	  question	  addressed	  here	  is	  not	  “to	  what	  extent	  can	  one	  person	  obligate	  herself	  to	  another?”	  but	  “why	  
is	  it	  that	  one	  person	  can	  obligate	  herself	  to	  another?”	  Answers	  to	  the	  former	  question	  are	  dictums	  on	  the	  
object of contracts and promises, and have to do with matters like illicit and impossible agencies, usury, 
the things that are outside of commerce, the public order and a great deal of competition and consumer 
law. We have said something about these issues under the topic	  “right	  over	  our	  disposable	  freedom”	  (go	  
to 4.1.3.2(a), 4.1.4.3(a) and 5.2.1.2). Answers to the question I am addressing now have to do with the 
presupposition of the previous question. It has to do with the possibility of contract, promise, 
testaments, and every other practice where one party commences or perfects a transaction by imposing 
a power or a right on another. (See 6.1.4.3.) 
A moment of Hohfeld’s discussion of privileges will help me further illustrate this differentiation. 
Hohfeld quotes a paragraph	  of	  Holland’s	  Jurisprudence	  to	  later	  refine	  it	  with	  his	  analysis. He quotes: 
If ***the power of the State will protect him in so carrying out his wishes, and will compel such acts or 
forbearances on the part of other people as may be necessary in order that his wishes may be so carried out, 
then	  he	  has	  a	  ‘legal	  right’	  so	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  wishes. 
And then says: 
The first part of this passage suggests privileges, the middle part rights (or claims), and the last part privileges. 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” in 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol 23, No 1, (1913), pp. 16-59, at p. 34. In my view, we could say that the subject 
of Holland as refined by Hohfeld has the privilege of carrying out his wish of making offers and promises 
to others, and the other subjects in turn have no right to complain against those pacific interventions. At 
the same time, the subject has the right to compel others to forbear from acting in a way that may distort 
her disposable freedom. Having her disposable freedom as a right of her own, our subject can carry out 





contract obligations complies with the rule of equal freedom; it is something that you 
recognize in me inasmuch as I recognize it in you. This means that you could also decide 
that I am a creditor of yours.503 
6.1.4.2. A REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM OF CHOICE: I CANNOT CHOOSE NOT TO 
CHOOSE 
One could object to my argument as over formalistic, saying that with similar reasoning 
one could legalize whatsoever social practice. So, if you are able to entitle me with an 
unrequested right because I can do the same thing to you, and only because of this equal 
possibility, then, insofar as I grant you the same possibility, I could also deem myself 
entitled to unilaterally impute duties to you. We would have, through the same process, 
validated freedom to command. There is something missing in the validating process. One 
must take notice (the argument proceeds) of the fact that private law is not only about 
equality of choices but also about the choices that people actually choose. In order for 
someone to acquire a right, duty or whatever legally significant value, the acquirer must 
will it, choose the right or duty, make it part of himself or relinquish it with a volitional 
act. Not only the disposer but also the acquirer must actually want the disposition-
acquisition. Otherwise we contradict the principle of freedom of choice.504 
In the light of these considerations, hence, freedom to contract cannot stand after its being 
evaluated from the principle of freedom of choice. For, according to the claimed freedom, 
A can choose for B	  legal	  stances	   that	  B	  has	  not	  actually	  chosen,	  which	  undermines	  B’s	  
freedom of choice. 
Let us analyze this argument. 
In the act of acquisition there is one person who gains and there is another person who 
loses. Freedom of choice demands two things for the acquisition to be rightful. First 
condition: the person who loses in the act of acquisition must assent to the acquisition—
                                                        
503  “…[W]hatever	   one	   party	   asserts	   from	   this	   standpoint must be true of everyone else. And this is 
something that all who can so view themselves can also recognize in others. Therefore, the claims parties 
make in relation to each other must be absolutely the same. No one claims the right to place others under 
any obligation or constraint that others could not simply do vis-à-vis	  her."	  Peter	  Benson,	  “Misfeasance	  
as	  an	  Organizing	  Normative	  Idea	  in	  Private	  Law,”	  in	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Law	  Journal,	  60,	  (2010),	  pp.	  
731-798, p. 781. Later utilizing the same principle	   to	   justify	   the	   ability	   (or	   "rightful	   power”)	   to	  
appropriate	  res	  nullius	  with	  the	  consequent	  unconsented	  restriction	  on	  the	  other	  parties’	  normative	  
abilities. (Idem, at pp. 787-788.) 
504 I	  cannot	  but	  recall	  Plato’s	  remark	  on	  that	  justice	  is	  so	  necessary among man that even among thieves 
some conception of justice applies. Plato, Republic, G.M.A. Grube translation and C.D.C. Reeve revision, 




the loser must assent that the acquirer, rather than she herself, owns the acquired choice. 
Second condition: the person who gains in the act of acquisition must assent to the 
acquisition—the winner must choose to acquire. 
An acquisition would not comply with the first condition if the only person choosing the 
acquisition were the acquirer—the loser losing without choosing it. I would acquire a 
choice unilaterally, for example, in the act of occupation. When I acquire the choice to 
exclude others from doing things with a thing that had no owner, I reduce the choices of 
others. For example, they are no longer able to occupy the thing themselves. Occupation 
has a problem with the first condition (although not with the second), in that its perfection 
requires no consent from the persons who lose in the occupation. In contrast, the 
unilateral promise satisfies the first condition, for the only person who loses a choice in 
promise is the promisor, the person who voluntarily gives a choice to the acquirer. 
The unilateral promise has a problem with the second requirement. The promisee does 
not have time to choose the transferred choice. As a matter of fact, the choice chooses him. 
The promisee, as we have seen in 5.2.3.2(b), 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, acquires the promissory right 
by gaining awareness of it, by the time he had the possibility to consider whether he wants 
to keep the promissory right he already had it. So acquisition by reception plainly 
contradicts the second condition—the acquirer acquires a new choice of action without 
choosing it. 
Is this possible in private law? I claim that it must be! 
The argument is this: 
A private actor who wants to reserve the choice of whether she is to be considered entitled 
to a transferred entitlement is one who renounces the possibility of offer, promise and 
other private law interactions. Freedom to contract will arise as the legal relation that we 
must presuppose in order to render voluntary transactions possible in private law. 
If I were to say, in conformity with the alleged principle that every choice must be chosen, 
that in order for you to have the choice to choose you must choose that choice too, then I 
will also have to ask you whether I can ask you to choose. This puts as in an infinite 
regress.	  For	  if	  I	  ask	  you	  ‘Can	  I	  make	  you	  a	  promise?’	  I	  am	  asking you to choose. By asking 
you to choose, I am imposing on you the choice to choose. At some point, if we are to have 
the opportunity to meet each other in a voluntary transaction, one must be entitled to 
impose, as it were, on the other, the choice to choose. Otherwise we make the whole 




have the choice to choose. This is a requirement for voluntary transfers of any sort and in 
any time and space. I will come back to this in 6.1.4.3. 
(A) AND NOTHING CHANGES IF THE VALUE TRANSFERRED IS NOT A POWER BUT A RIGHT 
You may reply that it is not the same to receive an offer as a	  promise.	  When	  I	  ask	  you	  “Can	  
I	  make	  you	  a	  promise?”	  I	  am	  making	  you	  an	  offer,	  not	  a	  promise.	  Whereas offers transfer 
powers, promises (are intended to) transfer rights. We grant it that persons acquire 
“powers”	   to	   accept	   offers	   without	   choosing	   them	   but	   not	   that	   they	   acquire	   “rights”	  
without choosing them. 
Contra legem, the claim is made in various jurisdictions. 505  I want to argue that, ex 
principle, the claim, if it is well grounded, is sterile, at least as to my claim, which is that 
unilateral promises can transfer rights. 
Let me begin with the grounded version of the claim: 
Persons can transfer powers because powers are revocable at will. X can entitle Y with 
the choice to accept the offer because, until and unless X receives what X wants in 
exchange for what Y offers, X is not obligated in private law. Obligations or (what is the 
same) credit rights need reciprocation to be perfectly transferred. If this is the argument, 
then the claim is grounded. However it does not go against the claim that unilateral 
promises can transfer credit rights, for when the promisor gives the right to the promisee, 
the promisee immediately causes a right for the promisor (see 5.4.2). 
Let us move to the ungrounded version of the claim.  
One can transfer a power and not a right because a power is a different thing to a right.  
                                                        
505 I say contra legem because almost every jurisdiction has positive law enforcing unaccepted promises 
when made in consideration of something—be this thing a past favor, an un-chargeable debt or the 
chance to have something. For modern private laws see Part 2 and 4.3.3.2 (d.1.). In Roman law, there is 




I will reply that, if there is such difference,506 it is immaterial as to their transferability.507 
Power and right are, properly speaking, subjective powers, i.e. the ability to do something 
that	   one	   (sometimes	   called	   the	   “active	   subject”)	   has	   as	   against	   another	   (“passive	  
subject”).508 The specific difference between power and right is that the subjective power 
that	   is	   called	   “power”	   is	   revocable	   and	   the	   subjective	   power	   that	   is	   called	   “right”	   is	  
definitive or irrevocable. Whereas the ability that a creditor has (to claim contractual 
performance) as against a debtor is unqualified, the ability that the offeree has as against 
the offeror (to bind the contractual offeror to the offered contract) is qualified with the 
no-right of complaint in case of offer-revocation.509 What the promisee acquires is—qua 
                                                        
506 For if the power to accept the offer is the seed from which the right to a performance could mature, then 
it is fair to ask, is the seed less than the fruit? By the contractual offer, it is communis opinio, the offeror 
transfers a power to the offeree. This power will mature in a contractual right when the offeree accepts 
the offer. The offeror must add nothing else and the correlative duty will bind her. It suffices that the 
offeree	  accepts	  the	  offer.	  Isn’t	  this	  telling you that the power to accept the offer is in some sense, the 
same thing as the contractual right?  
Kant’s words in relation to the acquisition of the legate by the legatee are pertinent:  
When the will is opened he sees that he had already at that moment, before accepting the legacy, become 
richer than he was before, since he had acquired the exclusive authorization to accept and this is already an 
enriching circumstance. 
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ob. cit., at 6:366, p. 500 (italics omitted). 
507 With	  good	  reason	  Pugliati	  states	  that,	  “As	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see,	  that	  which	  will	  be	  said	  about	  the	  acquisition	  
of a right can worth for every subjective situation, this expression being intended as comprehensive of 
all specific entity that makes a determined subject a boss [capo] (juridical power, status,	  faculty,	  etc.).”	  
Salvatore	  Pugliatti,	  “Acquisto	  del	  diritto	  (teoria	  generale),”	  in	  Enciclopedia del Diritto,	  t.	  I,	  Giuffrè,	  1958,	  
Varese, p. 509. 
508 López	  de	  Zavalía	   teaches	   that;	   “The	  subjective	   right is a favorable juridical position. With that claim, 
within	  the	  genus	  “juridical	  position	  of	  a	  subject”	  it	  is	  marked	  the	  basic	  difference	  with	  the	  juridical	  duty,	  
which	  is	  an	  unfavorable	  position.”	  And	  this	  favorable	  position	  accepts	  different	  “positions	  of	  freedom”,	  
one is the right with a claim, other is the power, there are several. Derechos Reales, Zavalia, Buenos Aires, 
1989,	  t.	  1,	  §3,	  n.2,	  p.	  46	  and	  ss. 
509 Could somebody say that an offeror who sells the offered thing to a third party without revoking the first 
offer is acting licitly? 
It is difficult to find cases showing the practical significance of the power to accept an offer. For if an 
offeree notices that the offeror is disposing of what she offered him without revoking the offer, he will 
simply	  accept	  the	  offer	  and	  demand	  breach	  of	  a	  contract.	  He	  will	  not	  go	  to	  a	  court	  and	  say,	  “Look,	  the	  
offeror	  is	  breaching	  his	  liability	  to	  be	  put	  in	  a	  contract.”	  Notwithstanding, I found a case where the miss-
revocation of the offer is so peculiar that the legal significance of offers is made emerge. In Petterson v. 
Pattberg ((1928) 22 Ill. 248 N.Y. 86, 161 N.E. 428) the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff saying 
that he will reduce the debt in an amount of $780 if the plaintiff could pay him the 5 years installments 
all at once before	  March	  31.	  When	  the	  plaintiff	  knocked	  the	  defendant’s	  door	  and	  said that he has come 
to cancel the debt, the defendant said the plaintiff that he had sold the bond to a third party. The plaintiff 
claimed for the recovery of the $780, which was the money he had to lose by canceling the bond held 





power—as much a power as what the offeree in fact acquires. And on the other hand, 
promise is as much unilateral as is the contractual offer. Accordingly, like promises 
contractual offers effectuate unilateral transfers of powers.510 
My question is this, is it really the fact of their revocability that makes powers 
transferable? 
In my opinion what makes all powers transferable is that they are favorable positions. 
They stand in opposition to burdensome or unfavorable positions, which it should be 
noted, could come in rights too. This typically occurs where one acquires real rights, like 
the charge of maintaining an immovable object in conditions that do not create 
unreasonable	  risks	  to	  the	  adjacent	  property	  or	  the	  notorious	  “obligations propter rem.”511 
But unilateral promise, offer, bequest and every undertaking that transfers in personam 
rights and in personam powers (howsoever they are acquired), only adds to	  the	  acquirer’s	  
                                                        
The decision shows the practical significance of the power transferred by offers: Offerors can always 
revoke their offer; yet, they must mind that while the offer stands, its legal significance is such that 
acceptance could knock on their door, making them liable for what they offered.  
Still, the case could be articulated to make a stronger point. This point is that Pattberg contravened some 
sort of liability before he revoked the offer. Think of the case this way: Had Pattberg not transferred the 
bond to a third party he could have effectively revoked the offer. The offer of Pattberg to Petterson was 
one the acceptance of which consists in an act—the fact of transferring money hand to hand. It is 
immaterial	  that	  Petterson	  says	  to	  Pattberg,	  “Hey	  I	  want	  to	  pay	  you.” What Pattberg wanted was the act 
of receiving the 5 years installments. (Of course, one could argue that the acceptance of this offer 
involved some type of collaboration on the part of the offeror—receive the payment—and that it would 
be unreasonable to consider that an offeror could deny such collaboration after having made such offer. 
But let us say that) Pattberg revoked the offer at the time. If this is the case, then what made him liable? 
What made him liable was that he revoked the offer after having breached it. He should have revoked 
before selling the bond to the third party. In having transferred the bond to a third party, he contravened 
her liability to cancel the bond in exchange for the total payment of the debt offered to Petterson. 
510 Hohfeld	   makes	   an	   argument	   comparable	   to	   Langdell’s	   on	   the	   issue of revocable offers. See Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” The Yale 
Law Journal, Vol 23, No 1, (1913), pp. 16-59, at p. 49-54, especially 51. See the interesting commentary 
of Pierre Schlag, “How	  To	  Do	  Things	  with	  Hohfeld?...,”	  op. cit., p. 197. 
511  Propter rem obligations are the obligations that come with the thing that one happens to own. 
Tettenborn	  offers	  an	  example:	  “If	  A,	  a	  landowner,	  agrees	  with	  B,	  a	  neighbour,	  not	  to	  use	  his	  land	  in	  a	  
certain way (such as not to build on it) and then sells the land to C, C is in certain cases [namely when C 
had	   notice	   of	   the	   agreement	   or	   the	   agreement	   was	   registered]	   bound	   by	   the	   agreement.”	   A.	   M.	  
Tettenborn, An Introduction to the Law of Obligations, Butterworths, London, 1984, at 139 and note 2. 
There are propter rem obligations in all legal systems and they are particularly prominent in Scots law, 
under	  the	  name	  of	  the	  “affirmative	  real	  burden.”	  George	  Gretton,	  “Ownership and its Objects,” in RabelsZ 




capacity for choice.512 As Kant talked of the right to acquire a bequest, they are things that 
do not in themselves diminish what belongs to the acquirer.513 
The most invasive situation that could emerge from the possession of a credit right is 
where a creditor of the creditor decides to exercise the first	  creditor’s credit right through 
him. Some private laws grant this action when its exercise would provide the claimant 
with the means to satisfy his credit. We call it subrogatory because the creditor 
subrogates another creditor by choosing to exercise his right. (We also call it Paulian 
because it was the jurist Paulus who first determined the justice of this action). Even here, 
if	   the	   promisee’s	   creditor	   exercises	   the	   promissory	   right	   by	   the	   promisee,	   isn´t	   the	  
promisee freer than he was before? 
And if the position of the promisee were not objectively but subjectively unfavorable, as 
where he received the right reluctantly, he can not only always reject the right,514 but also 
ignore it. For, once again, they do not put burdens on creditors and they automatically 
perish with the passage of time (See 5.6.2.2.(c)). This is probably why much legislation 
has established	  the	  principle	  that	  “it	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  everybody	  wants	  that	  which	  
appears	  to	  be	  of	  advantage	  to	  him.”515 
                                                        
512 Planiol rightly points out that in the contractual obligation it is the will of the debtor that assumes the 
preponderant role:  
Quand	   l’obligation	   naît	   d’un	   contrat,	   c’est	   la	   volonté	   de	   celui	   qui	   s’oblige	   qui joue le role preponderant; 
l’obligation	  n’existe	  que	  dans	  la	  mesure	  aú	  il	  l’a	  consentie	  et	  acceptee.	  Par	  suite,	  sa	  capacité	  est	  une	  condition	  
nécessaire	  du	  contrat,	  car	  celui-ci,	  étant	  l’oeuvre	  des	  parties,	  ne	  peut	  étre	  valable	  et	  efficace	  que	  dans	  la	  mesure 
où	  la	  loi	  leur	  reconnaît	  la	  capacité de	  s’obliger. 
Marcel	   Planiol,	   “Clasification des sources des obligations,”	   in	   Revue critique de legislation et de 
jurisprudence, n. XXIII, Paris, (1904), pp. 224-237, at pp. 227-228. 
513 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics	  of	  Morals…, op. cit., 6:238, p. 394. 
514 The commentary to the unilateral promise provision of the Principles of European Contract Law says: 
Even though a promise does not require acceptance it may be rejected by the promisee. A rejection will destroy 
the promise 
Ole Lando and Beale, Hugh (ed), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2000, at 157. James Viscount Stair was probably the first author to make this 
argument:  
It is true, if he in whose favour they are made, accept not, they become void, not by the negative non—
acceptance, but by the contrary rejection. For as the will of the promisor constitutes a right in the other, so the 
other’s	  will,	  by	  renouncing	  and	  rejecting	  that	  right,	  voids	  it,	  and	  makes it return. 
The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, (D.M. Walker Ed.), Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1981, 
at 1.10.4. 
515 This principle appears in the Codex Maximilianus Bavaricus civilis (Part 3, Chapter 13, n. 1) and the Civil 
Code of Western Galicia (Part 3, nn. 380 and ss.). Quoted in Mayer-maly Mayer-Maly,	   “Divisio	  
Obligationum,”	  in	  The Irish Jurist, Dublin, (1966\1967), p. 384. We see a similar principle in Justinian 




6.1.4.3. A SYSTEMATIC NECESSITY: VOLUNTARY TRANSACTIONS NEED FREEDOM TO CONTRACT 
I have tried to argue that persons have the freedom to grant powers and rights to others. 
Here I will further support my claim by saying that voluntary transactions need freedom 
to contract. What do I mean? Let me develop. 
The standard idea of private law persons is that of individuals with rights over things and 
a freedom to act without damaging the things of others. You can do whatever you want 
with your body, in your land and with the things that other persons owe you, and you are 
free to do as much as you want insofar	  as	  you	  “do	  not	  harm	  the bodily integrity of others,”	  
“do	  not	  use	  other’s	  things”	  and	  “conserve	  and	  perform	  the	  credit	  that	  others	  have	  against	  
you.”	  Looking	  at	  this	  picture	  we	  can	  say	  that	  private	  law	  is	  about	  the	  lives of isolated wills. 
They act within the boundaries of their right and, when they act outside of their 
dominium, they do so without interfering with the life of others.  
However, the metaphor of the isolated wills is only partially true. Ask a person as simple 
a question as; “How	  did	  you	  acquire	  your	  house?”	  You	  will	  find	  out	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  
means that provided her with ownership over her house, these means were founded on 
an interaction, and the interaction began with one person interfering in the life of the 
other without asking for permission. If the thing came to her by contract, someone had to 
tolerate the offer, or the invitation to make an offer, or the invitation of the invitation to 
make	  the	  offer…	  and if the thing came to her by occupation, others, many others had to 
tolerate that the thing will be no longer be appropriable by them. Enquiring further, you 
will find that she probably promises things, makes testaments, in general acts upon others 
in ways that, regardless of their opinion, they tolerate. 
One can justify almost every practice with the argument of equality of burdens and 
dismiss almost every practice with the argument of lack of consent. One could say, using 
the equality argument, that one is free to impose duties on another because the other is 
also free to do such a thing; and one could say, using the consent argument, that one 
cannot offer things to others because contractual offers imply unilateral interventions in 
the spheres of entitlements of others. The scholar could very well abstract the ideas of 
equality and freedom of choice from the law where they appear and enter into the 
business of explicating their possible implications systematically. This is a noteworthy, 
                                                        
La auctoritas del tutor es necesaria en ciertos actos a los pupilos, y en otros no: por ejemplo, no es necesaria 
cuando estipulan que se les ha de dar alguna cosa, y es necesaria si los pupilos prometen a otros. Se ha 
establecido que pueden sin la auctoritas del tutor mejorar su condicion, aunque necesitan de aquella para 
hacerla peor. De donde se deduce que en aquellos casos de los cuales proceden obligaciones mutuas, como en 
compras, ventas, locaciones, madnatos y depositos, si no interviene la acutoritas del tutor, los que contratan 




indeed intrinsically philosophical practice, but it is not the work of the jurist. The pure 
form of private law appears to the jurist as determined in a complex of rules, concepts, 
principles, patterns of interpretation and institutions. However defeasible, these private 
law	  pieces	  form	  a	  robust	  order,	  an	  order	  where	  questions	  like	  “can	  persons impose duties 
on	  others	  unilaterally?”	  have	  clear-cut answers. In this order I faced the	  question	  “could	  
persons	   grant	   rights	   to	   others	   unilaterally?”	   Agreed,	   it	   is	   a	   difficult	   question.	   Very	  
authoritative jurists offer answers alternative to mine. Though I find them unconvincing, 
they have arguments to justify their position as well. I think the question ultimately is, 
whether the	   private	   law’s	   main	   doctrines	   and	   concepts	   would suffer a considerable 
change once we introduce the institutions I propose. I think I have already diluted this 
concern. I am of the opinion that if one denies the efficacy of promise on the grounds that 
it cannot be accepted, we must also deny the efficacy of the contractual offer (and the 
contractual offer is not the only case where a person appears to tolerate unilateral 
attributions).  
Certainly all the voluntary transactions presuppose a moment where one party speaks to 
another and the other listens—i.e. receives an entitlement. We need therefore to 
presuppose the privilege by which persons can impose powers and rights on others, and 
the no-right by which persons have nothing to say against these pacific interventions. 
Freedom to contract is, I believe, the only means with which we can explain private law 
relations as strictly bipolar interactions. 
6.2. WE ARE BOMBARDED WITH PROMISES: AN EVERYDAY FACT AND THE BEST 
PRIVATE LAW SOLUTION 
6.2.1. INTERESTED PROMISE, AN EVERYDAY FACT 
Granting that persons can transfer rights to others unilaterally, we move now to evaluate 
a very sensitive issue. This issue arises in the context of an everyday fact. The opinion by 
King, J., with Low, P. J., and Haning, J., in the American case Harris v. Time, Inc 516 vividly 
depicts the fact at stake: 
                                                        
516 Joshua Gnaizda received a letter from Time. The front of the envelope contained a window, which 
revealed a picture of a calculator watch and the following statement: "JOSHUA A. GNAIZDA, I'LL GIVE 
YOU THIS VERSATILE NEW CALCULATOR WATCH FREE Just for Opening this Envelope Before Feb. 15, 
1985." After—and only after—opening the envelope, the following additional clause was revealed: "AND 
MAILING THIS CERTIFICATE [for a subscription to Fortune Magazine] TODAY!" Joshua, having opened 
the envelope, demanded the calculator watch without mailing the subscription certificate, based on the 




For many, an unpleasant aspect of contemporary American life is returning to the sanctity 
of one's home each day and emptying the mailbox, only to be inundated with 
advertisements and solicitations. Some days, among all of the junk mail, one is fortunate 
to be able to locate a bill, let alone a letter from a friend or loved one. Insult is added to 
injury when one realizes that individual citizens must pay first class postage rates to send 
their mail, while junk mail, for reasons apparent only to Congress and the United States 
Postal Service, is sent at less one-half of that rate. The irritation level soars to new heights 
when, succumbing to the cleverness or ruse of the sender of junk mail and believing one 
is being offered something for nothing, one actually opens an envelope and examines its 
contents, both of which would otherwise been deposited unopened in their rightful place, 
the garbage can. Snake oil salesmen have been replaced by bulk rate advertisers whose 
wares must be causing our postal carriers' backs to be nearing the breaking point under 
the weight of such mail.517  
Everyone living in a contemporary capitalistic society can recognize very well the 
scenario depicted above. As a matter of fact, we are bombarded with firm offers, 
gratuitous promises and interested promises alike not only through our mailbox, but also 
by radio, T.V., email and mobile phones. This everyday fact is solid proof of the fact that 
companies garner an advantage by making interested promises. But it also shows the 
reverse of their gain—we must tolerate their inducing us to engage into their businesses. 
We, without deciding it, create the chances they are looking for. This is an issue of life in 
contemporary civil society, which deserves juridical evaluation. 
My scholarship offered a transactional explanation of interested promises. The promisor 
disposes a performance of hers, the promisee receives that performance, the reception of 
that performance induces him to produce a chance and, as the chance is the benefit sought 
by the promisor, the promisor enjoys that benefit. But Part 5 assumed	  that	  it	  is	  “okay”	  to	  
                                                        
for breach of contract. Time argued that there was no contract because the mere act of opening the 
envelope was valueless and therefore did not constitute consideration. The court nevertheless held that: 
The act at issue here—the opening of the envelope, with consequent exposure to Time's sales pitch—may 
have been relatively insignificant to the plaintiffs, but it was of great value to Time. At a time when our homes 
are bombarded daily by direct mail advertisements and solicitations, the name of the game for the advertiser 
or solicitor is to get the recipient to open the envelope [....] From Time's perspective, the opening of the 
envelope was "valuable consideration" in every sense of that phrase. 
As	  the	  commentator	  puts	  it	  “The	  court	  rejected	  this	  argument on the ground that Time had bargained 
for and received the chance that if Joshua opened the envelope,	   he	  would	   order	  Fortune”.	  Melvin	  A 
Eisenberg,	  “Probability and Chance in Contract Law,”	  in	  UCLA L. Rev., 45, (1997-1998), pp. 1005-1076 
at 1018 (italics omitted). The court nevertheless dismissed Joshua's suit on another ground—that 
Joshua could not maintain the suit as a class action, and his individual claim was barred by the de 
minimis principle. 
517 Opinion by King, J., with Low, P. J., and Haning, J., concurring in Harris v. Time, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal. App. 




cast the promisee as someone who is creating a right for the promisor. It assumed that 
the chance-creating act is an interaction whereby the owner of a thing (the bargaining 
mode of reasoning) creates a benefit for another person (the value of the chance), which 
benefit the promisor takes as her own thing (has the right to benefit from the chance). 
I could have offered other legal explanations. Joining the judges of the quoted opinion, I 
could have left the matter to classical private law. This is to say, conceived of the promise 
as an offer and, as there was neither acceptance nor consideration, dismissed the 
promisee’s	  demands	   for	   lack	  of	  a legal case. This would mean that private law simply 
permits the practice of making interested promises. The promise of one party amounts to 
a contract proposal (or junk email) and the expectations of the other party to a self-made 
(or illegitimate) expectation (or the act of someone who has been fooled, as one of the 
justices in Harris v. Time, Inc. puts it). 
Another possibility would be to prohibit the practice of making interested promises. The 
law	  could	  elaborate	  a	  norm	  saying	  something	  like	  “whoever	  makes	  an	  interested	  promise	  
is liable for X fine,”	  “or	  goes	  to	  jail.” 
If we neither prohibit nor simply permit the practice we could, as a third alternative, 
regulate	  the	  practice	  in	  some	  form.	  “It	  is	  okay	  that	  people	  make	  these	  promises.	  We	  will	  
not prohibit them, but we will not leave promisors to revoke	  their	  promises	  at	  will.”	  There 
are three natural courses of action. First, we could prescribe a tort remedy for the case of 
promise non-performance. Second, in an attempt to add some punitive spice, establish a 
punitive damage remedy. The last possible kind of regulation is the proposal of this PhD, 
which is to regulate interested promises as what they are—voluntary causes of 
obligations. 
This section seeks to evaluate the alternative explanations. The result will reinforce the 
conclusions of my investigation. The claim is that treating the interested promise as 
unilateral (enforceable) promises is the best possible private law rule. 
6.2.2. POSSIBLE LEGAL RESPONSES 
Private law should render interested promises enforceable by considering that the 
reception of the promise by the promisee induces him to cause the benefit the promisor 
sought when making the promise, and obtained with the promise. In other words, this has 
been the argument of Part 5. This section is dedicated to evaluating the alternative 
proposals, which are: 
First, the law should avert her eyes from the practice of making interested promises, or 




Second, the law should prohibit the practice of making interested promises.  
Third, the law should regulate the practice of making interested promises as a tort or as a 
cause of punitive damages. 
6.2.2.1. SHOULD THE LAW SIMPLY PERMIT THE PRACTICE OF MAKING INTERESTED PROMISES? 
What do I mean by simply permitting the practice of making interested promises? A 
conduct that is simply permitted by the law is a conduct whose social effects are irrelevant 
to	  the	  law.	  For	  example,	  Ann	  is	  Paul’s	  girlfriend.	  Ann	  cheats	  on Paul with his best friend. 
Paul gets upset and suffers. Has Paul a compensation claim? The answer of all private law 
would be: “No, he has no claim. Even if our morality condemns	  Ann’s	  deeds	  and	  Paul’s	  
grief	  could	  be	  translated	  into	  money,	  Ann’s	  deed	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  wrong, for Ann is (legally) 
free to have sex	  with	  others	  outside	  marriage.”	  Another	  example:	  Françoise	  owes	  ₣1.ooo	  
to Pier. The cause of the debt was a gambling contract. They made the contract and played 
the	  game	  in	  a	  private	  address.	  Pier	  claims	  his	  credit	  to	  Françoise	  at	  a	  court	  of	  justice.	  The 
judge, who judges in accordance with the 1804 Code Civil, dismisses the demand. The 
argument is this: Even if private gambling is tolerated (simply permitted) by the French 
Republic,	  the	  debts	  arising	  out	  of	  it	  cannot	  be	  claimed	  at	  a	  court,	  for	  the	  “reason”	  of	  these	  
contracts goes against the morality of the Civil Code.518 
Simply permitting the practice of making interested promises signifies that private law is 
and must be indifferent to whatever effect (chance-creation, expectations or reliance) the 
making of an interested promise may bring about.  
I want to argue that this thesis gives rise to injustice. 
True, the classical rule is very clear in that the proponents can revoke their proposals 
before acceptance. Hence, the promisee should know that involvement and investment in 
an interested promise is undertaken at his peril. Yet, the practice of making interested 
promises has gained currency in contemporary civil societies. The reasonable man seems 
to	  take	  “firm	  promises”	  not	  as	  revocable	  offers	  but	  as	  what they are, firm promises. That 
promisees have the certainty that the promise will stand seems to be confirmed by the 
fact that promisors make these promises. For the benefit that promisors get—the chance 
that a promisee does something they want—depends on the fact that promisees believe 
that the promise stands firmly.  
                                                        
























So the social effect of the interested promises is twofold: on the one hand, promisees have 
the assurance that the promise stands, and on the other hand, promisors obtain a chance 
that promisees do what they want.  
It is almost redundant to say that the cause of the latter social effect is the former. 
Promisors obtain the sought-for chance because promisees trust and have the assurance 
that the promise stands. So, if we were to ask, what is it that the promisor pays for having 
her	  “social	  effect?”	  We	  would	  respond:	  She	  pays	  what	  the	  promisee	  obtains,	  the assurance 
that	  a	  promise	  stands	   firmly,	   the	   “other	  social	  effect.”	  What	   the	  promisor	  pays	   for	  her	  
sought-for chance is what private law calls voluntary obligation. But if we were to ask, 
what is it that the promisee pays?	  If	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  promisor’s	  chance is the obligation to 
maintain	  the	  promise,	  then,	  what	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  promisee’s	  assurance?	  And	  I	  would	  say	  
that the cost for the promisee is twofold. First of all, the promisee has to tolerate an 
unrequested benefit. To express it vividly, she has to deal with the thrice-weekly fact of 
having to empty her mailbox of the several (maybe uninteresting) interested promises. 
Secondly, the promisee has to take notice of unrequested promises. Since the promisee is 
a diligent private law person, she must cultivate awareness of her daily mail, get to know 
what the promisor says to her, and thus receive the assurance.519 In sum, the promisee 
gains a possibly useful assurance but loses by having to tolerate and be aware of an 
unrequested promise. 
Now I can make my point. If private law simply permits the practice of making interested 
promises (as it does in its classical version), private law leaves space for the following 
injustice: 
The promisor obtains the chance and, having had the promisee tolerate and consider the 
unrequested promise, the promisor repents of having made the promise and uses her 
power of revocation. Again, this abuse is possible because the reasonable person takes 
“firm	  promises”	  as	  firm	  promises	  but	  the	  law	  takes	  “firm	  promises”	  as	  revocable offers. 
As a result, the promisor gained the benefit of the chance without suffering the obligation. 
Or, what is the same, the promisee had to tolerate and consider the unrequested proposal 
without gaining the right. This does not seem to be a simply licit interaction (See 
4.1.3.3.1). 
                                                        




Hence, simply permitting the practice of making interested promises leaves room for 
injustice. 
6.2.2.2. WOULD THE LAW BETTER PROHIBIT THE PRACTICE OF MAKING INTERESTED 
PROMISES? 
Simply permitting the practice of making interested promises creates the risk of an abuse. 
The law could avoid this risk by condemning the practice. This is to say, the law should 
criminalize the practice of making interested promises in order to deter promisors from 
deceiving consumers, contractors and persons in general. The law could say for example, 
“Whoever makes a promise intending to induce the promisee to do something she wants 
must pay a fine of $X.”	  From	  now	  on	  persons	  are	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  get	  benefits	  through	  
promises, for the law detected that with a promise, a person can get a benefit and avoid 
the	  benefit’s	  costs.	   
Let me evaluate the prohibition hypothesis: 
It is difficult to argue that the making of a promise is something intrinsically bad. The 
reason for which a law would prohibit this practice is the misuse of the institution of 
promise by badly intentioned persons. But the risk inherent in the institution of promise 
is comparable to the risk that comes with freedom itself. 
One could believe that murders occur due to the excessive exposure of persons. As 
persons have the freedom to meet in public places, freedom sets the stage for murders. 
We would be better banning public interactions. We will enact a law by which persons 
who go around public places will be liable for a public fine. Interactions will reach their 
minimal possible number and murders will be reduced. The absurdity is evident. 
A comparable absurdity would be reached by the act of prohibiting interested promises. 
6.2.2.3. SHOULD LAW REGULATE THEM AS PRIVATE LAW TORTS? 
Prohibiting the practice of making promises is an absurd thing to do. The law could, 
instead of prohibiting the practice of making interested promises, prohibit the practice of 
breaching interested promises. This seems reasonable. The crucial questions are these: 
Why are we to do that and what should be the measures taken in the event of a breach?  
The reason private law could prohibit the breach of a promise is that the promisee became 
the owner of the promised thing. From the moment he receives the promise, the promise 
becomes a thing of his own, like his body, house and other belongings. He has a right over 




the promisor is harming something of the promisee. So the promisor must repair the 
damaged thing. If this is how we explain why breaching a promise is wrong then we are 
making a juridical, private law-like explanation. It is wrong that the promisor breaches 
the promise because it harms something of the promisee. But then the question arises: 
What should be the measure for the damage? Having given the juridical explanation we 
cannot	   say:	   “The	   remedy	   should	   consist	   of all the expenditures that the promisee 
expended while relying on the promise, like his money, things and time.”	  Why	  can’t	  we?	  
Well, because in this case, the obligation would be correcting harm made not to the 
promised thing itself, which is the thing that the promisee acquired through the promise, 
but to other things of the promisee, namely her money, her things and her disposable 
freedom. If we want to protect the promise as an acquired interest or right, then we have 
to	  say	  that	  the	  breach	  of	  promise	  obligates	  the	  breaching	  person	  to	  perform	  the	  promise’s	  
content, namely to do what she must do so that the promisee has the promised 
performance performed or the monetary substitute. If we want to make the promisor 
liable	  for	  the	  promisee’s	  expenditures	  in	  reliance	  on	  the	  breached	  promise,	  we	  have	  to	  
explain why those expenditures were due to the misconduct of the promisor. We cannot 
say that the misconduct consisted in the breach of the promise, for as the protected 
interest is not the promise (but the things the promisee expended), the breach of the 
promise is not the illicit act. Unless we determine the causal connection between 
expenditures of the promisee and the wrong of the promisor, the disposition that the 
promisee made with his resources was not due to the materialization of an illicit act in 
private law perpetuated by the promisor—it was his own responsibility. 
(A) A CASE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES? 
The criticism made of the tort solution obviously applies to the punitive damages 
approach. Still, we can say some things about punitive damages specifically. Private law 
could, for example, establish that the non-performance of an interested promise renders 
the promisor liable for damages that equal the amount of money that she saved by 
breaching the promise. So, if a TV company preferred not to perform the promise to give 
the job of anchorman to the winner of a competition because it calculated that the coming 
TV show will be more successful if it is presented by a third well-known journalist, then 
the company must be liable to pay all the money it calculated the TV show will gain by 
employing the third party presenter to the promisee-winner of the challenge. 
Actors, consumers and people in general will feel satisfied by such a measure. I myself 
would feel so too. The ways in which companies utilize the private law to play with the 
expectations created by consumers cannot fail to astonish. But punitive damage is not a 




enriching him without a cause. What did the promisee do to accrue such an amount? The 
thing he lost after all was the opportunity to act in a TV show and perhaps achieve fame. 
But he did not lose the 25 million dollars the clever lawyer argued for in the case in my 
example. One could prevent the unjust enrichment by saying that the promisor must 
compensate the plaintiff to the measure of his impoverishment and pay the punitive 
damages to a union or association representative of the interests of the plaintiff qua class. 
In the example, part of the money would go to the winner of the competition and the larger 
amount to the	  association	  of	  performers.	  Cabral,	  Mariano,	  López	  Andina	  and	  I	  elaborated	  
this proposal in an essay addressed to Argentinian jurists.520  Yet, having considered it 
again, I must say that from the private law perspective, the proposal is inadequate. What 
explains the participation of the association? What did the defendant do to the association 
to grant it a right as against the defendant? One could venture explanations, certainly, but 
without these explanations one cannot see the connection between the association and 
the defendant, and therefore one cannot justify the claim of the association as against the 
defendant. 
6.2.3. PRIVATE LAW CAN GIVE TO INTERESTED PROMISES THEIR DUE 
6.2.3.1. A RESTATEMENT 
Ordering the interested promise as a voluntary transaction is the only reasonable 
solution. What is more, one has reasons to believe that that is the right or adequate 
approach. Indeed, Part 1 showed that the interested promises provide promisors with a 
benefit and that such benefit cannot but come from the promisees. In other words, we 
noticed that the interested promises themselves manifest a sort of commutation. Based on 
this reading, Part 5 dedicated itself to looking for a form of saying what was already 
implicit in the reality we called interested promises. True, the idea that the promisee 
possesses a bargaining mode of reasoning, that the reception of the promise induces him 
to put that reasoning into action, that such act produces a chance and that the promisor 
perceives the value of the chance as someone who acquires a right over the benefits of the 
thing of another, are perhaps strange and complicated ideas. It is merely a proposal. I will 
use this space to present my apologies to the reader for any lack of clarity during our 
exploration, and to open the floor to simpler ideas. 
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   competition	   “Guillermo	   Borda”	   of	   the	   XXI Jornadas 
Nacionales de Derecho Civil, Universidad de Lomas de Zamora, Buenos Aires, September 2007, arguing 





6.2.3.2. An offhand proposal against the abuse of freedom to contract 
I want to finish this investigation by suggesting a solution to the issue of unrequested 
unilateral promises. Responding to the first undesired unilateral promise received by A 
from B, A can communicate to B	  that	  he	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  receiving	  B’s	  promises.	  In	  the	  
event that B sends another promise to A, B is straying beyond her freedom to contract. 
What remedy should be implemented? I leave the reader with this thought. But let me add 
this: 
In a state private law, the solution could be systematized. I assume that there is an 
institution—like a register of persons—from which companies take the names and 
domicile of the persons they address with their promises. A very practical solution would 
be this. The default rule is that every person is open to receiving and tolerating the 
unilateral promises that other persons send them. However, this is only a default rule. 
Persons could inform the institutions that provide names and domiciles to promisors that 
they are no longer interested in receiving promiscuous promises. So, with a personal and 





SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
It is a fact that private law, that group of concepts and rules developed for the purpose of 
explaining and governing relations according to corrective justice, has suffered a crisis 
during the last century. New transactions appeared, and as private law tried to explain 
and govern them, its classical categories were deformed and its long-prized coherence 
was obscured. The method of jurists has largely been replaced by sociology and 
economics. But these alternatives put private law on a path to extinction. When it follows 
the methodology of sociology, private law finds that people want efficiency or some other 
value. But the idea of efficiency, or say, the value of the autonomy of the will, make private 
law issue regulations that cannot be explained in the context of its classical rules, concepts 
and institutions. My doctoral dissertation is an effort to support private law’s	  
continuance. It proposes a method for explaining and governing new transactions in 
accordance with classical private law. 
These pages have been written to restate that the method works. Section 1 outlines the 
conclusions of Parts 2 and 3—namely, it explains how the application of the classical 
categories to a new type of case deformed the classical categories. Section 2 outlines the 
conclusions of parts 1, 4, 5 and 6—it demonstrates that the type of case that deformed 
private law during the last century can be explained and regulated in a way that looks and 
behaves like a classical private law category. Section 3 concludes this dissertation. It does 
so by suggesting that the incorporation of the new category will allow private law to 
reorganize itself and restore its classical categories to past health. 
SCF.1. THE LAW ON PROMISES: AN EXAMPLE OF THE CRISIS 
The revocation of unaccepted promises is an instance of a case that private law wanted 
to,	  but	  couldn’t,	  effectively	  address	  with	  its	  classical	  categories.	  Some	  private	  law	  used	  the	  
concept of contract to enforce revoked promises (that had never been accepted). English 
private law worked this way. To do so, common law had to treat promises as offers, and 
elaborate fictitious acceptances. The problem for contract law was that, as the fictitious 
acceptances	  were	  not	  fictitious	  acceptances	  of	  irrevocable	  promises,	  but	  rather	  of	  “offers,”	  
the fictitious acceptances became applicable to all sorts of offers, including true offers! 
The problem matures so that English contract law renders true offers of (generally 
unilateral) contracts enforceable before acceptance. Contract law is thus deformed—it is 
no longer about agreed-upon exchanges of rights. 
At other times private law chose to grant promisees remedies to cure damages caused by 




private law. Before the reliance arrangement, the Code Civil masterfully divided acts that 
cause obligation from acts of freedom. As the Code saw no cause or reason to bind the 
promisor to an unaccepted promise, promise in the Code Civil was a simply licit act, like 
an invitation to make a contract, go to the theater, or a love relation; things that people do 
without assuming legal obligations. To grant relief for the detriment caused by the 
revocation of a firm promise, French private law had to give some value to the 
expectations produced by promises. The question then arises, why is it that only reliance 
on a promise gives the right to a reliance remedy, and not reliance on a love declaration, 
a theater invitation, or a pre-contractual conversation? In French private law, it is no 
longer clear which act puts a person under an obligation, and which does not. The 
freedom/obligation division is blurred. 
The third most popular legal response to the need for unaccepted promises to be 
enforceable has been the enactment of provisions that render promises enforceable ex 
sempliciter. Germany pioneered this solution, and the Principles of European Contract 
Law generalized it. According to section 657 of the German Civil Code, a person who 
performs an activity requested in a promise of reward is entitled to the reward, even if 
she performed the activity in ignorance of the promise. According to article 2:107 of the 
PECL,	  not	  only	  is	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  reward	  enforceable,	  but	  also	  “a	  promise,”	  in	  general,	  
every	  promise	  “which	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  legally	  binding	  without	  acceptance,	  is	  binding.”	  
The social demand is covered, especially with the latter norm—but at the expense of the 
coherence of the whole private law. Indeed, these norms stand in manifest incoherence 
with the idea of private law. Section 657 of the BGB shows ample disregard for the 
relational aspect of the causes of obligation. If the creditor of a contractual obligation has 
to know of and accept the credit to be able to demand expectation damages from the 
debtor, how can someone who never knew of the promised reward (who never 
engendered expectations) be entitled to demand expectation damages from the 
promisor?	   The	   PECL’s	   article	   disregards	   the	   characteristic	   reciprocity	   of	   all	   causes	   of	  
obligation. The problem now is that since these institutions cannot be explained in light 
of traditional private law characteristics, we need different explanations, like the doctrine 
of the autonomy of the will, or the popular ideas of efficiency. As we have seen, these 
explanations tend to overwhelm private law, and confuse its character. 
SCF.2. CONTINUING PRIVATE LAW: A NEW CAUSE OF OBLIGATION 
The method I have chosen to explain and regulate interested promises is neither that of 
the economists, nor of the moralists. The method I have sought to apply is, I believe, the 




The first step consisted of looking at promissory cases predisposed to seeing traces of the 
juridical. The reality of promise-making is wide and varied, including episodes as diverse 
as promises to gods, lovers, family members, friends, relative strangers, and business 
people. Only the two latter contexts showed juridically interesting cases. The promise of 
a reward, contract, and fake gratuitous promises were the best examples. These promises 
are juridically interesting because, as I learned from sociological investigations, 
promisors	  make	  these	  promises	  to	  obtain	  what	  has	  been	  called	  “the	  value	  of	  a	  chance.”	  
Promisors assure promisees that they can count on the right to a reward, contract, or gift, 
because such assurances increase the likelihood that the promisees will do something the 
promisors want—like look for something they have lost, or decide to enter into a contract 
with them, or become consumers of their products. 
The next step consisted of characterizing the unprecedented case. It is certainly unjust if 
a promisor makes this sort of promise to the promisee, the promisee creates the value 
sought by the promisor, but the promisor then revokes the promise without liability as 
against the promisee. If this is a licit scenario, then the promisor has acquired the chance 
without paying its cost—the assurance to the promisee that he can count on the promise. 
On the other hand, the promisee received a promise that he never requested, created the 
possibility of acting as the promisor wanted, and then finds out that the promise was a 
mere declaration of intention. It is clear to me that the legal concept for promise is like 
those that private law uses to correct injustice. The task for me, accordingly, consisted of 
writing about juridically interesting promises in such a way that the reader could read a 
new cause for private law liability, a concept structured like the contract, tort, and unjust 
enrichment, and presented with names that make it sound legal. 
Thus, I applied myself to juridical construction—to determine promise as a new cause of 
obligation.	  As	  all	  causes	  of	  obligations,	  the	  “unilateral	  promise”	  presupposes	  two	  persons	  
owning things: the promisor, who owns a right over freedom to dispose and the promisee, 
who has a right over a bargaining mode of reasoning. As the voluntary cases of obligation, 
the unilateral promise is an interaction where two parties exchange their things: The 
promisor promises a (piece of freedom or) performance that the promisee receives as a 
credit right, and the promisee puts his reasoning into action, producing the chance that 
the promisor wants. The promisor perceives the benefit of this chance as someone who 
acquires a right over the fruits of the thing of another. The unilateral promise perfects an 
exchange	  of	  a	  “promissory	  right”	  for	  “a	  right	  over	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  chance.” 
If the systematic concept of contract is composed of the sub-concepts	   of	   “offer,”	  
“acceptance”	  and	  “consideration;”	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  tort	  is	  composed	  of	  the	  sub-concepts 




“enrichment,”	  “impoverishment,”	  and	  “lack	  of	  cause,”	  what	  are the components of the new 
systematic concept? I elaborated unilateral promise as a concept composed	  of	  “promise,”	  
“reception,”	  “chance	  causation,”	  and	  “chance	  perception.”	  An	  exchange	  of	  a	  promissory	  
obligation for a chance takes place when the promisor makes a promise, the promisee 
receives the promise, the reception of the promise induces the promisee to cause a chance 
and the promisor perceives the benefit of the chance. Part 5 concluded by showing that the 
unilateral promise does not occupy the field of application of the other causes of the 
obligation. 
Two sensitive questions arise. First, why should the promisee tolerate another granting 
him a right that he neither requested nor accepted? The answer to this question lies in 
“freedom	  to	  contract	  obligations.”	  The	  promisee,	  as	   the	  promisor,	  owes	  every	  possible	  
promisor the non-right to oppose against pacific interventions like offers, promises, and 
other conferral acts. Critics, if they wish to avoid neglecting the legal possibility not only 
of promise, but also of contract, must accept that by this freedom or privilege, persons can 
impose entitlements on non-accepting parties. Okay, but how can it be right that an 
interested promisor not only imposes a right on someone who neither requests nor 
accepts it, but also acquires something from him, the alleged value of a chance? This is a 
truly sensitive question. My proposal is that, given the absurdity (it is a crime to make 
interested promises) or impropriety (punitive damages) of alternative regulations, the 
concept of unilateral promise emerges as the best possible solution. To prevent abuses of 
the freedom to contract obligations, I propose that institutionalized private law could 
establish a register where every person who did not want to receive promiscuous offers 
and promises could put her name. Before making their public offers or promises, 
companies would have to check that they were not addressing someone who did not want 
to be addressed. 
SCF.3. THE UNILATERAL PROMISE: SOME PROBLEMS SOLVED 
National private laws have tried to fill the need of a legal solution to promissory cases 
with problematic arrangements. Part 2 showed how the figure of the collateral contract, 
the reliance theory and the doctrine of the obligationes ex lege have corrupted juridical 
interpretations of, respectively, English contract law, the French law of obligations and 
German private law. The unilateral promise not only promises to tackle the legally 
interesting promises without occupying the field of application of the classical categories 
but also to act as a purge of deforming arrangements. This is to say, if the state private 
laws incorporate the concept of unilateral promise, they will have means to deal with 
interested promises without having to use the double contract analysis, the reliance 




sense, they will become automatically abrogated. The classical private law concepts and 
divisions will recover their healthy form.  
Let me conclude in a technical fashion. Given that, as shown in 2.2.1, courts have implied 
acceptances and illusory promises in order to enforce interested promises as contracts, 
and that, as explained in 2.2.3, these arrangements deform contract law, and that, as 
proven in parts 4, 5 and 6, it is possible to construe interested promises as a sui generis 
voluntary cause of obligation, then it follows as a corollary that instituting unilateral 
promises in private law would heal contract law; for (and this is mere redundancy) 
instituting unilateral promise in private law will render some of the inimical contract law 
fictions futile, automatically abrogating them. 
Furthermore, given that, as shown in 2.3.1, courts apply reliance theory to give promisees 
remedies to cure damages caused by the undue revocation of promises, and as explained 
in 2.3.3, reliance arrangements blur the just division between acts of freedom and causes 
of obligation, and as proven in part 5, unilateral promise serves to enforce promises that 
bring benefit to the promisors and only those promises, then it follows as a corollary that 
the private law that institutes unilateral promise will reemphasize the blurred division 
between freedom and obligation; for (and this is mere redundancy) unilateral promise 
will serve to govern many of the cases that today are governed by reliance arrangements. 
Finally, given that, as shown in 2.4.1, parliaments enact norms by which simple offers and 
unnoticed promises create voluntary obligation, and, as explained in 2.4.3, these dicta and 
the considerations supporting them enter the legal system to confuse the form of private 
law, and, as seen in part 5, unilateral promise orders promises in accordance with 
corrective justice, then it follows as a corollary that a private law that recognizes 
unilateral promise will accentuate the form of private law; for (this is mere redundancy) 
a new juridical category will shine along with contract, tort, and unjust enrichment, and 
various spurious dicta and considerations will become otiose and henceforth 
automatically abrogated. 
In short, instituting the unilateral promise in a corrupted private law produces an 
automatic	  reorganization,	  by	  which	  each	  of	  the	  system’s	  components	  reacquires	  its	  just	  
and healthy form. Private law hence purges many of its deforming decisions. 
SCF.4. FINAL REMARKS: TOPICS OF INTEREST FOR THE 21TH CENTURY JURIST 
My PhD applied to promises a method which I think could be applied to all cases that 
private law governs to its own detriment. I want to finish this work by suggesting three 




S.C.F.4.1. OVERGROWN PERSONALITIES 
Inequality is not only an issue of public concern, but also the source of many private law 
issues. Laws imposing uses on property and limitations to freedom of contract have 
arguably been issued to palliate some of the sad effects of inequality. These laws go to the 
heart of private law. Dominum is no longer the right by which a person puts a thing to the 
use she best likes, and contract no longer the instrument that persons articulate to 
exchange things in the way they best want; hence, the crisis of property and contract law. 
Has the methodology of private law something to say to these issues? 
There are some things that private law simply cannot say. Private law cannot say that 
whoever owns Y sort of thing and does not use it in X sort of way will have to use it in X 
sort of way. Neither can private law say, if there is one person with seven and six persons 
with zero, the person with seven will have to give one to each of the six who have zero. 
No! Private law is not about distributive justice, it cannot be about distributing uses to 
things, or things to persons. Private law is about equal freedom. The private law solution 
to the problem of inequality lies in something that private laws have forgotten to do: 
regulating the authorization by which persons can obligate others to stay away from the 
things they appropriate, and the freedom that persons dispose as future assets through 
contracts and promises. 
I will make three brief notes. First, I will argue that private law cannot but regulate the 
authorization to acquire property, and the right over disposable freedom. Second, I will 
offer a suggestion on how private law could regulate the authorization to acquire 
property.521 Finally I will offer a prognosis: In implementing this necessary regulation, 
private law would solve the issue of inequality while purging many of its corrupting laws. 
In law, everything begins with an entitlement, be it given by another in reciprocation (as 
we private lawyers like to say),522 or by an authority in attribution (as a public lawyer 
would argue). 523  Romans	   liked	   to	   say,	   “to	   each	   his	   own.”	   If	   everything	   begins	   with	  
something of your own, then your capacity to acquire property, and your capacity to 
dispose your future performances through contracts, must be your own, too. Yet, 
something of your own must be in some way determinable. You cannot have some diffuse 
thing	  as	  your	  own.	  Hence,	  the	  saying	  “persons	  can	  extend	  themselves	  unlimitedly”	  cannot	  
be a saying in law. For no legal authorization can be devoid of limits. Neither can law take 
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522 See Introductory Part.1.1. 




as proper the saying	  of	  the	  merchants,	  that	  “what	  matters	  is	  not	  what	  one	  has,	  but	  what	  
others	  believe	  one	  has.”	  Merchants	  can	  conceive	  of	  “credit”	  in	  such	  a	  way;	  but	  private	  law	  
cannot. So, the extension that you can make yours by appropriation, and the freedom that 
you can exchange through contracts, must be limited, too. Otherwise, there are no things 
you could be authorized to acquire, nor could you have something to promise in exchange 
for other things. 
There have always been things that persons cannot acquire. Recall the idea of res 
sacrae,524 things whose spiritual value puts them outside of the commerce of men. Or even 
better, the idea of the res communes omnia,525 those things so important for the life of all 
that they cannot be subject to the exclusive will of one. These laws regulate things—
namely, classify a number of things as unsusceptible to ownership. The regulation that we 
must elaborate targets the authorization to acquire (acquirable) things. Private law has 
never done that. How can it be done? To start with, there is the universal authorization by 
which I have the capacity to make un-owned things mine. The exercise of this capacity 
grants me a real right over a thing, which you must recognize and respect. But the capacity 
itself has content. In other words, the un-owned things I can make mine are not unlimited. 
I imagine this content as a determinable extension that is freed to the person who has not 
occupied her own. This authorization is something like a negative right. Something that I 
own to the exclusion of others, a place that you cannot occupy without occupying what is 
freed for me. A place, I think, banned to those who have already occupied their own freed 
places. 
Today, it seems to me that if we had to draw those regions, we would find ourselves 
wanting. For the few have already occupied places that should be freed for the many. In 
such a scenario, where someone has occupied the freed space of another there is an illicit 
act: someone (the overgrown personality) is beyond her right limits and in the freed space 
of another (call it, the slimmed person). If a slimned person were to come to an overgrown 
person	  and	  say,	  “Look,	  you	  are	  occupying	  too	  much,	  I	  still	  own	  space	  for	  extending	  myself	  
and	  I	  want	  this	  space	  to	  be	  freed,”	  one would not be demanding redistribution. I would 
not	  be	  demanding	  that	  you	  give	  to	  me	  from	  what	  is	  yours.	  I	  would	  just	  be	  saying,	  “Look,	  
you have your feet on land that I should occupy. Please, leave this place. Not because your 
leaving will be followed by my arrival, but simply because you should not be standing 
there.	  What	  I	  do	  when	  you	  leave	  is	  for	  me	  to	  decide.”	  The	  Internet	  could	  be	  the	  platform	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where	  the	  measure	  of	  each	  one’s	  own	  capacity	  of	  acquisition	  could	  be	  actualized,	  and	  the	  
extension of each one’s	  own	  freed	  spaces	  registered.526 
What would the impact of such a regulation be? In the early twentieth century, laws were 
passed to demand that owners rent out their empty properties, or use their unused rural 
lands.527 One could be tempted to propose similar laws today. But these laws deform 
private law. According to property law, I am the owner of my land in the sense that I am 
the only one enabled to decide what purpose it will serve. No one can tell me what to do 
with my apartment. If I want it to serve no purpose at all, that is my right. I cannot be 
obligated to rent it. But then problems emerge. The problems emerge (my intuition tells 
me) because of overgrown personalities. There are private law persons who need low-
cost rentals because they have no home. And they have no home because overgrown 
personalities have more than ten. If the overgrown had to shrink her person to a size of 
entitlement that is comparable with that of the rest of her equals, then she, like all private 
law persons, will be able to do as she wishes with her two or three apartments. 
The same can be said of rural properties. The need to demand the use of rural land, to tax 
revenues, and to regulate prices is due (I have the intuition) to the fact that some 
landowners own disproportionate tracts of land. If they owned smaller amounts, their 
deciding	  not	  to	  put	  their	  land	  to	  work	  for	  a	  season	  would	  not	  alter	  the	  life	  of	  the	  town’s	  
peasants, and their deciding to work it to its maximum capacity would not bring them 
revenues far greater than those of their fellow private law personas and, finally, their 
deciding not to sell or oversell would not by itself determine the price of a good. If each 
had a measure that was more or less comparable with what other private law persons 
could have, there would probably be no need of rural law, income taxes, or price 
regulation. Thus the law of property would readopt its original form; the right by which a 
person puts a thing to the use she best likes. 
S.C.F.4.2. INTELLECTUAL THINGS AS RES COMMUNES OMNIUM 
Sometimes law tries to give expression to class interests without success. Today we see 
desperate attempts to determine technical and scientific discoveries as objects 
                                                        
526 So if I discover a new continent, I extend	  each	  one’s	  own	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  of	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  There	  is	  a	  new	  vast 
inhabited land; we are the same number of persons; our capacity of acquisition should be actualized. If 
before of the discovery I was a fit private law persona, someone who has acquired more or less all what 
he is allowed to, I will obviously have more space to extend myself. Yet again, I can occupy territory so 
long as my occupation does not prevent others from occupying their new freed spaces. 
527 See the theoretical foundations of such laws in the excellent works by Léon	  Duguit,	  Les Transformations 
générales	   du	   droit	   privé	   depuis	   le	   Code	   Napoléon,	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   Alcan,	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susceptible to ownership—so-called	   “intellectual	   property	   rights.”	   But	   the	  
reproducibility and volatility of these things make them inadequate for such technical 
determination. No matter how much you try, you will never make a table with water in its 
liquid state. These matters seem to resist the form law wants to impose on them. It is a 
case	  of	  what	  Radbruch	  calls	  “the	  determination	  of	  the	  form	  by	  the	  matter,”	  where	  a	  matter	  
appears to have only one possible legal solution.528 The intellectual things seem to be 
more like res communes omnium in	  Grotius’s	  sense—things whose nature makes them of 
communal use.529 
S.C.F.4.3. NETWORKS 
What about networks? The fact that I have entered into a relationship with you, relates 
me to parties with whom I have never related myself. Can we apply the rule of reciprocity 
to web relations? I have done something to your benefit. Because we belong to the same 
network, I acquire a credit and you acquire a debt. The credit I have acquired compensates 
for debts I might have acquired from others, and you will eventually have to extinguish 
your debt by benefiting me or another member of the network. If some members of the 
network grow unreasonably large, if two of us have far too many credits in comparison 
with the rest, what we have to do is seek proportionality, we need to benefit the 
impoverished members of the network. Again, the Internet could serve as the platform 
for regulating the balances. 
The credits and debts one may have against other participants of the network cannot be 
regulated as credits and debts under the law of obligations for the reason that network 
debts are payable not only to the party that contributed to its cause, but also to every 
other member of the network. This does not mean that networks should be outside 
private law. As I have argued in 4.2, private law can open new branches. 
S.C.F.4.4. LAST WORDS 
“The	  class	  of	  jurists	  is	  in	  decline.”530 This is true, but there is a way to reverse that fall. My 
proposal is to continue private law, to correct past mistakes with adequate private law, 
                                                        
528  I take the expression from the great Gustav Radbruch,	   Filosofía	   del	   Derecho,	   3ª	   ed., José	   Medina	  
Echeverría translation,	  Reus,	  Madrid,	  ¿2007?, pp. 48-49 and 261, where he relates the idea to Eugen 
Huber. 
529 The use by Grotius of the idea of res communes Omnia (in Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, 
translated by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, New York: Oxford University Press, 1916, Chapter 5) is 
different from the use made by Tribonian et al. (Justinian, Institutes, 2.1.1.) 
530 “Il	  ceto	  dei	  giuristi	  è	  in	  decline;	  e	  la	  giurisprudenza,	  classicamente	  intesa	  quale	  scienza giuridica (iuris 




and to extend private law over new, unexplored realities. There is plenty of work to do, 
and I see this vacuum as an opportunity. We have the opportunity to exploit thoroughly 
virgin fields with extremely powerful and suggestive know-how. We must make just 
private law.531 This is the time to do it. This is especially so since the last living private law 
is still visible. Many lawyers still believe that contract is a commutation of subjective 
rights, that tort obligations are for correcting wrongful harm, that persons cannot enrich 
themselves	   at	   another’s	   expense,	   that	   persons are equally free beings, not things 
susceptible to exploitation. It will be much more difficult to convince a generation raised 
and educated in a society where the right signifies wealth-maximizing behavior of the 
value of the practice I have tried to demonstrate in this work. We still live in an age where 
arguments based on equality still have an appeal. Hence, if I may paraphrase a private law 
modernizer, the vocation for our time is to make the voice of justice sound again. For what 
would a jurist say, if not what best accords with justice? 
                                                        
che	  dalla	  creazione	  della	  regola	  generale	  e	  astratta	  conduce	  alla	  sentenza	  decisoria	  del	  caso	  concreto.”	  
Vincenti, Umberto, Diritto	  senza	  identità:	  La	  crisi	  delle	  categorie	  giuridiche	  tradizionali, Laterza, Lecce, 
2007, p. 153. 
531 There are contemporary examples of conceptual jurisprudence. See the inspiring article by George 
Gretton,	  “Ownership	  and	  its	  Objects:	  Back	  to	  the	  pandectists?,”	  in	  RabelsZ Bd., 71, (2007) pp. 802-851. 
What	  is	  more,	  academic	  journals	  have	  appeared	  to	  “far	  leva	  su	  detto	  patrimonio	  di	  dottrina	  e	  di	  pratica	  
per	  mettere	  a	  fuoco	  i	  problemi	  epocali	  che	  sono	  venuti	  maturando	  nella	  società	  contemporanea	  e	  che 
hanno contribuito a modificare tradizionali concezioni del diritto, insieme con gli stessi fondamenti di 
questo. Riteniamo che sia giunto il momento di tentare una riorganizzazione di questo articolato insieme 
di	   conoscenze	   e	   di	   esperienze	   all’interno	   di un quadro teorico adeguato. Si tratta di un obiettivo 
certamente	  ambizioso,	  il	  cui	  conseguimento	  appare,	  comunque,	  lo	  strumento	  più	  idoneo	  per	  conservare	  
alle	  facoltà	  giuridiche,	  e	  quindi	  alle	  Università,	  quel	  ruolo	  scientifico	  trainante	  di	  cui	  sono	  depositarie, 
evitando	  di	  cadere	  in	  un	  empirismo	  dominato	  da	  una	  pratica	  senza	  orizzonti.”	  These	  are	  the	  opening	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